ML19256B563
| ML19256B563 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1979 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Jackie Jones CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908080706 | |
| Download: ML19256B563 (2) | |
Text
/pa as cq"'c, UNITED ST ATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y ' I.k[i-J, fe ;
REGION ll 101 M ARIE T T A ST., N W, SUIT E 3100 c, k' f
AT L ANT A, GEORGI A 30303 5
P JUL 61979 In Reply Refer To:
10-12M 50-261 Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN:
J. A. Jones Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 79-16 which requires action by you with regard to your reactor f acility(ies).
Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
'C ~
ws-
/
44 James P. O'Reilly Director
Enclosures:
1.
List of IE Bulletins Issued in last 12 Months 7908080706
JUL 2 01979 Carolina Power and
- Light Company cc w/ encl:
A. C. Tollison, Jr.
Plant Manager Box 458 Southport, North Carolina 28461 R. B. Starkey, Jr., Plant Manager Post Office Box 790 Hartsville, South Carolina 29550
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ESTORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 July 26, 1979 IE Bulletin No. 79-16 VITAL AREA ACCESS CONTROLS Description of Circumstances:
An attempt to damage new fuel assemblies occurred recently at an operating nuclear reactor facility. During a routine fuel inspection, the licensee discovered that a chemical liquid had been poured over 62 of 64 new fuel assemblies. Analysis indicates that the chemical liquid was sodium hydroxide, a chemical stored and used onsite The licensee stores new fuel assemblies in dry storage wells on the same elevation as the spent fuel pool within the Fuel Building, a vital area.
Access to the building is controlled by use of a coded keycard which elec-tronically unlocks the alarmed personnel portals. The licensee issues coded keycards to both licensee and contractor personnel after the successful com-pletion of a background screening program.
In addition, licensee site manage-ment certifies monthly that each individual has the need for a coded keycard in order to perform required duties. Further access within this l'uilding is not limited by other barriers or controls.
As a result of this incident, an initial licensee audit determined that several hundred licensee and contractor personnel had access to this area during the period when the attempt to damage the fuel was made.
The audit also revealed that one coded keycard reader at a vital area portal was inaccurately recording access data at the alarm station.
Also discovered during this audit were indications of frequent " tailgating" on access through the portals.
Tailgating occurs when more than one person passes through a portal on one person's authorized access. Their passage is therefore not recorded, and unauthorized persons could gain entry in this manner. Tailgating does not include authorized access controlled by an escort.
Discussion of Applicable Requirements:
10 CFR 73.55(a) requires the licensees to protect against industrial sabotage committed by an insider in any position.
10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) states that access to Vital Areas shall be positively controlled and limited to individuals who are authorized access to vital equipme:
their duties.
Specific commitments im in each licensee's approved Security P DUPLICATE DOCUMENT Entire document previously entered into system under:
h f
ANO No. of pages: