ML19254E908

Reg Guide 1.101,Revision 1, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants

ML19254E908
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	03/31/1977
From:	NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
To:
Shared Package
ML19254E904	List: ML19254E903 ML19254E908
References
REGGD-01.101, REGGD-1.101, NUDOCS 7911050044
Download: ML19254E908 (15)

Text

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Revision 1 anow

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION March 1977

! ~ ',) REGULATORY GUIDE s.....

OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT REGULATORY GUIDE 1.101 EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS A, INTRODUCTION B. DISCUSSION Section 50.34, " Contents of Applications; The Commission's interest in emergency planning Technical Information," of 10 CFR Part 50,"Licens-is focused primarily on situations that may cause or ing of Production and Utilization Facilities," re-may threaten to cause radiological hazards affecting quires that each application for a license to operate a the health and safety of workers or the public or facility include in a Final Safety Analysis Report resulting in damage to property. Emergency plans

( FS A R), along with other information, the applicant's should be directed toward mitigating the conse-plans for coping with emergencies, including the quences of emergencies and should provide items specified in Appendix E " Emergency Plans for reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can Production and Utilization Facilities," to 10 CFR and will be taken to protect health ant safety and Part 50. Section 100.3 of 10 CFR Part 100," Reactor prevent damage to property in the event of an Site Criteria, 'in the definitions of exclusion area and emergency, Although it is not practicable to develop low population zone, establishes additional criteria a completely detailed plan encompassing every con-for plans to cope with emergencies and serious acci-ceivable type of emergency situation, advance plan-dents.

ning, including the preparation of procedurestoimple-ment the planning objectives and periodic testing by 9

to the Preparation of Emergency Plans for Produc-Appendix E refers to a document entitled " Guide drills and exercises, can create a high ord.t of preparedness and ensure an orderly and timely tion and Utilization Facilities,"' which was decision-making process at times of stress, as well as developed to help applicants establish adequate plans the availability of necessary equipment, supplies, and for coping with emergencies. This regulatory guide services.

provides more complete guidance in developing the emergency plans required in the FSAR for nuclear An important element of emergency planning for power plan * ;. It describes a method acceptable to the nuclear power plants is the recognition of a need for NRC staff for complying with the Commission's active participation in the planning process by those regulations with regard to the content of emergency who have emergency response roles. Federal, State, plans for nuclear power plants, primarily in the and l'ocal agencies, as well as the licensee, have FSAR stage. Ad..tional guidance in the overall area responsibile roles to play in both the planning and the of emergency preparedness is under development and implementation of emergency preparedness will be forthcoming. The Advisory Committee on procedures. Federal interagency responsibilities for Reactor Safeguards has been consulted concerning radiological incident emergency response planning this guide and has concurred in the regulatory posi-were originally set forth by the Federal Office of tion.

Emergency Preparedness (now Federal Preparedness Agency, General Services Administration) in a

, lines indicate substantne changes from preuous issue.

Federal ReE ster Natice (38 FR 2356) Eubl%ed i

Copies may be obtained by request to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D C. 20555. Attention.

January 24, 1973. The Notice was revised as of Director, omce of Nuclear Reactor Regulation December 24, 1975, and published in the Federal USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES com~a s eouid t, -i to ia s <,w

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Register (40 FR 240 The current Notice outlines C. REGULATORY POSITION Federal agencies' responsibilities with respect to radiological emergency response planmng related to 1 Each appheani s emergency plan should include fised nuelcar facilities and to transportation acci-proiisions for coping with emergencies, both within dents insolving radioactive materials. To a large es-the boundary of the plant site and in the ensirons of tent. these responsibilities are directed toward a coor-the site. Responubility for planning and dination of Federal efforts to proude assistance to implementmg all emergency measures within the site State and local gmernments in their planning T%

boundaries rests with the licensee Phnmng and implementation of measures to cope with plant-l pobcy n based on the recogmtion that State and local related emergencies outside the site boundary with I

gosernments have the necessars authority to imple-ment protective measures for the pubhc m their particular emphasis on the low population /one iurisdictions Although Federal agencies can and will should be a coordmated effort involung the hccnsee respond to emergencies arismg from nuclear power and local. State. and Federal agencies hasing plant actiuties if necessary. such response should be emergency responsibilities. The emergency plan regarded primarily as supportn e of. and not as a sub-should describe the coordination of the arrangements stitute for, responsible action by licensees and State and agreements between the hcensee and these agen-and local gmernments The developmen. of an effec-cies.

tive interface between the hcensee and the State and local gosernments in radiological response planning

2. The scope and content of a nuclear power plant is therefore necessary.

emergency plan should be substantially rivalent to that recommended in Annes A. "Orgawation and in the pre aration of emergency plans for a specific Content of Emergency Plans for Nuclear Pow er nuclear power plant, the appbcant should be guided PlantsJ to this guide. To ensure organizational by the following criteria to clarify the scope, content, proficiency in coping with emergencies, provisions and purpose of the document that describes the should be made for an annual review of the emergency plan and for periodic testing, updatmg.

ans.

improving pr cedures based on training, drills.

an I Although considered a part of the Final Safets exercises, and changes on site or in the environs.

Analysis Report, the plans should be prepared and maintained as a separate document.

1 Features and candidate subjects that should be

2. This document should be an expression of the considered m the preparation of specific procedures oserall concept of operation, w hich describes the es-for implementing the emergency plan are described in sential elements of advance plannmg that base been Annex B. " Implementing Procedures for Emergency considered and the prouvons that have been made to Plans." to this guide. Implementing procedures need cope with emergency situations. It should incor-not be incorporated into the plan and are not re-porate information about the emergency response quired to be submitted as part of the Final Safety roles of supporting orgamrations and offsite agen-A naly sis Report to the Commission. These cies. That information should be sufficient to ensure procedures should, however, be available fo-review coordination among the supporting groups and by the Office of Inspection and Enforcemein during between them and the beensee its prehcensing and routme inspections.

1 Details that can reasonably be espected t D. IMPLEMENTATION change from time to time, e g., names and telephone numbers. specific items of equipment and supplies.

The purpose of this section is to provide informa-insentcry Ints, and step-by -step procedures or tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC checklists that may be altered as a result of esperience staffs plans for using this regulatory guide.

or test escrenes. need not be mcorporated irto the plans submitted as part of the Final Safety Analysis Report Howeser detailed procedures that will en.

This guide reflects current Nuclear Regulatory l sure timely and effective implementation of sarious Commission practice. Therefore. except in those I aspects of the emergency plan should be prepared cases m which the appheant proposes an acceptable l alternatise method for complying with specified por-On, NeI Ie e [WaE l'ons of the Commission's regulations. the method t

t described herem is being and will continue to be used tmenems e m.nse su, in surre d i ned N uclea r m the esaluation of Final Safety Analysis Reports l t mimes O

1268 242

=2

ANNEX A ORGANIZATION AND CONTENT OF EMERGENCY PLANS 9-FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

1. DEFINITIONS

2. SCOPE AND APPLIC ABil.lTY This section should provide deGnitiors of any This section of the plan should define the unit terms that are unique to the power plant under con-plant, station, or area to which the plan is appheable sideration or are given connotations that differ from and p usent a summary of the planN inter-normally accepted usage. Listed below are some relationships with (1) its implementing procedures terms used in this guide along with the definitions (2) plant operating, radiological control, and in-that should be applied to these terms when they are dustrial security procedures; (3) other em<.rgency used in emergency plans.

plans of the company (e g., an overall corporate plan); and (4) emergency plans of other participating 1.1 Assessment actions-those actions taken during agencies, particularly the responsible State aFency or or after an accident to obtain and process informa-other governmental authority hasing radiclogical tion that is necessary to make decisions to implement emergency planning responsibilities in the immediate speciGc emergency measures.

offsite area.

1.2 Corrective actions-inose emergency measures

3.

SUMMARY

OF EMERGENCY PLAN taken to ameliorate or terminate an emer ency situa.

tion at or near the source of the problem in order to This se on should describe the key elements of

' prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive overall ei..ergency planning logic, incorporating material or to reduce the magnitude of a release, e.g.,

graded emergency classifications of increasing shutting down equipment, firefighting, repair and severity and theb..ationship to the participating damage control.

status of onsite and offsite persoral and agencies.

1.3 Protective actions-those emergency measures

4. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS taken after an uncontrolled release of radioactive material has occurred for the purpose of preventing 4.1 ClassiGcation Sptem G

or minimizing radiological exposures to persons that would be likely to occur if the actions wcre not taken.

An emergency plan should characterire several classes of emergenc3 situations. The system of clas-1.4 Population at risk-those persons for whom siGcation employed should consist of mutually ex-protective actions are being or would be taken.

clusive groupings (to avoid ambiguity) but should cover the entire spectrum of possible radiological 1.5 Recovery actions-those actions taken after the emergency situations. Succinct verbal rather than emergency to restore the plant as nearly as possible to numerical or alphabetical classification designations its preemergency condition.

are recommended to gise better immediate mforma-tion to personnel as to the scope and character of the I.6 Protecin - action guides (PAG)-projected situation. The system of classification should be com-radiological dose or dose commitment values to in-patible with the system used by the State and local dividuals in the general population that warrant governments. Each class defined should be associated protective action following a release of radioactive with a particular set ofimmediate actions to be taken material. Protective actions would be warranted to cope with the situation. (These actions should be provided + reduction in individual dose expected to described in Section 6.) This section should note that be achiewd by carrying out the protective action is various classes of accider,ts require a graded scale of not offset by excessive risks to individual safety in responses. For example, a fire may begin as a small taking the protective action. The PAG does not in-problem but then increase in severity and therefore clude the dose that has unavoidably occurred prior to move up from one class of accident to another.

the assessment.

Specific implementing procedures should be 1.7 Emergency action levels-radiological dose prepared for each identined class of emergency (see rates: specific contamination lesels of airborne.

A.nex B).

waterborne, or surface-deposited concentrations of radioactne materials; or specific mstrument indica-An acceptable classification scheme is fescribed in tions (including their rates of change) that may be qualitative terms in Sections 4.1.1 through 4.1.5. This used as thresholds for initiating such specific part of the emergency plan should describe the emergency measures as designating a particular class criteria for characterizing each class and the criteria of emergency, initiating a notificatis procedure, or or speciGe emergency action levels to be used to l I

initiating a particular protectise action.

recognize and declare each class or subclass.

1.101-3 1268 2 0

41.1 Perwonel I mersenes threats or m il disturbance; severe natural phenomena in the plant ensironment such as a flood.

T ho clan msohes.iccidents or occurrences onsite earthquake, tsunami, hurricane, or tornado in which emergency treatment of one or more in-emerFency situations such as nearby industrial o dividuak is required it includes those situations that forest fires: or release of a toxic or noxious gas in or hase no potential for escalation to more sesere near the plant. This section cf the emergency plan emergency conditions T here may be no effect on the should ide tify specific candidate situations for plant, and immediate operator action to alter plant Emergency Alerts and the criteria that would he used statut u not necemrily required. A Personnel to recognize and declare this class.

Emergency does not actnate the entire emergency organization but may activate such teams as the first and team. It may also require special local services such 41.3 Plant (Unit) Emergency as ambulance and medical Emerg ncies in this class can reasonably be expected to occur durmg the life of This class mcludes physical occurrences within the the plant-plant requiring staff emergency organization response. The initial assessment leading to this class Implementing procedures for handhng this class of should indicate that it is unlikeh that an offsite emer9ency may ako be incorporated m the plant.

hazard w ill be created. H ow e'ver, substantial rad stion protection puedures and general in-modification of plant operating status is a highh dustrial safety procedures.

probable corrective action if it has not already taken

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Included in this class are injuries that may be com-place by the automatic protective systems. Although plicated by contamination problems or ' excessive this class is associated with a judgment that the emergency situation can be corrected and controlled radiation exposures to onsite personnel.

by the plarit staff, notification of corporate head-Recogmtion of this class of emergency is primarily 4.uarters and, in turn, notification of appropriate off-a judgment matter for plant supervisory or manaFe-site agencies to alert them as to the nature and extent f the incident should be measures associated with ment personnel. Its importance as part of the clas-this class. F_or example, incidents such as fires that sifica tion scheme rests to some extent on its "negatn e" information content, viz, that the incident may have a significant potential for triggering a rele se of radioactise materials to the offsite environs gising rise to the emergency is restricted in its scope of insobement. This section of the plan should should require that the licensee notify the principa designate the classification criteria and should resp nsible State and local agency of the plant status enumerate discrete accident situations that could gise The licensee would then recommend that the perti-nent ffsite agencies required to respond to a par-rise to the Personnel Emergency class.

ticular emergency be contacted, apprised of the situa-41.2 Emergenes Alert tion, and directed to assume an alert condition (short

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of mobilization) until further notice. The offsite apn-This class msohes specific situations that can be cies would be expected to remain in this condition un-recognized as creating a hazard potential that was til either the plant was veriGed to be in a safe condi-previously nonexistent or latent. The situation has tion or until one of the other emergency classification not yet caused damage to the plant or harm to per.

categories was indicated, possibly requiring further sonnel and does not necessarily require an immediate action by offsite emergency response personnel.

change in plant operating status. Inherently, Protective evacuations or isolations of certain plant however, this is a situation in which time is available areas may be necessary. This class of emergency can to take precautionary and constructive steps to pre.

also reasonably be expected to occur during the life of vent an accident and to mitigate the consegurnces a plant.

should it occur. Emergency Alert situations may be brought on bs eit her manmade or natural Examples of situations that might fall into this phenomena and can reasonably be expected to occur class are those accidents analyzed in the FSAR as during the hfe of the plant.

esents that are predicted to have insufficient radiological consequences offsite to warrant taking Emergency Alert conditions imply a rapid transi.

protectne measures. Fires and explosions in the plant I tion to a state of readmess by plant personnel and having no radiological consequences offsite will possibly by offsite emergency support orgamiations.

generally fall mto this class. although they may also the possible cessation of certam routine functions or be treated as separate and distmet emergency clas-actisities within the plant that are not immediately es.

sification categories.

I sential, and possible precautionars actions that a speciGc situation may require. Examples of situations

"d' "I rnemes to wee.a set unn inadena should be

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jewfibed in the fauht) phpical scunty plan required punuant that,.hould be placed in this class are threats to or m o R w % and nould be withheid trorn pubhc daciosu

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breaches of plant security measures such as bomb punuant m m a R : mei l

1.101-4 1268 244

ctivation levels for declaring Plant Emergencies quire corroborating evidence from two independent should be based on (1) the recognition of an im-sources that provide input to the control room. The ;

mediate need to implement in-plant emergency bases and criteria used to specify these emergency ac- !

casures to protect or provide aid to affected persons tion levels should be described and their relationship in the plant or to mitigate the consequences of to protective action guides explained. Licensees damages to plant equipment; (2) a positive observa-should use, and should recommend to local and State tion that effluent and other radiological monitors authorities for use, protective action guides incor-shi w no indication of a possible Site Emergency; and porated in Federal agency guidance.'

l (3) a positive observation that there is no apparent 4.1.5 General Emergency breach of any fuel cladding, primary system boun.

dary, or containment. This section should describe Hypothetical accidents hase been postulated that the alarm conditions or combinations ref alarm condi-have the potential for serious radiological conse-tions and the emergency action levels for initiating a quences to public health and safety. Although the Plant Emergency, likelihood of occurrence of such an esent is extremely 4.l.4 Site (Station) Emergency low, emergency plans should include a General Emergency class which provides for early warning of Emergency situations more sesere than plant the public and prompt initiation of protective actions emergencies are not expected to occur during the life within the low population zone. Provision should of a plant because of design features and other also be made for modification or expansion of measures taken to guard against their eccurrence.

protective actions, based on conditions prevailing at Nevertheless, it is considered necessary and prudent the time of an accident, to include areas in w hich pro-to make provisions for a class that involves an un-jected doses to individuals would be likely to exceed controlled release of radioactive materials into the the upper limits of protective action Fuides.

air, water, or ground to an extent that the initial as-sessment indicates the advisability of considering Emergency action levels and other criteria for protective action offsite. Mobilization and readiness declaring a General Emergency should be specified in of principal offsite emergency organizations is a terms of information readily available in the control recommended measure. Protective actions are likely room. Such information should include the status of to include evacuation of plant areas other than con-engineered safeguards. The selection of the levels trol rooms and emergency stations; they should in-should be guided solely by postulated conditions within the plant' that would be likely to lead to 9clude, for example, the evacuation of construction personnel when additional units are under construc-serious releases of radioactise products into the at-tion on the same site. Associated assessment actions mosphere. An acceptable planning basis is the most include provisions for monitoring the environment.

serious design basis accident analyzed for siting pur-Situations falling into this class include those acci-dents analyzed in the FSAR that could result in Coordination with local authorities is an essential releases of radioactise materials to the environment.

element of the planning for this class to ensure the The releases would be of sufficient magnitude to war-availability of mechanisms for early warning of the rant consideratbn of protective measures offsite to public.

minimize potential health hazards due to resulting abnormal lesels of airborne or deposited radioactise 4.2 Spectrum of Postulated Accidents materials? '

Accident analysis sections of Safety Analysis Emergency action levels for declaring a Site Reports are primarily concerned with the design Emergency should be defined (1) in terms of instru-responses of a plant to postulated malfunctions or ment readings or alarms that annunciate in the con-equipment failure and include estimates of the trol room, including indications of the functioning of radiological consequences of discrete accidents. By safety systems and the readout from effluent contrast, emergency planning is concerned with in-monitors and (2) alternatively in terms of specific dividual and organizational responses to the con-contamirr ;on lesels in environmental media, e.g.,

tinuum of potential accident situations, including water, soil, vegetation, milk. To avoid unnecessary those discrete accidents that have been h 'othesized.

response to false alarms, the activation criteria for This section of the emergency plan should describe control room monitors should be defined so as to re-how the postulated accidents are encompassed within the emergency characteritation classes and should

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''al for the De clopment of Radiatio Protec.

ovide a summar>' anal) sis of their implications for tion Standards i ederal Radiation ( eunal. Report No 5. Juls

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emergency planning. Implications to be considered tw and Report No t sta> 19c should include (1) instrumentation capability for "stanuai or Protect.se scoon Guides and Protecim Actions for prompt detection and continued assessment and (2) 9 Nudcar inodents" K hapter 21. U.S Enur, mental Protection Apena -l P s.5 20l l.'54101. September 19'S

• See 10 CF R Part Inn. footnote i to (lon 11 1.101-5 1268 245

manpower needs in relation to the anticipated se-5.3 Augmentation of Onsite Emergency Organi ation quence and timing of events.

This :-@ 60uld describe tv o categories of off-

5. ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL OF site support assistance to the plant staff emergency EMERGENCIES organization.

Starting with the normal operating organizat6n as 5.3.1 Licensee Headquarters Support a base, this section of the plan should descabe the emergency organization that would be acovated on Headquarters management, administrative, and the site and its augmentation and extension offsite.

technical personnel should be prepared to augment Authorities and responsibilities of key individuals the plant staffin the performance of certain functions and groups should be delineated. The communica-required to cope with an emergency. The following tion links established for notifying, alerting, and special functions are considered appropriate for mobilizing emergency personnel should be identified.

headquarters support and should be incorporated in the overall plan, although company policy and 5.1 Normal Plar.t Organization organizational features may dictate variations in modes of assigning responsibilities for these functions Both day and night shift staffs (crews) should be among headquarters personnel, plant staff personnel, described, indicating clearly who is in the immediate and outside support organizations:

onsite position of asponsibility for the plant or sta-tion and his authority and responsibility for declaring an emergency.

1. Environs monitoring,

2. Logistics support for emergency personnel, e.g.,

5.2 Onsite Emergency Organization transportation, temporary quarters, food and water, sanitary facilities in the field, and special equipment This section should describe the onsite emergency and supplies procurement, organization of plant staff personnel for both day

3. Technical support for planning and and night shift situaticns.

reentry / recovery operations,

4. Notification of governmental authorities, and 5.2.1 Direction and Coordination

5. Release ofinformation to news media during an emergency coordinated with governmental The position title of that person onsite who is authorities.

designated to take charge of emergency control measures should be clearly identified. A specific line of succession for this authority should also be given.

The emergency organization status of supporting A policy statement describing the scope of authority headquarters personnel should be specified, relative and responsibility vested in that role by the company particularly to the person directing the plant (applicant) should be included. Function d respon-emergency organization.

sibilities assigned to this individual siould be described.

In some instances, companies may provide for cer-5.2.2 Plant Staff Emergency Assigmmnts tain emergency supporting services to their plants by contracts with private organizations. Where this is The plan should specify the organizational groups the case, the nature and scope of the support services l to which the following additional functional areas of should be characterized here. (When such contractors emergency activity are assigned, including an indica-are used, evidence of their qualifications may be re-tion of how the assignments are made for both day quested.) Specific services by contractors Mould be and night shifts and for plant staff members both on-identified at the appropriate places in the emergency site and away from the site. Functional areas should plan.

include.

1. Plant systems operations.

5.3.2 Local Services Support

2. Radiological sursey and monitoring,

3. Firefighting.

This section should identify the extension of the

4. Rescue operations.

organizational capability for handling emergencies to

5. First aid, be provided by ambulance, medical, hospital, ~1d

6. Decontamination, firefighting organizations. Evidence of the arrange-

7. Security of plant and access control.

ments and agreements reached with such organiza-

8. Repair and damage control, tions should be included in an appendix. This section

4. Personnel accountability, should contain references to that appendix and to the

10. Recordkeeping. and parts of the plan in which the functions of these

11. Commumcations organizations are described.

u '*

1268 246

5 Coordination with Participating Gmernment class and its associa.ed emergency orgam/ation Ihe A p ncies additional measures may be organized into awe +

ment actions, corrective actions, protectne actions.

Tha ection should identify the principal State and aid to affected persons, where applicable to each agency (designated State authority) and other class.

gosernmental agencies (local. county State, and Federal) having action responsibilities for 6.1 Activation of Emergenc3 Organiiation radiological emergencies in the area in which the plant is located. If the boundary line between two The emergency conditions classified m Sectian 4 I political entities, e g.. counties or States, passes insolve the alerting or activation of progrcunels within the low-population zone or within approx-larger segments of the total emergency orgam/ation.

imately four miles of the site, agencies from both This section should describe the communication steps gosernmental entities should be included. Subsec-taken to alert or activate emergency personriel under tions for each such agency should include:'

each class of emergency. In particular, action lesels (based on readings from a number of sensors in-

1. The identity of the agency.

cluding the pressure in containment, the response of

2. A description of the authority and responsibility the ECCS. etcJ for notification of offsite agencies of the agency for emergency preparedness planning should be described. The existence, but not the and for emergency response, particularly in relation details.of a message authentication scheme should be to those of the licensee and to those of o:her agencies.

noted for such agencies.

3. A description for each agency of specific response capabilities in terms of the expertise of per-6.2 Assessment Actions sonnel and other organizational resources available.

Copies of written agreements with such agencies Effectise coordination and direction of all elements should he included in an appendix. The information of the emergency organization require continuing as-a clear concept of radiological sessment throughout an emergency situation. The shmid provide, response operations.

details of assessment functions should be incor-

4. Actisation of the agency function, including ti-porated in explicit implementing procedures for each ties and alternates for both ends of the communica-emergency classification. This sectioishould include, Geommumc. and primary and alternative means of tion links however, a description of the methodolegies and ation. Administrative control methods techniques to be used by the licensee That descrip-that will ensure the effective coordmation and control tion should give reasonable assurance that the j of the emergency activities of support organizations magnitude of releases of radioactive materials can be I should be established.

determined, that the magnitude of any resulting i The designation and location of the Emergenc) radioactive contamination can be determined, that Operations Center of each State / local government projected exposure to persons onsite or offsite can he estimated, and that emergency action levels specified agency -

can be determined, all in a timely manner.

Tspical agencies to be included here are law en-6.3 Correctise Actions fore'ement agencies, departments of health or en-uronmental protectio 1 civil defense or emergency /

In some emergency situations, actions can be taken disaster control agencies, and the regional co-to correct or mitigate the situation at or near the ordinatmg offices of USERDA's Radiological As-source of the problem (for esample. to prevent an un-sistance Program.

controlled release of radioactive materials or to reduce the magnitude of a release). Such actions

6. EMERGENCY MEASURES should be considered as a supplement to design features and as both a backup and an extension of Specific emergency measures should be identified automatically initiated actions. Proficiency in correc-m thn section /or cach emergenct clau and related to tive ctions should constitute a major objectisc ol the action les els or criteria that specify when the measures are to be implemented.

traimng eff rt and onsite drill program. This section should identify those actions, e g., fire control.

repair. and damage control, that can and would be The planning represented bs this section should implemented when necessary.

lead to more detailed emergency procedures and as-signments for executing tasks by appropriate 6.4 Protectise Actions members of the emergency organization. Emergency measures begin with the activation of an emergency This section should describe the nature of protec-tise actions for which the plan provides, the criteria i k an alternaine method of prouding the informati a requested in these whsestiont the.ipptwant may choose to wbmit copies of "If applicable. reference should be made to We desripison talled ush agenoci radiologisal emergency response plans as eudence for in Regulators Guide I 'O. Section 9 s 1. "I are Prot es tion

% tem '

i of auertaNe soordination 1268 247 1.lpi 7

for implementing these protectise actions, the area special equipment or st pphes. Measures that should~

involsed, and the means of notifying or warning the be consinered fo. persons within the exclusien area persons or population at risk. Describe also steps include taken (1) to provide to sisitors to the plant or site and (2) to make available on request to occupants in the

1. Indisidual respiratory protection, low population zone information concerning how the

2. Use of protective clothing, and emergency plans provide for notification to them and

3. Use of radioprotectise drugs, e.g., individual how they can expect to be advised what to do.

thyroid protection.

6.4.1 Protective Cover, Evacuation, Personnel Ac-For each measure that might be used, a description countability should be given of:

The emergency plan should provide for timely I. Criteria for issuance, relocation of persons in order to prevent or minimize

2. Locations of items, and exposure to radiation and radioactive materials. The

3. Means of distribution.

following items should be included:

6.4.3 Contamination Control Measures

1. Plant Site Provisions should be made for preventing or minimizing direct or subsequent ingestion exposure

a. Action criteria.

to radioactive materials deposited on the ground or

b. The means and the time required to warn or other surfaces. Control of in-plant contamination advise persons involved, i.e.,

should be described in specific radiological protec-tion procedures and need not be repeated here.

(1) Employees not having emergency assign-

ments, 6.4.3.1 Plant Site (2) Working and nonworking visitors, (3) Contractor and construction personnel, Protective actions within the exclusion area but I

(4) Other persons who may be in the public utside of fenced security areas should be described access areas on or passing through the site or within nd should include, where applicable:

the exclusion area.

a. Isolation or quarantine and area access control,

b. Control of the distribution of affected

c. Evacuation routes, transportation of person-nel, and reassembly areas, including alternatives for agricultural products, including milk, inclement weather and high traffic density.

c. Control of water supplies, and

d. Missing persons check.

d. Criteria for permitting return to norma' use.

e. Radiological monitoring of evacuees.

Action criteria (Protective Action Guides) ar.d responsibility for implementation of the measures 3 Offsite Areas, planned should be described.

a. Actions planned to protect persons in the low population zone and criteria for their implementa-6.4.3.2 Offsite Areas" tion

b. The roeans and the time required to warn or Protective actions planned for the low population advise the persons involved, including:

z ne with provisions for extending such actions to areas farther from the site boundary, if necessary.

(1) Businesses, properts owners, and tenants:

should be described and should include the same ele-(2) Schoo's or recreational facilities; and ments as in 6.4.3.1 above.

(3) General public.

6.5 Aid to Affected Personnel 6 4.2 Use of Onsite Protective Equipment and Supplies This section of the emergency plan should describe measures that will be used by the licensee to provide Additional protectise actions that should be con.

necessary assistance to persons injured or exposed to sidered in emergency planning include measures for radiation and radioactive material. The following minimizing the effects of radiological exposures or matters should Se included:

contammation problems bs the onsite distribution of The L S Food and I) rug Admuiistration n presently deseloping

'If the informanon requested here is included in s opies of guidanse for the use of radioprotestise drugs radmloghal ernerFeno resporne plans of applisable geserrn,ent agen.es bee f ootnote to Section 5 JL si need not he repeated Refer to footnote to Sechon 6 412 s

}hh [

1.101-8

,6.5.1 Emergency Personnel Exposure should also be described Their locations should be related to the reactors, prevailing wind direction. and This should specify exposure guidehnes for entr) evacuation routes.

l or reentry to areas in order to (1) remose injured

, persons and (2) undertake corrective actions. Ex-7,2 Communications S stems 3

posure guidelines should also be speciGed for l emergency personnel who will be providing first aid, This should gisc brief descriptions of both onsite decontammation, ambulance, or medical treatment and offsite communications systems. including services to injured persons and a description of how redundant power sources that would be required to these guidelines will be implemented. Methods for perform vital functions in transmitting and recen ng permitting volunteers to receive radiation exposures info;mation throughout the course of an emergency in the course of carrying out lifesaving activities 7.3 Assessment Facilities should ensure expeditious decisionmaking and a reasonable balance of relative risks?

Many of the emergency measures described in Sec-6.5.2 Decontamination and First Aid tion 6 will depend on the availability of momtoring instruments and laboratory facilities. This section Capabilities for decontaminating personnel should should list monitoring systems tha' are to be used to be included, along with a brief description of Grst aid initiate emergency measures, as well as those to be training and capabilities of appropriate members of used for continuing assessment. The listing should be the emergency organization.

organized as follows:

6.5.3 Medical Transportation 7.3.1 Onsite Systems and Equipment Arrangements for transporting injured personnel,

l. Geophysical phenomena monitors, e.g.,

who may also be radiologically contaminated, to meteorological, hydrologic, seismic.

medical treatment facilities should be specified.

2 Radiological monitors, e.g., process, area, emergency, efnuent, and portable monitors and 6.5.4 Medical Treatment sampling equipment.

3. Process monitors, e.g., reactor coolant system Arrangements made for local and backup hospital pressure and temperature, containment pressure and and medical services and the capability for the temperature, liquid levels, How rates, status or lineup 9 evaluation of radiation exposure and uptake should of equipment components.

be described.

4. Fire detection devices.

For both hospital and medical service, the plan 7.3.2 Facilities and Equipment for Offsite i

should incorporate assurance not only that the re-Monitoring quired services are available, but also that persons providing them are prepared and qualified to handle

1. Geophysical phenomena monitors.

radiological emergencies. Written agreements with

2. Radiological momtors.

respect to arrangements made by the applicant

3. Laboratory facilities, Gxed or mobile.

should be included in the appendix.

7.4 Protectise Facilities and Equipment

7. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Specific facilities and equipment that are mtended t serve a protective function should be described.

This section of the emergency plan should identify, The description of shelter or assembly areas should j describe briefly, and give the locations of items to be emphasize those features that en<.ure their adequacy I used or maintained by the licensee. Where ap-with respect to their capacity for accommodating the propriate, references may be made to apphcable sec-

~

number of persons expected and with respect to tions of the Final Safety Analysis Report for ad-shielding, ventilation, and inventory of supplies, in-ditional detail.

ciuding, for example, respiratory protection, protec-tive clothing, portable lighting, and commumcations 7.1 Emergency Control Centers equipment. If design and other details are provided This should include the principal and, if prosided elsewhere in the Final Safety Analysis Repo.', only a for, alternative onsite locations from which effectise brief summary need be gnen.

emergency control direction is gnen. One alternatise offsite location under the jurisdiction of the applicant 7,5 First Aid and \\ledical Facilities

%uonal ( ounul on Radiation Protection and sicasurernents.

l WRI) Herort No A summary description of onsite laeilities should R " Haw Radunon Protestion Cntena." n.

sued lanuan it wl. rues 99.in:

be presided. (Offsite medical facilitws should be 1.101-9 1268 249

identified in the appenda (Section 10 of Annes A to Thn plan should also provide for quarterli drills thn regulatory guide) along with the agreements Mr fire team (fire brigade) mem bers. annual fire proudmg for their use )

emergency drills contain.ng provnions for a p r ticipation by an offsite fire department, and anr 7.t> I)amage ( ontrol Equipment and Supplies drills of repair and damage control teams Th should be conducted as realistically as is reasonab y A summary description of onsite damage control possible. Provisions should be made for critiques of equipment and supplies should be provided.

all drills and exercises. Training should melude delineation of methods to evaluate its effectiseness

8. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY and to correct weak areas through feedback with PREPAREDNESS emphasis on schedules, lesson plans. practical train-This section of the plan should describe the means to be employed to ensure that the plan will continue 8.1.3 Emergency Planning Coordinator to be effectise throughout the lifetime of the facility.

It is suggested that licensees establish and maintain 8.1 Organi ational Preparedness on the normal plant operating staff an Emergency 8.1.1 Traimng -

Planning Coordinator whose responsibility should include the coordination of offsite emergency plann-This should melude a description of specialized in-ing efforts. Principal duties of this position may be itial trainmg and periodic retraining proFrams to be described in this section.

provided to each of the following categories of emergency personnel:

8.2 Reilew and Updating of the Plan and Procedures

1. Directors or coordinators of the plant Provision should be made for an annual review of emergency organaation.

the emergency plan and for updating and improving

2. Personnel responsible for accident assessment.

procedures to incorporate results of training and meludmg control room shift personnel.

drills and to account for changes onsite or in the en-

3. Radiological monitoring teams v rons. Means for maintaining all coordinate ele-

4. Fire control teams (fire brigades).

ments of the total emergency organization informed

5. Repair and damage control teams.

of the plan and revisions to the plan or relevant

6. First aid and rescue teams.

procedures should be described. Provisions

7. Local sersices personnel.

reviewing and updating all written agreement

8. Medical support personnel least every two years should be included.

9. Licensee's headquarters support personnel.

8.3 Maintenance and Imentory of Emergenc3 Equip-81.2 Drills and Esercises ment and Supplies This section should describe prosisions for the con.

duct of periodic drills and esercises to test the ade.

The operational readiness of all items of emergency quacy of timmg and content of maplementing equipment and supplies should be ensured. The procedures and methods, to test emergency equip-provisions for performing maintenance, surveillance ment, and to ensure that emergency orgamtation per-testing, and inventory on emergency equipment and sonnel are famihar with their duties. Preplanned supplies should be described.

descriptions or simulations of accider.ts or similar esents should be used to prepare scenarios ap-

9. RECOVERY propriate to.the objectises of each drill or exercise.

This section should describe general plans, m-The plan should proside for an mitial esercise ciuding applicable criteria, for restoring the plant as prior to loadmg of the first umt at any site and for an-nearly as may be possible to a safe status.

nual exercaes thereafter using scenarios appropriate to ;he Site Emergency or General Emergency clas-10 APPENDIX siGcations of Section 4.1 Each of these esercises should contain prousions for coordination with and The appendis should include the following itemv i

participation of of fsite emergency personnel, in-cludine those of State and !ccal gosernment agencies.

l. Copies of agreement letters with offsite Each eserene should test, as a minimum, the com-emergency response sunnorting orgamzations and mumcations links and notiheation procedures with cgg,,s gr summaries of referenced interfacing those offsite agenaes to demonstrate that capabiht}

emergency plans.

for early warnmg of the pubht is maintained 2 Plots of calculatect time-distance-dose for see aim Fenie <.mac i 's I ue Prmesm Guidetres fm N uclear Pn e K. i most serious design basis accident as called for in 1268 250 i m'""

latest reusion of Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard

5. Listings by general category of emergenc3 kits.

g Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for protective equipment. and supplies that are stored Nuclear Power Plants." Section 13.3-1.a. -1.b, and and maintained for emergency purposes. A detaded catalog of individual items should not he included in

-1.c.

3. A map or maps, drawn to suitable scale and clearly legible, that reflect the information called for in Regulatory Guide 1.70. Section 13.3-6.a. and -6.b.,

The written procedures t.i.cmselves and a detailed and display the. cxclusion area and low population catalog of protective quipment and supplies should zone bound. ries.

be available at the plant site for inspection at any

4. Listings, by title, of written procedures that time by a representative of the Commission's Office implement the plan.

of Inspection and Enforcement.

~1268 251 O

l.101-11

ANNEX B IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES FOR EMERGENCY PLANS This anna prosides guidance regarding the order and logical sequence. The instructions show preparation and content of procedures that imple.

he sufficiently detailed for a qualified individual to ment the emergenes plan.

perform the required actions without supervision but need not proude a completely detailed description of

1. CONTENT AND FORMAT OF PROCEDURES the actions. methods, or processes.

This section describes desirable features that if the user is gisen the latitude to esercisejudgment sh wld be incorporated. where appropriate, into in-in imple nenting specific actions or parts of the diudual implementmg procedures.

procedure guidelines should be provided in the I.I Organisation and Responsibilities 1.4.3 Cautions and Precautions Each procedure should specify the indnidual or orgamrational element haung the authority and important steps or precautions should be noted or responsibihty for performing specific critical tasks highhghted within the procedure.

covered by the procedure.

1.4.4 References 1.2 Action I.eiels When procedural steps require other functions or Emergency action lesels and protectne action jobs to be performed the controlling procedure guides should be specified in procedures, along with should contain the reference to other applicable the emergency actions or protectise actions required procedures.

and the mdiuduals or organizational units responsi-ble for their implementation.

1.4.5 Signoff Sheci.s and CFecklists 1.3 Actions by Support Agencies Comptes or lengthy controlling procedures should hase prosisions for signoff sheets or checklrsts The specific actions to be performed by support document the fact that required actions have b groups should be identined m the procedures dealing taken or base been completed. Examples inct with their actiuties. If the emergency actions per-notification call hsts and personnel accountability formed by these groups cequire coordmation with checks.

other elements of the emergency organization, the particulars and requirements of this coordmation

2. SCOPE AND IMPLEMENTING should be specified in the controlling procedure PROCEDURES 1.4 Procedure Format 2.1 Immediate Action Procedures A rigid format ler implemen:me proctdures is not suggested in this guide An acceptable format should There should be a separate procedure for each displas the action steps so the user of the proceaure identified class o' emergeny to specify and imple-car ciearh understand hn duties. The format of ment the preplanned response actions required for procedures that specify immediate actions to be taken that emergency condition. Each procedure should (1) has special signiheance because the user needs brief cle rly identify the action level, the protectise action and esplicit mstructions that can be followed easil.

guide. or the conditions for declaring the emergency and quickh.

e ndition;(2) list by priority the individuals and ele-

~

ments of the emergency organization that are to be I Al Conditions and Prerequnites notified and mobilized, and (3) specify the emergency actions that are to be taken by designated indiuduals 1 ach procedure should esplain the prerequisites and elements of the emergency organization. Com t and condit,ons that should esnt before the specified mumcations procedures acknowledgerr ents of orders and reports, actions or operations are performed These should be the form of action lesels or protectise action of relatne priority of communications with the scene m

g uides.

of the emergency, site emergency control center, con-l trol room. outside actiuties. etc. Effectise methods i i ; 2 Actions and 1 imitations for rapid internal and external transmission ofinf mation may include prepositioned messages (fil!

' rocedures should present the required actions m a the blanks 'n speciGed sequencet mstructions for succinet and conene manner and m step-by-step of soice (telephone and radio transmission) ano,

1268 252 i ioi-':

! telew w f acsimde tNNL use at manual status T he procedures should deugnate mdnaduak has-l boards hir details of the emergency, and use of maps.

mg the responubihty of accountmg for persons charts and plant configuration drawmps f or ute and withm areas and huddmps withm the ute The

'otal areas required hs unes A 10 3 procedures should contam appropriate checksheets and ugnoffs and should provide for reportmg of m-i formation to the central authority in charge of the 2.2 l'mcreenc3 \\ction Prondurn The following sectmns hst sublects that should be cosered by written procedures T he titles of specific 2 2 6 Awewment Actmns procedures, as well as their contents may sary among hcensees but the actions or subjects described Procedures should describe the mtem for gather-below should be cosered within the group of mg mformatmn and data on which to base decisions procedures that implement the emergency plan to escalate or deescalate emerFency response actmnt They should identify the types and sources of infor-mation available such as control room radiological 2 2.1 Notificatmns and meteorological instruments and radiation and Call hsts to alert and mohibre the emergency contamination lesel as defined by in-plant. site boun-organization and supportmg agencies should be dary, and onsite and offsite surveys. The procedures specified f or each identified class of emergency. If call should specify action lesels(based on readings from a Ints are not too lengthy or comples, they should be number of sensors including the pressure in contain-incorporated mto the immediate action procedure.

ment, the response of the ECCS. etc.). protective ac-tion guides, and other guidelines as a basis for deci-2.2.2 Radiological Surveys sions to initiate emergency measures and actions or to terminate or otherwise modify emergency actions Procedu res should specify the methods, and in progress. The procedures should assign respon-preplanned locations if feau,ble, for emergency sibilities for gathermg and using assessment dato and radiological sursep in the plant and in the environs information.

of the plant. The procedures should include or refer to requirements for providing co ected data and in-2.2.7 First Aid and Medical Care n

formation to the indnidual or orgamiational element The procedures that specify the methods and in-S responsible for emergency assessment lunctions structions for recening, transporting, and handling 2.23 Personnel Mon,toring and Decontammation injured persons and provioing for their medical treat-ment should specificalh include the precautions and The procedures shou d require memtoring of m-special handhng required for contammated patientt or other areas The procedures should cover separately the provi-dniduals leasing restricted areas known or suspected to be contammated. The smns for and use of medical treatment facilities in procedures should specify contamination lesels that both onsite and offsite areas.

require decontammath.n actiont.They should aho mclude or refer to decontamination procedures for 2.2.8 Firefighting sarious types and lesek of radioactne contamma-tion in addition to the normal hazards of firefighting such as flame. heat, smoke, toxic gas structural 2.2 41 vacuatmn of Onute Areas failure, electric shock, etc., the procedures should aho coser precautions for fighting fires insohmg Procedures for evacuation should include the ac' radioactise materials and for situations where tmn lesch that require esacuation of specified areas' firefighters mas otherwise be exposed to radiation.

buildmps, and the site. Primary and secondar)

They sho-cover the responsibilities and esacuation routes and assembly areas should be cardbihties u. ooth in-house and offsite firefighting deugnated. T hese procedures should refer to or be teams and equipment. They should include specific related to tnose procedures for personnel account-instructions for monitoring the exposure to radiation abihty and personnel monitoring.

of offsite personnel involved in firefighting.

2.2.5 Personnel Accountahiht) 2.2.4 Reentry A method of personnel accountabihts should be Procedures and guidelmes should be deseloped f or specified in procedures to ensure that, at all timet all reentry to presiously esacuated areas for the pur-mdniduah within the site conlines and arcas and poses of sn mg ines, search and rescue of missmg buildings withm the site are warned of immment and mjured persons or mampulation. repair. or threats or hazardous conditions and esacuated f rom recosety of critical equmment or systems Specitic atfected areas it required guidehnes should be meluded in these procedures for I ~ 101 - 1 ~1 1268 53 z

masimum emergency radiation esposures tor reentrs strumentation should be prepared.nd stored with '

and rescue per sonnd. I'roce d u res should be the equipment. Procedurcs should melude msentory deseloped for permittmg solstary acceptance ol hsts 01 kits. equipment. and mstrutnents and prosi-emergency exposure for hfesasing actions, uans f oi periodie insentory inspection cahbration.

2.2.10 Plant Securio The normal pl.m t security procedures should proside for security and access control during The traming program for the emergency organi7a-emergency conditions and should include provisions tion should be documented in the form of schedules for unencumbered access by emergency schicles and and lesson plans or lesson outimes The program personnel.

should include training for heensee employees and for offsite organizations and personnel who are to 2.2.1 i Recoser) proside support in the emergency response. The training for offsite personnel w ho may be required to Action lesels and guidelines should be developed enter the site should typically include famiharization

.or restormg operations and property as nearly as with the site and instructions on site procedures possible to a safe status. The less complex operations necessars for their safety and for their effectise inter-such as personnel emergencies and emergency alerts face witti onsite personnel. Offsite personnel training should require only brief recosery action procedures.

may include emergency dc,simeter issue procedures.

The more complex emergency operations, however.

fire main connection locations schicle access routes.

(site and general emergencies, for example) will and plant alarms.

generally require correspondingly complex recovery actions. It is not practicable to plan detailed recovery Training should include delineation of methods to actions for all concen able situations, but procedures evaluate its effectiveness and to correct weak areas that include at least the imtial planning considesa-through feedback with emphasis on schedules. lesson tions for recosering. repairing. decontaminating. etc.'

potentially affected portions of the facihty should be plans. practical training, and periodie examinations.

des eloped 2.3.5 Tests and Drills Durmg onsite recosery operations, personnel ex-posures to radiation should be maintained within 10 Procedures should proside for practice drills that CFR Part 20 limits.

use detailed scenarios to test both specific procedures and implementation of the major aspects of the 2.3 Supplemental Procedures emergency plan. The scenarios should be planned simulations of emergency situations. and they should This section hsts subjects for procedures that sup.

be approved by plant management after they have piement those cosering emergency response actions.

been reviewed for scope and adequacy.

The specific titles and contents may vary. but the described subjects should be cosered in the hcensee's The procedures should consider the utility of procedural system testing on both an announced and unannounced basis. They should require the use of an obserser staff 2.31 Commumcations during the conduct of test drills and should contain prosisions for appropriate checklists or critique Procedures should be asailable for activating.

sheets to be used by the obserser staff.

operating, testing, and maintaining the emergency commumcations setems.

3. REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF PROCEDURES 2.3.2 Documentation and Records Procedures should include requirements for The procedural system used by licensees should recording the implementation and completion or ter.

contain written rules and mstructions goserning the mination of emergency response actions, logging as.

w riting. revising. and updating of implementing seument data. reports of personnel accountabilitv.

procedures. The instructions should specify the and mamienante of required records and logs.

methods to be used to ensure that procedures. resi-sions. and changes are res iewed for adequacy ap-2 3 3 i quipmem and instrumentation proved for use, and dntributed to user organizations and individuals having the iesponsibility for Opci at m g mstructions for equipment and in-implementing the procedures.

O iim."

1268 254

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a S

UNITE D ST ATES I

l WUCLEAR REGULATOmW COMMISSION W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20SSS postagg aMo r g es Pato U s MUCLE AR REGULATORY OFFICI AL BUSINESS C ond es e ssa oM PE N ALTY F OR Pmsv ATE USE. 4300 1268 255 g

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555 April 1,1979 IE Bulletin No. 79-05 NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND Description of Circumstances:

On March 28, 1979 the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 experienced core damage which resulted from a series of events which were initiated by a loss of feedwater transient. Several aspects of the incident may have general applicability in addition to apparent generic applicability at operating Babcock and Wilcox reactors.

This bulletin is provided to inform you of the nuclear incident and to request certain actions.

Actions To Be Taken By Licenseas (Although the specific causes have not been determined for individual sequer.ces in the Three Mile Island event, some of the following may have contributed.)

For all Babcock and Wilcox pressurized water reactor #acilities with an operating license:

1, Review the description (Enclosure 1) of the initiating events and subsequent course of the incident.

Also review the evaluation by the NRC staff of a postulated severe feedwater transient related to Babcock and Wilcox PWRs as described in Enclosure 2.

These reviews should be directed at assessing the adequacy of your reactor systems to safely sustain cooldown transients such as these.

2.

Review any transients of a similar nature which have occurred at your facility and determine whether any significant deviations from expected performance occurred.

If any significant deviations are found, orovide the details and an analysis of the significance and any corrective actions taken.

This material may be identified by reference if previously submitted to the NRC.

g 3.

Review the actions required by your operating procedures for coping O

[2) )

with transients. Th ssed include:

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 20555 APRIL 5, 1979 IE Bulletin 79-05A NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAN9 - SUPPLEMENT Description of Circumstant:es:

Preliminary information received by the NRC since issuance'of IE Bulletin 79-05 on April 1,1979 has identified six potential human, design and mechanical failures which resulted in the core damage and radiation releases at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 nuclear plant. The infomation and actions in this supplement clarify and extend the original Bulletin and transmit a preliminary chronology of the TMI accident through the first 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> (Enclosure 1).

1.

At the time of the initiating event, loss of feedwater, both of the auxiliary feedwater trains were valved out of ser-lce.

2.

The pressurizer electromatic relief valve, which opened during the initial pressure surge, failed to close when the pressure decreased below the actuation level.

3.

Following rapid depressuriz tion of the pressurizer, the pressurizer level indication may have lead to erroneous inferences of h.igh level in the reactor coolant system.

The pressurizer level indication apparently led the operators to prematurely terminate high pressure injection flow, even though substantial voids existed in the reactor coolant system.

4 Because the containment does not isolate on high pressure injection (HPI) initiation, the highly radioactive water from the relief valve discharge was pumped out of the containment by the automatic initiation of a transfer pump.

This water entered the radioactive waste treatment system in the auxiliary building where some of it overflowed to the floor.

Outgassing from this water and discharge through the auxiliary building ventilation system and filters was the principal source of the offsite release of radioactive noble gases.

5.

Subsequently, the high pressure injection sys',em was intermittently 1

operated attempting to control primary coolant inventory losses r)'

through the electromatic relief valve, apparently based on

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pressurizer level indication.

Due to the presence of steam and/or noncondensible voids elsewhere in the reactor coolant system, p/..

this led to a further reduction in prima ry.

j;

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 20555 APRIL 21, 1979 IE Bulletin 79-05B NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND - SUPPLEMENT Description of Circumstances:

Continued NRC evaluation of the nuclear incident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 has identified measures in addition to those discussed in IE Bulletin 79-05 and 79-05A which should be acted upon by licensees with reactors designed by B&W.

As discussed in Item 4.c. of Actions to be taken by Licensees in IEB 79-05A, the preferred mode of core cooling following a transient or accident is to provide forced flow using reactor coolant pumps.

It appears that natural circulation was not successfully achieved upon securing the reactor coolant pumps during the first two hours of the Three Mile Island (TMI) No. 2 incident of March 28, 1979.

Initiation of natural circulation was inhibited by significant coolant voids, possibly aggravated by release of noncondensible gases, in the primary coolant system.

To avoid this potential for interference with natural circulation, the operator should ensure that the primary system is subcooled, and remains subcooled, before any attempt is made to establish natural circulation.

Natural circulation in Babcock and Wilcox reactor systems is enhanced by maintaining a relatively high water level on the secondary side of the once through steam generators (OTSG).

It is also promoted by injection of auxiliary feedwater at the upper nozzles in the OTSGs.

The integrated Control System automatically sets the OTSG 1evel setpoint to 50% on the a::erating range when all reactor coolant pumps (RCP) are secured.

However, in unusual or abnormal situations, manual actions by the operator to increase steam generator level will enhance natural circulation capability in anticipation of a possible loss of operation of the reactor coolant pumps.

As stated previously, forced flow of primary coolant through the core is preferred to natural circulation.

C:her means of reducing the possibility of void formation in the reactor coolant system are:

A.

Minimize the operation of the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) on the pressurizer and thereby reduce the possibility cf pressure red k open.

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555 July 26, 1979 IE Bulletin Nos.79-05C & 79-06C NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND - SUPPLEMENT Description of Circumstances:

Information has become available to the NRC, subsequent to the issuance of IE Bulletins 79-05,79-05A, 79-05B, 79-06,79-06A, 79-06A (Revison 1) and 79-06B, which requires modification to the " Action To Be Taken By Licensees" portion of IE Bulletins79-05A, 79-06A and 79-06B, for all pressurized water reactors (,PWRs).

Item 4.c of Bulletin 79-05A required all holders of operating licenses for Babcock & Wilcox designed PWRs to revise their operating procedures to specify that, in the event of high pressure injection (HPI) initiation with reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) operating, at least one RCP per loop would remain operating.

Similar requirements, applicable to reactors designed by other PWR vendors, were contained in Item 7.c of Bulletin 79-06A (for Westinghouse designed plants) and in Item 6.c of Bulletin 79-06B (for Combustion Engineering designed plants).

Prior to the incident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI 2), destinghouse and its licensees generally adopted the position that the operator should promptly trip all operating RCPs in the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) situation. This Westinghouse position, has led to a series of meetings between the NRC staff and Westinghouse, as well as with other PWR vendors, to discuss this issue.

In addition, more detailed analyses concerning this matter were requested by the NRC.

Recent preliminary calculations performed by Babcock & Wilcox, Westing-house and Combustion Engineering indicate that, for a certain spectrum of small breaks in the reactor coolant system, continued operation of the RCPs can increase the mass lost through the break and prolong or aggravate the uncover-ing of the reactor core.

The damage to the reactor core at TMI 2 followed tripping of the last operating RCP, when two phase fluid was being pumoed through the reactor coolant system.

It is our current understanding that i three of the nuclear steam system sucoliers for PWRs now agree that an acceptable action under LOCA symptoms i3 to trip all operating RCPs immediately, before significant voiding in the reactor coolant system occurs.

Action To Be Taken By Licensees:

In order to allev s after a

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