ML19257D216

Statement of Matl Facts as to Which There Is No Geniune Issue to Be Heard Re G Hursh & R Castro Contentions. Intervenors 791205,800107 & 14 Responses to NRC & Licensee Interrogatories Admitted Absence of Bases for Allegations

ML19257D216
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	01/24/1980
From:	Baxter T, Traviesodiaz SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML19257D211	List: ML19257D210 ML19257D216 ML19257D220 ML19257D221 ML19257D222 ML19257D225
References
NUDOCS 8002010537
Download: ML19257D216 (6)

Text

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January 24, 1980 UNITED STATES OF AMEPICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BCARD In the Matter of

)

)

SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT

)

Docket No. 50-312

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(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating

)

Station)

)

LICENSEE'S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE TO BE HEARD (HURSH-CASTRO CONTENTIONS)

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R.

S 2.749(a), Licensee states, in support of its motion for summary disposition of all the contentions advanced by Intervenors Gary Hursh and Richard Castro ("Intervenors") in this proceeding, that there is no genuine issue to be heard at the hearing with respeet to the following material facts:

1.

(All Hursh-Castro Contentions).

Intervenors have admitted that there is no factual basis, or refuse to divulge the basis if one exists, for any of the contentions they have advanced in this proceeding.

Intervenors' Response, dated December 5, 1979, to First Set of NRC Staff Interrogatories to Gary Hursh and Richard Castro; Intervenors' Response, dated January 14, 1980, to Second Set of NRC Staff Interrogatories to Gary Hursh and Richard Castro; Intervenors' Response, dated January 7, 1980, to Licensee's First Set of Interrogatories.

1857 059 80020' "5 3'l

2.

(Hursh-Castro Contention 3).

The Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station (" Rancho Seco") has a hard-wire control-grade direct reactor trip upon the occurrence of a loss of feedwater.

Affidavit of Robert A. Dieterich, ("Dieterich"),

para.

2.

3.

(Hursh-Castro Contention 5).

The setpoints for system high primary pressure reactor trip and pilot operated relief valve actuation at Rancho Seco have been modified so that a reactor trip occurs before actuation of the pilot operated relief valve ("PORV").

Dieterich, para.

3.

4.

The modified setpoints for system high primary pressure reactor trip and PORV actuation have been incorporated into Rancho Seco's Technical Specifications and, as set, greatly reduce the probability that there will be actuation of the PORV during a transient.

Dieterich, para.

3.

5.

(Hursh-Castro Contention 8).

The operating procedures at Rancho Seco include procedures for initiating and controlling auxiliary feedwater independent of ICS control, and these procedures have been reviewed and found satisfactory by the Commission Staff.

Affidavit of R.J.

Rodriguez

(" Rodriguez"), para.

2.

6.

(Hursh-Castro Contentien 9).

Rancho Seco has hard-wire control grade reactor trips on loss of main feedwater and on turbine trip, and the circuitry and other plant modifications introduced to implement these features have been 1857 060

analyzed by the Commission Staff and found satisfactory.

Dieterich, para.

4.

7.

The hard-wire control-grade reactor trips on loss of main feedwater or turbine trip have circuitry which is designed to the highest industry standards to provide high reliability of operation, and comparable in quality and reliability to other control-grade circuitry at Pancho Seco which has proved extremely reliable.

Dieterich, para.

5.

8.

The hard-wire control grade reactor trips on loss of main feedwater or turbine trip have operated successfully in two loss of feedwater transients and two turbine trips at Rancho Seco, as well as in monthly tests of the circuitry.

Dieterich, para.

5.

9.

The hard-wire control-grade reactor trips on loss of main feedwater or turbine trip at Rancho Seco are adequate in performance and reliability. Dieterich, para.

5.

10.

(Hursh-Castro Contention 20).

Rancho Seco is designed to dispose of any hydrogen accumulation within the containment building by purging it instead of recombining the hydrogen.

Dieterich, para.

6.

11.

In the maximum hypothetical accident with 1%

fuel failure, it would not be necessary to start purging hydrogen at Rancho Seco until 770 hours0.00891 days <br />0.214 hours <br />0.00127 weeks <br />2.92985e-4 months <br /> after the initiation of the accident. Dieterich, para.

6.

1857 061 12.

Licensee has entered into an agreement with the Arizona Public Service Company under which a hydrogen recom-biner will be loaned to the Licensee promptly upon Licensee's request.

Dieterich, para.

7.

13.

The hydrogen recombiner loaned by the Arizona Public Service Company to Licensee would be delivered to Rancho Seco within twenty-four hours of being requested.

Dieterich, para.

7.

14.

Assuming a hydrogen recombiner were required in the event of an accident caused by a feedwater transient, the need for such a recombiner would not arise until at least several days after the initiation of the accident, thus giving ample time for shipment of the Arizona Public Service Company recombiner to Rancho Seco and its installation there.

Dieterich, para.

7.

15.

(Hursh-Castro Contention 21).

The capacity of the pressurizer at Rancho Seco was designed so that the pressurizer will not empty or become totally filled during normal operation or following transients, including anticipated loss of feedwater transients.

Affidavit of Bruce A.

Karrasch

("Karrasch"), paras.

4, 5.

16.

No pressurizer discharge to the quench tank occurs during an anticipated loss of feedwater transient.

Karrasch, para.

6.

c 1857 062

4 17.

The quench tank is designed so that it accom-modates the total steam discharge and the discharge rate of the PORV and the pressurizer safety valves for various off-normal events, including a rod withdrawal accident.

Karrasch, para.

6.

18.

In the event primary system steam discharge due to off-normal conditions exceeds the capacity of the quench tank, the containment building is designed to provide isolation of the discharge and continued protection of the health and safety of the public.

Karrasch, para.

6.

19.

(Hursh-Castro Contention 22).

As long as reactor coolant temperature and pressure are maintained in a subcooled condition, pressurizer level (which is available directly to the operators in the control room) is an adequate indication of system water level.

Podriguez, para.

3.

20.

During the current outage, a subcooling indica-tor will be installed at Rancho Seco which will eliminate any need for the operators to interpret temperature and pressure data.

Ro d r ig ue z, para.

3.

21.

(Hursh-Castro Contention 25).

Instrumentation exists at Rancho Seco for monitoring the auxiliary feedwater flow to each steam generator, including indication in the control room of valve position and whether pumps are running.

Rodriguez, para.

4.

i857 063 22.

Licensee is adding instrumentation to indicate in the control room the pressurizer relief valve pocition, which instrumentation will be operational approximately on June 1,

1980.

Rodriguez, para.

5.

23.

The pressurizer relief valve at Rancho Seco opens and closes automatically on pressure, and a block valve in series with the pressurizer relief valve may be operated remotely from the control room.

Rodriguez, para.

6.

24.

Those auxiliary feedwater valves which are normally closed and need to open for initiation of auxiliary feedwater flow open automatically.

Auxiliary feedwater valves which are normally in the open position are locked open, so no automatic operation of those valves is required.

Rodriguez, para.

6.

Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, PCTTS & TRCWBRIDGE tbh s9M' /,14 7

Th6 mas A.

Eaxter

,)

Lex K.

Larson Matias F.

Travieso-Diaz Counsel for Licensee 1800 M Street, N.W.

(202) 331-4100 1857 064