ML19256F508

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Summary of 791105-08 Review of Facility Emergency Plan & AR Radiological Emergency Plans
ML19256F508
Person / Time
Issue date: 11/15/1979
From: Axelson W
NRC - EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TASK FORCE
To: Pagano F
NRC - EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TASK FORCE
References
NUDOCS 7912190276
Download: ML19256F508 (5)


Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION w

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. p WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 November 15, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Frank Pagano, Chief, Emergency Planning Review Task Force FROM:

William L. Axelson, Team Leader, Emergency Planning Review Task Force

SUBJECT:

TRIP REPORT REGARDING SITE REVIEW AT ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE FOR IMPROVING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS On November 5-8, 1979, Review Team No. 6 conducted a review of the Arkansas Nuclear One Emergency Plan and the State of Arkansas Radiological Emergency Plans. A site tour was initially conducted, followed by technical meetings with plant and corporate management personnel. On November 7, the team met with representatives from the Arkansas Office of Emergency Services (OES);

the local counties of Yell, Pope, Johnson, and Logan OES; Arkansas State Police; Arkansas Military Department; Army Corps of Engineers; Arkansas Department of Human Services; National Red Cross Office from Little Rock, Arkansas; Yell County Judge and Sheriff; and Arkansas State Senator, Mr. Joe Ray.

In general, the meetings conducted with plant personnel and corporate manage-ment went smoothly, as well as the meetings with state and local representa-tives. The reason for the productive meetings with the State and local authorities was due primarily to the close working relationship with Arkansas Power and Light and the State of Arkansas, as was evidenced during our meet-ings. We encouraged Arkansas Power and Light to continue to work closely with their State and local representatives for improving emergency proce-dures.

One item brought to our attention by State Senator Joe Ray may develop into a problem.

Senator Ray indicated that Arkansas Power and Light tax revenues from ANO are not evenly distributed to surrounding counties (Yell, Johnson, and Logan), yet these counties are part of the 10 mile EPZ.

Currently, the majority of tax revenues are distributed to Pope County only.

During the meetings with Arkansas Power and Light, all items from the accept-ance criteria were discussed in detail.

Clear guidance regarding Emergency Action Levels (EALs) was particularly discussed in detail. Arkansas Power and Light stated that the guidance in NUREG-0610 will be addressed in their new emergency plan.

Real time instrumentation (when possible) will be used as the basis for EALs.

162\\ W 7912190

Frank Pagano During the meeting with state and local officials, all items from the accept-ance criteria were discussed in detail. Those items which were deemed ade-quate were also addressed.

Items needing improvement or clarification were stressed.

Particular attention was given to the early warning and clear instruction criteria and the media source used to inform the public.

The following items were identified during our review:

Arkansas Nuclear One Emergency Plan 1.

In general, the facility plan does not satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.101 especially in the area of uniform action level criteria based on plant parameters.

The licensee agreed to develop tables indicating plant para-meters (real time) which would be used to classify an Alert, Site, or General Emergency. These parameters will include the new high range con-tainment monitors and gaseous effluent monitors and the radioiodine stack samples as per NUREG-0578.

Currently, the facility plan is structured in RGl.101 format. Only minor changes and incorporation of NUREG-0610 and NUREG-0578 needs to be accomplished to bring it in conformance with RG1.101.

2.

The licensee has tentatively selected locations for the onsite Technical Support Centers (TSC) and operational Support Group Center (SGC) for the January 1, 1980 requirement.

For Units One and Two, the TSC will be lo-cated at the remote shutdown panels (above the control rocm).

The SGC will be in the planning and scheduling area located on the fourth floor of the administration building. The locations of the permanent TSC and SGC have not been resolved at this time.

The licensee, the review team, and the Lessons Learned Task Force are currently evaluating the proposal for these locations.

Currently, the licensee is proposing that the TSC, SGC, and near-site EOC all be situated in one location.

This location will be one of three physical sites depending on the severity of the accident.

The three locations will be the onsite administration build-ing, the offsite visitors center or the Russelville Local Office.

Each location will have identical accident assessment capability (instrument-ation, computer terminals,etc).

However, none of the centers will meet the habitability requirements of NUREG.0578.

3.

The licensee's plants currently do not provide high range instrumenta-tion for containment monitoring or stack effluent monitoring as per NUREG-0578.

However, Unit Two currently has containment monitors which should meet the requirements of NUREG-0578 (107R/hr; safety grade and redundant.

The licensee intends to qualify these instruments and in-stall similar instruments for Unit One.

Regarding the stack effluent monitors, the licensee believes these instruments can be installed, calibrated, and made operational.

These items from NUREG-0578 should be completed on schedule.

4.

The licencee capability to determine gaseous radiciodine effluents follow-ing an accident needs improvement. Access to and collection of the samples from the samplirg station should not be a problem. However, no procedures 162(l92

Frank Pagano have been developed to measure radioiodine in the presence of large quantities of noble gas interference in the filter.

The team stressed the importance of purging the charcoal cartridges or switching to a silver zeolite filter media. The same problem was identified for in-plant iodine measurements.

The licensee agreed to develop procedures for sampling and analyzing radioiodine as an Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure which will be referenced in the new emergency plan.

5.

The licensee does not provide a means for sampling reactor coolant or containment atmosphere as per NUREG-0578 without exceeding occupational dose limits. Currently, the licensee is reviewing all appropriate de-signs and procedures to assure the feasibility of sampling and analyzing reactor coolant and containment atmosphere under accident conditions.

These reviews should be completed and a report forwarded to Lessons Learned describing the review and recommending corrective actions, by January 1, 1980. The licensee stated that corrective actions will be implemented by January 1,1981, subject to equipment availability and NRC review. Additionally, the licensee proposed to relocate their radioanalytical laboratory to the upper level of the turbine room.

They believe this area will be free from any noble gas interference under accident conditions.

The team concurred in this proposal.

6. The licensee has begun work on improving their offsite environmental monitoring program as per SECY-49-450.

The new NRR Branch Technical Position for RG 4.8 was explained to the licensee with particular atten-tion to the new rings of TLD's.

The licensee agreed to implement this program and agreed to include the locations of all fixed radiological environmental monitoring stations in their new plan.

In addition, the licensee has the capability of aerial surveillance.

7.

The licensee has committed to a B & W and CE program for detection of inadequate core cooling. Currently, the licensee has ordered redundant, cafety grade, primary coolant saturation meters which will provide on-line indication of coolant saturation conditions.

The team stressed that these instruments and other indicators of inadequate core cooling should be factored into the EALs for emerger.cy classifications.

The instruments will be installed by January 1, 1980.

8.

Fbny other items required by the new acceptance criteria have not been fully addressed. The licensee agreed to inclede these items in their new emergency plan. Special attention should be given to dayshift and offshift organizations including (1) block diagrams, indicating these organizations for normal and emergency conditions and (2) block diagrams, indicating primary and secondary communications.

Emphasis should be placed on ensur-ing compatibility of the facility plan with state and local plans in the areas of communication, notification, and early warning.

State of Arkansas Emergency Plan and Pope, Yell, Johnson and Logan County Plans Although the State Plan has received NRC concurrence, the following areas of improvement were discussed with the State and local agencies.

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Frank Pagano 1.

No authority to evacuate or warn boaters from Lake Darnell (resort area next to the facility) has been designated.

The State indicated the State Game and Fish Commission has this authority.

Futther, the State agreed to incorporate this agency and it's responsibilities into their plan.

2.

No authority to control the ingestion pathway has been designated in the State Plan.

The State indicated that Arkansas does not have a Department of Agriculture. However, the County Agriculture Boards (a similar group of agencies) does have this authority.

The State agreed to incorporate this agency and it's responsibilities (including out to the 50 mile EPZ) into the plan.

3.

The State Plan currently has Class A,B,C, and D emergency classification systems. The State agreed to change to the guidance of NUREG-0610.

4.

Although the State Department of Health has the dose assessment responsi-bility, the State Plan needs to provide more details regarding this responsibility (eg, methodology).

5.

The State's PAGs for inhalation and ingestion are not compatible with the EPA or HEW guidance. The State is taking a more conservative approach.

The State appeared reluctant to change their PAGs.

6.

Currertly, no means for early warning and notification to the public exists for the 10 mile EPZ.

Some cities currently have CD sirens, however, no provisions have been made to use these during a plant emergency.

The State is currently investigating the tone-alert systems.

Problems, such as area coverage with the required intensity, are currently being investi-gated by the State OES.

7.

Currently, the State and local plans provide no commitments to conduct anraal drills.

However, the State conducted an extensive exercise during CY79 and indicated that they would continue to have annual drills and stated they would Encorporate this in their plan.

8.

The State or local plans provide no provisions for maintaining dose re-cords of emergency workers or monitoring of evacuees.

The State agreed to provide a description of this in their plan.

The team suggested that a quick-sort method of determining thyroid overexposure should be in-cluded.

9.

The local plans provide for adequate evacuation of the 10 mile EPZ. How-ever, it is not clear who orders the evacuation, especially at 4:00 A.M.

in the morning.

The State agreed to provide a 24-hour / day contact who would begin immediate implementation of recommended protective actions from the plant.

10. As a result of the public meeting, two areas of concern were identi-fled which the team feels should be addressed in the State or local plan.

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Frank Pagano They are (1) local school boards should be contacted or involved in the preparation of evacuation plants, and (2) prompt warning of residents within the 10 mile EPZ who have no telephones, radios, TV or electricity should be addressed.

.?

U-William L. Axelson, Team Leader cc: G. Vissing, DOR /NRR J. Everett, IE/RIV D. Glen, Battelle Northwest Lab.

H. Gaut, OSP 1621 195