ML19256B295
| ML19256B295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1979 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Jeffery Grant TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906080205 | |
| Download: ML19256B295 (1) | |
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' f 799 ROOSEVELT RO AD E'~t \\ ' e cLEN ELLvn. ett NOis soisi MAY 181979 Docket No. 50-346 Toledo Edison Company ATTN:
Mr. James S. Grant Vice President - Energy Supply Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 4;652 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 79-08, is forwarded to you for information.
If there are any questions related to the contents or intent of the Circular or its attachments, please contact this office.
Sincerely, dB W James G. Keppler Director
Enclosure:
IE Circular No. 79-08 cc w/ encl:
Mr. T. D. Murray, Station Local PDR Superintendent NSIC Central Files TIC Director, NRR/DPM Harold W. Kohn, Poner Director, NRR/ DOR Siting Commissic PDR Helen W. Evans, ". ate of Ohio 79060802o5
i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION III May 18, 1979 IE Circular No. 79-08 ATTEMPTED EXTORTION - LOW ENRICHED URANIUM
Background
In January 1979, a temporary contractor employee who was working at the General Electric plant in Wilmington, North Carolina, allegedly entered the plant and removed a drum containing two 5-gallon cans of low enriched uraniu= from the facility with the intention of extorting money for the return of the material. The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted an intensive investigation leading to the arrest of the employee on February 1,1979. All material was recovered and returned to the plant.
Discussion Based on preliminary information provided the NRC, the theft was allegedly carried out in the following manner:
On Friday, January 26, 1979, the subject worked the day shift.
At 10:50 p.m. the same day he drove back to the plant and entered with the night shift. He showed his Florida driver's license at the entrance gate instead of his yellow contractor badge because it had a blue background similar to that on the picture badge which he thought was required to gain access to the area of the plant that he wanted to penetrate. He had allegedly gained access using his driver's license on previous occasions.
Once inside the plant, the subject would have been guided by gate:
and fences into a parking area had it not been for the fact that one gate had been re=oved to allow installation of truck scales.
He proceeded down the unprotected road to an area adjacent to the building he wanted to enter.
After the subject entered the building through a personnel door, he proceeded to his normal working station which was the Chem Tech Lab and entered, using his own key. In the lab he picked up his protective clothing, a two wheel cart used to move 55 gallon drums and a container used to ship chemicals. The container could hold two 5 gallon cans.
He then proceeded to a door leading up a stairwell into the radiation
IE Circular No. 79-08 May 17, 1979 controlled area. The door was normally locked even though not required by regulations; however, at this time it was slightly ajar due to cal-function of the locking mechanism. Once inside the door, the subjcet put on his protective clothing and proceeded up the stairs to the Blend Queue Area. He removed two 5-gallon cans of UO2, carried the=
down the stairs and put them in the shipping container. He then removed his protective clothing and retraced his steps on to the Chem Tech Lab. Once back in the lab he opened one can and removed some of the material which he intended to use to effect his blackmail scheme. Using the 2 wheel cart, he transported the remaining material to his car and loaded it in his trunk. He retraced his steps and left the plant just before midnight on Friday, January 26.
Procedures require anyone leaving the plant after midnight to sign out. He had been in the plant approximately one hour. He had come in with the inco=ing plant change and had lef t with the outgoing shif t.
Conclusior.
The G. E. Wilmington plant had an industrial security system in operation at the time of the incident. This theft was facilitated by a failure of this system. The failure to check the subjects identification badge closely enough to distinguish a Florida driver's license from a General Electric badge authorizing access other than normal working hours and the failure to protect a disabled remotely operated gate which would have denied automobile access to the im=ediate area where material was stored were significant factors in the success of this theft. A third contributing factor was access to the material through an emergency exit which was normally closed and locked against access to the area where the material was stored.
Although the circumstances surrounding the possible occurrence of an event similar to this will vary according to each licensee's operation and safe-guards system, the attached su= mary of this event clearly demonstrates the interrelationships of minor problems that seem insignificant if taken.alone, but when combined, can allow a loss to occur.
It also emphasizes that the possibility of an insider threat against a licensed facility does exist.
This Circular is issued for your information.
No action is requested of you and no written response to this Circular is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, con tact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Attachments:
1.
Sanitized Summary of GE Wilmington Incident 2.
List of IE Circulars Issued in the Last Twelve Months.
Sanitized Summary of G.E. Wilmington Incident I.
Su==ary On Monday, January 29, 1979, at 11:45 a.m., Region II was notified by telephone by the General Manager of the Wilmington, North Carolina, General Electric Co=pany plant, that an extortion letter and a sample of UO2 powder were found at his office door when he came to work about 8:00 a.m.
The letter stated that the writer had in his possession two 5-gallon containers of UO2 powder which he had taken from the plant. The containers were identified in the letter by serial numbers and by the gross weight (approximately 145 pounds total). The letter further stated that enough UO2 had been removed from one of the containers to furnish samples to newspaper editors, senators, anti-nuclear group leaders and others if his demand for
$100,000 in cash was not met by Thursday, February 1.
The writer further stated that after the sa=ples had been delivered, if he had not received the money, one container of UO2 powder would be dispersed through one unnamed large American City. The UO2 powder from the second container would be dispersed through another large city if an additional $100,000 in cash was not provided at that time.
The General Manager verified the authenticity of the container numbers and the fact that the containers were not in their assigned locations.
Regdon II advised the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC, Head-quarters, and the Atlanta office of the FBI. The Atlanta FBI turned the case over to the Charlotte, North Carolina FBI office.
The FBI assumed investigative jurisdiction on Monday, January 29.
It was decided not to send NRC investigators to the plant at that time, but that the NRC would wait for further developments and concentrate on planning and related safety evaluations. On Tuesday, January 30, two Region II investigators, knowledgeable in accountability and health physics, were sent to the plant to furnish technical expertise in the areas of material control and accountability and health physics, and to review GE activities to determine how the event occurred, with-out interferring with the FBI investigation.
A temporary employee of a General Electric Company subcontractor was subsequently arrested by the FBI on 2/1/79.
The containers and all the SNM were recovered by the FBI and returned to CE.
Pr;3 1 of 2
IE Circular No. 79-08 May 17, 1979 11 Conclusions The special inspection disclosed that:
(a) the material control and accountability system functioned as designed and identified the missing containers in accordance with regulatory requirements; (b) health physics procedures were followed in accordance with regulatory requirements; (c) normal industrial security procedures were followed; and (d) no items of noncompliance with regulatory requirements were identified.
Page 2 of 2
IE Circular Fo. 79-08 May 18, 1979 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Circular Subject Date Issued To No.
of Issue 78-03 Packaging Greater Than 5/12/78 All Holders of Type A Quantities of Reactor OLs, cps, Low Specific Activity Fuel Cycle, Radioactive Material Priority I Material for Transport and Waste Disposal Licenses 78-04 Installation Error That 5/15/78 All Holders of Could Prevent Closing of Reactor OLs or Fire Doors cps 78-05 Inadvertent Safety Injection 5/23/78 All Holders of During Cooldown Reactor OLs or cps 78-06 Potential Common Mode 5/23/78 All Holders of Flooding of ECCS Equipment Reactor OLs or Rooms at BWR Facilities cps 78-07 Damaged Components of a 5/31/78 All Holders of Bergen-Paterson Series Reactor OLs or 25000 Hydraulic Test cps Stand 78-08 Environmental Qualification 5/31/78 All Holders of of Safety Related Equipment Reactor OLs or at Nuclear Power Plants cps 78-09 Arcing of General Electric 6/5/78 All Holders of Company Size 2 Contactors cps 78-10 control of Sealed 6/14/78 All Medical Sources Used in Licensees in Radiation Therapy Categories G and G1 78-11 Recirculation M-G 6/15/78 All Holders of Set Overspeed Stops BWR OLs or cps Page 1 of 3
IE Circular No. 79-08 May 18, 1979 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Circular Subj ect Date Issued to No.
of Issue 78-12 HPCI Turbine Control 6/30/78 All Holders of Valve Lift Rod Bending BWR OLs or cps for plants with HPCI Terry Turbine 78-13 Inoperability of Multiple 7/10/78 All Holders of Service Water Pumps Reactor OLs and cps except for plants located in: AL, AK, CA, FL, GA, LA, MS, SC 78-14 HPCI Turbine Reversing 7/12/78 All Holders of BWR Chamber Hold Down Bolting OLs or cps for plants with a HPCI Terry Turbine excepting Duane Arnold and Monticello 78-15 Checkvalves Fail to 7/20/78 All Holders of Close In Vertical Reactor OLs or cts Position 78-16 Limitorque Valve 7/26/78 All Holders cf Actuators Reactor OLs or cps 78-17 Inadequate Guard Training /
10/13/78 All Holders of Qualification and Falsified and applicants Training Records for Reactor OLs 78-18 UL Fire Test 11/6/78 All He.1ders of Reactor OLs or cps 78-19 Manual Override (Bypass) 12/28/78 All Holders of of Safety Actuation Signals cps Page 2 of 3
e Ot IE Circular No. 79-08 May 18, 1979 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Circular Subject Date Issued To No of Issue 79-01 Administrction of 1/12/79 All Medical Unauthorized Byproduct Licensees except Material to Humans Teletherapy Medical Licensees and each Radiopharmaceutical Suppliers 79-02 Failure of 120 Volt Vital 2/16/79 All Holders of AC Power Supplies Reactor OLs and cps 79-03 Inadequate Guard Training-2/23/79 All Holders of Qualification and Falsified and applicants Training Records for Special Nuclear Material Licenses in Safeguards Group I 79-04 Loose Locking Nut On 3/16/79 All Holders of Limitorque Valve Reactor OLs or cps Operators 79-05 Moisture Leakage In 3/20/79 All Holders of Stranded Wire Conductors Reactor OLs or cps 79-06 Failure to Use Syringe 4/19/79 All Holders of and Battle Shields in Medical Licensees Nuclear Medicine except teletherapy licensees 79-07 Unexpected Speed Increase 5/2/79 All Holders of of Reactor Recirculation BWR OL's or CP's MG Set Resulted in Reactor Power Increase Page 3 of 3