ML19254F665

Forwards NRC Position Re Safe Shutdown Capability.Requests Info within 90 Days to Complete Review of Fire Protection Safety Evaluation

ML19254F665
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	10/22/1979
From:	Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Andagnini G BOSTON EDISON CO.
References
NUDOCS 7911160222
Download: ML19254F665 (2)

Text

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'*N 00TOBER 22 879 Docket No. 50-293

.Mr. G. Carl Andognini Boston Edison Company 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusets 02199

Dear Mr. Andognini:

In the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for fire protection supporting Amendment No. 35 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-35 for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Alternate Safe Shutdown Capability was identified as an incomplete item of review in Section 3.2.1 and as a modification for which additional infomation was required in Section 3.1.18.

To expedite the completion of our review of this ' item, we are enclosing our position entitled, " Safe Shutdown Capabil ity". Section 8 of this document specifies the infomation we require to complete our review. Please provide this infomation within 90 days of the date of this letter.

If some of the infomation is already available in a previous submittal, you need only reference that material.

Sincerely, o 1to, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:

Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability cc w/ enclosure:

see next page 134.

174

/

Mr. G. Carl Andognini Boston Edison Company cc:

Mr. Paul J. McGuire Pilgrim Station Acting Manager Boston Edison Company RFD #1, Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360 Anthony Z. Roisman Natural Resources Defense Council 917 15th Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C.

20005 Henry Herrmann, Esquire Massachusetts Wildlife Federation 151 Tremont Street Boston, Massachusetts 02111 Plymouth Public Library North Street Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360 1347 175 I

STAFF POSITION SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Staff Concern During the staff's evaluati6n of fire ' protection programs at operating plants, one or more specific plant areas may be identified in which the staff does not have adequate assurance that a postulated fire will not damage both redundant divisions of shutdow3 systems.

This lack of assurance in safe shutdown capability has resulted from one or both of the follo,<ing situations:

Case A: The license.e has not adequately identified the systems and components required for safe shutdown and their location in specific fire areas.

Case B: The licensee has not demonstrated that the fire protection for specific plant areas will prevent damage to both redundant divisions of safe shutdown components identified in these areas.

For Case A, the staff has required that an adecuate safe shutdown analysis be perfomed. This evaluation includes the identification of the systems required for safe shutdown and the location of the system components in the plant. Where it is determined by this

' evaluation that safe shutdown components of both redundant divisions are located.in the same fire area, the licensee is required to dem:nstrate that a postulated fire will not damage both divisions or provide alternate shutdown capability as in Case B.

For Case B, the staff may have re' quired that an alternate shutdown capability be provided with is independent of the area of concern or the licensee may have propcsed such a capability in lieu of certain addit.ional fire protection codifications in the area. The specific modifications associated with the area of concern along with other systems and equipment already independent of the area fom the alternate shutdown capability.

For each plant, the modifications needed and the combinations of systems which provide the shutdown functions may be unique for each critical area; however, the sh0tdown functions provided should maintain plant parameters within the bounds of the limiting safety consequences deemed ac:eptable for the design basis event.

!34[ l[b Staff Position Safe shutdown capability should be demonstrated (Case A) or alternate shutdown capability provided (Case B) in accordance with the guidelines provided below:

1. Desi:n Easis Event Ne design basis event for ::nsi snutd:wn is a postulated fire in recuncant safe shut::wn cabies/ec it.as teen deter.inec that fire DUPLICICE DOCUMENT

nat safe shut::wn ca; ability w; te nsidered:

(1)

Offsi*e pcwe Entire cocument previously entered into system un er:

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No. of pages:

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