ML19257D582
| ML19257D582 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1980 |
| From: | Baxter T, Traviesodiaz M SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19257D570 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0585, RTR-NUREG-585 NUDOCS 8002050056 | |
| Download: ML19257D582 (11) | |
Text
.
January 24, 1980 UNITED STATES CF AMERICA NUCLEAR BEGULATORY CCMMISSION EEFCRE THE ATCMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BCARD In the Matter of
)
)
SACRAMENTC MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
)
Eocket Nc. 50-312
)
(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
)
Station)
)
LICENSEE'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT CF ITE MCTION FCR
SUMMARY
DISPCSITICN OF CCNTENTICN 5-2 BY CALIFCENIA ENERGY CCMMISSION California Energy Commission's (" CEC") Contention 5-2 states as follows:
Whether the containment bui'.5ing should be mcdified to provide overpressurization protection with a controlled filtered venting system to mitigate unavoidable releases of radionuclides?
This ccntention was admitted by the Licensing Board in its Crder dated October 5, 1979.
At that time it was not clear what problem CEC's Contention was designed to address --
that is, whether CEC considered the system necessary for compliance with existing NRC criteria in the event of a loss of feedwater transient, or whether it was aimed at other, more severe events.
g "[
1873 264 8002050 1
As a result of the discovery process, it is now clear that CEC's proposal is intended to mitigate the ccnsequences of very severe loss of ccolant accidents resulting in core melt situations.
In response to Licenste's interrogatories, CEC describes such accident scenarios as follows:
The Peactor Safety Study [ WASH-1400] and the [ Underground STUDY] describe severe loss of coolant accidents resulting in core melt situations that might result in temperatures and pressures exceeding the design basis of the Rancho Seco reactor containment structure.
The Bancho Suco containment structure has not been dcsigned to contain such a core-melt accident.
Accordingly, the CEC believes that potential means to mitigate the consequences of sucg accident scenarios deserve further study.
CEC goes on to identify reactor vescel rupture as a source of such an accident.2 Finally, CEC claims that a controlled filtered venting system potentially could mitigate the consequences of such scenarios.'a The documents referred to by CEC in these interroga-tory responses in support of their contention also make it clear that the purpose of CEC's contention is to examine means to protect the public against core-melt accidents.
CEC has cited as its main authority a document which it calls "Undcrground Siting Study."4 The executive summary of that document states:
1 California Energy Commission's Eesponse-to the Licensee's Second Set of Interrogatories, dated January 17, 1980, Response to Interrogatory 2, p.
4.
2 Id.,
Response to Interrogatories 3 and 4, pp.
5-6.
3 Id., Response to Interrogatory 5, p.
6.
}8[3 2bb 4
Underground Siting of Nuclear Power Reactors:
An Cption (continued next page)
This study has developed solutions to the technical problems associated with so-called reactor core-meltdown accidents.
A principal conclusion of this report is that it is feasible to design passive systems to reduce potential consequences from core-melt accidents to very low levels.
Underground siting is only one of several alternatives.
In addition, alternatives to underground siting, such as remote siting and controlled release of excessive pressure through simple, engineered filter systems, appear feasible.
While not as fully effective, these alternatives capture some of the benefits of underground siting at less ecst.D Similarly, as wc discuss further below, the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Final Feport (NUREC-0585) (also cited by CEC as a basis for Contention 5-2) mentions controlled filtered venting in the context of possible f uture regulatory requirements to protect against the consequences of core melt accidents beyond the current design basis set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A.0 This being the case, it is now apparent that CEC's proposal constitutes an impermissible challenge to a Ccmmission reg ulation -- namely, the General Cesign Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants.
These criteria require a containment structure which, with the containment heat removal system, is designed to (continued) for California, June, 1978, prepared by CEC's Nuclear Assessments Office.
5 Id.,
at iv.
See also the Affidavit of Pobert A.
Dieterich in support of and accompanying this Motion
("Dieterich"), at para.
3.
6 See, NUREG-0585, pp. 3-3 through 3-6.
1873 266 accommodste the calculated temperature and pressure conditions resulting from a loss of coolant accident.
Loss of coolant accidents are defined as:
...those postulated accidents that result from the loss of reactor coolant at a rate in excess of the capability of the reactor coolant makeup system from breaks in the reactor coolant pressure boundary, up to and including a break equivalent in size to the double-ended rupture of the largest pipe of p
the reactor coolant system.'
These General Design Criteria are applicable to reactors such o
as Rancho Seco.'
The Rancho Seco design includes a containment and engineered safety features, including containment heat removal systems, which comply with the requirements of the General Design Criteria.10 In advancing Contention 5-2, CEC does not take issue with Rancho Seco's meeting the Appendix A require-ments; rather, CEC is asking the E ;rd to ordain a fundamental generic change in the design requirements for nuclear power plants.
For, in order for the Licensing Board to consider CEC's Contention, it would have to question the adequacy or validity of the General Design Criteria -- a function it has 7
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 50; see also Criteria 16 and 38.
8 Id.,
Definitions and Explanations.
9 Id.,
Introduction.
10 Dieterich, para.
4.
A controlled filtered venting system is not required in order for Rancho Seco to comply with the General Design Criteria.
Dieterich, para.
5.
1873 267
_a_
not becn empowered to perforn.11 Indeed, if a plant is designcd in acccrdance with the safety standards set forth in the Ceneral Cesign Criteria and other Commission's regulations, it is entitled (absent unusual circumstances) to receive a construction permit or operating license and operate.l
The application of controlled fil te r ed venting as described in the Underground Siting Study would actually result in a violation of the General Design Criteria.
Criteria 16 and 5C require an essentially leak-tight containment for pressures up to and including those generated by design basis accidents.
The controlled filtered venting concept discussed in CEC's report includes rupture discs on the containment which would rupture presumably at pressures at or below the containment design pressure.13 This design modification cculd result in an 11 10 C.F.R. 5 2.758 provides that Commission rules are not subject tc challenge in proceedings such as this one; see, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAE-138, 6 AEC 520, 528 (1973); Union of Concerned Scient: 'ts v.
AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A provides for departures from the criteria to take into account " unusual sites or environ-mental conditions".
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, Introduc-tion; Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2), ALAB-543, 9 NRC 626, 627 & n.3 (1979).
However, r) such unusual circumstances are claimed to exist here.
12 See, Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 MFC 33, 42 (1977);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-194, 7 AEC 431, 444 n.25, reversed in part on other grounds, CLI-74-40, 8 AEC 809 (1974); Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), ALAB-161, 6 AEC 1003, 1006 (1973).
9'77 268 13 The Underground Siting of Nuclear Power Reactors stud
'd (continued next page) uncontrolled rclease inconsistent with current design requirements.1 The Commission's policy of not including protection against core melt accidents as a design basis has also found expression in its environmental rcquirements.15 By a Ccmmission pclicy embodied in the proposed Annex to the Commission's regulations implementing NEFA,16 it is explicitly acknowledged that the consequences of accidents more severe than current design basis accidents (" Class 9 accidents") need not be provided against in the design.
That policy is 1cngstanding and has been consistently upheld by the courts.1 Recently, in Cffshore Power Systems, the Commission ruled that (continued) n.4, supra, describes at p.
5-4 the rupture discs as ceing "de-signed to fail at pressures above those anticipated in de-sign basis accidents yet below those which would jeopardize the primary containment.
The discs are also temperature sensitive, since it is possible in some specific accident se quence s to generate excessivcly high temperatures with relatively low pressures."
See a: so pp. 5-8 through 5-10 and S-6 of that study.
14 See, Dieterich, para.
6.
15 There are, of course, no environmental issues in this proceeding.
16 36 Fed. Reg. 22851 (1971).
17 Ecology Action v.
AEC, 492 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1974);
Carolina Environmental Study Group v.
AEC, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League v.
AEC, 533 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 85 6 (1976); Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 632 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 435 U.E.
519 (1978);
Hodder v. NRC, 589 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, U.S.
100 S.Ct. 55 (1979).
i873 269
_e_
that policy will continue to apply to land-based reactors pending its reconsideration in a rulemaking prcceeding.
Other recent decisions support continued application of that policy.
Last month the Appeal Board in the Black Fox proceeding applied Offshore to uphold a licensing board's refusal to permit consideration of Class 9 accidents as a general matter.lo See also, Pennsylvania Fower s Light Co.20 where a claim that the accident at Three Mile Island justified general censideration of Class 9 accidents was explicitly rejected.21 Even assuming arguendo that the TMI-2 accidcat was a Class 9 accident, merely reciting that proposition does not imply that such an accident, or any other Class 9 accident, is credible at Rancho Seco.
As the Board well knows, following the TMI-2 accident various changes in plant procedures, equipment, and personcel training have been implcmented at 16 Cffshore Power dyctems (Floating Nuclear Plants), CLI-79-9, 10 NRC (September 14, 1979).
19 Public Service Company of Cklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB -5 7 3, 10 NRC (December 7,
1979).
20 (Susquehanna Steam Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-29, October 19, 1979, slip op. at 5-10.
21 To be sure, the Commission has always allowed parties to demonstrate that special circumstances exist for a given reactor that would reader credible an accident normally classified as Class 9.
Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331 (1973); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), ALAB -13 7, 6 AEC 491 (1973).
However, CEC has made no showing of 1073 270 special circumstances for Rancho Seco.
Rancho 2eco as a condition of resumed operation to insure that such an accident would no t occur.
In fact, the adequacy of these changen to assure that the facility will respond safely to a feedwater transient is the main issue at this hearing.
Cn the other hand, an accident substantially worse than that which occurred at IMI-2 would have to occur before a controlled filtered venting system could be useful in helping to maintain containment integrity.
For these reasons, the proper course for CEC to air its proposal would be to seek a rule change.
The T"I-2 Lessons Learned Task Force, in recommending that measures such as filtered venting be explored, did so in the context of recommending that a rulemaking proceeding be instituted to consider whether a new regulatory requirement should be promulgated.'2 It may also be tha t the rulemaking proceeding which the Commission is reactivating in order to reconsider its policy on Class 9 accidents would provide an appropriate forum es for consideration of CEC's proposal.'"
One final point:
a controlled filtered venting system as proposed by CEC is not commercially available or even technically developed.
There has been no demonstration of the effectiveness, reliability or safety of such a system.24 These 22 NUREG-0585, p.
3-5.
23 See, Offshore Power Systems, supra, slip op. at 9.
24 Dieterich, para. 7; and see, Pesponse, n.1,
- supra, Response to Interrogatories 5 and 10.
^
r facts are not disputed by CEC.
Therefore, CEC cannot possibly be asking for a ruling by tnis Board that such a system be installed.
The ecst which it could be asking is for the Board to respond to its stated belief that " potential means to mitigate the consequences of such accident scenarios deserve further study".'6 But it is totally inappropriate for an ind iv id u al licensee to be required to undertake a study on a generic issue, the outccme of which would bear only on a possible future change in the Commission's generally applicable regulatory requirements.
As a licensing board in another proceeding has stated in granting a motion for summary disposition of a contention on underground siting of nuclear plants:
- ,3
[
It is clear from a review of the supporting j
affidavits, including admissions by the
.1 Intervenor's expert, Professor Kazman, in J
25 Response, n.1 supra, pp.
6-9, Responses to Interrogatories 5-15.
26 Id. at 4, Response to Interrogatory 2.
And see, CEC's Supplements to Responses to First Set of NRC Etaff Interrog-atories and Responses to the NRC Staff's Second Set of Inter-rogatories, dated January 17, 1980, at p.
10 where CEC states:
.[W]e believe the Licensee should be directed to undertake studies regarding the benefits, costs and feasibility of installing such overpressurization pro-tection.
More particularly, the CEC believes that reasonable measures to mitigate the consequences of containment accidents should be included as part of the defense-in-depth concept for nuclear plant safety (emphasis added).
1873 272
~..
e
'M g
both his deposition and his affidavit, that underground siting of nuclear power plants is not yet a viable, reasonably practical, presently-available alternative today.
Professor Kazman, in effect, urges only that such a method of construction should be seriously studieJ and attempted by the Applicant.
Eut the Applicant, a public utility, is not in the business of ex-ploratory or developmental ESC.
Father, it is strictly limited in what it may do with its construction funds.
It is required, by its naturc as a public utility, to acccamo-date and meet the public's projected demand fo r electric power - and within the framework of a f airly rigid time schedule.
It is not the appropriate agency to devote large sums of me ey to experimental R&C, and, then, if that experiment dces not work, to " attempt" some other construction expegimcnt with the use of its custcmers' moncy.~'
To summarize, CEC's suggestien in Contention 5-2 of the need for a controlled filtered venting system, as amplified in its interrogatory responses, does not involve a claim that existing Commission design criteria cannot or will not be met.
Instead, it amounts to an impermissible challenge to the Ccamission's regulations establishing the design basis requirements for plants such as Rancho Seco, as well as the Commission's policy on consideration of Class 9 accidents.
Moreover, the system proposed by CEC would leave Pancho Seco in violation of those criteria, for it would require a less than leak-tight containment at pressures at or below the containment design pressure.
Finally, there is no disagreement between the parties that the installation of such a system is not 27 Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Stati 0,7} }J}
Units 1 ani 2), LBP-75-10, 1 NRC 246, 250 (1975).
O/
practicable ct this time.
For these reasons, there is no
" genuine issue as to any material fact" which is within the purview of this Board to resolve, and Licensee is entitled as a matter of law to a ruling that the possibility of installing a controlled filtered venting syster at Rancho Seco is not a this proceeding.'8 proper issue in
~
Respectfully submitted, S H A's;, PITTMAt;, PCTTC & TFC'iERIDGE p
- /
r fj' aka.,
f, /l/fa1DAA-))O T
Thomas A.
Eaxter
~~
Lex E.
Larson Ita tias F.
Travieso-Dia:
Counsel for Licensee 1800 fl Street, N.W.
Wa shing ton,
C.C.
20036 (202) 331-4100 28 10 C.F.P.
f 2.749(d).
1873 274