ML19254E713
| ML19254E713 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1979 |
| From: | Gorinson S, Kane K PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
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| Shared Package | |
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| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911020196 | |
| Download: ML19254E713 (83) | |
Text
7 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TO PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND d
e ADVANCE COPY NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BEFORE IOls, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1979
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REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Sttc. ley M.
Gorinson, Chief Counsel Kevin P.
Kane, Deputy Chief Counsel Charles Harvey Ruth Dicker Eric Pearson Associate Chief Counsel Dan W.
Reicher Thomas Blood Dan Sherman Legal Assistants 4
OCTOBER 1979 WASHINGTON, D.C.
1230 203
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This document is solely the work of the Commission staff and does not necessarily represent the views of the President's Commission or any member of the Commission.
This pre-publication copy is a final document and will be
~
subject only to minor editorial changes in its published form.
b j '230 t 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS I.
INTRODUCTION -- p. 1 II. REACTOR SITING -- p.
3 III. NRC REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING -- p.
7 IV. THE TMI OPERATING LICENSE REVIEW - CONTENTION 8 -- p.
11 V.
TMI PLAN AND PROCEDURES -- p.
14 A.
THE SITE EMERGENCY PLAN -- p.
14 B.
THE IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES -- p.
18 VI. RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLANNING ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES PRIOR TO THE TMI ACCIDENT -- p. 20 A.
FEDERAL RESPONSE PLANS AS OF MARCH 28, 1979 -- p.
20 1.
INTERAGENCY PADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE PLAN (IRAP):
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY -- p.
20 2.
FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN FOR PEACETIME NUCLEAR EMERGENCIES (FRPPNE):
FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY -- p.
22 B.
FEDERAL PROGRAMS PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE STATES FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING -- p.
24 VII.
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN PENNSYLVANIA --
p.
29 A.
ANNEX E TO THE PENNSYLVANIA DISASTER OPERATIONS PLAN --
p.
29 B.
BRP PLANS VIII.
COUNTY AND LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING
- p.
33 IX.
CONCLUSION -- p.
37 9
APPENDIX 1 --
39 APPENDIX 2 -
p.
40 APPENDIX 3 -- p.
43 APPENDIX 4 -- p.
47 APPENDIX 5 -
p.
51 1230 205
1 I.
INTRODUCTION This report examines the principal influences that shaped the emergency planning in place at the time of the TMI accident.
The report is divided into two parts.
The first part reviews the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) requirements on reactor siting and emergency planning, and traces the influence of that regulatory approach in the emergency plan developed by the utility.
The second part examines federal, state, and local planning activities in this regulatory climate during the years before the TMI accident.
Reactor siting, discussed in the first part of the report, plays an obvious and critical role in emergency preparedness because the location of a reactor affects the nature and extent of the off-site response required in an emergency.
NRC provisions that permit reactors to be built close to population centers or that require consideration of hypothetical accidents without taking into account substantial radiation releases beyond a small zone are examples of siting criteria outlined in the paper that have a direct impac: on the context in which emergency planning must be performed.
In addition, concepts related to reactor siting, principally that of the low population zone (LPZ), have been applied in administrativa proceedings to define geographically the planning obligation f the licensee, an obligation that has been criticized for being too limited to provide an adequate measure of protection for the public.
The regulatory approach to reactor siting has had a direct impact on the NRC's view of the role of off-site emergency planning.
There is evidence to suggest that emergency planning has been a low priority function in the NRC and its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), largely as a result of the agencies' nearly complete confidence in designed reactor safeguards for public pro-tection.
Sworn testimony indicates that certain elements within the AEC and NRC have held the view that emphasis on radio-logical emergency planning would serve only to arouse public concern and to stifle the development of nuclear power.
Even if these attitudes are changed, however, the NRC has no authority to require radiological emergency planning by off-site organizations. M oreover, its efforts to assist the states in planning have been completely advisory and, according to some observers, large.ly ineffective.
The NRC could adopt a rule prohibiting the siting of reactors in states that do not have NRC-approved emergency plans, but it has not done so.
1230 2n5
2 The emergency plan developed by Met Ed for TMI-2 is a case study of some aspects of the NRC approach.
During the TMI-2 licensing p oceedings, the intervenors challenged the suf ficiency of emergency planning for the facility and raised issues that foreshadowed deficiencies that became apparent during the accident.
Fcr example, the intervenors were prevented from questioning a witness about the sufficiency of emergency planning beyond the state's prescribed five-mile planning radius -- three miles larger than the TMI LPZ -- on the basis of a principle established in other proceedings to the effect that the licensee's planning obligation ends at the peri-meter of the LPZ.
The NRC's first recommendation to state officials during the accident, however, was that a ten-mile evacuation be undertaken.
The second part of this eport examines the radiolo-gical emergency planning activities of off-site organiza-tions at all levels of government.
Prior to the TMI accident, the NRC regulatory approach appears co have contributed to a belief that off-site emergency plar.ning near nuclear power
~
plants was practically unnecessary because of the depth of designed reactor safeguards.
In this regulatory climate, a federal response plan developed by other federal agencies has spent years in bureaucratic limbo.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania civil defense organization did not begin to develop a radiological emergency plan until 1975, even though the Peach Bottom plant and TMI-l were operational, and the state had had nuclear power plants under construc-tion within its borders for several years prior to that time.
Apathetic local officials could not be motivated to participate in radiological emergency planning activities.
When an accident finally occurred, the state plan was thought inadequate, county plans were limited, and local plans were nonexistent.
All evacuation plans in effect now were either created or substantially expanded during the most critical phase of the accident.
The NRC regulatory approach and the lack of urgency with which various levels of government have conducted planning activities indicate a fundamental problem of attitude that is woven into the fabric of the radiological emergency planning in place at the time of the TMI accident.
123.,
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3 II.
REACTOR SITING The reactor siting stage of the NRC licensing process plays a critical role in emergency planning and preparedness.
Reactor siting is the process of determining feasible loca-tions for power reactors, and is important both to safe reactor operation and emergency planning.
W edner a reactor is built in an earthquake or flood-prone ea, for example, directly affects its prospects for continued safe operation.
Whether it is built near population centers directly af fects the feasibility of off-site protective action in the event of an emergency, as well as the extent of the treat to public health an accident might create.
The NRC controls siting decisions for nuclear reactors by criteria set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations, Volume 10, "Part 100."l/
With respect to locating reactors near populated areas, Part 100 establishes a two-step decision-making procedure.
The first step involves mathematical computations of potential fission product releases from proposed reactors.
The possible impact of those fission product releases on densely populated areas determines whether the reactor would be too close to those areas.
The second step, if necessary, is the review of specific site characteristics.2/
In the first step of the procedure, the NRC assesses the maximum fission product release that would be caused by a major accident.
This information, in turn, directly determines the size of the LPZ, which is defined as an area containing " residents, the total number and density of which are such that there is a reasonable probability that appro-priate protective measures could be taken in their behalf the event of a serious accident."3/
The proximity of the LP,Z to
" population centers" finally dictates site suitability -- no reactor may be constructed in a location closer to the nearest boundary of any " population center" than a dis tance equaling 1 and 1/3 times the LPZ radius.
For purposes of the NRC provision, a " population center" is an area with 25,000 or more inhabitants.
The foundation on which this decision-making crocess is built is the evaluation of the postulated major accadent from which a fission product L' lease would result.
The NRC has estabilched nine classes of postulated accidents, the review of which is instrumental in establishing performance standards for engineered safety features.4/
The classes of the accidents are ranked in ascending order according to the seriousness of their potential environmental consequences and probable occurrence rates.5/
Class 1 accidents are 1230 700
4 based on small system perturbations that re' ult in insig-nificant health and safety consege ces.
Class 9 accidents, the most serious group, are characte 'ted by successive system failures more severe than thom considered by pro-tective systems designers or safety e'
' nee s.
The most serious radiation release and adverst a?
. consequences would be expected to result from the cucurrence of a class 9 accident.6/
Class 8 accidents include a spectrum of postulated
" loss-of-coolant accidents" (LOCAs), those in which various pipe breaks would, without replenishment of coolant, result in total or partial interruption of reactor coolant flow to the core.7/
The NRC analyzc' 'his postulated range of LOCAs as part of its standard review of facility design.8/
If the analysis of these LOCAs, based on conservative assumptions,9/
indicates that they would not produce radiological conse-quences at the proposed LPZ boundary in excess of the substantial Part 100 exposure limits, the proposed LPZ will be accepted.10/
In a class 9 accident, the designed safety systems are presumed to fail.
However, the NRC does not use class 9 accidents which would result in more substantial radiation releases into the environment than class 8 LOCAs, as the basis for siting determinations.
Nor does it use them for establishing performance standards for reactors, having taken the view that, due to the NRC's " defense in depth" regulatory approach, the likelinood of the :ccurrence of a class 9 accident is extremely remote.ll/
The TMI accident, however, has now been classified by the NRC as a class 9 accident.12/
Because the calculation of the LPZ is based in large part on the designed reactor safeguards, it is possible for an applicant to reduce the size of the zone if its border is too close to a population center.
The applicant can do so by st plementing the plant design by adding more reactor s
safeguc^ds, th.ereby reducing the design basis accident's (DBA) postulated fission product release and, in turn, the LPZ itself.13/
This situation arose concerning the Seabrook, N.H.,
nuclear plant.
The reactor was already under construc-tion when it was objected to as being too near to the recreational shoreline, a " densely populated area" under NRC regulations.
Reactor safeguards, however, permi_ted a reduction of the LPZ sufficient to exclude the shoreline.14/
A fundamental problem in the NRC regulatory approach that af fects emergency preparedness is that the LPZ boundary is determined under postulated accident conditions with reference to a standard that permits a substantial dose of radiation to an individual.
An applicant is required to determine:
1230 209
4a A low population zone of such size that an individual located at any point on its outer boundary who is exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the postulated fission product release (during the entire period of its passage) would not receive a total rad-iation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to the thyroid from iodine exposure.14a/
If the postulated fission product release were actually to occur at these levels, it is evident that persons outside the LPZ would receive serious doses of radiation.
The effects of a release beyond the LPZ and the preparedness of off-site organizations to cope with those effects should be a central concern of the regulator, but prior to the TMI accident, they clearly were not.
Prior to the accident at Three Mile Island, the NRC staff had adopted the position that "a distance of 3 miles to the outer boundary of the low population zone is usually adequate."15/
Even with the substantial doses of radiation postulated for determining the LPZ boundary, the NRC regulatory approach 1230 210
5 to sitting reactors has resulted in some LPZs of less than a mile in radius.16/
In the case of TMI-2, the LPZ was established at Y miles.17/
Since a reactor with an LPZ of 2 miles can be constructed 2-2/3 miles from the " densely populated boundary"18/ of a major population area, TMI-2 is 2.2 miles from Middletown, which is not a major population area, and 10 miles from Harrisburg, which had at the time of siting a population of 68,000.19/
The estimated population of the 50-mile area immediately surrounding TMI is nearly 2 million.
The TMI-2 application predicted that that figure would increase to over 3 million during the 30-year life of the facility.
The proximity of reactors to large population centers is not unusual -- 10 million people live within 20 miles of a nuclear reactor.20/
This regulatory approach has drawn criticism from both wiEhin and outside the NRC.21/
The NRC approach to reactor siting has complicated the problems of planning for and responding to radiological incidents at nuclear power plants.
Under this approach, the NRC and the AEC before it have placed reactors in locations where emergency response might be extremely difficult.
Commenting on this problem, Robert Ryan, director of the NRC's Office of State Programs, wnich has responsibilities for emergency planning, described his reaction to the siting of New York's Indian Point nuclear power complex, which has three reactors:
I think it is insane to have a three-unit reactor on the Hudson River in Westchester County, 40 miles from Times Square, 20 miles from the Bronx.
And if you describe that 50-mile circle, as I said eefore, you've got 21 million people.
And that's crazy. I'm sorry.
I just don't think that that's the right place to put a nuclear facility.
And it was bad enough to put one in, but subsequently they put another in and then yet another....
[I] t's a nightmare from the point of view of emergency preparedness.22/
It should be noted that the siting regulacions dis-regard post-licensing changes in land use.
Even if an area qualifies at the time of licensing as a sparsely populated region in which an evacuation or other protective action could be carried out successfully, there is no guarantee that the area will maintain that character over time.
In many cases, population concentrations can increase in areas near reactors to the point that original siting assumptions become invalid.
Although the NRC has been aware of this problem, its regulations do not address it.23/
The NRC has recently begun to review its approach through task forces.
The NRC Siting Policy Task Force, the
-1}
\\2bU
6 first NRC group since 1962 formally to evaluate siting policy,24/ recommended in August 1979, that the LPZ be abandoned in favor of a " fixed emergency planning distance of 10 miles."
The emergency planning zone would be one in which " evacuation of persoas, including transients, would be feasible if needed to mitigate the consequences of an acci-dent."25/
This proposal is consistent with that of a joint NRC/ Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Task Force Report issued in 1978.26/
The NRC has now endorsed the recommenda-tions of the NRC7 EPA Task Force.2]/
As a result of the present regulatory approach of the NRC, however, the location of the TMI plant, with its LPZ of 2 miles, was approved without considering the effects of an accident causing a considerable release of radiation beyond the LPZ.
That policy has made the possibility of off-site consequences of reactor operation less prominent and has contributed to the development of an attitude visible at all levels of government that radiological emergency planning for off-site consequences was not at all a matter of urgent concern and was not even necessary for areas more than a few miles from the site.28/
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7 III.
NRC REQUIFEMENTS FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING Both the AEC and the NRC accorded emergeiry planning a low priority.
One reason for this attitude was their confidence in designed reactor safeguards, reflected in their approach to reactor siting. Another reason, as NRC Commissioner Peter Bradford admitted, was " reluctance to confront the public with high visibility emergency planning in the context of nuclear power.
It was uncomfortable."29/
That this was a concern was also acknowledged by the NRC's assistant director for emergency preparedness in its Office of State Programs:
There were people in the agency [AEC) who were afraid that if emergency preparedness and planning became too big an issue that it may stymie the development of nuclear power.
I think that is a fair statement.30/
The history of emergency preparedness within the AEC and NRC demonstrates the lack of commitment.
In 1969, when approximately 20 twenty nuclear power plants were already in operation,31/ only seven AEC employees out of 500 to 600 had any responsibility for emergency planning,32/ and even those seven did not work exclusively on emergency planning matters.
Between 1969 and 1972, they collectively worked "about one to two man years per year" on the subject.33/
Even after the promulgation of 10 CFR Appendix E, the regulation on emergency planning, " emergency planning was not a big piece of business in the AEC."34/
The commitment increased somewhat after 1972,35/ although it remained weak.36/
Immediately prior to the TMI accident, only three full-time professionals and one secretary out of 2,500 NRC employees worked on emergency preparedness matters.37/
"The emergency preparedness function in the NRC was a backwate-and... was not receiving the time, attention, and resources which were necessary to make it a successful program."38/
The problem is not only one of resources, however.
It is also one of attitude.
For example, in response to a May 1578, report by the Citizens for a Better Environment, entitled " Nuclear Power Plant Evacuation Plans," which alleged that radiological emergency response planning was inadequate, Robert Ryan, Director of the Office of State Programs for the NRC, while disputing the " sweeping denuncia-
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tion of our program by CBE," raised a series of emergency preparedness issues for internal resolution by the commis-sion.
The memorandur. was never answered.
According to Ryan, "it disappeared Anto the sand like a glass of water in the Sahara.
It just created not a ripple."39/
Only since the TMI accident has the NRC proposed a comprehensivo review of its regulatory approach to and resource allocations for emergency planning.40/
o 4 7 7p 12J']
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8 The lack of commitment evident in NRC's historical approach to emergency planning is manifested in its current regulations.
Under Appendix E,41/ construction permit applicants need submit for NRC review only general informa-tion regarding emergency planning.42/
Operating license applicants must submit more extensive information,43/ and it is at the operating license review stage that a more detailed examination of emergency planning takes place.
Under the regulation, licensee emergency plans must address several matters,44/ but the appendix states only that " plans should contain" those elements and does not specify the ways in which those matters should be treated.45/ Regulatory Guide 1.101 (1.101),46/ which was written to provide more detailed guidance on NRC's view of the extent of planning required by Appendix E, has no legal force.
According to a recent congressional report, of the 48 sites with operating commercial power reactors, only four have plans that the NRC considers to be in compliance with 1.101.47/
TMI is not one of the four.48/
Prior to the accident, tee NRC had no plans to require licensees not in compliance to revise their emergency plans to meet 1.101 standards.
One reason given for this decision was the NRC manpower commitment.49/
Since the accident, however, the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has determined to bring non-complying plants into compliance with 1.101 on a " fairly short time fuse."50/
1.101 covers a range of planning by advising licensees to classify potential accidents,51/ " describe" emergency response organizations,52/ " identify" emergency plans and equipment,53/ and provide some "means to insure" maintenance of emergency preparedness.54/
1.101 categorizes " emergency measures" by whether the inEended ef fect of the measures is to mitigate on-site or off-site consequences of accidents.
For on-site consequences, plans cover several different responsive actions,55/ but for off-site consequences, only three are mentionedT-a.
"[A]ctions planned to protect persons in the low population zone and criteria for their implementa-
~
tion";56/
b.
"the means and the time required to warn or advise
~
the persons involved, including (1) businesses, property owners, and tenants; (2) schools or recreational facilities; and (3) general public";5]/
and c.
regarding control of contaminated foodstuffs, provisions "for preventing or minimizing direct or subsequent ingestion exposure to radioactive materials deposited on the ground or other 1230 214
9 surfaces
...."58/
For off-site areas, these provi-sions should taEe the form of "[P]rotective actions planned for the low population zone with provi-sions for extending such actions to areas further from the site boundary, if necessary...."59/,60/
Although the extent of the off-site planning required of the licensee to satisfy these elements is unspecified, it has been held that the licensee's planning obligation is limited to the LPZ.61/
Limiting the obligation to a zone of only a few miles is an approach consistent with both the NRC's approach to siting and its stated position that the response to the off-site consequences of radiological incidents is primarily the responsibility of state and local governments.62/
It is an approach, however, that has drawn extensive criticism.63_/
The NRC has instituted a program, discussed in detail later in this report, by which it reviews state plans and issues a letter of " concurrence" if the plans contain certain elements.64/ The program was intended to encourage states to upgrade tEeir emergency plans in accordance with 154 criteria.65/
From 1974 to 1977, no state plans qualified.66/
In 1977, the NRC reduced the number of planning elements necessary for concurrence to 70.67/
Since that reduction, 13 states have received NRC concurrences, including two since the accident at TMI.68/
In the judgment of NRC's director of the Office of 5 tate Programs, 24 additional states need concurred-in plans.69/
Despite its view that off-site emergency response is the obligation of state and local governments, the NRC does not require as a condition of licensing that state emergency plans receive NRC concurrence or have specific elements.
It has been stated that one reason for this policy has been the NRC'a concern that, if the policy were adopted, state governors would have a veto, in effect, over nuclear power plant siting by purposely not obtaining NRC concurrence for state plans.70/
The official reason for this policy --
reflecting tee NRC regulatory approach -- was stated by Lee Gossick, the NRC's executive director for operations, in response to criticism from the General Accounting Office (GAO):
NRC protects public health and saf'ty by giving primary consideration to site characteristics and design features of nuclear facilities.
Once we are satisfied that these meet an adequate measure of safety, we evaluatt the emergency plans for the facility.
From this point of view, State and local emergency plans 1230 215
10 provide an added margin of protection for the public in the vicinity of a nuclear facility in which we believe that an adequate measure of safety already* exists.
The Commission's licensing decision process is struc-tured to take into account a wide variety of standards and criteria in the evaluation of proposed or existing nuclear power plants to the end that substantial conservatisms exist in design and operating safety margins. To the extent that proposed or existing plants fail to meet these standards, NRC would not license them or permit them to continue to operate.
In this context, State and local plans, while related to the facilities undergoing the licensing process, and to applicant's emergency plans, are not essential in determining whether the plant can be operated without undue risk to public health and safety.
(Emphasis supplied.)71/
(* Emphasis in original.)
Since the accident, Chairman Hendrie has retreated from this statement, saying in hearings before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives that the " assortment of ques-tions" raised by the accident " absolutely" revised that staff position.72/
Hendrie would not, however, go so far as to recommend that licenses should not be issued in the absence of effective state ara local plans, preferring to resolve that issue within the commission at a later time.73/
Commissioner Richard Kennedy, however, still adheres to the view that state and local plans are not necessary for safe reactor operation.74/
Nonetheless, in states which do not
" move toward" having effective plans, he would consider shutting down plants in the future.75/
Two other commis-sioners, Peter Bradford and Victor GTlinsky, feel that licensing should be contingent upon states and localities having " satisfactory emergency plans."76/
The author of the statement quoted above, Lee Gossick, has testified that his views remain unchanged. Although Gossick acknowledgc; cnat off-site communications are necessary, he believes that "a plan for evacuation is perhaps of marginal value."))/
Regardless of NRC's resoluti!n of this issue, its long-standing approach to emergency planning unmistakably influ-enced the emergency planning in olace during the TMI accident, a planning process that was shaced at the licensing stage.
1230 215
11 IV.
THE TMI OPERATING LICENSE REVIEW -- CONTENTION 8 The radiological emergency planning performed by Met Ed and state and local governments for TMI was specifically challenged during the NRC's operating license review process.
Met Ed's application proposed an exclusion zone of 2,000 feet,78/ a zone which would reach neither bank of the SusqueEanna River.
The proposed LPZ was 2 miles.79/
Acceptance of that LPZ by the NRC would result in TMI-2 being located within 10 miles of Harrisburg, PA (1970 popula-tion 68,000),80/ within 1.5 miles af Goldsboro (1970 popula-tion 600), witEin 2 miles of York Haven (1970 population 700),
within 2.5 miles of Royalton (1970 population 1,100) and within 2.2 miles of Middletown-Steelton (1970 population 22,450).81/
The total population within the LPZ was estimated at 4,000 J2/
In accordance with established procedure, the NRC staff initially reviewed the TMI-2 emergency plan and, in its safety evaluation report (SER), concluded that the plan satisfied all of the legal requirements of Appendix E.83/ To support that conclusion, the staff cited the plan's compati-bility with 1.101, noted that necessary agreements between the utility and off-site organizations had been reached, and further concluded, based on its calculations, that "the time to evacuate any 22 1/2 degree sector out to five miles would vary from three to six hours, with resulting radiation doses which are a small fraction of the siting doses of 10 CFR Part 100."84/
Supplements to the SER did not discuss the emergency pTan, indicating that the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, which reviewed the SER, had no objections.85/
At the public hearing stage of the licensing procedure, however, when the NRC staff position on the cmergency plan was already taken, assertions of plan inadequacy arose.
Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), an environmental group which was not represented by counsel and which did not present direct testimony, raised numerous objections to the proposed license, including Contention 8 on emergency planning:
The warning and evacuation plans of the Applicants and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are inadequate and unworkable.
The plans assume that all local and state officials involved are on 24-hour notice and can be contacted immediately.
They further assume that all people notified will promptly react and know how to respond and are trained in what to do. They also assume that the public, which has been assured that accidents are " highly unlikely" or " highly improbable," will respond and allow themselves to be evacuated.
No 1230 217
12 operating license should be granted for Unit 2 until emergency and evacuation plans are shown to be workable through live tests.86,/
At the hearing before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), the state and county civil defense agencies and the NRC staff supported the TMI-2 plan.
Craig Williamson, deputy director of what is now the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, testified for Met Ed.
Williamson out-lined Pennsylvania's emergency response structure, the
~
state's Disaster Operations and Assistance Plan, and the state's expected response in an emergency.87/
The NRC staff also supported the licensee by reiterating its earlier SER approval of the plan.88/ Kevin Molloy, the director of civil defense for Dauphin County, who was aided in the preparation of his testimony by Met Ed lawyers,89/ testified that his emergency organization could successfufTy contact all necessary persons "within minutes" of the onset of an accident.90/He testified further that his organization could evacuate tne most populated areas around the plant out to 5 miles in a period of less than 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.91_/
During the proceedings, state and Met Ed lawyers had not objected to questions about planning beyond the LPZ so long as the area discussed was within the 5-mile emergency planning zone the state required of civil defense organiza-tions.92/
When Molloy was pressed by intervenors about whether he could promise effective evacuation in areas beyond 5 miles from the site, however, the lawyers for both Pennsylvania and Met Ed objected to the line of questioning on the basis that nowhere was it apparent that an evacuation beyond 5 miles might ever be necessary.
Citing a decision of the Atomic Licensing and Appeal Board (ALAB) in a previous case, Met Ed lawyers further maintained that any such discussion went beyond the " confines" of the hearing.
The board sustained the objections, thus precluding any inquiry into the state of emergency preparedness beyond the 5-mile radius.93/
At the conclusion of the proceedings, the ASLB dismissed the intervenor's objections:
[W]e find that the record supports the conclusion that Contention 8, in its entirety, is without merit, and that the Staff has properly assessed the adequacy and workability of the emergency response.
We also find the emergency and evacuation plans to be both adequate and workable. 94/
Six months later, the ALAB affirmed.95/
Relying heavily on the opinion evidence entered in the Tower proceedings, the ALAB rejected all of the intervenors' arguments.
It dismissed 1230 ?!3
13 intervenors' contention that " live tests and drills" should be held regularly (to ensure continued plan workability) on the basis of Molloy's testimony that such tests could be
" counter-productive."96/
Again relying on Molloy, it dismissed the notion teat local officials might be unable to respond adequately to a nuclear emergency because of their lack of specialized knowledge about radiation, holding that the lack of detailed knowledge of why evacuation might be necessary presents no bar to executing an evacuation successfully.
It dismissed as unfounded the intervenors' argument that sufficient numbers of emergency response personnel might be unavailable on occasion to assist the public.9]/
On the question of considering feasibility of evacua-tion beyond the 5-ndle emergency planning zone required by the state, the board said:
It is true that, for reasons which need not be dis-cussed here, the applicants and the staff nevertheless looked into the possible need for protective measures within a five mile radius of the reactor -- and the intervenors were permitted to cross-examine on the evidence presented in this regard.
It scarcely follows from this fact, however, that the question of emergency planning at still greater distances from the LPZ boundary had to be explored at the intervenors '
instance.38,/
4 1230 219
14 V.
TMI PI AN AND PROCEDURES Against this regulatory backdrop, the "Three Mile Island Emergency Plan" was written and approved.
At first, the plan seems imposing, comprising two volumes and hundreds of pages.
In fact, however, section 2 of the TMI plan, designated the " site emergency plan," which comprises only 26 pages of text, is the only document reviewed by the NRC for compliance with the requirements of Appendix E and 1.101.
The remainder of the first volume of the plan sets forth introductory information (section 1), " letters of agreement" with government authorities (section 3),
a copy of the TMI Annex to the Pennsylvania Plan (section 4), and the important site emergency plan implementing procedures (section 5).
Volume 2 is primarily devoted to nonradio-logical emergencies.
A.
THE SITE EMERGENCY PLAN The site emergency plan is divided into seven major parts.
The first, " Emergency Conditions," outlines criteria for determining which types of accidents constitute "emer-gencies."
It classifies emergencies into three categories:
local or personnel emergencies (on-site accidents involving one or more persons and protective evacuation of one or more buildings, but causing no off-site consequences), site emergencies (incidents which could result in uncontrolled radiation releases off-site), and general emergencies (incidents with a potential for serious radiological conse-quences to the health and safety of the general public).
The plan supplements each classification with " conditions,"
descriptions of events and on-site and off-site " action" which those events might necessitate.99/
With respect to " emergency measures,"100/ the plan clearly reflects the NRC planning standards for which it was drawn.
In accordance with 1.101, " emergency measures" focus predominantly on on-site crisis management, including means for declaring emergencies,101/ designation of channels of notification,102/ minimal accident assessment actions,103/
and aid to affected personnel.104/
In line with 1.101,
~
requirements for of f-site emergency response by the licensee are limited to notification of off-site organizations.
Section 4.1.4 requires Met Ed to notify either the Pennsyl-vania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) or the state Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) if a site or general emergency occurs.105/
Section 4.3.2, governing notification, states:
Metropolitan Edison is responsible for prompt notifi-cation of appropriate Pennsylvania state authorities 1230 220
15 if a TMI accident is causing or threatening to cause significant off-site exposure as defined in Reference 6.
The State of Pennsylvania, Bureau of Aadiological Health (now BRP), is responsible for the management of all off-site aspects of a radiation emergency and the Pennsylvania State Council of Civil Defense (now PEMA]is responsible for carrying out the required protective actions.
The plan permits the licensee to exercise discretion in choosing the agency to be notified.
Section 4.1.4 permits emergency notification of either PEMA or BRP.
This lack of precision may have contributed to confusion on Friday morning, the third day of the accident, when the Met Ed shif t supervisor called PEMA to inform it of a planned radiation release.
That conversation and another following shortly thereaf ter generated a great deal of confusion concerning the need for evacuation. Had the supervisor called BRP, it is possible that the misunderstandings would not have occurred.
Both PEMA and BRP officials agreed that BRP, not PEMA, should have been called.106/
The plan also identifies emergency facilities.107/
For TMI-2, the plan designated an emergency control center (the TMI-2 control room), an on-site emergency control station (located in the 306-foot elevation of the TMI-l control building),108/ and an off-site emergency control station (the TMI observation center).109/
All of these facilities were used extensively during the accident.110/
The plan requires Met Ed to have available communicationslll/ and accident assessment equipment.ll2/
During the accident, however, equipment available for communication with off-site organizations was inadequate.
At section 6, the plan also covers training of employees for emergency response.
The section calls for a one-day, annual " General Training Program" for the TMI staff to review the plan's provisions.113/
"Off-site agencies with emergency responsibilities" may attendll4/ and include PEMA, the Dauphin, York, and Lancaster County civil defense offices, the BRP, state police, local fire companies, and local hospital radiation emergency personnel 115/
The plan also requires periodic drills.116/
At TMI, health physics and training groups normally develop drill schedules, scenarios, and participant lists, with the objective of including every shift in at least one annual 2-to-4 hour drill.117/
Drills by design have no impact on normal plant operations.ll8/
Off-site agencies, including PEMA, BRP, and county civil defense organizations, are asked to participate in drills and to observe them from the control room.119/
Whether this observation is meaningful is open to sa1 12 3 U. JE-
16 question. Kevin Molloy of Dauphin County recalled attending some drills:
And when they conducted their yearly drills, [we] ;ould be invited down, te come observe which procedures they followed, things of that nature, which was impressive.
Although, we didn't quite know what they were doing, to be quite honest.120/
Two or three NRC inspectors normally observe licensee drills.
Their major interests are the functioning of the control room and emergency control center, the flow of
_nformation, the adequacy of accident assessment, and the general coordination of the emergency response.121/
Although they participate in post-drill critiques, NRC inspectors need not and sometimes do not put their obser-vations into writing for a permanent record.122/
An NRC inspector assigned to TMI was asked how he could recall emergency response' deficiencies from one year to the next without some written record, and he responded, "I guess I have a good memory."123/
The part of the plan that announces Met Ed's " agree-ments" for coordinating emergency response 124/ is of particular interest.
Section 8 provides:
Written agreements have been reached with local, state, and federal agencies and private medical facilities with regard to the type of support to be provided to the TMI Nuclear Station in the event of an emergency.
The written agreements ensure that there is a clear understanding of assigned responsibilities and that there will be proper coordination of activities in the event of an emergency.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In fact, however, these " written agreements" are often only form letters addressed to the licensee.
In the letters, of f-site organizations merely acknowledge their statutory roles in emergency response.
Typical is the " letter of agreement" of the United States Coast Guard, which provides in part:
This is to advise you that, upon notification by the Station Superintendent or his designee of an emergency situation involving a disaster which has occurred or is impending at Three Mile Island Generating Station, the Coast Guard will provide its traditional response.125/
The letter from Dauphin County's Office of Civil re?ense, which is identical to letters from other county emergency organizations, provides in full as follows:
12 3 b, n ') 7
17 This is to advise you that, upon notification by the Station Superintendent or his designee of an emergency situation existing at the Th.ee Mile Island Nuclear Station, our Civil Defanse Lnit will provide assistance as available.126/
Similarly, the "writtc'. agreement" from PEMA simply cites the Pennsylvania Disaster Operations Plan and informs Met Ed that it can expect support from the county level.127/
The same kind of letter is obtained from the regional DOE Radiological Assistance Plan Of fice.
As an NRC staff member made clear, there is little substance behind these NRC-required arrangements:
QUESTION:
I'm just interested in what the precise off-site response capability has to be in order for you to decide that a utility plant (sic: plan] is adequate.
ANSWER:
They must be a
,e to show that there is a law enforcement agency in existence.
That there is a state agency in existence which has the prime contact and the prime responsibility and authority, or at least accepts the responsibility for doing certain things.
Okay?
They also must mdce an agreement with the federal inter-agency radiological assistance plan by DCE.
QUESTION:
Make an agreement with the plan?
ANSWER:
With the local, regional Department of Energy office for federal aid in emergency.
QUESTION:
What does that agreement say?
ANSWER:
It must -- simply at the federal one, it's a pro forma letter that they get from DOE, and that's all it is.
[I] t goes back, as I said, to findings that were made a long time ago, from a legal standpoint, which none of the staf f here has ever really questioned, we have never questioned, which has to do with what is reason-able to impose on an applicant for a licensee as far as the worst accident, there is a scoping accident that has to be encompassed in his plan to give him a license, as compared to what the rest of the world may do anyway.
And the scoping accident has been the part 100 acci-dents.
And the Part 100 accident, you aren't going to have bodies because as long as that containment is there, you have all the time in the world to do things.128/
i230
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18 B.
THE IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES The site emergency plan imp:.cmenting procedures, found at section.5 of the TMI Emergency Plan, are unlike the plan they implement in several respects.
First, they are detailed.
They specify with scme care the precise responsi-bilities of various licensee employees during radiological emargencies..Thus, they, and not the site emergency plan, are the key to a licensee's emergency preparedness.129/
Second, the procedures are kept up to date.
There is no similar requirement that the TMI site emergency plan be modified to reflect current facility operation.
- Third, because implementation of procedures is required by the operating license itself, compliance with the procedures is enforceable.
The site emergency plan imposes only require-ments to plan.130/
The NRC has no regulations specifying the content of the procedures.
In the past, Region I of NRC has reviewed the TMI procedures as part of its facility inspection program.
The Region I emergency planning officer inspects emergency preparedness on an average of once each year.
The number of inspections varies depending on staff availability and past licensee performance.131/
An average inspection takes approximately 20 to 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> 132/
The TMI procedures, divided into 13 parts,133/ begin by outlining responses for local, site, and general emer-gencics.
Local emergencies, relatively minor occurrences without off-site complications, do not rcquire notification of off-site organizations.134/
Site and general emergency procedures, howeve':, require notification of civil defense authorities "
(within fivc minutes if practical) after determination of the emergency,"135/ as well as deployment of on-site and off-site radiation monitoring teams,136/ and evreuation, if necessary, of all nonessential personnel.137/
With respect to Met Ed's responsibilities to evacuate the general public, the procedures reflect the apprcach of the plan by describing the responsibilities of off-site agencies to evacuate people from the low population zone:
S4.0 Evacuation of General Population from the Low Fopulation Zone 4.1 If data reported by the Emergency Off-site Monitoring team exceeds Radiation Protection Guides recommended by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, evacuation of the general population will be initiated.
These guides are listed in Section 4 of the Three Mile Island Plan, i230 224
19 4.2 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has the ultimate responsibility tor evacuation, provided the appropriate department within the Commonwealth (Bureau of Radiological Health) can be contacted at the time and the situation permits.
If the situation requires immediate protective action for the local population, Met Ed will recommend to the County Civil Defense, to initiate the evacuation of the affected area.
4.3 If the decision is made to evacuate the section of the LPZ in the downwind direction, each resident of the affected area will be notified and instruc-tad to report to specified Civil Defense shelters.
It may be necessary for the State Police to erect certain road blocks at roadways.
4.4 The U.S.
Coast Guard will be responsible for notifying swimmers and small craft in areas adjacent to the site to evacuate.
The Coast Guard will be notified by the Civil Defense.
The evacuation of people from an area larger than the 2-mile TMI LPZ is not contemplated by either the plan or the procedures.138j/ Protective action for the off-site conse-quences of a radiological incident is the responsibility of state and federal organizations.
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20 VI.
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLANNING ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES PRIOR TO THE TMI ACCIDENT The responsibility to plan for and respond to the off-site consequences of radiological accidents at NRC-licensed facilities rests with various federal, state, and local organizations.
The evidence suggests, however, that these organizations have not conducted planning activities with a sense of urgency.
At the time of the TMI accident, federal efforts in radiological emergency preparedness had focused on planning the response of federal agencies to peacetime radiological incidents and assisting state and local governments in their own planning.
This section examines the federal efforts in the light of the accident.
A.
FEDERAL RESPONSE PLANS AS OF MARCH 28, 1979 On March 28, 1979, two formal federal interagency programs had been created to develop radiological emergency plans for federal agencies. The older of the two resulted in the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP) to provide technical federal assistance, principally radio-logical monitoring and communication capabilities, during a peacetime nuclear incident.139/
The more recent effort was the Federal Response Plan for Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies (FRPPNE), which concentrates on the development of opera-tional emergency response plans to protect the public health and safety.140/
Although IRAP signatory agencies provided indispensable technical monitoring assistance, much of this support was rendered on an ad hoc basis outside the formal structure of the plan.
At the time of the accident, FRPP??
was still being developed.
1.
INTERAGENCY RADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE PLAN (IRAP):
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY IRAP was developed in 1961.
At that time no federal agency had responsibility to plan or coordinate the federal response to a peacetime radiological incident.
The preamble to the revised 1978 version of IRAF states the purpose of the plan:
The Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP) was developed in 1961 by an interagency committee of Federal agency representatives as a means for providing rapid and effective radiological assistance in the event of a peacetime radiological incident.
The IRAP provides a means whereby the participating Federal agencies may coordinate their radiological emergency related activi-ties with those of state and local health, police, fire, and civil defense agencies.
795 j?}O
21 The preamble emphasizes that the plan is designed to coor-dinate and provide for the effective performance of the functions of the various federal, state, and local agencies, and not to supersede those functions.
In short, IRAP cocrdinates agency functions; it does not create new ones.
IRAP should not be confused with RAP, the DOE Radiological Assistance Program.
RAP is a long-standing program which originated in the AEC and, after the reorganizations in the executive branch of 1975 and 1978, is now administered by DOE.
RAP is primarily a program through the national laboratories to offer states and nuclear fa'cilities assis-tance during radiological emergencies.
When operating under RAP, COE team members offer advice, monitor radiation levels, and otherwise assist as necessary.
IRAP designates the Department of Energy, successor co botn the Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), as the lead agency under the plan.
As lead agency, it has sole responsibility for implementing the plan and coordinating the personnel and resources of the 13 federal agencies that may assist the state government in the response to a peacetime radiological incident.141/
In 1975, when the AEC was reorganized into the NRC and ERDA, it became ul. clear which responsibilities fell to ERDA and which to NRC.142/
The agencies discussed the problem and finally spelled out their responsibilities in the 1977 " Agreement between the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for Planning, Preparedness and Response to Emer-gencies."
This agreement accepts IRAP as the vehicle by which the NRC may obtain the support of ERDA's (DOE's) resources in an event involving an NRC licensee, but it does not specify whether NRC or ERDA (DOE) has responsibility for implementing IRAP in the event of an incident.143/
The TMI accident was the first test of IRAP in a respense to a significant incident at an NRC-licensed nuclear power plant.144/
NRC Chairman Hendrie stated in testimony before a congressional subcommittee that IRAP " worked fairly well" during the accident,145/ but after the notification phase, the extent to which IRAP actually influenced the actions of some of the signatory agencies is unclear.
For example, IRAP explictly assigns the lead agency role to DOE, but the DOE on site coordinator has stated that he was uncertain whether the NRC, as the federal agency with exclusive regulatory responsibility 'for the licensee, would assume DOE's assigned responsibility.146/
Despite this uncertainty, DOE officials determined on Wednesday that it would be unnecessary to request assistance from other federal agencies with assigned responsibilities under IRAP.147/
When the accident became more serious on Friday, however, high-level officials in EPA and HEW, both IRAP signatories, set into action an ad hoc response.148/
These officials 1230 ^J7
22 generally were unaware of IRAP's existence,149/ as were White House officials who coordinated an interagency task force.150/
After the crisis period of the accident had passed, HEW and EPA officials, still unaware of IRAP, learned that DOE had become the lead agency for the colla-tion and dissemination of environmental monitoring data.
Believing that a conflict of interest existed in DOE's dual role as an agency responsible for the development of nuclear technology and as lead agency at the site in the collation of data, these officials requested the White House to shift lead agency responsibility to the EPA for long-term environ-mental monitoring.151/
2.
FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN FOR PEACETIME NUCLEAR EMERGENCIES (FRPPNE):
FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY The other federal response plan existing at the time of the TMI accident was the " Federal Response Plan for Peace-time Nuclear Emergencies" (FRPPNE).
Developed by the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA),152/ FRPPNE sets out four categories of nuclear incidents 153/ and assigns to specific federal agencies responsibilities for developing response plans for each category.
Therefore, FRPPNE is not a plan outlining specific responses tu nuclear incidents; it is a process by which responsibility for planning is assigned to particular federal agencies and by which coordination and publication of completed plans areaccomplished.154/
This process had not been completed by the time of the TMI accident.
Development of FRPPNE began in 1974, as a result of FPA's belief that existing radiological response plans did not adequately cover the full range of possible peacetime nuclear incidents.
Although IRAF was in effect in 1974, FPA determined that IRAP did not address the full spectrum of problems that could occur in the event of a peacetime nuclear incident.155/
FPA officials believed that the response detailed under IRAP was only adequate for FRPPNE Category 1 incidents.156/
Moreover, while the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 required the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA), the agency responsible for admini-stering that Act, to provide assistance to state and local governments in responding to disasters, that assistance could be provided only upon request by a state governor and upon subsequent declaration by the President that a major disaster existed.157/ FPA believed that a broad range of catastrophic radiological incidents could occur under circumstances in which a response by other federal agencies would be needed, in addition to that provided by the Disaster Relief Act.
In that event, the President would want to utilize the full capabilities of all appropriate departments and agencies.158/
Thus, FPA officials believed that neither IRAP nor FDAA's authority under a Presidential 1230
^73
23 declaration was adequate to deal with the broad spectrum of possible emergencies resulting from nuclear accidents.
In 1974, FPA began distributing draf ts of FRPPNE to 32 federal departments and agencies for review and concurrence.
Under FRPPNE, it was proposed that FDAA be assigned responsi-bility for developing a coordinated federal plan in response to a Category 3 event.
By December 1976, all agencies had concurred on the proposal except FDAA.
Beginning in 1974, FDAA objected to FRPPNE on two grounds.
First, FDAA main-tained that FPA was acting beyond its authority because certain Executive orders were interpreted by FDAA as limiting FPA planning authority to emergencies affecting national defense or national security.
Second, FDAA believed that the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 had already assigned to FDAA the authority to plan for all kinds of disasters.159/
FPA, in response to FDAA's objections, recognized FDAA's authority for disaster assistance but only in the event that the Disaster Relief Act was implemented by a Presidential declaration.
FPA pointed out that FRPPNE was intended to cover nuclear incidents where a federal response in addition to that provided by the Disaster Relief Act might be appro-priate.160/
Moreover, FPA maintained that it was not limited to planning only for nuclear incidents affecting national security or defense.161/
This disagreement precipitated a series of delays in the development of plans under FRPPNE that continued for the next 5 years.
No plans under FRPPNE were available for the TMI accident.162/
In December 1976, FPA issued an interim report that incorporated language changee believed to resolve FDAA's objections,163/ but the report was not acceptable to FDAA.164/
FDAA's responsibilities under the plan were limited to Category 3 incidents, and since FDAA's nonconcur-rence was the only remaining obstacle to finalizing the FRPPNE program, FPA issued "FRPPNE Interim Guidance" in April 1977, so that the other FRPPNE agencies could begin planning for Category 1, 2,
and 4 incidents.165/
The TMI accident, according to an FPA official, would have been a Category 3 incident if it had worsened.166/
In summer 1977, FPA and FDAA staff finally reached agreement.167/
On September 26, 1977, Donald Carbone, the FDAA staff representative, forwarded the agreed language changes along with his recommendation for concurrence to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), FDAA's parent agency, for final approval.
HUD responded approxi-mately one year later in early fall 1978.
It requested that Carbone resubmit the September 1977 memorandum.
The reason given for the request was that HUD had " lost" the memorandum.168/
The memorandum was resubmitted and on n'^
19q
[
U
' /
u
24 October 31, 1978, HUD sent a letter to FPA stating that HUD would concur in FRPPNE, provided the agreed language changes were incorporated into the plan.169/
Between September 1977, and spring 1979 -- even after HUD sent its letter -- FPA continually called FDAA and HUD to determine the status of HUD's position on FRPPNE, but received no definitive statement on the progress of the review.170/
During spring 1979, James Thomas of FPA called Carbone inquiring about the status.
He was informed that HUD's concurrence had been forwarded to FPA in October 1978.171/
It appears that HUD's letter had been misdirected within FPA to a person who had moved to another position.172/
The two agencies, having finally achieved the concurrence sought in 1974, were in a position to begin planning under FRPNNE for Category 3 incidents.
At the time of the TMI accident, FRPPNE had yet to be published,173/ and'the lack of coordination between the two agencies continued during the accident itself.
Thomas of FPA planned to convene a meeting of federal agencies during the accident in part because FDAA had never prepared a Category 3 incident plan.174/
Carbone of FDAA, on the other hand, has testified that even had FRPPNE been finalized, FDAA did not intend to develop any Category 3 plans since the procedures "would be the ones that we would normally be carrying out in iinplementation of the Disaster Relief Act, any kind of a disaster, nuclear or otherwise."175/
Ironi-cally, the two agencies have now been combined with the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency into one agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
B.
FEDERAL PROGRAMS PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE STATES FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RES_PONSE PLANNING Federal emergency management agencies acknowledge that primary responsibility for planning for and responding to an incident at a fixed nuclear facility rested with the state and local governments. Recognizing this basic principle of emergency preparedness, FPA published, in 1975, a Federal Register notice that outlined a federal interagency effort established in 1973 to assist state and local governments in radiological emergency response planning.176/
No federal agency had authority to require state and local planning, and the FPA program was designed to " encourage" states to develop plans.177/
The prefatory language in the 1975 Federal Register notice stressed the " exceedingly low probability of incidents involvi.g radioactive materials in fixed nuclear facilities."
State participation in the program is completely voluntary.178/
1230 230
25 The program assigns NRC the responsibility as lead federal agency to coordinate the efforts of this interagency group, to develop guidance for the state and local govern-ments for the preparation of radiological emergency plans, and to review and " concur" in state plans.179/
Prior to taking on responsibility as lead agency of tnis federal interagency group in 1973, NRC had no formal program to guide state and local governments in the development of radiological response plans.180/
As lead agency, the NRC has established the following three committees:
o The Federal Interagency Central Coordinating Committee (FICCC), comprised of senior level personnel of all participating agencies, is responsible for establishing policy for the interagency group.181/
o The Headquarters Advisory Committee (EAC), an FICCC subcommittee, is responsible for expediting each member agency's assistance to the states at the regional level.
o The Regional Advisory Committee (RAC), comprised of regional office personnel of the member agencies, is responsible for assisting states in developing radiological response plans and for reviewing state plans submitted to FICCC for approval.182/
Under this program, the NRC established and published guidelines to both federal agencies and state governments for the preparation of radiological emergency response plans.183/
These guidelines are also used by the RACs in determining the adequacy of state plans submitted for review.
Upon finding that a plan meets the standards established in the NRC guidelines, the RAC recommends approval to the headquarters advisory commit:,ee.
NRC then makes a final review of the plan and " concurs" in it if the plan meets the specifications set out in the NRC guidelines.184/
In 1^75, Pennsylvania submitted draft emergency planning documents to the NRC for review under thi's program.
Approx-imately one month later, NRC responded that the materials fell short of the standards established in the NRC guide-lines, and " encouraged" the state to develop its plan further.185/
Over a year and a half later, the RAC members held an informal meeting with the state to discuss emergency planning, but Pennsylvania officials were more interes'ted ir.
talking about other things.
Collins of the NRC stated, "I
think they had questions on the Price-Anderson Act and a lot i230 231
26 of things which were of interest to them....
I don't think a heck of a lot came out of that meeting."186/
Pennsylvania submitted no other emergency planning documents to the RAC or NRC.187/
As Collins testified, the NRC had dedicated a very small staff to assisting the states in off-site emergency planning, and therefore, chose to concentrate its efforts elsewhere.188/
Once the NRC concluded that Pennsylvania officials had little interest in developing a plan under this program, "we took our business elsewhere because we couldn't afford to sit around and work with people who at that time didn't seem to be showing a great deal of interest.
We had to go where the action was."189/ At the time of the TMI accident, Pennsylvania had not formally submitted its radiological respon'se plan to the RAC for review, and, therefore, had not received NRC concurrence.190/
Pennsyl-vania is not the only state that has declined to participate in this cooperativO program.
Prior to the TMI accident, 25 states had operating commercial nuclear power plants.
Of these 25 states, 11 had radiological emergency plans in which the NRC had concurred.191/
Federal and state officials recognize that the opera-tional history of the interagency planning assistance program indicates the program has been ineffective.192/
A major contributing factor has been the reluctance of both the federal and state governments to incur the costs and to commit the staff and recources necessary to develop radiolo-gical response plans under the program.193/
The FICCC program provides only technical assistance to the states for developing plans -- no financial assistance is available:194/
some of the states and local governments feel that they don't have the resources to do this kind of planning.
And they are looking for financial assis-tance and they don't have the proper staffs and this kind of thing.
That has been one excuse that has been trotted out for not following the guidelines.195/
In addition, it has been charged that some states have intentionally delayed development of radiological plans for the purpose of pressuring state legislatures to allocate funds for emergency planning.
Harold Collins, the NRC's Office of State P rograms assistant director for emergency programs, stated:
I have had state officials that confessed that to me, told me outright that the reason they were doing nothing or proceeding along at such a pace that would barely keep them going in emergency planning in this area was precisely that, that they were hoping against hope that something would happen and they would get 177 20t)
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27 money or funds or stimulate their legislators to give them the wherewithal to do this kind of planning.196/
John McConnell, assistant director of DCPA,197/ a signatory agency to the FICCC program, testified, however, that the member federal agencies must share responsibility for the disappointing performance of the program.
McConnell explained that the participating agencies have not allocated enough time or resources to the states for active assistance in the preparation of radiological response plans.
"I'm afraid that we depended too muel. upon advice and not enough on actually helping states to do their planning job."198/
Throughout FICCC's operational history, DCPA has recommended to the chairman of FICCC that the other agencies make a greater effort and that more specific guidance be given to the states.
The situation has not significantly improved and the lack of momentum is attributable in part to the AEC-NRC regulatory approach.199/
DCPA's McConnell has stated that federal agencies were hesitant to become involved in this effort because they believed that a radiological incident was unlikely:
there is a reticence in most federal agencies to dedicate people, staff and funds to emergency prepared-ness for things they do not believe are very likely to happen.
Also, the states are just as responsible and just as reticent to spend time and staff on emergency prepared-ness and they need situations to occur like Three Mile Island to bring this to their attention.200/
In 1977, the NRC established an interorganizational committee, comprised of members of three major national organizations concerned with state radiological emergency preparedness, to advise the NRC on the efficacy of federal programs providing assistance to the states in radiological emergency response planning and preparedness.201/ In March 1978 the comn'ittee reported to the NRC that it had reviewed the FICCC program and found it to be ineffective.202/
The committee also stated:
The issue of the need for dynamic, viable emergency plans for peacetime nuclear emergencies is of such significance that the best efforts of the total avail-able resources from all appropriate and responsible local, state, and federal governments must be fully utilized in the development of such plans.203/
The committee made several recommendations to the NRC that it believed essential to the improvement of the FICCC
?
,2
}2bb I~S
28 program.204/
The NRC, in turn, met with members of the committee anu indicated its unhappiness with the committee's criticism of the concurrence program:
The (NRCl had -- I think they had hoped, perhaps that we wouldn't be quite so outspoken on their policies and procedures as we have been.
It has caused them some problems -- some conflict of what we're saying and what they want to do.
I think they've been a little disturbed at times that we were maybe a little more aggressive than they had thought we would be.
....the information that came back to us was that they
[NRC) were talking about how and why we felt the way we did about concurrence, and NRC made numerous comments that they were.not too happy with what we were saying.
They didn't agree with us, and then that has gone on for some time.205/
P:opite this and other criticisms,206/ the NRC staff in December 1978 responded to a ~iAO report criticizing the NRC approach to emergency planning by adhering to the tradi-tional AEC-NRC position that off-site planning merely adds a margin of safety to a system that is already safe enough.207/
That position represents an attitute toward off-site emergency planning that appears to have affected the planning activities of state, county, and local organizations in Pennsylvania prior to the TMI accident.
e 1230 211
29 VII. RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLANNING ACTIVITIES IN PENNSYLVANIA A.
ANNEX E TO THE PENNSYLVANIA DISASTER OPERATIONS PLAN At the time of the TMI accident, Pennsylvania had a radiological response plan entitled " Annex E, Nuclear Incidents (Fixed Facilities)," which was part of the general emergency plan for the state.208/
This plan was initially published in 1977 by the State Council of Civil Defense, now the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA)209/,
the state's emergency management agency 210/, and was updated later in 1977, and again in 1978.
Although there were operating nuclear power plants in the state prior to 1977,211/ no radiological emergency response plan had been developed prior to that time.
The original version and both updates of Annex E were funded through Pennsylvania's participation in a federal grant program.
The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 a-
.horized appropriations of $250,000 to each state for the levelopment of plans, programs, and capabilities for disaster prepared-ness and prevention.212/
In addition, annual grants of up to $25,000 could be awarded to each state to cover 50 percent of the cost of improving, maintaining, and updating state disaster plans.213/ This program, administered by the FDAA, focused primarily on general emergency planning, although a state could allocate a portion of this funding to develop "special contingency planning," including radiological emergency response plans for fixed nuclear facilities.214/
Development of radiological plans was considered collateral to the main thrust of this program; the FDAA review process did not include evaluation of the substantive quality of the
.adiological emergency plans developed under the program.
This approach appears to have affected the development of Pennsylvania's Annex E.
According to Donald Carbone, the FDAA official respon-sible for overseeing the grant program, Pennsylvania sub-mitted an application on January 22, 1975.
This application provided that, in addition to improving and updating its general emerger.c operations plan,215/ Pennsylvania proposed to develop a plan:
To meet potential problems arising from possible accidents at nuclear power facilities (three major plants are currently in operation within the State, with others under construction), a new section, setting forth the over-all policies, practices and p:.ocedures to be followed in the conduct of emergency operations associated with such accidents will be added to the plan.
In addition, three separate supplements to the plan will be prepared.
The latter will prescribe
'i30 235
30 the details of emergency actions and operations within the immediate vicinity of each particular facility currently in operation.
. 216/
When the Pennsylvania grant application was accepted by FDAA, the State Council of Civil Defense (now PEMA) contracted with an independent research firm for dee91op-ment of the emergency operations plan.217/
In its first quarterly Performance Report on the development of its plan, submitted to FDAA for the period covering February 20 through March 31, 1975, the Pennsylvania director of Civil Defense reported that he, with the chief of the Bureau of Radiological Health, now tr a Bureau of Radiation Protection _ ~
the Department of Environmental Resources, and the contractors retained by the state for the development of the plan, had agreed that active participation on the part of tech-nical representatives of the operators of the three nuclear plants within the state "would be not only proper, but also essential to the develcpment of sound, fully coordinated and effective plans.
An initial joint meeting of the state's and utilities' representatives was scheduled for April 16, 1975.218/
In its second Performance Report, Pennsylvania indicated that the April 16, 1975, meeting led to assurances of cooperation in future planning activities by representatives of the three nuclear plants.
The state agencies also agreed to incorporate into their plan an accident classification system developed by the State Council of Civil Defense.219/
Information provided to the President's Commission by FDAA indicates that no quarterly report filed by Pennsylvania between January 1975 and February 1977 mentioned the state's progress in developing a radiological response plan.220/
When Oran Henderson was appointed director of the State Civil Defense Council in August 1976 he reviewed the emer-gency operations plan prepared by the independent contractors and found it unacceptable.221/
He directed his staff to prepare a
" family of plans," a basic plan and a series of annexes, to cover the various types of disasters to which Pennsylvania is susceptible.222/
Pennsylvania submitted its final disaster operations
~
plan for review to FDAA, Region III, on July 12, 1977, and it was reviewed by both the regional and national office of FDAA.
The plan was accepted on February 7, 1977.223/
Although both the FDAA national and regional office made general comments about the plan, they said nothing specific about Annex E, the radiological emergency component.224/
7^
'7' 12JU d
t
31 Carbone testified during his deposition that the formal review process of emergency plans prepared under this grant program is limited to a " contractual review"--whether there has been compliance with the terms of the grant work plan.
The content and quality of the plans are not a concern in the formal review process:
"It's not a judgmental or an evaluative review."225/
As an informal matter, and at the discretion of the regional office involved, the regional office may offer the state advice as to the adequacy, quality or efficacy of a plan, but this advice is not a function of the grant management program.226/
Carbone testified that FDAA Region III's approach when Pennsylvania submitted Annex E was to conduct only a contractual review:
I think their viewpoint was pretty much as I just suggested, that their review of it was in terms of what was supposed to be in the work plan.
During the life of that particular program in the state, there were changes in our region, in the leadership of our region, and also, more significantly I think, changes in the management of the program but at a state level.
That probably had a greater bearing on what happened in the development of the state plan in Pennsylvanii.
.227/
Pennsylvania also participated in the annual grant program, presently called the Improvement Grant Program, which is sponsored by FDAA, and provides $25,000 to each state for emergency planning.
According to the deputy regional director of FDAA, Region III, Pennsylvania's "first task which was accomplished under this grant was to update Annex E,
' Nuclear Incidents,' tc the Commonwealth Disaster operations Plan."228/ In its first Quarterly Performance Report under the Improvement Grant Program, for the period ending March 31, 1978, Pennsylvania reported:
A.'nex E,
' Nuclear Incidents' to the Commonwealth Disaster Operations Plan has been rewritten.
It has been expanded ta the degree necessary to fill the need for a state fixed facility nuclear plan.
It is now ready for editing and coordination.229/
Carbone testified that the changes made to the October 1977 version of Annex E were only "a minor revision, just to make a technical change, I believe, as I recall to add one additional reference agency."230/
In August 1978 Pennsylvania made other changes to Annex E, which was then printed and distributed.231/
The August 1978 version of Annex E was in place at the time of the TMI accident.
A detailed descrip-tion of Annex I is attached as Appendix 4.
b 0 l ~T 7
/
32 The process for developing a radiological emergency plan satisfactory to state authorities had continued for nearly 3 years, despite the operation of nuclear power plants in the state before and during that period.
John McConnell, a DCPA official assigned by the White House to assist in planning activities during the accidt...".,
' reviewed Pennsylvania's Annex E at the time of the accident and found it to be "very inadequate, very brief and without e,ubstance."232/
B.
BRP PLANS Annex E provides that the technical aspects of planning for and responding to nuclear incidents in Pennsylvania are the responsibility of the BRP of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources.233/ BRP has developed ;wo radiological emergency response plans designed so'.ely for tha use of BRP staff. Neither technical nor finar.cial assistance was provided by federal agencies for development of these plans.234/
Other state agencies are given task assignments in these plans, but these assignments merely reflect those made in Annex E.235/
The first plan, entitled the " Department of Environmental Resources, Bureau of Radiological Health Plan for a Nuclear Power Generation Station Incident," sets out general procedures and guide-lines for responding to nuclear incidents and provides methods for applying EPA Protective Action Guides.236/
The second plan, "Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Annex to the Pennsylvania Plan for the Implementation of Protective Action Guides," applies the provisions of the general BRP plan to TMI specifically, and lays out procedures for evaluating the possible off-site consequence of different incidents at TMI. Both plans were developed by Margaret Reilly, chief of the Division of Environmental Radiation,237/
who stated that neither of these plans had been submitted to the NRC for concurrence.
Feilly does not believe that the NRC review and concurrence process could have been useful:238/
a lot of people in Bethesda (NRC] ought to know by now that we've been pretty active in emergency planning up here, although we haven't chosen to go the route of concurrence because personally I don't see where it would -- I don t think it would have brought us beans in thia accident.239/
Although the two BRP plans were developed by the same agency, they provide different classifications of radio-logical incidents and different notification procedures among the facility, PEMA, BRP and county emergency organi-zations.
The PEMA Annex E classifies incidents in the same manner as the general BRP plan, but prescribes notification procedures dif ferent from either BRP plan.
Met Ed's own emergency plan for TMI uses a different system of classify-ing incidents.
Little effort was made to coordinate the four plans in their classification of incidents and notification procedures.
7zo a7a JU
)
~J w
a
33 VIII. COUNTY AND LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING Following the basic princip'ania's Annex E provlies that le of the emergency preparedness structure, Pennsylv primary responsibility for planning for and initially responding to a nuclear incident rests with county and local governments.240/
County and local officials did not perceive the operation of TMI to be dangerous, however, and, therefore, had little interect or incentive to plan for a radiological incident.
The lack of interest may be attributable in part to the NRC's regulatory approach.241/
James Montgomery, chairman of the Interorganizational Advisory Committee, a committee comprising state and local disaster preparedness directors, explained the impact of the NRC approach on state and local governments:
QUESTION:
Do you have any feeling as to whether the lack of motivation at the state, local and county levels is due to the fact of the approach that the NRC has traditionally taken of de-emphasizin3 the possibility of an accident happening?
MONTGOMERY:
I think that's part of i+
ves.
I don't think there are any questions about that.
They certainly did not come on strong with the opposites.
There's no question about that.
I think there's a feeling of frustration that here there was pressure, but no requirement and all of this complex guides and everything on developing a plan, but no one in NRC saying that these things could be dangerous folks.
You better get a plan going.
That was frustrating.
People -- I think staces felt they were caught between a rock and a hard place because of the money involved, and the lack of leadership and emphasis by -- particularly, I think, the higher mt.nagement of NRC.242/
The impact of the AEC-NRC regulabmg approach is evident at the level of utility-community relations.
For instance, in 1974, the Borough of Middletown, located less than 3 miles from TMI, was assured by Met Ed that the evacuation of Middletown would never be necessary.
Town officials were told in a letter that, even in the event of a catastrophic nuclear accident, they would have several days to execute an evacuation:
1230 239
34 Even the worst possible accident postulated by the AEC would not require evacuation of the Borough of Middletown.
In the event of a catastrophic accident at Three Mile Island where it may be necessary to evacuate people who were close to the plants, i.e., within 2 miles [the TMI LPZ), a period of several days would be available to accomplish the evacuation without subjecting the people to unsafe levels of radiation exposure.243/
At the county level, emergency preparedness directors complained that it was extremely difficult to spark interest in radiological emergency planning.
Although many county directors are full-time paid employees, most local directors work on a volunteer basis.244/
Kevin Molloy, director of the Dauphin County Emergency Preparedness / Communications Department, testified that in the fall 1978 he called a meeting to urge authorities from Dauphin County municipalities to develop their con emergency response plans for incidents at TMI.
Few people attended the meeting.245/
As Molloy explained:
Unfortunately, in most cases the local directors are volunteers that are -- the state law says every municipality will have one.
The local elected heads of government appoint one.
They don't support him.
They don't care whether he attends training sessions or anything.
There is just a very negative attitude.
Back the too, when we were called Civil D, fense and so forth, Civil Defense carries a very negative image....
But there was just a -- just a general I-don't-care atti.ude.
And everybody assumed that the crunty has a
[radi, logical emergency] plan.
And I explained to them that m3 nlan did not cover the specifics needed during this t
'f emergency situation.246/
2.s Another indication of apathy at the local level is that county emergency management directors have, in the past, successfully conducted drills involving emergencies other than radiological incidents.
They believed, however, tPat drills involving a radiological emergency would be unsuccessful because of public apathy.247/
Paul Leese, director of the Lancaster County Emergency bbnagement Agency, stated:
Because of the apathy at that time, I think that j ust because of the fact that nothing had ever happened up there, that the people j ust were not tco enthused about it.
I think that is the whole thing.
Now it is a different situation.248/
1230~240
35 Before the accident, PEMA had requested that counties within a 5-mile radius of nuclear power plants develop 5-mile evacuation plans.249/
Pursuant to this directive, 5-mile evacuation plans were developed by Lancaster and York counties.250/
Dauphin County, the only other county located within a 5-mile radius of TMI, had already developed such a plan in 1974.
Kevin Molloy testified that, upon his appoint-ment in 1974, he discovered that no emergency plan existed at the county level for response to an emergency at TMI.
Believing that a plan was necessary, Molloy arranged a meeting, attended by state police representatives, BRP, Met Ed, and local civil defense people, to discuss the development of an emergency plan. As a result of this meeting, the 5-mile evacuation plan was developed.251/
Even though PEMA had requested the preparation of these plans, it provided little guidance during their development,252/ and when the county evacuation plans were submitted to PEMA upon ccmpletion, there was very little comment by PEMA on the plans.253/
Although both the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.101 and PEMA's Annex E provide for the coordination of emergency plans between the utility and off-site agencies, Met Ed was not involved in the preparation or review of county plans.254/
At the local level, on March 28, 1979, there were no written plans in existence for responding to an accident at TMI255/, despite the state's basic philosophy that the lowest level of government at which an emergency occurs has primary responsibility for responding.
County and state officials explain that because most local emergency directors ara volunteers, it is very difficult to convince them to invest time to develop adequate written emergency plans.256/
Henderson stated:
[E]xperience has shown that municipalities do a much more credible job during times of an emergency than their plan would indicate that they would or could.
It is very difficult sometimes.
You see all of your local municipal directors are strictly volunteers.
There are no paid local municipal directors.
About two-thirds of our county directors are paid, but thu mass of these 2,200 are strictly volunteers.
And to attempt to get polished plans from these municipalities is an extremely difficult job.
They can express to your [ sic] their mechanism, and what they would do in time of an emergency.
But actually putting it down in writing, it leaves a lot to be desired from a professional planning viewpoint.2}]/
I230 241
36 During the accident, however, the municipalities had no choice but to develop written evacuation plans.
- Indeed, when the decision was made to expand evacuation planning to 10 and 20 miles, the three counties were required to expand their own plans substantially.
With the expansion of the radius for evacuation planning, other counties became involved.
Prior to the accident, the emergency
~
management directors of one of these counties had attended a meeting with NRC representatives to discuss plans to respond to a radiological incident at TMI.
He was given to believe that his county would merely be a host county and that the off-site consequences of any incident would not extend beyond 5 miles.258/
Plans were unnecessary.
I230 242
37 IX.
CONCLUSION This report does not propose specific alternatives to the nation's approach to planning for radiological emergencies at nuclear power plants.
Various organizations with more time and resources have undertaken detailed studies in this area, as in the case of the joint EPA-NRC Task Force Report.
The report do aments, however, a funda-mental problem of attitude that is woven into the fabric of radiological emergency planning.
The NRC and the AEC, its predecessor, have traditionally assigned a low priority to off-site radiological emergency planning in part because of their confidence in designed reactor safeguards reflected in their regulatory approach, and their reluctance to stimulate public concern about the safety of nuclear power.
The lack of importance attached to off-site emergency planning is reflected in the present NRC regulatory approach and practices.
The attitude of the regulator of the industry has contributed to a lack of urgency and sense of purpose in the planning activities of other governmental organizations.
Without specific authority or a request to do so, the FPA thought it necessary to initiate planning activities among other federal agencies, but a significant part of the effort atrophied in a bureaucratic limbo for years.
Despite the construction of nuclear power plants within its borders for several years and three operational plants by 1974, the Pennsylvania civil defense agency dia not begin to develop a radiological emergency plan until 1975.
The state did not participate actively in the NRC concurrence program, a program which itself had been criticized as " ineffective" by'an NRC-sponsored committee.
At the time of the accident, the state plan was reviewed by a federal emergency planning expert who found it "very inadequate, very brief, and witaout subs tance. "
The three counties within a 5-mile radius of TMI had the required 5-mile evacuation plans, but no written plans had been prepared at the local level.
Attempts to spark interest in radiological emergency planning prior to the TMI accident were largely ignored by apathetic local of ficials.
The TMI accident demonstrated in harsh terms that conscientious, coordinated off-site radiological emergency preparedness is indispensable, when evacuation plans were hurriedly being prepared during the most critical hours of the accident, the NRC in Washington was writing criteria for recommending the evacuation of wedge-shaped areas of various distances downwind of the plant; state and federal emergency planning officials, however, were preparing plans for the evacuation of circular areas of 5, 10 and 20 miles from the plant.259/
Perhaps the experience of TMI will instill, at all levels of government, a sense of urgency
.y 1230 24,3
38 and responsibility for radiological emergency preparedness.
Indeed, in Ehe heat of post-TMI scrutiny, the NRC has increased its commitment to emergency planning and initiated a rule-making proceeding to reexamine its emergercy planning regulations.
But a sustained commitment to emergency preparedness is needed, and the history of the past few years indicates that the perfcrmance at all levels of government his f allen short of the mark.
O e
1230 244
39 APPENDIX 1 a
Major signatories and a brief description of their Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP) functions follows:
1)
Department of Defense
-- Operates a Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC), jointly staffed by DOD and DOE, that functions as a central information contact for radiological information and assistance coordination.
Provides initial accident response by the installation closest to the scene.
2)
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency -- Operates an extensive " National Warning System" communications network; distributes and maintains large supplies of radiation survey meters and dosimeters.
3)
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare --
Monitors foods and other substances for contamination through the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Attempts to minimize exposure to potentially injurious radiation.
4.
Environmental Protection Agency -- Coordinates radiological assistance response of EPA (Office of Radiation Programs), BRH/FDA, and the Office of the Executive Director of Regional Operations (EDRO ), FDA.
Response consist of maintaining regional monitoring teams to measure environ-mental radiation, evaluating extent of contamination, collecting and analyzing samples, and advising on actions that should be taken for protection of public health end safety.
5)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission -- Collects and evaluates facts and circumstances of incidents involving radioactive materials.
Maintains a large technical, manager-ial, and professional staff available for use under IRAP, but, unlike DOE, does not have extensive emergency equipment available.
6)
Department of Encrev -- Resconsibility for overall management and administration to implement the IRAP.
Coordinates use of its and other agencies' resources in accident response.
The other signatory agencies to IRAP are the Department of Agriculture, the Departmenc of Commerce, the Department of Labor, the Department of Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Postal Service, 1230 245:
y
40 APPENDIX 2 The other major signatories to the FICCC program, other than the NRC, and a description of their major responsibilities, follows:
EPA is responsible for (1) establishing protective action guides based on projected radiation doses that might result from radiological incidents at fixed nuclear facilities and (2) recommendations as to appropriate protective actions that can be taken by governmental authorities as to ameliorate the consequences of a radiological incident at a fixed nuclear facility.1/
HEW is responsible.for (1) assisting state health departments and professional organizations in the development of plans for the prevention of adverse effects from exposure to radiation, including the use of prophylactic drugs to reduce radiation dose to specific organs, (2) providing guidance on appropriate planning actions necessary for evaluating and preventing radioactive contamination of foods,2/ and (3) providing guidance on emergency radiation doses related to emergency and medical personnel who might be contaminated in the recovery operation.
DCPA is responsible for (1) assisting state and local authorities in planning emergency preparedness actions required for response to radiological incidents, and (2) providing guidance on the use of civil defense resources for use in radioivgical incidents.
FDAA is responsible for (1) providing guidance to state and local authorities on state emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities and (2) recommending to NRC appropriate guidelines for evaluation and review of state and local planning activities.
FPA is responsible for monitoring federal radiological emergency planning and training activities.
FICCC also established task forces on training and instrumentation both chaired by DCPA~[Carbone depositic.. at 59).
The training task force is charged with developing means that provide the states with the necessary training for response te radiological incil_c.;s [Carbone deposition at 60].
DCPA has conducted courses for the chief advisors to the governors in which procedures for responding to peace-time nuclear incidents are reviewed [McConnell deposition at 25].3/
One such course was held for Pennsylvania approximately
~
1230 246
41 1 year prior to the Three Mile Island incident [McConnell deposition at 26].
The instrumentation task force, chaired by a DCPA technician, was still in the research and planning stage on March 28, 1979 [McConnell deposition at 16].
This taek force is currently studying the possibility of using radiation monitoring instruments, originally distributed to the states by DCPA for use in nuclear attacks, for peace-time nuclear incidents, as well as the possibility of producing additional instruments for peace-time use [Id.].
I230 247
42 NOTES TO APPENDIX 2 1/
EPA's Office of Radiation Programs took on the respons-ibility under FICCC for establishing a manual for protective action guides that is intended to guide state and local governments in the development of emergency response plans.
Galpin interview at 8-9.
These guidelines set out specific actions to be taken to protect the public from radiation exposure and actions that can be taken at lower levels to reduce exposure resulting from a major accident at a nuclear power plant.
Gerusky dep. at 11-13; Galpin dep. at 58; See "A Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protection Actions for Nuclear Incidents," September 1975.
2/
At the time of TMI accident, HEW had not yet published final protective action guidelines for food and milk. Villforth deposition at 14-15.
3/
These training courses cover, among other things, analysis of radiation readings and protective action.
1230 248
43 APPENDIX 3 A brief summary of the major provisions of BRP plans follows:
1.
BRP Plan for a Nuclear Power Generating Station Incident, September 1977 Section 1 -- Scope.
A general discussion of the scope of the plan which includes both the governmental structure of emergency management and steps to be taken to protect the public health.
Section II.
Sats out three classifications of radiation incidents and establishes protocol for notifications and action, based in part on information given in NRC Guide 1.16
" Reporting of Operating Information - Appendix A, Technical Specifications."
o Class I incidents.
Events of potential off-site
" interest" but having little or no off-site radio-logical impact.
The facility operator will directly advise BRP and will also directly advise the county civil defense organization for routine support services.
o Class II incidents.
Events that involve actual loss or major reduction in the protection provided to the health and safety of the public.
The facility operator will contact PEMA, who will then disseminate notice to BRP, appropriate county civil defense agencies and federal agencies.
o Class III incidents.
Events that threaten to lead to the release of radioactive materials to off-site areas in quantities and types sufficient to suggest action by off-site agencies for the protection of off-site population against inhalation and direct exposure hazards.
The facility operator will immediately contact the county civil defense agency and PEMA.
PEMA will then notify various levels of government, including BRP, and appropriate neighboring states and federal agencies.
The plan's basic premise is that a facility operator has the best knowledge of the status of his facility.
Government agency responsibilities vary according to the seriousness of the incident.
Basically, for Categories II and III, BRP, after the required notice from PEMA, is responsible for contacting the facility to obtain a description of the occurrence, prognosis, and recommendations.
BRP will then 1230 249
44 relay this information and its recommendations back to PEMA.
PEMA is responsible for coordinating and transmitting information to other State agencies, neighboring states and appropriate federal agencies.
In Category III incidents, PEMA will establish a state Emergency Operations Center and will exercise general direction and control over state, county, and local emergency operations.
County civil defense agencies act as conduits of information to local governments which are responsible for carrying out prompt response functions (police and fire protection, for example]
as applicable.
Section V.
-- Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions.
This section reproduces the EPA " Manual for Pro-tective Action Guides and Protective Actions, Chapter 2" (September 1975).
Section VI -- Accident assessment.
Places joint respon-sibility for accident assessment on the facility and BRP, while recognizing that primary responsibility for early accident assessment and estimation of off-site consequences rests with the facility operator.
Section VII -- Protective action options.
There are four principal protective actions:
evacuation, sheltering, thyroid blocking and respiration protection.
This section of the plan details radiation dose measurements that would necessitate an evacuation, notes that sheltering should be used in severe incidents when there is insufficient time for evacuation, and directs that thyroid blocking be undertaken only with the approval of the FDA.
Respiratory protection requires equipment not practicable for the public at large.
Section VIII -- Food protection.
Contamination of fresh milk supply is considered a serious thred: in this area because of the "effect of amplification of dose commitment through the cow."
In light of this amplification effect, the population at risk from consuming milk is larger tnan that at risk from direct exposure.
The plan details factors involved in determining the extent of risk, maximum doses of radiation in milk for safe consumption, and draft FDA protective actions for milk.1/
The plan also discusses protective actions for produce and water.
Section IX -- Resources.
This section of the plan lists BRP aquipment, staff, and resources as well as resources of other state and federal agencies that may be used in responding to nuclear incidents.
Three federal resources are listed:
They are available to assist state and local agencies in assessing the consequences of radiation i230 250
45 accidents; 2) EPA, Office of Radiation Programs, maintains laboratory facilities and personnel to assist during an emergency; 3) NRC is expected to share its environmental sampling data with BRP.
BRP " assumes" that EPA and NRC would provide assistance to the state in the event of a reactor accident.
2.
Three Mile Island Annex to the Pennsylvania Plan The TMI Annex begins with a site description, an explanation of acronyms, a telephone directory, and prepared messages for broadcast or notification.
The main portion of the Annex consists of a discussion of the various categories of nuclear incidents in relation to TMI.
For each category, the Annex details postulated events, the population at risk, a sequence of events for notification of and response to the incident, a communications flow-chart, and a discussion of recovery measures.
Type three and four accidents also have a response checklist, identical to the one in the utility's emergency plan.
The accident categories are detailed as follows:
o Type one accident.
Unplanned release of substan-tial quantities of waterborne radioactive material into the Susquehanna.
o Type two accident.
Those cccurrences at TMI with the potential to lead to unplanned releases to the atmosphere.
In this event, Met Ed contacts PEMA and PEMA contacts BRP.
BRP then calls Met Ed to assess the status of the plant using a checklist of questions included in the plan.
BRP relays the information to PEMA and others, o
Type three accident.
Those failures likely to lead to the release of significant quantities of radioactive material to off-site areas.
A chain of communication similar to that for Type two accidents is employed in Type three accidents.
o Type four accident.
Those events resulting from failure of the primary coolant pressure boundary accompanied by single or multiple failure of engineered safeguards or consequence-mitigating features.
The chain of communications is similar to that used for Type two and three accidents.
I230 251 1
46 NOTES TO APPENDIX 3 1/
The plan notes that FDA protection action guides Tor fresh milk'have not been finalized.
As stated earlier, at tne time of the TMI incident they still were not in final form.
v 1230 252
47 APPENDIX 4 Annex E, Nuclear Incident (fixed facility), (Augus t 1978), a seven-page document attached to the basic disaster operations plan, establishes policies and procedures for response to fixed facility nuclear incidents and assigns responsibilities for response to such incidents to govern-ment agencies.
Three categories of nuclear incidents are defined:
I, incidents which have no off-site radiological consecuences, which arouse public concern, and which may require the support of off-site services (fire fighting and ambulance services); II, incidents which involve an actual loss or major reduction in the protection provided for public health and safety; III, incidents of sufficient severity for off-site organizations to take action to protect populations from direct exposure and inhalation hazards.
Annex E, following the conceptual basis of the basis disaster operations plan, states that:
County and local governments have primary responsibility for off-site response to a nuclear incident and will provide the initial response to the incident.
The State Council of Civil Defense [PEMA] will provide state off-site coordination of emergency planning.and response to nuclear incidents.
Section VII cf Annex E lists in general outline form the responsibilities of local and state governments:
VII.
Responsibilities A.
Local Civil Defense 1.
Maintain detailed planning for emergency services to support county civil defense operations ' includes fire, police, and ambulance).
2.
React to protective measures recommended by County Civil Defense Director.
3.
Coordinate local government responses.
4.
Maintain detailed planning for emergency operation (warnings, alerts, evacuation).
B.
County Civil Defense 1.
Maintain detailed planning for emergency operations (includes fire, ambulance, police, and rescue squads).
1230 253
48 2.
Maintain detailed planning for emergency operations (warnings, alerts, evacuations).
3.
Coordinate local and county emergency operations.
4.
React to protective measure recommended by Bureau of Radiation Health or the operator of the facility.
C.
State Council of Civil Defense (PEMA]
1.
Coordinate state response in emergency operations involving nuclear incidents.
2.
Coordinate the state planning for emergency operations to support nuclear incidents.
3.
Notify the Bureau for Radiological Health and appropriate state agencies of reported nuclear incidents.
4.
Notify appropriate neighboring states.
5.
Area Civil Defense Directors coordinate the county planning effort particularly in those instances where more than one county is within five miles of a fixed facility.
D.
Department of Environmental Resources [BRH, now BRP]
1.
Assess nuclear accident including interpretation of radiological monitoring measurements.
2.
Identify protective actions and notify:
a.
First - involved counties b.
Second - State Council of Civil Defense and other appropriate state agencies 3.
Serve as lead state agency for technical assistance for radiological health and incident assessment.
.i 4.
Coordinate assistance from federal radiation protection agencies.
I230 254
49 5.
Provide plans for ee.ch nuclear facility as guidance for preparation of plans for affected counties.
E.
Facility 1.
Coordinate emergency plans with off-site agencies.
2.
Provide for accident diagnosis and prognoses.
3.
Develop dose projections for off-site areas.
4.
Make appropriate protective action recommendations to off-site agencies.
.1230 255
50 NOTE TO APPENDIX 4 The October 1977 version of Annex E included a fourth category invoIving a post-III situation requiring long-range-recovery and rehabilitation.
The version of Annex E in place at the time of the TMI accident did not include a post-III situation.
e 9
1230 256
51 APuENDIX 5 DAUPHIN COUNTY EMERGENCY PLAN FOR COMMUNITIES NEAR THE THREE MILE ISLAND FACILITY, 1975 The stated purpose of the Dauphin County plan is to set forth procedures and guidelines to be utilized by authorized emergency personnel in Middletown, Royaltown, and Londonderry townships.
The plan is intended to " provide for the orderly and efficient handling of area residents during time of serious incidents emanating from Three Mile Island.
In-cluded in the plan are areas of responsibility, communication information (telephone, radio, television) maps, mass-care sites, evacuation plans, and general information regarding radiological incidents.
The plan indicates that the heads of local government direct actions to be taken in an emetjency.
The County Civil Defense Coordinator is responsible for assisting the local director in any manner requested.
The local civil defense director has the overall responsibility for the coordination of information and resources.
Responsibility for the movement of people from danger areas rests jointly with PEMA, the Dauphin County Civil Defense Director, and local civil defense directors.
Decisions concerning the need for evacuation are based upon information received by the County Director and/or local directors from the state, from information of anticipated events, or from reports of events which have already occurred.
1230 257
52 York County -- Procedures to be Followed Should an Accident Occur at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Three Mile Island Atomic Power Station, 5-Mile Evacuation, June 1978 This eight-page plan is based on the principle that detailed plans usually are discarded in the turmoil of an emergency.
Given this assumed fact, the plan provides that the best way to operate in an emergency is to get qualified people into the county emergency operations center who have established duties involving information distribution to relevant agencies and proceed based on the specific situation presented by the incident.
The plan notes that in the event of an accident numerous state and federal agencies will probably appear on the scene.
In regard to this, the plan states, "While we will give all agencies our complete cooperation our first duty is to safety of the York County resident."l/
1230 258
53 1/
8,000 information cards were printed and distributed to local residents to inform them of the existence of the plan (Jackson Interview at 9].
G 9
e 1230 259-
54 Lancaster County -- Emergency Plan for Communities near The Three Mile Island Facility, October 1, 1977 This plan sets forth procedures-and guidelines to be utilized by emergency personnel in five Lancaster County townships and boroughs in the event of an accident at TMI requiring evacuation. of people within 5 miles of the plant.
Patterned af ter the Dauphin County plan, it imposes responsibility for the evacuation of people from affected areas upon PEMA, Lancaster County Civil Defcnse, and directors of local communities.
Evacuation decisions are based upon information received by the county civil defense director or local directors from PEMA, warning notices, or reports of events which already have occurred.
The 42 page document includes telephone numbers, maps, community statistics, listings of mass facilities, evacuation plans, state police plan, evacuation 7olicies, and radiological information.
The plan provices for the participation of hospitals in the emergency response.
Hospital notification procedures are included in the plan.
However, hospitals are expected to provide their own plans.
Local directors located within 8 miles of the plant received copies of the 1977 plan.
In February 1979 county residents within 7 miles of TMI received cards with instruccions for response to a nuclear accident.
1230 260
55 NOTES 1/
10 CFR Part 100 (1979).
2/
Regulatory Guide 4.7, which is advisory in effect, Indicates the influence which specific site characteristics should exert on decision-making.
With respect to population considerations, the gui6e states that:
[ilf the population density, including weighted tran-sient population, projected at the time of initial operation of a nuclear power station exceeds 500 persons per square mile averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles (cumulative population at a distance divided by the area at the distance), or the projected population density over the lifetirae of the facility exceeds 1,000 persons per square mile averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles, special attention should be given to the consideration of alternative sites with lower population density.
Regulatory Guide 4.7.C.3.
3/
10 CFR S100.3 (b). The fission product release also determines the size of the facility's " exclusion zone."
The exclusion zone is the area immediately surrounding the reactor over which the utility must have complete authority, including the power to exclude or remove people or property.
10 CFR S100.3(a).
Applicants calculate the size of the exclusion ;Sne by determining the distance from the plant at which a person, if located there during the two hours immediately following the onset of an accident, would receive a worker's once-in-a-lifetime dose.
10 CFR 5100.11 (a) (l;.
Applicants calculate the LPZ in the same manner as the exclusion zone, but assume that the projected whole-body exposure would occur over a 30-day period.
10 CFR 5100.11 (a) (2).
The dose limits used in 5100.11 are 25 rems to the whole body or 300 rems to the thyroid.from iodine exposure.
This is a substantial dose, many times more dangerous than the radia-tion exposure of any individual.
durina the entire TMI accident.
4/
10 CFR Part 50, Annex to Appendix D (hereinafter, Annex).
Appendix D of Part 50 was revoked in 1974 (39 FR 26279) but its annex remains in effect as a proposed NRC regulation and serves as an informal regulatory guide.
36 FR 22851; 10 CFR S100.ll, footnote 1; Regulatory Guide 1.4.
5/
Report of the legal staff on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (hereinafter, "NRC report").
6/
For a fuller discussion of these postulated accidents and NRC's review of them, see the NRC report.
~
1230 26t
56 7/
U.S. 2 ? ear Regulatory Commission, Standard Review l
Flan, S15.6.5.
8/
Id.
9/
Id.,
SII; Regulatory Guide 1.4.
10/
Id., Appendices A-D; Regulatory Guide 1.4; Martin deposition at 20-40.
11/
Annex; See also testimony of Joseph Hendrie, chairman of the NRC, before the Environment, Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Emergency Planning Around U.S. Nuclear Power Plants; Nuclear Regula-tory Commission Oversicht, May 7, 10, and 15, 1979 (herein-after, " Congressional Hearings") at 551; whether risks presented by class 9 accidents are sufficiently great to warrant siting reactors only in unpopulated areas has been ru)2d a matter for congressional, rather than judicial, review.
Porter County Chacter of the Izaak Walton League of America
- v. Atomic Energy Commission, 553 F.2d. 1011 (7th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied 429 U.S. 945 (1976).
12/
"NRC Staff Response to Board Question No. 4 Regarding the Occurrence of a Class 9 Accident at Three Mile Island,"
filed in In the Matter of Public Service Electric and Gas Co.,
ASLB, Docket No. 50-272, Aug. 24, 1979.
The NRC position was based on the multiple system failures which occurred during the accident rather than on the amount of radiation released off-site.
Id.
13/
In the matter of New England Power Company, ALAB-390, 773, 737 5 NRC (1977) (hereinafter, "New England").
See also In re Southern California Edison Co., ALA 1 NRC383, 404-405 (1975).
14/
In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, Nos. 50-443, 50-444, ALAB-421, 6 NRC 25 (1977).
14a/ 10 CFR ll(a) (2) (19 79).
15/
Regulatory Guide 4.7.C.3.
16/
LPZs vary from less than a mile up to 10 miles in radius.
Co'. lins deposition at 36.
17/
Safety Evaluation Report, S2.1.3 (operating license stage).
18/
The " population center distance", which is 1-1/3 times the LPZ radius, is measured from the boundary cf population density rather than from the boundary of the political subdivision.
Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
- v. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, 423 U.S. 12 (1975).
1230 262
57 19/
Safety Evd.aation Report, SS2.1.3 (operati- : license stage).
20/
Report of the Environment, Energy and Nacural Resources Subcommittee on the Covernment Operations Committee of the House of Representatives, " Emergency Planning Around U.S."
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ovarsight, Aug.
8, 1979 (hereinaf ter" Congressional Report"), citing U.S.
NRC, " Demo-graphic Statistics Pertaining to Nuclear Power Reactor Sites,' NUREG-L348, Table 1 (December 1977, draft).
21/
See Ryan deposition at 71.
The Environment, Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the House of Representa-tives was also critical:
As previously noted, class 9 is the most serious category of accidents.
But it is not the greater severity which makes the exclusion of class 9 accidents from the analysis so grave an error.
Class 9 accidents are not simply quantitatively different from the other eight classes of accidents, they are qualitatively different.
In analyzing the first eight classes of accidents, the Commission assumes that during an accident some or all of the plant's safety systems (e.g.,
containment, spray, filters, emergency core cooling) will work.
An accident in which these systems work is called a " design basis" accident because the plant is assumed to respond to the accident as it was designed to respond.
In a class 9 accident, the engineered safety systems fail.
A class 9 acci-dent, therefore, is the only class of accident where the plant is assumed not to work as designed.
In assuming that any system as complex as a nuclear reactor, releasing such vast amounts of energy, will always work as designed, the Commission reveals an unwarranted faith in man's technological capabilities.
The Commission's rationale for ignoring the possibility of class 9 accidents, of course, is that they are so improbable.
But doubt has recently been cast on the precision of theoretically calculated probabilities of class 9 accidents.
Moreover, the real life example of the Three Mile Island Accident suggests that proud claims of infinitesimally small probability are unsoundly based:
many experts consider that accident was of the class 9 type.
Moreover, to assume that the possibility of class 9 accidents need not be taken account of.in emergency planning is sheer regulatory sophistry.
The central purpose of emergency planning is to prepare for acci-dents.
Yet in assuming that class 9 accidents can be ignored, the Commission is assuming that the plant will 1230 263
58 always work as designed, since only in a class 9 accident does the plant fail to perform according to design.
But if the plant always works as designed there is never really an accident.
The Commission, in short, plans for nuclear accidents by assuming they will not happen.
Congressional Report at 40-41.
22/
Ryan deposition at 71.
Ryan believes that if the TMI acciden.. had occurred oc Indian Point, less of life might have resulted:
Everybody says what a terrible situation we had at Three Mi'e Island, and I agree, but can you imagine what it would have been if it had been at Indian Point?
It would have been calamitous.
You would have had dozens, hundreds of people killed perhaps trying to get out of the place, because the roads are, you know, they're North-South roads basically and the narrow old turkey bridge -- I'm from New York so I know the area fairly well -- there are narrow, old bridges, one of the oldest bridges across the Hudson, the Bear Mountain Bridge, is a two-lane bridge going, you know, West-East across the Hudson.
It's just a riciculous place Id. at 71-72.
23/
Memorandum, " Staff Practice on LPZ Boundaries at Sites Ith Operating and New Units," from 3rian Grimes, chief, EEB, Division of Operating Reactors, to L. Crocker, DPM, April 4, 1978.
See also Congressional Report, p.
41.
24/
Ryan deposition at 69-70.
25/
Report of the Siting Policy Task Force, NUREG-0625, August 1979.
26/
NRC/ EPA Task Force on Emergency Planning, " Planning Basis for the D velopment of State and Local Government Radiological Aergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0396, December 1978 (hereinaf ter, "NRC/ EPA Task Force Reporf ).
The task force recommends an emergency planning zone of "about 10 miles" for the plume exposure pathway and "about 50" for the ingestion exposure pathway.
Id.,
p.
16.
2~/
NRC Policy Statement, " Planning' Basis for Emergency Responses to Nuclear Power Reactor Accidents" (undated, although issued on Oct.
5, 1979).
The endorsement recom-mends using the NRC/ EPA Task Force Report as NRC guidance only and does not specify that the recommendations be retroactively applied to existing sites.
Id.
1230 264
59 28/
The effect of the AEC-NRC approach is demonstrated in
-a 1974 letter from Met Ed to the nearby Borough of Middletown.
See footnote 243, infra, and accompanying text.
29/
See *radford deposition at 151.
30/
Collin
_aposition at 18.
31/
Id. at 8.
32/
Id. at 7.
33/
Id.
34/
Id. at 12.
35/
NRC began some guidance programs to involve federal agencies in planning efforts.
Id. at 13-16.
36/
The FY 1978 NRC budget for the emergency preparedness program involving state and local governments was $250,000, representing 0.15% of the total NRC FY ~978 budget.
Memor-andum, Robert Ryan to Lee Gossick, Aprii 10, 1979.
32/
Ryan deposition at 33-34.
38/
Id. at 6-7.
39/
Id. at 33.
See memorandum from Robert Ryan to Lee Gossick, Executive Director for Operations, Aug. 16, 1978.
40/
44 FR 41483 (July 17, 1979).
THE NRC staff working cn emergency preparedness was increased to 13 after the acci-dent.
Ryan deposition at 6.
The budget of the Office of State ?rogram.s for emergency preparedness program functions, moreover, may be increased by as much as 50 percent.
Id. at 15.
~
41/
The statutory authority supporting Appendix E is S 161 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which authorizes the commission to:
b.
establish by rule, regulation or order, such standards and instructions t govern the posses-sion and use of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material as the Commission may deer necessary or desirable to promote the common cadense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property.
(Emphasis supplied.)
1230 265
60 42/
10 CFR S 50. 34 (a) (10).
The level of detail required is that degree " sufficient to assure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans with facility design features, site layout, and site location with respect to such considera-tions as access routes, surrounding population distributions, and land use."
Appendix E, Part II.
43/
10 CFR S 50.34 (b) (5) (v) ; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Part II..
--44/
Those matters are:
o organizations for coping with radiation emer-gencies (S IV ( A) ) :
o identification of employees or others with special qualifications for coping with emergencies (S IV(B)) ;
o means for assessing magnitudes of radiation releases (S IV(C)) ;
o criteria for notifying off-site agencies (S IV(C));
o criteria for involving off-site agencies (S IV(C));
o criteria for determining use of protection meas-ures (S IV(C));
o agreements reached with officials and agencies concerning warning and implementing protection measures (S IV(D)) ;
o provisions for keeping plans up to date (S IV(E));
o emergency first aid and personnel decontamination facilities (S IV(F)) ;
o arrangements for treating individuals outside site boundaries (S IV(G)) ;
o training of employees (S IV(H)),
o provision for periodic emergency drills (S IV(I));
and o
criteria for reentry into a facility.following an accident (S IV(J)).
45/
Appendix E, S IV.
46/
Regulatory Guide 1.101, " Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, March 1977.
47/
Congressional Report at 19.
48/
The four plants are D.C.
Cook, Hatch, North Anna, and Salem.
Congressional Hearings at 573.
49/
Testimony of Harold Denton before the President's Commission, Aug. 23, 1979, at 19.
50/
Ryan deposition at 18.
1230 266
61 51/
1.101, SC.
Accidents fall into five graduated levels of severity:
Personnel emergency - " accidents or occurrences onsite in which emergency treatment of one or more individuals is required... (including)...those situations that have no potential for escalation to more severe emergency conditions."
Emergency alert - situations that "can be recognized as creating a hazard potential that was previously non-existent or latent.
The situation has not yet caused damage to the plant or harm to personnel and does not necessarily require an immediate change in plant operating status."
Plant (Unit) emergency
" physical occurrences within the plant requiring staff emergency organization response... [where it would be]...unlikely that an off-site hazard will be created."
Site (Station) emergency - an accident involving "an uncontrolled release of radioactive materials into the air, water, or ground to an extent that the initial assessment indicates the advisability of considering protective action offsite."
General emergency - although the regulation is not specific on the precise description of accidents that rise to the " general emergency" level, general emer-gencies encompass accidents that "have a potential for serious radiological consequences to public health and safety."
Applicants are permitted te classify accidents by an alternate approach, assuming that the alternate approach is "substantially equivalent."
Id.
52/
1.101, Annex A, S5.
53/
Id.,
S7.
54/
Id.,
58.
1230 267
62 55/
They are:
o protective actions for relocating on-site persons during emergencies, including o
" action" criteria ( S6. 4.1.1 (a) ) ;
o warning of on-site persons ( 5 6. 4.1. l (b ) ) ;
o evacuation routes, transportation of personnel, and reassembly (56.4.1.1(c));
o missing persons checks ( 5 6. 4.1. l (d) ) ;
o radiological monitoring of evacuees
( S 6. 4.1.1 (e ) ) ;
~
o protective actions regarding distribution of protective equipment and supplies in the exclusion zone, including o
individual respiratory protection (S6.4.2.1);
o use of protective clothing (S6.4.2.2);
o use of radioprotective drugs, e.g.,
individual thyroid protection (S6.4.2.3);
o protective actions regarding in-plant contamination control measures (56.4.3);
o protective actions outside of security area, but within the exclusion area, including o
isolation or quarantine and area access control (56.4.3.1(a));
o control of distribution of affected agri-cultural products, including milk (S6.4.3.l(b));
o control of water supplies (S6.4.3.l(c));
and o
criteria for permitting return to normal use (S6.4.3.l(d)); and o
protective action to aid affected personnel, including o
exposure guidelines for entry and reentry to areas in order to remove injured persons and undertake corrective actions (S6.5.1);
o decontamination and first aid (S6.5.2);
o meetical transportation (S6.5.3);
o medical treatment (S6.5.4).
56/
1.101, 56. 4.1. 2 (a).
57/
1.10~
S6.4.1.2(b).
1230 268
63 58/
1.101, S6.4.3.
59/
1.101, S6.4.3.2.
Off-site contamination control provisions should include the same " elements" as are required for on-site contamination control:
a.
Isolation or quarantine and area access control; b.
Control of the distribution of affected agricul-ture products, including milk; c.
Control of water supplies; and d.
Criteria for permitting return to normal use.
Id.
S6.4.3.1.
60/
56.4 indicates t'sc plans should also describe steps "taken
...(2) to make available on request to occupants in the low population zone info mation concerning how the emergency plans provide for notification to them and how they can expect to be advised what to do."
61/
The NRC's Atomic Licensing and Appeal Board (ALAB) has held that, during licensing proceedings, the feasibility of developing an emergency plan applicable to the area beyond the LPZ is not relevant to the determination of whether the regulations have been met.
New England,
- p. 747.
62/
- See, e.g.,
prepared testimony of Joseph Hendrie, supra note 7, at 380.
63/
See Congressione.1 Report at 40 (using the LPZ as the basis for emergency clanniny is " devoid of any rational basis"); " Report to the Cor.Jress, Areas around Nuclear Facilities Should be Becter Prepared for Radiological Emer-gencies," EMD-78-110, (March 30, 1979), ("GAO Report") at 21
("
these zones do not cover the entire area that could be affected by [ releases from the most severe types of nuclear accidents]"); NRC/ EPA Task Force Report, Appendix III B ("If the engineered safety features are lost during an accident, then the LPZ has no meaning with regard to the size of the areas around the plant in which emergency response would be appropriate").
64,/
See " Guide and Checklist for Development and Evaluation of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Fixed Nuclear Facilities," NUREG 75/111, Dec.
1, 1974; (NUREG 75/111); the General Accounting Office (GAO) has recommended that all states with reactors meet these NRC standards.
GAO Report, p.
35.
65/
NUREG 75/111.
Ryan deposition at 27.
66,/
Ryan deposition at 27.
1230 269
64 67,/
Id. " Supplement No.
1" to NUREG 75/111, March 15, 1977.
68/
The 13 states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, and Washington.
Attach-ment to memorandum from Robert Ryan to Lee Gossick, April 10, 1979.
The two states added since the accident at TMI are Arkansas and Nebraska.
Ryan deposition at 28; CoAlins deposition at 25.
Other sources have stated that prior to the accident only nine states had concurred-in plans.
Congressional Report; GAO Report.
69/
Ryan deposition at 28.
70/
Bradford deposition at 151. g n
71/
Letter to J.
Dexter Peach, djirector, Energy and Mineral Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, from Lee Gossick, executive director, for Operation,; Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion, dated Dec. 18, 1978, at 1-2f.
Anticipating the GAO criticism, the NRC's Office of Stpte Programs agreed in October 1978, that plants in statbs without NRC concurrences should not be licensed.
Ryan deposition at 41-43.
The Office of Nuclear naactor Regulation, haaever, opposed the suggestion and that ended the discussion unt.11 the accident.
Memorandum from Harold Denton to Robert Ryan, Nov. 3, 1978; Ryan deposition at 43-44.
72/
Congressional Hearings at 574.
73/
Letter to Honorable Paul McClosky from Joseph Hendrie, June 26, 1979; cited in Congressional Hearings at 578-582.
74/
Kennedy deposition at 174-182.
75/
Id.
76/
Letter from Joseph Hendrie to Honorable Toby Moffett, June 26, 1979, cited in Congressional Hearings at 603.
77/
Gossick deposition at 37.
78/
Technical specifications, DesAgn Features, Figure 571-1; Safety Evaluation Report, Sept.
5, 1969, S2.1 (con-struction permit stage).
79/
Technical specifications, Design Features, Figure 571-2.
1230 270
65 80/
Safety Evaluation Report, S2.1.3 (operating license stage).
81/
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Annex to the Pennsylvania Plan for the Implementation of Protective Action Guides,
("Pa. Plan Anncx") Part I; Safety Evaluation Report, S2 1 (construction permit stage).
82/
Pa. Plan Annex, Part I.
83/
Safety Evaluation Report, S13.3 (operating license stage).
84/
Id.
This calculation disagreed with Met Ed's own computations, which concluded that evacuations out to four miles could be effected in less than two hours.
Testimony of NRC staff on Emergency Plans for Evacuation filed before the ALSB, Docket No. 50-320, (hereinafter, "NRC staff testimony") at 4.
85/
Safety Evaluation Report (operating license stage),
nupplements 1 (undated) and 2 (February 1978).
86/
NRC staff testimony at 1.
87/
Prepared testimony of Craig Williamson, Docket No. 50-770.
88/
NRC staff testimony.
The staff also cited an "exten-EIve study" conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency.
That study, according to the staff, found "no statistical difference in the effectiveness of evacuation with or without an emergency plan."
The staff was unwilling to sponsor that result, however, commenting that " preplan-ning is desirable and prudent. "
Id. at 3.
89/
Transcript of ASLB proceedings, May 18, 1977, p.
T7374.
~
90/
Prepared testimony of Kevin Molloy, Docket 50-320,
- p. 10.
~
91_/
Id. at 6, 10.
92/
Transcript of ASLB proceedings, May 20, 1977, at 1,736-1,739.
93/
Id.
94/
In the Matter of Metropolitan Edison, et al., AS LB,
Docket 50-320, 6 NRC 1185, 1206 (Dec. 19, 1977).
P 1230 271
66 95/
In the Matter of the Metropolitan Edison Co.,
et al.,
Docket 50-32 0, ALAB-4 86.
CCH Reports, at 28,674, (July 19, 1978)( hereinaf ter," Met Ed").
96/
Met Ed, p. 28,677.
Molloy had contended that live tests would not conform to real emergencies and that emer-gency responses learned during live tests might be inappropriate in real emergencies.
Met Ed at 28,677-678.
97/
Met Ed, at 28,679-81.
98/
Met Ed, at 28,681.
99/
Site Emergency Plan, S2.1.
Tied to this emergency classification is a postulation of five possible accidents for TMI.
These accidents are:
Case I LOCA:
A loss-of-coolant accident assuming severe core damage and fuel melting with 100 percent of the noble gases and 25 percent of the iodines released to containment (S2.2.3);
Case II LOCA:
Primary coolant leak sufficient to damage fuel rods, releasing gases between the fuel and fuel rods into containment ( S2. 2. 4) ;
Case III Gas Decay Tank Rupture:
Rupture of a gas decay tank, causing premature release of its radio-active contents to the auxiliary building and to the atmosphere (S2.2.5);
Case IV Fuel Handling Accident:
Gross mechanical damage of the entire outer row of fuel rods in the assembly with no retention of noble gases (52.2.6); and Case V Steam Generator Tube Rupture:
A double-ended rupture of the steam generator tube with unrestricted discharge from each end to the secondary side of the steam generator (S2.2.7).
These postulated accidents, inserted in accordance with 1.101 requirements (1.101, Annex A, S4.1), play no apparent role in influencing licensee response in time of emergency.
100/ Id.,
S4.
101/ Id.,
S4.1.1.
102/ Id.,
S4.1.2 - 4.1.3.
103/ Id., S4.2.
104/ Id., 54.4.
1230 272
67 105/ The plan identifies these organizations as the State Council of Civil Defense and the Bureau of Radiological Health.
Id., S4.1.4.
106/ See report of the legal staff on emergency response.
107/ Site Emergency Plan, 55.0.
108/ Id.,
S55.2.1 - 5.2.2.
109/ Id., 55.3.
110/ See report of the legal staff on emergency response.
111/ Id., S5.4.
112/ Id., 55.5.
113/ Id.,
56.1.1.6.
114/ Id.,
S6.1.1.1.
115/ Id.,
S6.1.1.4.
116/ Drills are of five types:
site or general emergency drills, medical emergency drills, fire emergency drills (with off-site fire departments invited to attend), repair party team drills, and fire brigade drills.
All of these must be held annually, except for fire brigade drills, which must be held quarterly.
Id.,
S6.1.2.
117/ Dubiel deposition at 56-58.
118/ Ii.,
For a description of the various drills held at TMI du:Ang calendar year 1978, see " Investigation into the March 28, 19'9, Three Mile Island Accident by Office of Inspection and Enforcement," U.S. NRC Investigative Report No. 50-320/79-10, NUREG-0600 (August 1979), at II-1-17, 18.
119/ Dubiel deposition at 63-64, 78-81.
NRC Region I inspectors were present at the last drill, held at TMI-l on Nov. 11, 1978. Representatives of the state agencies were also present.
Dubiel recalls that some of those who were invited did not come, but he cannot remember which (Id. ).
Dubiel cannot remember whether any suggestions were made after the Nov. 11, 1978, drill, but he does recall post-drill discussions with off-site agency observers on other occasions.
Dubiel deposition at 81-82a.
120/ Molloy deposition at 15.
121/ Donaldson deposition at 53.
1230 273
68 122/ Id. at 45.
123/ Id. at 47.
124/ Vol.
1, S3.
125/ Letter from R. Jacobs, captain, U.S. Coast Guard, to J.
Herbein, vice president, Metropolitan Edison Company (ccpy undated).
The letter goes on to advise Met Ed that par-tially "due to involvement in primary mission areas such as search and rescue, maritime pollution, and fisheries law enforcement," Coast Guard response to a TMI emergency might be somewhat delayed.
TMI Emergency Plan, S3.
126/ Letter from Kevin Molloy, Civil Defense of Dauphin County, to J.
Herbein, vice president -- generation, Metro-politan Edison Company, dated Aug. 25, 1977* (*date unclear on copy).
TMI Emergency Plan, S3.
127/ Letter from Oran Henderson, director of civil defense, to J. Herbein, vice president, Metropolitan Edison Company, dated Aug. 18, 1977.
TMI Emergency Plan, S3.
128/ Martin deposition at 110-12.
During the accident, however, NRC senior management repeatedly told state and federal officials that the " lead time" for evacuation might range from zero to several hours.
See report of the legal staff on emergency response.
129/ Donaldson deposition at 64.
130/ The TMI-2 operating license technical specifications require Met Ed to " establish, implement, and maintain written procedures covering implementation of the Emergency Plan."
Technical specifications, Administrative Controls, S6. 8 (e).
If there is no license condition requiring emergency plan implementation, enforcement can be difficult.
Donaldson deposition at 62-63.
See 10 CFR 50.36; 50.40; 50.42; 50.43.
131/ Donaldson deposition at 11.
132/ Inspectors inventory emergency kits and emergency equipment to ensure that all items required by the plan are in place, and some of the equipment is actually tested to ensure that it is in working order.
Inspectors visit the licensee's emergency control center, examine the communi-cations equipment, and inspect radiation monitors and other equipment.
Off-site agencies with emergency responsibility are visited, as well as the area hospital with capability to treat irradiated workers.
Inspectors also review documents.
When an inspector is relying on a document to ascertain that s.
1230 274
69 the licensee has satisfied a particular responsibility, the inspector will normally not "look behind" the document to ensure'that its contents are truthful.
The inspector would do so, however, if, for some reason he suspected the docu-ment's validity:
"[0] ne lehrns to knoe who to trust and who not to trust."
Additionally, a random sacpling of approxi-mately 25 percent of licensee personnel wi-h designated emergency response duties are interviewed :o determine the extent of their training and their assessments of their own emergency response capabilities.
Donaldson deposition at 13-38.
133/ The thirteen parts are:
-Local Emergency Procedures (S1670.1);
-Site Emergency Procedures (S1670.2);
-General Emergency Procedures (51670.3);
-Radiological Dose Calculations (S1670.4);
-On-site Radiological Monitoring (S1670.5);
-Off-site Radiological Monitoring (S1670.6);
-Emergency Assembly, Accountability and Evacuation (S1670.7);
-Emergency Re-Entry for Repair on Rescue (51670.8);
-Emergency Training and Emergency Exercises (51670.9);
-Hershey Medical Center Medical Emergency Procedure (S1670.10);
-On-site Medical Emergency Procedure (Injured and Contaminated) (S1670.11);
-Emergency Contact List (S1670.14); and
-Post-Accident Re-Entry and Recovery Plan (S1670.16).
134/ Procedure 1670.1, SS4.1.3, 4.2.1, 4.4.1.
The procedures require simple on-site notification of appropriate personnel, the taking and evaluation of a radiation survey, and the implementation of " appropriate steps to return condition to normal."
135/ Procedure 1670.2, S4.1.4.
Figure 4 of the procedure contains a schematic drawing of a " communications tree."
The drawing gives rise to the possibility that TMI would notify others in addition to PEMA, if appropriate.
136/ Id., S4.1.9.
137/ Id., S4.1.13.
138/ Other procedures establish methodologies for radio-logical dose calculations (Procedure 1670.4) and radio-logical monitoring (Procedures 1670.5, 1670.6), means for detection of radiation on the decontamination of exposed workers, (Procedures 1670.10, 1670.11) and accounting for and assembling plant workers during emergencies (Proced-ure 1670.7).
For radiation emergencies, initial medical 1230 275
70 treatment will be on-site, possibly in the "First Aid Room" (Procedure 1670.11, 51.2).
Patients in need of prolonged treatment would be sent to the Milton S.
Hershey Medical Center, (Id., S1.4), where a single room has been made available for this purpose (Procedure 1670.10, SIV (c) (2) ).
Occupation-specific training programs, consisting of reviews of planning provisions and refamiliarization of workers with emergency equipment, are also required (Procedure 1670.9, S4.0).
Off-site agencies are invited
~
for training (Id., S3.5.1).
(For a listing of off-site agencies which have participated, see NUREG-0600, p. II-1-7).
Regarding drills, procedures call for written evaluations by off-site agency observers (Procedure 1670.9, S4.1.4.1).
Drill scenarios must be based on " plausible simulated accident [s]" sufficient to trigger site or general emergency response (Id., S4.1.5).
The last procedure governs post-accident re-entry, and recovery (Procedure 1670.15).
Only one page in length, it concedes the impossibility of anti-cipating post-accident conditions and, therefore, establishes no mandatory response actions.
It does, however, recommend that officials hold off on commencing recovery until the emergency is over (Id., 51. 3 ).
1230 276
71 139/ IRAP, Preamble.
140/ FRPPNE, Interim Guidance, April 1977 at 2.
141/ IRAP at 2, 8.
A listing of signatories to IRAP and their responsibilities under it may be found at Appendix 1.
142/ Memorandum, L. Joe Deal (DOE) to File, re:
Critique for Response to Three Mile Island Accident, at 6.
143/ Id.
144/ Deal deposition at 8; Villforth deposition at 44.
145/ Statement of Joseph Hendrie, chairman, NRC, before the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, Committee on Government Operations, 96th Congress, 1st Session, at 389-390.
146/ Deal interview at 36-38.
147/ Deal deposition at 76; Deal interview at 36-38.
148/ Gage deposition at 34; Cotton deposition at 123-124.
149/ Id.; Villforth deposition at 42-44.
150/ Watson deposition at 107; Eidenburg deposition at 158.
151/ Cotton deposition at 100-l' ; Gage deposition at 89-91.
152/ FPA, within the General Services Administration, is charged with, among other things, responsibility for developing federal policies and programs with respect to emergency preparedness and working with federal agencies to ensure that appropriate planning is coordinated and completed.
Executive On' rs 11051 and 11490, as amended.
a 153/ The four FRPPNE categories are:
Category 1 - A nuclear incident with minor and located effects; Category 2 - An incident with the potential for nuclear detonation and/or widespread dispersal of radioactive contanination; Category 3 - An occurrence in which, despite all preventive and controlling efforts, there is nuclear detonation and/or widespread dispersal of radioactive contamination; Category 4 - The post-Category 3 environment during which long-range recovery and rehabilitation are effected.
FRPPNE Interim Guidance, April 1977 at 11-12.
1230 277
72 154/ It is interesting to note that FRPPNE adopts the view that built-in reactor safeguards reduce the need for off-site emergency planning to protect the public health and safety:
Federal, state, and local goverments, private industry, and other governmental users have taken measures to prevent foreseeable accidents associated with the manufacture, transportation, storage, and use of radioactive materials and devices intended for civil and military use.
Safety features are incorporated in each nuclear reactor to reduce the probability of accident and the risk of radiological contamination.
Security safeguards in addition to safety features are built into every nuclear weapon to assure an extremely low probability of an accidental or unauthorized detona-tion.
[Id. at 1].
155/ Thomas deposition at 11.
156/ Id. at 10-11.
157/ Public Law 93-288.
FDAA, although not required to do so, is authorized by the Act to develop disaster prepared-ness plans (Id. at 5201(a)).
No disaster declaration was made during the TMI accident.
Indeed, federal and state officials purposely avoided making an explicit declaration.
See Report of the legal staff on emergency response.
158/ Thomas deposition exhibit 2; Carbone deposition at 34-36.
159/ Carbone deposition at 32-33; Thomas deposition at 6-9; Thomas deposition exhibits 2, 3.
160/ Thomas deposition exhibit 2.
161/ Id.
162/ Carbone deposition at 52.
163/ Thomas deposition at 23.
164/ Id. at exhibit 3.
165/ Id. at 18, 19.
As a result, the FBI furnished upgraded U.S.
plans for peacetime nuclear emergencies involving terrorism, a Category 2 incident under FRPPNE.
The Depart-ment of Defense (DOD) developed an extensive exercise involving a nuclear weapons accident, also a Category 2 incident under FRPPNE.
Id. at 20-21; FRPPNE Interim Guidance, April 1977.
166/ Thomas deposition at 54.
1230 278
~
73 167/ Id. at 25-26, exhibit 5.
168/ Carbone deposition at 49-53.
169/ Id. at 55; Thomas deposition, exhibit 6.
170/ Thomas deposition at 28-29.
171/ Carbone deposition at 51.
Carbone believes that Thomas' inquiry may have been made after the TMI accident.
Id. at 53.
172/ Id. at 51.
173/ Id. at 52, 174/ Thomas deposition at 57-58, 175/ Carbone deposition at 55-56.
176/ 40 FR 59494 (Dec. 24, 1975). The notice superseded a Federal Register notice of Jan. 24, 1973.
The participating agencies in the 1975 Federal Register notice are NRC, FPA, DCPA, FDAA, DOE, HEW, EPA, and DOT.
As part of that federal effort, the notice called upon EEW to assist states in development cf plans to prevent adverse effects of radiation exposures, including the use of drugs to protect the thyroid g?and against radioactive iodine.
In partial response to that notice, the Food and Drug Administration of HEW issued, about 3 months before the accident at TMI, a
Federal Registar notice soliciting new drug applications for production of potassium iodide (KI) for use as a thyroid-blocking agent during a radiological emergency.
43 FR 58798 (Dec. 15, 1978).
As of March 28, 1979 the FDA had received no responses to its notice from pharmaceutical companies.
Villforth interview at 19.
A problem in obtaining KI for the population near nuclear facilities has been lack of funding.
According to Thomas Gerusky, the director of Pennsylvania's Bureau of Radia-tion Protection:
Every time we went to the federal government or the state government and requested assistance in purchasing or establishing a system to get KI in, we were told the state is going to have to spend the money if they want it, and we didn't have the money to set up the KI program.
(Gerusky deposition at 87.)
During the TMI accident, KI had to be produced in vast quantities on an emergency basis.
See the report of the legal staff on emergency response.
/
1230 2791
74 177/ Thomas deposition at 35.
178/ Hardy deposition at 15.
179,/ 40 FR 59494 (Dec. 24, 1975);
see generally 1978 NRC Annual Report at 135-136.
A description of the responsibi-lities of the major signatories appears in appendix 2 to this report.
180/ Collins deposition at 18-22; Montgomery deposition at 17-18.
181/ Thomas deposition at 32; Carbone deposition at 57.
182/ Id. at 31-32; McConnell deposition at 10; Carbone deposition at 57.
183/ NUREG-75/lll and Supplement 1 thereto; NUREG 0093.
184/ McConnell deposition at 10; Hardy deposition at 6-7; Galpin deposition at 6.
The NRC also conducts training courses for state and local officials.
Collins deposition at 31-33.
185/ Collins deposition at 26-27.
186/ Id at 26-28.
187/ Id.
See footnote 239 and accompanying text.
188/ See footnotes 36-38 and accompanying text.
189/ Collins deposition at 28.
190/ Id. at 26; McConnell deposition at 10-12; Thomas deposi -
tion at 37.
191/ See footnote 68 and accompanying text.
192/ Collins deposition at 21-22; McConnel deposition at 19-21; Montgomery deposition at 22-30.
193/ Collins deposition at 21; McConnel deposition at 21.
194/ As discussed in Section VII, however, federal financial assistance has been available from other sources for the development of state radiological plans.
Pennsylvania had develooed a radiological response plan using financial assistance.
195/ Collins deposition at 21.
1230 280
75 196/ Id. at 29.
197/ DCPA, an agency within the DOD, has responsibility pursuant to the National Civil Defense Act of 1950 for preparing the U.S.
for enemy attack.
In 1976. this Act was amended to extend DCPA's responsibility to include preparation for natural disasters.
National Civil Defense Act of 1976.
198/ McConnell deposition at 11.
199/ Id. at 19-21.
200/ Id. at 21.
201/ Letter from Robert Ryan, director of Office of State Programs, NRC, to Dale McHard, chairman of Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, July 28, 1977.
The committee was formed as one of 12 under the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors.
Comprised of 12 persons who represent the conference and state and local civil defense organizations, the committee meets five or six times a year or more frequently if necessary.
The committee functions as a " sounding board" for states to respond to NRC proposals.
Ryan deposition at 61-65.
202/ Letter from David Snellings, chairman of Interorganiza-tional Committee on Emergency Response Planning and Prepared-ness, to Robert Ryan, Office of State Programs, March 1, 1978, with attachment, Feb. 22, 1978; Montgomery deposition at 11.
203/ Letter, with attachment, supra note 202.
204/ Id. The committee recommended that the NRC provide (1) means of funding to the states for development of radiolo-gical emergency response plans; (2) professional consultants to state and local governments in development of plans, and (3) timely guidance in areas such as scope of incident, protective action guides, instrumentation, warning capabilities, and timely notification by the utility.
205/ Montgomery deposition at 48-49.
206/ As early as April 1975, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, NRC, reported to the NRC chairman that it had reviewed the status of emergency preparedness and found that off-site emergency planning was inadequate:
There is a need for further improvement of response plans on the part of state and local agencies who will be responsible for protection of people in the neigh-1230 281
76 borhood'of plants.
This includes the development of a well defined division of responsibilities and of the coordination required among people responsible for on-and off-site aspects of protective actions.
Additional observations by the Committee are that the response plans of many states responsible for dealing with population groups in the neighborhood of nuclear power plants are only in the planning stages, or if completed, show a need for more professional knowledge in this subject area.
The Committee recommends.
.that the NRC assume a role of leadership in coordinating the necessary efforts to foster the development of adequate state emergency response capabilities.
Letter from William Kerr, Chairman, ACRC, to William A.
Anders, Chairman, NRC, April 8, 1975.
207/ See footnote 71 and accompanying text.
1230 282
77 208/ Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Disaster Operations Plan.
209/ The name-change was made in 1978, pursuant to the adoption by the state of a model act prepared by the Council of State Governments for upgrading civil defense organiza-tions.
Henderson deposition at 4.
210/ PEMA is the state agency responsible for planning, coordinating, and committing resources for the full range of potential emergencies occurring within the state.
(Henderson testimony, Aug.
2, 1979, hearings, at 32).
PEMA's overall direction and policy is established by the "rcarnor.
The council is required to meet at least three times a ye'r and within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> following a disaster. (Henderson deposition at 27-28).
The council consists of 16 members, including the governor, lieutenant governor, secretaries of various state agencies having primary disaster responsibilities, four members of the state legislature, and the majority and minority speakers of both state houses.
211/ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissier. Annual Report 1978 at 290.
212/ Disaster Relief Ac'c of 1974, as amended, S201(c).
213/ Id. at S201 (d).
214/ Wilcox deposition at 6; Carbone deposition at 3-5, 19.
215/ This plan was initially developed in 1963 under a so percent matching grant program administered by DCPA ;
Pennsylvania, through its participation in this program developed only a general emergency operations plan.
Prior to the existence of Annex E, the state response to a peace-time nuclear incident was planned with the normal oper-ational roles of the state agencies as provided in the General Operations Plan. Letter from James Lothrop to Ruth Dicker of the President's Commission staff, dated September 25, 1979.
4 216/ Excerpts from Pennsylvania Development Grant Work Plan relevant to radiological emergency response planning.
Carbone to Wilcox, April 24, 1979.
217/ Henderson deposition at 9.
218/ Letter dated April 25, 1975 from Richard Gerstell, Director of Pennsylvania Civil Defense to Paul Cain, regional director of FDAA, see attaching first quarterly report under FDAA grant program.
I230 283
78 219/ Letter dated July 24, 1975 from Richard Gerstell, director of Pennsylvania Civil Defense to Norman Steinlauf, acting regional director of FDAA, see attaching second quarterly report.
220/ See routing s'ip memo from Carbone to Wilcox, attaching are all quarterly reports mentioning Radiological Emergency Response Plans ( R"RP ).
In its third report, covering the period of Joly 1, 1975, to September 30, 1975, Pennsylvania reported that " portions of a three-part booklet for each of the three nuclear power stations in the state are in draft and under review by the Council, the Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH) and the power companies." (Letter dated October 14, 1975, from C.A. Williamson, acting director of Civil Defense to Arthur Doyle, regional director, FDAA, attaching third quarterly report. )
The fourth quarterly Performance Report states:
"The decision was made NOT to publish the three-part booklet for each nuclear power plant site in the state as reported in Part II of the quarterly report for the period ending September 30, 1975. Instead, two site nonspecific pamphlets were drafted, one for the general public and one denoting governmental responsibilities within the state.
These two documents are currently under review." Letter dated January 26, 1976, from Williamson to Arthur Doyle, attaching fourth quarterly report.
Col. Henderson testified during his deposition that sometime in 1976, the State Council of Civil Defense prepared a booklet to be dis-seminated to the general public around Three Mile Island which discussed what the public should know about radiation.
In attempting to obtain concurrenc~e on distribution of this booklet from the various state agencies, objections were raised that a separate booklet concerning radiation problems unduly emphasized dangers of a fixed nuclear site, when, in fact, Pennsylvania suffers much nore from floods and snow storms.
For these reasons, the BRP would not give its concurrence and the document was not published or dis-tributed.
Henderson deposition at 29-33.
221/ Henderson deposition at 9.
222/ Id.
223/ Carbone deposition at 14-15, exhibit 1.
224/ Id. at 17.
225/ Id. at 9-10.
I230 284 4
- e
79 226/ Id. at 9-13.
227/ Id. at 14.
In the. August 1, 1978, meeting of the Inter-Organizational Advisory Committee of the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, the issue of FDAA funding for the development of state emergency resg:rse plans were discussed.
The committee found that the use of such funding for planning efforts with regard to fixed nuclear facilities was largely dependent on the work of the regional director of FDAA.
Inter-Organizational Advisory Committee Meeting, CRCPD, August 1-3, 1978, Bethesda, Md.; Godwin deposition at
+
8.
228/ Memorandum, Alfred Hahn, HUD to John Gibson, HUD, July 6, 1979.
229/ Quarterly Performance Report, Pennsylvania Disaster Preparedness Grant No. 207-71-1072 period ending March 31, 1978.
230/ Carbone deposition at 7-8.
231/ Quarterly Performance Report, Pennsylvania Disaster Preparedness Grant No. 207-71-1072, period ending September 30, 1978; letter from James Lothrop, plans officer, PEMA, to Ruth Dicker of the President's Commission staff, Sept. 25, 1979.
232/ McConnell deposition at 36-37.
233/ Annex E, S VII D.
BRP has two main functions : (1) inspecting, licensing, and determining regulatory compliance of all non-NRC licensed users of radioactive matel:.als and x-ray equipment in Pennsylvania; (2) environmental moni-toring and emergency planning.
(Gerusky deposition at 3-4.)
BRP personnel play the technical lead role in radiological matters.
(Henderson deposition at 35.)
Although BRP has responsibility for environmental monitoring, its monitoring program is a limited operation designed mainly to verify the accuracy of the data collected by the nuclear facility.
This program is funded by the NRC in exchange for providing NRC with the data collected.
At the time of the TMI accident, BRP was carrying out the minimum program required by the NRC and Thomas Gerusky, director of BRP, testified that the state's monitoring program during the accident was not adequate.
(Gerusky deposition at 16-18.)
In 1975, Gerusky had recommended to the Pennsylvania House Mine and Energy Management Committee that BRP 's environmental monitoring program be expanded to ensure effectiveness during a nuclear accident. Although legislation was introduced that year and in later years, it had failed to pass.
After the TMI accident, however, the state appropriated funds for BRP to establish an expanded monitoring program.
(Gerusky deposition at 16-22.)
1230 285
80 234/ Reilly interview at 6-7, 33.
235/ Id. at 33.
236/ Gerusky deposition at 10-12.
Protection Action Guides (PAG) can best be described as " decision making points."
They are radiation doses to which the public should not be exposed or which, at lower levels, call for certain protective actions.
Action is required as raciation levels approach the PAGs and is not to be delayed until the levels are actually attained.
Reilly interview at 11-13; Gerusky deposition at 12-13.
237/ Reilly interview at 6; Gerusky deposition at 11.
238/ Reilly interview at 29-20, 32.
239/ Id. at 19.
The implementation of these plans during the course of the TMI accident is discussed in the report of the legal staff on emergency response.
Margaret Reilly stated that two problems with the TMI Annex became evident during the accident: first, the information needed to assess the situation, and second, the events at the plant cannot be easily compartmentalized according to the types set out in the plan.
(Reilly interview at 25-28.)
e i230 286 w.
81 240/
DOP, Annex E, SVI.
Section 7 of the Pennsylvania State Council of Civil Defense Act of 1975, Pamphlet Law 28, provides for the creation of county and local emergency management agencies:
Each political subdivision of this state is hereby authorized and directed to establish a local organi-zation for civil defense in accordance with the State Civil Defense Plan and program.
Each local organization for civil defense shall have a Director who shall be appointed by the Governor upon the recomrindation of the executive officer or governing body of the political subdivision.
The director shall be responsible for the organization, administration, and operation of such local organization for civil defense, subject to the direction and control of such executive officer or governing body.
241/
Montgomery deposition at 31-32.
242/
Id.
243/
Letter from F.
Shirk, supervisor, Communications Services, Met Ed, to George Merkle, manager, Borough of Middletown, PA, dated Feb.
4, 1974.
244/
Henderson deposition at 7.
245/
Molloy deposition at 27.
246/
Id. at 25-26.
247/
Id. at 13-14; Leese interview at 20, 22; Jackson interview at 10-11.
248/
Leese interview at 21.
249/
Leese interview at 13-15; Jackson interview at 6.
Approximately 3 years before the TMI accident, PEMA, in conjunction with BRP and a private contractor (Systems 1
Development Corporation of California), decided to establish 5-mile evacuation zones to provide uniformity in the state with respect to planning near nuclear power plans.
At that time, Pennsylvania had 3 nuclear plants.
The Peach Bottom i
plant had an L7Z of 4.6 miles, the Beaver Valley plant an LPZ of 3.6 mi"es, and TMI an LPZ of 2 miles.
Taking the larest of the 3 LPZ 's and adding some distance as "an extra fudge f acto'., " a 5-mile radus was adopted.
Henderson deposition at 10.
250/
Leese interview at 15; Jackson interview at 6.
L230 287
82 251/
Testimony of Kevin Molloy, Aug.
2, 1979, President's Commission hearing at 4.
252/
Molloy deposition at 11; Leese interview at 75; Jackson interview at 7, 60.
253/
Molloy deposition at 11; Leese interview at 15; Jackson interview at 7.
A general description of the 5-mile plan appears in Appendix 4.
254/
Molloy deposition at 11; Leese interview at 15; e
Jackson interview at 9.
255/
Holloy deposition at 27.
256/
Id. at 25.
257/
Henderson deposition at 7.
258/
Boyer interview at 5-7.
259/
See report of the legal staff on emergency response.
9 1230 288