ML19254F616
| ML19254F616 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/31/1979 |
| From: | Arlotto G NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| To: | Fraley R Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19254F617 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-42FR17134, RULE-PR-50 NUDOCS 7911160084 | |
| Download: ML19254F616 (17) | |
Text
,
NOTE T0:
Document Control Room 016 FROM:
D. P. Notley, Engineering Methodology Standards Branch Office of Standards Development Please place the attached document in the PDR using the following file and file points:
PDR File Related Documents (SelectOne)
(Enter if appropriate)
Proposed Rule (PR)
X ACRS Minutes No.
Reg. Guide Proposed Rule (PR)
Draft Reg. Guide Draft Reg. Guide Petition (PRM)
Reg. Guide Effective Rule (Bi)
Petition (PRM)_
Effective Rule (RM)
Federal Register Notice SD Task No. EM-915-1 NUREG Report Contract No.
Subject:
Fire Protection Rule for Operating Nuclear Power Plants 1
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON
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OCT 31 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Raymond F. Fraley, Executive Director Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards FROM:
Guy A. Arlotto, Director Division of Engineering Standards Office of Standards Development
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED FIRE PROTECTION RULE REVIEW REQUEST As per agreement between ACRS staff (P. Tam) and SD staff (D. Notley), 15 copies of the Proposed Fire Protection Rule are enclosed (Enclosure 1) for use by the Fire Protection Subcomittee. This proposed draft rule is scheduled for review by the ACRS Fire Protection Subcomittee on December 5,1979, followed by full Committee review during the regular December meeting.
At the special request of the Director, NRR, this proposed draft rule is under-going expeditious implementation and is therefore being sent to you for review concurrent with NRR staff review.
We plan to have any NRC staff comment resolutions to you by COB, Monday November 19th. is a copy of the mini value-impact statement that was written when value-impact statement will be forwarded gt)f r;ve-man fire b the rule was first proposed and limited to An expande'd th the of er comments by November 19th.
^%,s GuyA.\\ Arlotto, Director DivisipnofEngineeringStandards Office of Standards Development
Enclosures:
1.
Proposed Fire Protection Rule 2.
Mini Value-Impact Statement cc:
!?
6 004 CONTACT:
D. Notley 443-5921
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PART 50.55a CODES AND STANDARDS (k) Fire Protection:
In order to meet the requirements of General Design Criterion 3 - Fire Protection for an ope ating boiling or pressurized water-cooled nuclear power facility, the minimum requirements contained in Appendix R shall be satisfied.
APPENDIX R - FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAF FOR OPERATING B0ILING OR PRESSURIZED WATER-COOLED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS INTRODUCTION Two of the recommendations made by the Special Review Group that investi-gated the March 22, 1975, fire at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant pertained to assurance that the fire protection program at operating nuclear power plants conform to General Design Criterion 3 - Fire Protection contained in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Apper. dix A.
First, that NRC should develop additional specific guidance for implementation of GDC 3 requirements.
- Second, that NRC should make a detailed review of the fire protection program at each operating plant comparing it to the guidance developed per the above recommendation.
In response to the first recommendation, NRC developed Branch Technical Position 9.5.1 Fire Protection for new Nuclear Power Plants, and Appendix A to BTP 9.5.1 - Fire protection for operating plants and plants under licensing review.
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In response to the second recommendation the NRC has required each operat-ing plant to submit a revised Fire Hazard Analysis, and has then reviewed the licensee's analysis, in conjunction with a site visit, against the guidance contained in BTP 9.5.1 and appendix A to the BTP.
During the course of these reviews several ik Nes have refused to accept the staffs interpretation of minimum requirements necessary to conform to GDC-3.
This appendix states those fire protection requirements for light water cooled nuclear power facilities that are considered minimum requirements for those areas to satisfy General Design Criterion No. 3.
The first part specifies the general requirements of an acceptable fire protection program, while specific requirements are contained in the second part.
I.
General Requirements A.
Fire Protection Program A fire protection program shall be established at each plant under the direction of a qualified individual at senior management level who has authority commensurate with the responsibilities of the position.
The program shall establish the fire protection policy for the protection of systems impor-tant to safety at each plant, and the procedures, equipment and personnel requjred to implement the program at the plant site.
The program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection with the aim to:
1.
prevent fires from starting; 2.
rapidly detect, control and extinguish those fires that do occur; 3.
design and construct the plant so that a fire which starts in spite of the fire prevention activities, and which continues to burn in i7'6 006 2
spite of the fixed automatic fire suppression systems will not prevent the safe shut down of the plant.
The fire protection program shall consist of an integrated effort of
- ~
procedures, equipment, and persorinel necessary to carry out the three part defense-in-depth concept.
There are broad overlaps in each of these three steps, but they can be stated in general terms as follows:
Fire Prevention Minimize built-in fire hazards by design and plant o
arrangement.
Identify, eliminate and/or control hazards during nor, mal operation, o
and maintenance, repair, or modification activities.
Fire Detection and Suppression Provide for adequate design, installation, testing and maintenance o
of fixed and portable fire detection and suppression systems and equipment.
Establish, train and equip a fire brigade.
o Safe Plant Shutdown During Fire o
Separate redundant plant shut down systems by fire barriers so that a single fire burning out of control will not jeopardize safe shutdown.
Establish procedures and program to provide surveillance of all plant o
activities to assure passive and active fire protection systems or components are in proper condition.
B.
Passive and Active Systems Passive and active fire protection of appropriate capability ant adequate capacity should be provided for those systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown, with or without off site power.
General'y, 1 7'6 007 3
in plant areas where potential fire damage may jeopardize safe plant shutdown, the primary means of fire protection should consist of fire barriers between redundant systems and both automatic fire detection and suppression systems.
When safe shutdown cannot be assured by barriers and detection and suppression systems, alternate shutdown capability independent of that particular area shall be provided.
C.
Manual Fire Fignting Manual back-up fire lighting capability should be provided throughout the plant to help limit the extent of fire damage.
D.
Access for Manual Fire Fighting Access shall be provided to all areas containing structures, systems and components important to safety to permit effective functioning of the fire brigade.
E.
Fire Hazard Analysis The adequacy of fire protection for any particular plant area shall be determined by analysis of the effects of postulated exposure fires on the ability to safely shut down the reactor, and/or ability to nunimize and control release of radioactivity to the environment.
II.
Specific Reauirements A.
Fire Water Distribution System An underground yard fire main loop shall be installed to furnish anticipated fire protection water requirements.
Two widely separated fresh water supplies consisting of tanks, pumps and piping shall be provided to furnish necessary water volume and pressure to the yard fire main loop.
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Separate redundant suctions from a large body of water will satisfy the requirement for two widely separated water supplies.
Fire pumps and their controllers and pump supplies shall satisfy the requirements af NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) No. 20 - Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps.
B.
Water Supply Minimum fire water storage shall be dedicated by means of a o
vertical standpipe for other water service when storage tanks are used for combined service water / fire water uses.
Other water systems (such as screen wash pumps in the main o
cooling water pump house) shall be permanently connected to the fire main system when such other water systems serve as back up fire water supply.
Such alternate pumps and their associated controls and power supplies shall satisfy the requirements of NFPA 20.
Minimum fire water storage and delivery capability should be o
based on maximum expected water demands for safety related areas or other areas which present fire exposure hazard to safety related areas.
C.
Manual Fire Suppression Standpipe and hose systems shall be installed so that at least one effective hose stream will be able to reach any location that contains, or could present an exposure fire hazard to, safety related equipment.
716 009 5
D.
Automatic Fire Detection Automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant containing or presenting a hazard to safe shutdown or safety related systems or components.
Such fire detection systems shall use one or more of the readily available commercial products such as ionization detectors, fixed temperature-rate or -ise thermal detectors, photo electric light obscuration or light scattering smoke detectors, infra-red flame detectors, or continuous line type thermal detectors.
E.
Automatic Fire Suppression Automatic fixed fire suppression systems shall be provided in areas containing cables or equipment of redundant safety or safe shutdown systems that would be required to bring the plant to hot shutdown.
Alternate safe shut-down capability shall also be provided wherever safe shutdown would be jeopardized because such automatic fire suppression system failed to operate during a fire, or operated but could not control and/or extinguish the fire.
The requirement for automatic fire suppression may be waived when all cables in an area are coated with an approved fire retardant material.
F.
Fire Brigade A plant fire brigade, fully trained and equipped for fire fighthing, shall be established to assure adequate manual fire fighting capability for all areas of the plant containing safe shutdown or safety related systems or components.
The minimum size of the fire brigade shall be at least five members on each shift.
The fire brigade members qualification shall include a physical examination for performing strenuous fire fighting activity.
Equipment provided for the brigade will consist of at least the following:
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Perscnal protective equipment such as turnout coat, boots, gloves, o
hard hat and pressure demand full face shield self contained breathing apparatus of minimum one-half hour rated capac.ity, approved by National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for fire fighting purposes.
o Manual suppression equipment such as portable extinguishers and standpipe and hose with nozzles suitable for the location.
o Other systems and/or equipment necessary for efficient utiliza-tion of the brigade such as:
emergency lighting in access routes to areas containing safety related systems or components; and emergency communication capability throughout the plant.
G.
Fire Brigade Training The fire brigade training program must ensure that the capability to fight potential fires is established and maintained.
The program shall consist a
of an initial classroom instruction program followed by periodic classroom instruction, practice in fire fighting and fire drills:
1.
Instruction a.
The initial classroom instruction shall include:
(1)
Identification of the fire hazards and associated types of fires that could occur in the plant, and an identifi-cation of the location of such hazards.
(2)
Identification of the location of fire fighting equipment for each fire area, and familiarization with layout of the plant including access and egress routes to each area.
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(3) The proper use of available fire fighting equipment, and the correct method of fighting each type of fire.
The types of fires covered should include electrical fires, fires in cables and cable trays, hydrogen fires, flammable liquid, waste / debris fires, and record file fires.
(4)
Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting plan with specific coverage of each individual's responsibilities.
(5) The proper use of communication, lighting, ventilation and emergency breathing equipment.
(6) The direction and coordination of the fire fighting activities (fire brigade leaders only).
(7) The toxic characteristics of expected products of combustion.
(8) The proper method for fighting fires inside buildings and tunnels.
(9) Detailed review of fire fighting procedures and proce-dure changes.
(10) Review of latest plant modifications and changes in fire fighting plans.
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s Note:
Items (9) and (10) do not apply to plant security personnel who may be assigned to the fire brigade.
b.
The instruction shall be provided by qualified individuals knowledgeable, experienced, and suitably trained in fight-ing the types of fires that could occur in the plant, and in using the types of equipment available in the nuclear power plant.
c.
Instruction shall be provided to all fire brigade members and fire brigade leaders.
d.
Regular planned meetings held at least every 3 months shall repeat the classroom instruction program over a two year period.
2.
Practice Practice sessions shall be held for each shift fire brigade on the proper method of fighting the various types of fires which could occur in a nuclear power plant.
These sessions shall provide brigade cembers with experience in actual fire extinguish-ment and the use of emergency breathing apparatus under strenuous conditions.
These practice sessions shall be provided at least once per year for each fire brigade member.
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3.
Drills Fire brigade drills shall be performed in the plant so that the fire brigado can practice a. a team.
Drills shall as a minimum include the following:
a.
Assessment of fire alarm effectiveness, time required to notify and assemble fire brigade, and selection, placement and use of equipment.
b.
Assess each brigade member's knowledge of his role in the fire fighting strategy fcr the area assumed to contain the fire.
Assess the brigade members conformance with estab-lished plant fire fighting procedures and use of fire fighting equipment, including self-contained emergency breathing apparatus, communication equipment, and ventila-tion equipment, to the extent practicable.
c.
The simulated use of fire fighting equipment required to cope with the situation and type of fire selected 'or the drill.
The area and type of fire chosen for the drill should be varied such that brigade members are trained in fighting fires in all safety related areat,.
The situation selected should simulate the size and arranget.nt of a fire which could reasonably occur in the area selected, allowing for fire development due to the time required to respond, to obtain eauipment, and organize for the fire, assuming loss of automatic suppression capability.
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d.
Assessment of brigade leader's direction of the fire fight-ing effort, as to thoroughness, accuracy, and effectiveness.
e.
Drills shall be performed at regular intervals not to exceed 3 months for each shift fire brigade.
Each fire brigade member should participate in each drill, but must partici-pate in at least two drills per year.
A sufficient 1 umber of these drills, but not less than one for each fire brigade oer year, shall be unannounced to determine the fire fighting readiness of the plant fire brigade, brigade leader, and fire protection systems and equipment.
At least one drill per year shall be performed on a "back shift" for each fire brigade.
f.
The drills shall be pre planned to establish the training objectives of the drill, and shall be critiqued to deter-mine how well the training objectives have been met.
Unannounced drills shall be critiqued by members of the management staff responsible for plant safety and security.
g.
At three year intervals, drills shall be critiqued by qualified individuals independent of the licensee's staff.
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4.
Records Records of training provided to each fire brigade member including drill critiques shall be maintained to assure that each member receives training in all parts of the training program.
These records of training should be available for review.
H.
Emergency Lighting Emergency lighting consisting of fixed units with individual 8-hour minimum battery power supply shall be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment, and in access routes to all safety related areas, and other areas presenting a hazard to safety related areas.
I.
Administrative Controls Administrative controls shall be established to minimize external fire hazards in areas containing structures, systems and components important to safety.
These controls shall establish procedures to govern:
1.
the handling and limitation of the use of ordinary combustible materials, combustible and flammable gases and liquids, HEPA and charcoal filters, ion exchange resins, or other combustible supplies in safety related areas, and to assure that these items are not stored in tafety related areas.
2.
transient fire loads during maintenance, modification, or refuel-ing operations, such as combustible and flammable liquids such as cleaning solvents or it5ricating oiles, wood and plastic products, and other combustible materials in buildings contain-ing safety related systems or equipment.
This control should 7'.6 016 12
require an in plant review of proposed work activities to identify potential transient fire loads.
The onsite staff mem-ber designated the responsibility for reviewing work activities for potential transient fire loads should specify the required additional fire protection in the work activity procedure.
3.
control of ignition sources, a flame permit system shall be developed to control welding, flame cutting, brazing or soldering operation.
A separate permit shall be issued for each area where work is to be done, and if work continues over one shift shall be valid for not more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
4.
the removal from the area of all waste, debris, scrap, oil spills, or other combustibles resulting from the work act.ivity immediately following completion of the activity, or at the end of each work shift, whichever comes first.
5.
periodic housekeeping inspections to assure continued compliance with these Administrative Controls.
6.
the use of specific combustibles in safety related areas.
All wood used in safety related areas during maintenance, modifi-cation, or refueling operations (such as lay-down blocks or scaffolding) shall be flame-retardant treated.
Equipment and/
or supplies (such as new fuel) that is shipped in untreated combustible packing containers, may be unpacked in safety related areas if required for other valid operating reasons.
- However, all combustible materials shall be removed from the area J6 Ol7 13
immediately following the unpacking.
Combustible material shall not be left unattended during lunch breaks, shift changes or other similar periods.
Loose combustible packing material such as wood or paper excelsior shall be placed in metal containers with tight fitting self closing metal covers.
J.
Alternate Shutdown Systems If the configuration of fire protection features and the separation (by distance, shield or barrier) between redundant shutdown systems in a fire area does not provide reasonable assurance that safe shttdown capability can be maintained in the event of a major fire, a capability for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions shall be provided which is independent of the specific fire area and which assumes the loss of all redundant safe shutdown cables / equipment contained therein.
Two design condition shall be accommodated:
(1) offsite power is available; and (2) offsite power is not available.
If there are several such areas, the combinations of systems which provide the shutdown capability may be unique fcr each critical area; however, the shutdown capability provided shall be able to achieve and maintain sub-critical reactivity conditions in the reactor, maintain reactor coolant inven-tory, achieve and maintain hot standby
- conditions for a PWR (hot shutdown
- for a BWR) for an extended period of time, achieve cold shutdown
- conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter.
During this transient, the reactor coolant system process variables shall be within those predicted for a loss of normal ac power; the fission product boundary integrity shall not be affected; i.e., there shall not be fuel clad damage, rupture of any primary coolant boundary, or rupture of the containment boundary.
a As defined in the Standard Technical Specifications.
6 018 u
The performance goals for the shutdown functions shall be as follows:
o The reactivity control function shall be capable of achieving and maintainingcoldshutdownreactivityconditions.
The reactor coolant makeup function shall be capable of maintaining o
the reactor coolant level above the top of the core for BWRs and in the pressurizer for PWRs.
o The reactor heat reri^ual function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal.
The process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct o
readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control the above functions.
o The supporting functions shall be capable of providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc. necessary to permit the operation of the equipment used for safe shutdown functions.
The equipment and systems used to achieve and maintain hot standby condi-tions (hot shutdown for a BWR) should be (1) free of fire damage; (2) capable of maintaining such conditions for an extended time period longer than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if the equipment required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown is not available due to fire damage; and (3) capable of being powered by an onsite emergency power system.
The equipment and systems used to achieve and maintain cold shutdown condi-tions should be either free of fire damage or the fire damage to such systems should be limited such that repairs can be made and cold shutdown conditions achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after 716 019 15
the fire should be capable of being powered by an onsite emergency power,, system; those used after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by offsite power.
These systems need not be designed to (1) seismic Category I criteria; (2) single failure criteria; or (3) cope with other plant accidents such as pipe breake stuck valves (Appendix A BTP 9.5-1), except those portions of these systen3 ahich interface with or impact existing safety systems.
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