ML19254F640
| ML19254F640 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1979 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Stewart W FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911160131 | |
| Download: ML19254F640 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES 7,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION C,
g a
REGION 11
(
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, G EORGIA 30303
- j NOV 5 1979 In Reply Refer To:
RII:JP0 50-302 Florida Power Corporation Attn:
W. P. Stewart, Manager Nuclear Operations
'P.
O. Box 14042, Mail Stop C-4 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Gentlemen:
This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities.
No specific action or response is requested at this time.
If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular, Bulletin, or NRR Generic Letter will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions.
If you have questions regarding the matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Sincerely, Yc rut James P. O'Reill Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Information Notice No. 79-26 2.
List of IE Information Notices Issued in the Last Six Months 7911160
J Florida Power Corporation t cc w/ encl:
G. P. Beatty, Jr.
Nuclear Plant Superintendent Post Office Box 1240 Crystal River, Florida 32629 4
1351 303
SSINS:
6870 Accession No:
7908220133 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.
20555 November 5, 1979 IE Information Notice No. 79-26 BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY
' Description of Circumstances:
On September 14, 1979, the Consumers Power Company (CPC) notified the NRC of discovery at the Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant of a valve misalignment that had resulted in containment integrity being breached for an indeterminate length of time.
While preparing to perform a Type "C" leak test between two manual valves in a 3" bypass line around the main 48" containment purge valve, plant personnel dis-covered that both of these manual isolation valves were locked in the open posi-tion. These valves should have been locked closed.
Investigation by the licensee indicated that the valves may have been improperly positioned since April, 1978, when an efficiency test of the bypass line filters was performed.
The plant has operated at power for the major portion of that time period.
The valve misalignment had no actual impact on the public health. However, in the event of a design basis accident wherein fuel damage and release of primary coolant inside the containment are postulated, the open valves would provide a significant path for a radioactive release from the containment.
The initial design purpose for the bypass system was to provide a long term hydrogencontro}jeapability for the containment atmosphere following a design basis accident.- It was intended that after approximately 30 days following an accident, when containment pressure and activity levels dropped sufficiently to permit venting, this system would be manually valved to vent the containment atmosphere, through high efficiency and charcoal filters, to the exhaust stack.
Thus the components in the bypass line beyond the two manual isolation valves were not designed for the severe service they would be exposed to with the valves open during the initial pressure surge of the design basis accident, and signif-6' icant uncontrolled release would result. High radiation in thi vicinity of the bypass line would also make immediate closing of the manual isolation valves, even if identified as the source of leakage, an extremely hazardous oneratina The principal cause for this event was in proper use and positioning of these valve valve line-up checklist, which is perfonn DUPLICATE DOCUFElff Entire documeht previously 1/ Current NRC requirements call for the entered into system under:
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hydrogen buildup. Palisades has recombin-usi 3M
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