ML19256B339

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Forwards IE Bulletin 79-05B, Nuclear Incident at TMI-Suppl. No Written Response Required
ML19256B339
Person / Time
Site: 05000516, 05000517, Shoreham  File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 04/23/1979
From: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Wofford A
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
References
NUDOCS 7906110015
Download: ML19256B339 (1)


Text

Y g*M "0 UNITED STATES 0c y?g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g

P' REGloN I o

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KING OF PRUSSI A, PENNSYLVANI A 19406 4

/?2 231979 Docket Nos. 50-322 50-516 50-517 Long Island Lighting Company ATTN:

Mr. Andrew W. Wofford Vice President 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, NY 11801 Gentlemen:

The enclosed Bulletin 79-05B is forwarded to you for information.

No written response is required.

We have also enclosed copies of recom-mendations of the ACRS to the Commission for your information.

If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely, n

Boyce H. Grier

" Director

Enclosures:

1.

IE Bulletin No.79-05B with Enclosure 2.

ACRS Recommendations to the Commission dated April 18, 1979 and April 20, 1979 (Typed Copy) cc w/encls:

J. P. Novarro, Project Manager Edward M. Barrett, Esquire Edward J. Walsh, Esquire T. F. Gerecke, Manager, Engineering QA Department 79061100/[

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 20555 IE Bulletin 79-05B April 21,1979 Page 1 of 4 NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND - SUPPLEMENT Description of Circumstances:

Continued NRC evaluation of the nuclear incident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 has identified measures in addition to those discussed in IE Bulletin 79-05 and 79-05A which should be acted upon by licensees with reactors designed by B&W. As discussed in Item 4.c. of Actions to be taken by Licensees in IEB 79-05A, the preferred mode of core cooling following a transient or accident is to provide forced flow using reactor coolant pumps.

It appears that natural circulation was not successfully achieved upon securing the reactor coolant pumps during the first two hours of the Three Mile Island (TMI) No. 2 incident of March 28, 1979.

Initiation of natural circulation was inhibited by significant coolant voids, possibly aggrevated by release of noncondensible gases, in the primary coolant system.

To avoid this potential for interference with natural circulation, the operator should ensure that the primary system is subcooled, and remains subcooled, before any attempt is made to establish natural circulation.

Natural circulation in Babcock and Wilcox reactor systems is enhanced by maintaining a relatively high water level on the secondary side of the once through steam generators (OTSG).

It is also promoted by injection of auxiliary feedwater at the upper nozzles in the OTSGs.

The integrated Control System automatically sets the OTSG level setpoint to 50% on the operating range when all reactor coolant pumps (RCP) are secured.

However, in unusual or abnormal situations, manual actions by the operator to increase steam generator level will enhance natural circulation capability in anticipation of a possible loss of operation of the reactor coolant pumps.

As stated previously, forced flow of primary coolant through the core is preferred to natural circulation.

Other means of reducing the possibility of void formation in the reactor coolant system are:

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Minimize the operation of DUPLICATE DOCUMENT the pressurizer and thereb reduction by a blowdown th Entire document previously entered into system under:

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