ML19259A641

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Forwards Review of Systematic Evaluation Program Safety Topic V-11.A, Requirements for Isolation of High & Low Pressure Sys. Requests Verification of Correctness of Data by 790129
ML19259A641
Person / Time
Site: La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date: 12/21/1978
From: Ziemann D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Linder F
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
References
NUDOCS 7901080362
Download: ML19259A641 (7)


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December 21, 1978 Docket No. 50-409 Mr. Frank Linder General Manager Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue, South La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601

Dear Mr. Linder:

RE: VERIFICATION OF PLANT INFORMATION ON SEP TOPIC V-ll.A,

" REQUIREMENTS FOR ISOLATION OF HIGH AND LOW PRESSURE SYSTEMS" Our initial review of SEP Safety Topic V-ll.A has been completed. The enclosed table presents docketed information on reactor coolant system interfaces with low pressure systems. Also included is plant information obtained during our recent safe shutdown review of your facility.

Only systems that had direct interfaces with the primary system were considered. These were the water cleanup systems, the ECCS, the sampiing systems, and the RHR systems. High pres w e systems connected to the primary system that indirectly interfaced with a low pressure system (i.e., service water or component cooling through a heat exchanger) were not considered. Systems designed to operate at high pressure were also not included (i.e., BWR isolation condenser) except for the high pressure RHR system on several BWRs, which were included for completeness.

For PWRs the seal injection system was included because it was identified in a memo from E. G. Case to R. F. Fraley (Ref. 1) as having the potential to inadvertently overpressurize the water makeup tank. For BWRs the reactor vessel head spray cooling system was included because the potential for overpressurizing the condensate storage tank, if not properly vented, may exist.

790108036>>

. Mr. Frank Linder

-2 December 21, 1978 Isolation requirements for the ECCS system injection lines as stated in Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.3 are listed below:

(1) One or more check valves in series with a normally closed motor-operated valve. The motor-operated valfe is to be opened upon receipt of a safety injection signal once the reactor coolant pressure has decreased below the ECCS design pressure.

(2) Three check valves in series.

(3) Two check valves in series, provided that there are design provisions to pemit periodic testing of the check valves for leak tightness and the testing is performed at least annually.

The isolation requirements for the RHR system as stated in Branch Technical Position BTP-RSB 5-1 are listed below:

(1) The followin, shall be provided in the suction side of the RHR system to isolate it from the RCS.

(a) Isolation shall be provided by at least two power-operated valves in series. The valve positions shall be indicated in the control room.

(b) The valves shall have independent diverse interlocks to prevent the valves from being opened unless the RCS pressure is below the PHR system design pressure. Failure of a power supply shall ut cause any valve to change positions.

(c) The valves shall have independent diverse interlocks to protect against one or both valves being open during an RCS increase above the design pressure of the RHR system.

(2) One of the following shall be provided on the discharge side of the RHR system to isolate it from the RCS:

(a) The valves, position indicators, and interlocks described in item 1(a) - (c),

(b) One or more check valves in series with a normally closed power-operated valve. The power-operated valve position shall be indicated in the control room.

If the RHR discharge line is used for an ECCS function the power-operated valve is to be opened upon receipt of a safety injection signal once the reactor coolant pressure has decreased,

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Mr. Frank Linder December 21, 1 978 (c) Three check valves in series, or (d) Two check valves in series, provided that there are design provisions to permit periodic testing of the check valves for leak tightness and the testing is performed at least annually.

Isolation requiremcats for the cleanup and sampling system are dictated by the requirements of SRP 6.2.4 and GDC 55 related to lines that pene-trate the primary containment boundary and are listed below:

(1) One locked closed delation valve--inside and one locked closed isolation valve outside containment; or (2) One automatic isolation valve inside and one locked closed isolation valve outside containment; or (3) One locked closed isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside containment; or (4) One automatic isolation valve inside and one automatic isolation valve outside containment.

The table indicates (1) if the systems meet the isolation requirements identified; the types of valves used, (2) if the capability for leak testing individual valves exists, (3) the high pressure low pressure interfaces, (4) method of pressure reduction in closed loop systems and (5) how the systems are isolated (by procedures or automatically).

Check valve orientation was included because there has been some recent concern that vertically mounted check valves are not as effective as those mounted horizontally. There was, however, no data in the FSARs on check valve orientation.

For isolation of the systems identified to meet current criteria, they must satisfy conditions in the appropriate SRPs, GDC 55 and Section XI of the ASME Code. These documents establish the combinations of accept-able valves, the testing interval, and the individual valve leak testing requirements.

Mr. Frank Linder December 21, 1978 To meet SEP schedule requirements, we need your verification of the correctness of the data presented in the enclosed table and all additional information you may have pertaining to Safety Topic V-11.A by January 29, 1979.

Sincerely, 4

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g g, rva i s 4k.. r w Dennis L. Ziemann) Branch #2 Chief Operating Reactors Division of Operating Reactors

Reference:

Memo:

E. G. Case to R. F. Fraley, Executive Director ACRS, dated July 11, 1977.

Subject:

" Isolation of Low Pressure Systems from Reactor Coolant System".

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure:

See next page

Mr. Frank Linder

-5; Qecember 21, 1978 cc Fritz Schubert, Esquire Staff Attorney Da iryland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue, South i

La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601

0. S. Heistand, Jr., Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C.

20036 Mr. R. E. Shimshak La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Dairyland Power Cooperative P. O. Box 135 Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 La Crosse Public Library 800 Main Street La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 Coulee Region Energy Coalition ATTN: George R. Nygaard P. O. Box 1583 La Crosse, '~:consin 54601

4 PLANT: Lacrosse Evaluation of Isolation of Low Pressure Systems From Reactor Coolant System Heets Redundancy Testable Location of Method of Direct Interfaces *4 Isolatio9 of Type Between HP/LP Check Valve Pressure Method of 3

Criteria Isolation Valves Valves Interface Orientation Reduction Isolation Remarks 6

Water Cleanup System 8

Inlet No No 1HO NA NA NA Called primary purification (51-25-001) system. Stated stop valves exist but only one identi-fiable in Fig. 5.8 (FSAR)

Discharge No ECCS Low Pressure No low pressure injection Injection system LowPgessureCore Yes 1HO (53-No NA Spray 25-003)

ICK (53-26-002)

Sampilng System No information provided in FSAR RHR System -

Suction Side Called decay heat cooling system-high pressure system (1500 psig & 650*F). Stated inlet and stop valves exist but are not identifiable NOTE: RHR system is designed for system pressure 9'

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Discharge Side l

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i kOTE:

1. PWRs only
2. BWRs only
3. Only direct interfaces considered--service water and component cooling water systems not evaluated
4. High pressure systems (i.e., control rod drive hydraulic, isolation condenser, standby liquid control, high pressure injection, & RCIC) connected to reactor coolant pressure boundary not evaluated
5. Inadvertent oterpressurization of makeup tank due to reactor coolant pump seal leak 'off
6. Reactor water cleanup system for BWRs and CVCS or Letdown System for PWRS 7.. Isolation requirements for ECCS specified in SRP 6.3 (Section III), for RHR system in BTP RSB 5-1

. attached to SRP 5.4.7 and for water cleanup and sampling system in GDC 55

8. NA - Not Appilcable i

t eo 6