ML19254B045
| ML19254B045 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1979 |
| From: | Creswell J, Flint J, Shackleton O METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190218 | |
| Download: ML19254B045 (43) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f
I In the Matter of:
2' 7E TMI INVESTIGATICH INTERVIEW y
3 of Mr. John H. Flint Physics Test Coordinator S
l Si Si 7!
t 8!
Trailer #203 9!
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10j Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
i July 2, 1979 12' (Date of Interview) 13!
Jt'ly 17,1979 141 (Oate Transcript Typec) 323 15!
(Tape Numcerts))
16l 17' 18l
- 19i, 20!
21; NRC PERSONNEL:
22' l
Mr. James S. Creswell 23 i Mr. Owen C. Shackleton 24; 251 V) '\\ l 1
7909190 2/f
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1l SHACXLETON:
The time is now 9:03 a.m., EDT, July 2, 1979.
This is an 2{
interview of Mr. John H. Flint. Mr. Flint is the Physics Test Coordin-3 ator for the Babcock and Wilcox C:mpany, presently assigned ;'
.e 4
Three Mile Island facility.
Present to conduct this interview from Sj the U. S. Nuclear Regula~iry Commission, is Mr. James S. Creswell.
61 Mr. Creswell is a Reactor Inspector, assigr.sd to Region III.
My name 7j is Owen C. Shackleton.
I am an Investigator assigned to Region V.
Mr. Flir.t has been interviewed several times before, and just prior to going on this recording, pardon me, he has been interviewed one time g
before.
10!
Just prior to going on to this recording, just momentarily, I discussed with Mr. Flint that the two page document that we originally i
had presented to iiim to sign before his first interview was still in 12' effect, and he said that he was aware of this.
Now to make it a 131 matter of record, I would like to repeat that this two page, document 15:
from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, sets forth the purpose i
and scope of this investigatier and identifies the authority of the U.
,6 1
t
- 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct this investigation.
I 17l further identifies Mr. Flint's rights to refuse to be interviewed and 181 to refuse to give us a signed statement.
And that he has the right to have someone of his choice present during the course of this interview.
201 Mr. Flint, do you acknowledge, sir, that you understand fully the 21!
statement that I'm referring to?
22l 23 FLINT:
I do.
24l 25!
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e if SHACXLETON: And do we have your permission to tape this interview?
2!
l FLINT:
You do.
31 41 0
SHACXLETON: And would you like a copy of the tape?
ci I
Gi FLINT:
Tape and transcript.
/
I al' SHACXLETON:
- 0. K.
Fine, we'll provide you with a copy of the tape at 91 the conclusion of this interview.
And we'll give you a copy of the transcription, as soon as it is received.
And now I will turn the interview over to Mr. Creswell.
Go ahead, Jim.
12l 13 l
CRESWELL:
John, in our previous interview with you, we had discussed 141 with you that there was a setup on the Habcay RTDs, which was implemented 15i with an additional voltmeter to read the up-scale readings on the T 161 l
hots. Were those digital voltmeters connected whenever you arrived in 17;!
the Control Rocm?
18i 19 FLINT:
There was only one digital voltmete. connected vo, and it was 20!
in place when I arrived in the Control Room.
21l l
22' CRESWeLL:
Could you estimate, John, how long after you had arrived 231
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there it was, before you realized that... or before you went over and 24 looked at the readings?
25i i
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l 11 FLINT:
I would say, approximately one hour.
l 2:
3 CRESWELL:
So, that would put it around 10 o' clock?
4!,
FLINT:
That is correct.
c t
i 6!
CRESWELL:
7 Also, you made some statements regarding the increase on I
8j the SRMs and RRMs. And that you felt that that was indeed due to a change in the leakage flux pattern.
Do you remember specifically who g
you informed with that information?
101 l
lit FLINT:
Ed Frederick, Bill Zewe and Lee Rogers.
12l i
13l CRESWELL:
14\\
As a group, John?
15; FLINT:
I believe that Bill Zewe and Ed Frederick were there at the 16:
same time; Lee Rogers was a separate time.
He was not there when the 17!
other two were.
18f 191 CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
Could you approximatie affix the time on when you did 201 that?
21!
22!
FLINT:
Between 10-10:30, I would estimate.
That's only an estimate.
23) 24l 25l T
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ilj CRESWELL:
Do you recollect discussing this subject with Scott Wilkerson?
I 2;
FLINT: No, I do not.
3 4l
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CRESWELL:
One of the statements that you made earlier was that you
-l had talked to the operator about steam generator levels.
And I believe 6
i 7j that you stated that you recommended that the steam generators be gl filled to a higher level.ian was existing at that time.
91 i
FLINT: That is correct.
10!
11!
CRESWELL: Would the steam generators have been about 50% on the 12l l
operating range whenever you got involved with that area?
131 1
14' FLINT:
I believe they were at 50% at that time.
At least the A 15 generator was approximately 50%.
17l l
CRESWELL:
Looking at the governing procedure for the steam generator 18j levels at this particular point in time, and this would be procedure 191 2102-3.3, I believe that procedure calls for 50% on the operating 20:
level.
j 21,
22l l
FLINT: That is correct.
23l 24l 25i
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1.
CRESWELL: Why did you feel it was necessary to increase the level 2
beyond the 50% on the oper: ting range?
l 31 4j FLINT:
The B steam generator was isolated, end therefore was not r
Sj assisting in the cooldown process, and we had superheated steam in the 6i hot leg piping, which would reduce the efficiency of the generator to cool down. A higher level, therefore, would help to conseose this 7
material and increase heat removal capabilities.
8{
91 CRESWELL:
- 0. X.
Could you characteri;e your decision to do this as 01 one of taking the cr.nditions that you knew at the time, and based on those conditions, making the recommendation? Or were you I
aware previously that under certain type of accidents, that more than 131 50% level on the operating ran3e, would be required?
l 15t FLINT:
It was based on the conditions at the time.
16' 17f l
CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
Are you aware of any type of accident conditions, 181 small break type of accident conditicas, where more than 50% level 19!
would be required?
20l 21:
l FLINT:
No, I am not.
22!
23 CRESWELL:
Do you recall who you worked with? The operator that you 241 I
worked with in this evolution?
25t 4
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6 FLINT:
It would be Ed Frederic<s and Bill Zewe. Of course these 1!
2 recommendations were made to Lee Rogers to pass on to the Met Ed task 3j gr up that was actually making decisions to undo this.
In other words I cannot direct the operator to do this.
41 Si e
_i CRESWELL:
So, what you're saying is, you made the recommendation to el Lee Rogers.
Then did he make the recommendation then to Bill Zewe, or 7
... 9 g
9f i
FLINT:
No, I would also talk to Bill Zewe and Ed Fredericks about my 101 recommendation.
But, Lee Rogers would pass it on to the groep.
Gary 11 Miller would make the decision as to whether or not it would be followed 12!
out.
13 f
14!
CRESWELL:
But, did Gary tell Bill Zewe to do that?
15; 16i i
FLINT:
Yes, I'd say they did.
17!
181 CRESWELL:
It would appear that during this period of time that you're 19I working very closely with the operator.
Is that correct?
20j t
21:
FLINT:
I would not say working very closely with the operator.
I was 22!
out in the area where the operators are, to review plant parameters, 23 and therefore, be able to keep Lee Rogers up to date on what was going 24) on, or to be able to quickly isolata any change in conditions.
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7 CRESWELL: Were you there when the operator did in fact, and I would yi assume that was after Ed Fredericks had increased the level in the 2
3j steam generator. Were you there when he did that?
4j FLINT: Yes, I wcs.
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5 l
6i CRESWELL: When he did fill the steam generatnr up, and I'm assuming this it. the A steam generator...
8 9l I
FLINT: That is correct.
101 2
11!
l CRESWELL: What did you observe as far as paramecer chances in the 12!
I plant?
13l 14!
FLINT:
I did not.<now of any immediate parameter changes.
The level goes up; the temperature and pressure changes a bit in the generator, i
but there were no major changes at that immediate time, that I remember.
17!
18t CRESWELL:
So, that you didn't feel that the evolution was successful?
19i 20!
FLINT:
I felt that it would take a period of time tc, take it successful.
21:
22l i
CRESWELL: When you say a period of time, that the amount of condensation 231 that you were getting in the steam generator was at a very slow rate?
24!
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FLINT:
1l There would be a slow rate, and at that period of time we did 2
net have the capability to dump into the condensor.
And we were only 3j using the atmospheric dump valve for control of heat removal and 4j occasionally opening the block valve on the pressurizer.
Therefore, g) heat transfer would be very low.
I 6;
7j CRESWELL:
Did you observe any temperature changes, i.e., either on 8
the T hot, the T cold, or the secondary side, or level changes?
g Sorry, you were changing the level on the secondary side but rtid you notice any temperature changes on the secondary sid::?
11!
t FLINT:
12l At this time, 1 cannot remember whether or not I did observe a temperature change.
131 141 l
CRESWELL:
Did you request any data from the process computer during 15 this evolution?
16; 17i FLINT:
Yes, I did.
18!
191 CRESWELL: What was the nature of that data?
2ft 21:
FLINT:
Primarily the incore thermocouple temperatures.
It was also 22l bringing out source range, intermediate range indication and some 231 par 7eters on the steam generators.
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9 11 CRESWELL: What would be the nature of the parameters on the steam 2
generators?
l 31 4
FLINT:
Levels, temperatures, pressures.
i Sj CRESWELL:
Now, would this be a nature of a point by point interrogation 6
i 7'
of the computer, or did you ask for certain operator's summaries?
8 gj FLINT:
Primarily point by point interrogation.
l 10 CRESWEl L:
But did you ask for any operator summaries connected with I
this?
12!
i 13!'
FLINT:
There were one of two summaries, but I cannot remember their 141 numbers at this time.
15l 16i 17l CRESWELL: Were you evaluating this data on your own, or were there I
other people there evaluating the data?
3 -u 191 i,
FLINT:
Primarily evaluating on my own, although on occasion we'd have IL(
some discussion with Ivan Porter.
21; 22l CRESWELL:
0.K.... John, there are certain tech specs associatedgvith the steam generator levels, as a funtion of what operating mode that 24j you're in.
Did you consider the effect of change of level on the tech 251
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10 FLINT: Yes, I did.
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CRESWELL: And what the levels that you advised that they change to 3
4l were in conformance with the tech specs.
Sl i
FLINT:
To the best of my knowledge, they were.
6 i
7!
aj CREWSELL:
During our previous interview, you stated that before they tried to repressurize to collapse the bubble the first time, that you g
g stated that you didn't think because there were super heated conditions inside the reactor coolant system, that the bubble could be collapsed.
11!
Did you inform anybody of that?
I 13\\
FLINT:
I informed Lee Rogers of this fact.
I believe, Ed Frederick 14!
and Gary Miller.
16 CRESWELL:
How did Mr. Miller respond when you informed him of that?
18t FLINT:
He responded with the consensus of the group, meaning was 19!
that, although it may not work, that it was worth a try.
20:
21l CRESWELL:
But, you had described to him certain physical aspects that 22t day, in that, if have super heat in the reactor coolant system, such i
23!
that the pressure is above the safety relief valve setpoint, that 24:
there is... essentially no way that you can pressurize the reactor 25i s.
I
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If coolant system to a pressure that would collapse the super heated 2
steam, or condenser super heated steam.
I 31 1
4j FLINT:
That is correct, however, since the RTDs are not normally used Sj in this range, no one was pos.itive that they were providing absolute 1
Si temperatures.
7l CRESWELL:
But, thi's was after a point in time when they had hooked up 8
gj the additional voltmeter t: the RTDs and had obtained a reading indicating i
l in the nature of... or in the area of 720 degrees F.
11i FLINT:
That is correct.
12!
i 13l CRESWELL; 141 So that your impression is that they disregarded those y
readings.
16i FLINT:
17!
I would not use the term " disregarded".
There was some question I
18l as to their accuracy... an absolute magnitude.
19!
CRESWELL:
Was it based on just one set of readings or did they have 21l both loop readings at that point?
i 221 FLINT:
We had both loop readings.
23l 24l 25i e
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CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
You mentioned that at the time they got the 28 pound 2j pressure spike in the afternoon, that you had heard a noise.
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41, FLINT: That is correct.
Si 6
CRESWELL:
Did you discuss this particular event with anyone else?
Is the situation where you hear the noise and you thought it was a damper?
7 81 FLINT:
I thought it was a ventilation damper cycling.
91 101 CRESWELL:
Was it something when you noticed that and then you turned I
around and go back up to doing whatever you were doing at the time?
13l FLINT:
Yes.
I had no reason to think otherwise at the time.
14!
15 CRESWELL:
I believe that you stated earlier that you knew that the containment sprays had gone off.
17!
1a; FLINT:
Shortly after that tha containment sprays went off.
20l CRESWELL:
21{
But, that didn't attract your interest any more than just a curiosity?
22!
t 23l FLINT:
24l Building pressure had increased, and it had initiated the building sprays.
25l There were two key pieces of information that I did Qh c; a y
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gj not know at this time. And that was the length of time that the 2
electromatic relief valve had been stuck open, and the throttling of 3
high pressure injection prior to my coming there.
I therefore had no i
4 reason to asstme any significant amount of hydrogen which would have
,)!
led to a detonation.
6i CRESWELL:
You have however, looked at the SRM RM traces earlier?
8:
FLINT: That is correct.
101 CRESWELL:
You had thought that that those indications were as a result of change in the attenuation of the radiation from the core?
i 12l l
131 FLINT:
That is correct.
14) 151 CREWELL:
But you did not feel that the core had been voided at time?
16j 17!
FLINT:
I felt that there had either been... well, voiding would be 18t the word.
Steam bubbles are live voiding of the core.
196 20t CRE5WELL:
But, that it had not been uncovered.
21) i 22!
l FLINT:
Well, I don't know of the... I would say it was uncovered, 23) i probably.
24l 25l
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CRESkELL: Would that tend to indicate to you, at least the possibility 2
f fuel damage?
I 3l 4j FLINT: The possiblility of fuel damage at that time, in my opinion, Sj was that we had had significant release of the pellet cladding gap 6
ac M y.
l 7l CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
... But, t'lat... I would assume that, since you' re 8
g saying from the aressure spike that you didn't feel like there was any
...there was a possibility of hydrogen being there.
That there had I
not been like a metal water reaction?
12 i
FLINT:
If there nad, I would rive anti :1,ated it to be minimal, based 131 on the information I had t that time.
14!
15l CRESWELL:
So you could not have attributed the 28 pound pulse to a metal water... or a hydrogen burn some sort of hydrogen combustion in containment?
18!
191 FLINT:
No, I did not at that time.
201 21i CRESWELL: And basically, your concept of fuel damage at that time was 22l a release of cladding activity... a pellet to plant?
23j 2 41 25I e
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1!
FLINT: Gap activity... that is correct.
l 2!
l 3l CRESWELL: What do you feel or what were your feelings about how that 4l activity cat.!d have been released? By what mechanism?
I Si I
Gi FLINT:
Are you referring to the activity from the gap into the coolant system?
8 CRE5WELL:
g I believe you stated that you felt that the release o' activity was from the peliet to clad gap area.
Now, what sort of failure mechanism did you feel had caused that release of activity?
12; I
FLINT:
131 We had undergone an overpressure reactor trip, and then had I
14!
depressurized, since the fuel cladding would still be hot and there l
would still be significant pressure within the assembly and up until 15!
that point in time, ws had had no known failures that I knew about, I assumed that it was a shock to the fuel itself.
18!
CRESWELL: A shock?
191 201 FLINT:
A shock... we had either had void formation in the core in 21i uncovering of the core. We had had a large pressure transient.
22' l
Either one or both of these mechanisms could have induced failure of 23 the cladding.
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CRESWELL:
The rapid pressure drop would be associated with the pin compression factors?
2, l
3l FLINT: That is correct.
l Si CRESWELL:
Gi And the pin c:mpression factors, if I understand them
/
correctly are related to whether the clad is undergoing a compressive or tensile type of stress.
91 i
FLINT: That is correct.
1 01 11:
CRESWEQ: The case Leing when you have a large pressure drop that 12l 131 there's the possibility, since the pressure is less on outside of the
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cladding, that the stress in the clad will go to a tensile type of stress, the pressure being greater inside the pin.
15!
16:
FLINT:
That is correct. And this can induce failure.
1 17!
18!
CRESWELL:
Did you look at the Reactor Building pressure chart, when 19t or after that pressure spike had occurred?
20l 21!
i FLINT:
No, I did not.
22l 23t i
CRESWELL:
Did you observe anybody over there in that area?
People 24!
over congragating in that area looking at the chart.
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1l FLINT:
Someone went over there and I do not remember the individual looked at it and said we've had we've had a 28 pound pressure spike.
2 3!
,g CRESWELL:
Out loud so that everyone in the Control Room could near e'
it.
i Gi FLINT:
It was normal speaking voice.
I imagine most people could 7
hear him.
g 91 CRESWELL:
0 Where were you scanu'.iv wnen ne said that?
i 11:
FLINT:
On the left hand side of the control console in the vicinity l
13!
of the makeup tank instrumentation, between there and the desk.
14i CRESWELL:
That would have been close to the process computer typewriters, 15i etc.?
16; i
17 FLINT:
Approximately 10 feet from them.
18 191 CRESWELL:
Closer to the center of the control board?
20!
21l FLINT:
Closer to the canter of the control board and than to the 22{
computer at that time.
22j 24!
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gj CRESWELL:
Did you observe a number of people congregating around in 2
that area?
3\\
1 FLINT:
One or two other people went over to look at the chart.
,i Again, I do not remember precisely who they were.
c i
I 6i I
CRESWELL:
7 So, after the guy announced that there has been a 28 pound 8j spike, you go on back to what you are doing?
SI FLINT:
That is correct.
10 11l CRESWELL:
12!
So you thought it was apparently insignificant... type of I
an event?
13) o 14!
FLINT:
I would not say insignificant.
It was not something that I understood at that time.
1Si 17 CRESWELL:
Y-' felt that other people were go9g to celve into it and 191 20i FLINT:
That is correct.
I felt the Met Ed personnel would pursue it, 21; as to what had caused it.
22!
23l CRESWELL:
Did you receive any kind of a report later on, or hear 2 41 anybody else discuss what the ultimate analysis had been, or what 25j caused that?
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y FLINT:
Not that day, no.
At this time we had been having problems 2l with some of the power supplies and instrumntation, and it was felt i
3j to be an instrumetation problem, or probably an instrumentation 4
problem.
Si CRESWELL:
0.K. John, in our previous discussion with you, you had 6
i 7j made statements about the switching of high pressure injection pump.
g And if I may go back and just read an excerpt frem the transcript.
"That someone had finally succeeded in bringing the hot leg temperature g,
n the A side down on scale. At this point in time, the operator 10 attempted to s' itch the inlet packing that was sending the high pressure f
injection in to try to collapse the B side also.
At that time he lost the A side, and went back up off-scale above 620."
How was he performing this manipulation to switch the inlet packing that was in the high f
pressure injection?
16i FLINT:
By changing the amount of flow that goes to the respective 17,!
loops from the high pressure igection system throuch the 16 valves.
191 CRE5WELL:
In other words, he throttled one side, one valve the 16 valve in one train.
22!
l FLINT:
To the best of my knowledge, that's correct.
23l 24:
25!
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1 CRESWELL:
0.K.
... Do you have any idea who made there, or directed 2
that they try to attempt to collapse the bubble the second time?
l J!
4j FLINT:
A team frem the Emergency Command Control point over at the gl Observacion Center.
l 61 CRESWELL:
7 Would that have been say, Mr. Herbein that gave that directive?
8 FLIrlT,:
Mr. Herbein gave the directive.
'I have no knowledge of the g
individuals involved in the actual decision over there.
i 10j i
11!
i CRESWELL:
12!
Well, how did you become aware that a... being in the Control Room, did you see someone in the Control Room give the directive to do that?
14-i 15l FLINT:
At this point in time, I had walked into the Shift Supervisor's 16; l
office, and the conversation was being conducted at this time between 17' the Emergency Control Center and the personnel up in the Control Room.
18{
19l CRESWELL: Who was talking to Mr. Herbein at this point?
20l i
21!
FLINT: Gary Miller.
22 23l CRESWELL:
Did he initially disagree with that directive?
25!
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d FLINT:
He explained our previous attempt... at attempting to collapse 1
2!
a bubble and the results of that attempt.
l 31 CRESWELL: Was the directive characterized as being one to collapse 4
the bubble?
~
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61 FLINT: Could you restate that?
7 s!
CRESWELL:
Is that the way that you understood the directive... that g,
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is that you should increase, or the plant personnel should increase j
the pressure to try to collapse the bubble, or were there other factors involved in making that directive?
12',
131 FLINT:
It was an attempt to collapse the bubble, as I remember it.
14!
15' CRESWELL:
This is the way it was characterized?
17l FLINT: That is correct.
18!
19!
CEE5WELL:
I think you may have already have stated this, but, during 20!
that conversation did Mr. Miller say that we've already tried that and it didn't work?
22' 23f l
FLINT:
That is correct.
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22 i
lj CE5WELL: Then, evidently the directive was made on the theory that 2
again the pressure indications that you were getting weren't correct?
i
'3 4l FLINT:
Since I was not f avolved with the decision over on the Observation Si Center, I cannot state what their basis for making that decision was.
6:
CRESWELL:
How would this particular directive been carried out? By what means? Like increasing high pressure injection flow, would this 8!
be the way that it would be done?
91 10l FLINT:
We would increase high pressure injection flow and use the 11:
block valve if necessary to throttle or control pressure in the system.
12; I
13I CRESWELL: Was there any recommendation made at that point about how 14!
muche high pressure injection flow you shoula use?
16; FLINT:
Not that I remember in connection with this evolution.
17) 18(
CRESWELL: Was the directive characteri::ed to the point that a specific 19i pressure was given at which they should attain in the reactor coolant 20; system?
211 2h FLINT:
Approximately 2,300 pounds.
23!
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1 CRESWELL:
That was the request that was made... to go to 2,300 3
pounds of pressure?
I 31 4;
FLINT:
I'm not certain whether that 2,300 pound figure came from the gj Observation Center or was the consensus of the group in the Control 6
Room, or a combination of the two.
But, the end result wa.= aoproximately 2,300 pounds.
i 8l CRESWELL:
Were you present whenever Mr. Miller gave the directive g;
outside the Control Room, or whenever he gave the directive, say, to a supervisor to do that?
l 12l l
FLINT: Yes, I was.
13) r 14l CRESWELL:
Do you remember hcw he phrased what he should do?
Or how should he carry out the directive?
i 17!
5 FLIf4T:
IS!
In general, it was to use the high pressure injection.
As we started to see a pressure increase, which we were monitoring specifically 191 20j on the computer digital indication, as well as on the video screen that is there, CRT-2.
And as they started to get up the pressure, 21.'
22l they would gradually throttle back on high pressure injection to slowly approach the spigot, so we would not overshoot or suddenly go 231 solid.
24!
l 25i L>,6
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24 If CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
John, the next question, I'm go':ng te ask you may 2j seem a little odd from retrospect, but, I'm trying to get an idea what i
3j the thinking was in the Control Room during the accident.
Could 4
you give me.an idea of how you felt people we e concerned about whe*.her Si the core was _ covered or why? What would happen if the core wasn't
- '*U 6
i FLINT:
I'm afraid I do not understand the question.
g 91 i
CRESWELL: Was there concern in the Control Room over whether the core 10!
i was covered during that morning?
11:
12l l
FLINT:
Yes. The question was raised on whether or not the core was 131 in fact covered.
14i 15.
CRESWELL: 'when was that question raised?
i 17l FLINT:
I would say it was late morning.
I can't set a time on it.
1St 191 CRESWELL:
And do you recall who raised that question?
20!
21!
FLINT:
No, I do not.
22l l
231 CRESWELL:
But, can you give me an idea of why the person that raised 241 the concern was concerned that the core was covered?
25i s*
c-x
+
e
t 25 i
!lj FLINT:
No, I do not know.
l 2l t
CRESWELL: What would be the problems that you would encounter if the 31 i
4 core was uncovered?
l Si Si FLINT:
believe the decision was made in the Shift Supervisor's I
7 of fice, and I was not present in that room at the time, that I remember, and therefore, I do not know who raised it, or what questions were asked at the time.
91 101 CRESWELL:
11;.
Can you recollect what computer dcta that you did request through the morning? Now, we've already mentioned that, at the time 12!
l
+ hat the steam generators were being filled up, you had requested some 13l point data from the computer.
And also, maybe a couple of operators' 14!
summaries, regarding steam generator temperatures and so forth.
16!
FLINT:
That is correct.
IS[
CRESWELL:
Now, I believe also in your previous discussions with us, 19!
you said that you had requested some incore temperatures.
20!
21l FLINT:
That is correct.
i 22l 23l CRESWELL:
About what time of day would that have been?
2 41
. 4 25i'
- a\\
'l l
i
1 26 i
1 FLINT:
I believe I started recording them at approximate.ly 0930, and continued on until I left at 2300 that evening.
2' I
31 CRESWELL:
Now, you would be requesting these as like a data output 5
from the computer?
I Si FLINT:
That is correct.
i 8l gj CRESWELL: Punching them out.
10f FLINT:
Yes.
11!
12l l
CRESWELL:
Would these be as a summary or would they be again point by 131 point?
14!
15i FLINT:
Depending on which group I called up, it would either be a i
point by point or a summary.
I could be a combination of the two, 17!
depending on what I was looking at, at the time.
IS!
191 CRESWELL:
Did you plot these on a core map?
20t 1
21!
FLINT:
No, I did not.
22) 23i CRE5WELL:
What use were you making of this data?
24!
25!
4 cut A
i
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27 l
gj FLINT:
On the incores was a way to see how many came down on-scale.
2j When I first started looking at them, most of them were off-scale high.
3 41 CRESWELL:
5 Owen, I wonder if we could right now, take a pause on the tape.
I'll get the computer data out.
We'll scan through it, and 6
then come back on tape, once we determine what he has.
7 i
8!
SHACKLETON:
Very good, we'll shut the tape off at this time.
Tha time is now 9:38 a.m.
10]
11:
SHACXLETON:
This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. John H.
12!
(
Flint.
The time is now 9:42 a.m., EDT. We took a break while Mr.
13l 14!
- Creswell and Mr. Flint looked over charts and data that Mr. Creswell had in a binder.
Continue...
15 16i CRESWELL:
During our discussion with John, we went over what data he 17!
had requested from the computer.
The information that I have here 18t l
during that discussion, and John, you correct me if I'm wrong.
It was 191 determined that as far as Mr. Flint is concerned, the data that he 20!
requested during that time period is still not available.
21!
25l FLINT:
That is correct.
23 i
24i 25i i
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l 28 l
1:
CRESWELL: John, when they started up a reactor coolant pump, late in 2j the afternoon of March 28th, the selection of the pump, I believe was i
3l based on the A pump being on the fact, you could get spray to the 4
pressurizer.
Si FLINT:
That is correct.
6 7
CRESWELL:
g For what purpose would you want spray being in tyee top of.
conditions that you found yourself in at that point?
101 FLINT:
11:
It was just a desirable feature, that, if at some later time 12!
you wanted to spray down, you would have the capability of doing so.
131 CRESWELL:
But if I remember correctly, the pressurizer was near full, and had been, for some period of time.
16i FLINT: That is correct.
However, once we would collapse the steam bubble in the hot leg, and get circulation going with at least one 181 reactor coolant pump; had the heaters going, we felt that we could 191 reestablish a bubble in the pressurizer and therefore, we wanted spray 20!
capability if possible.
21:
22l CRESWELL:
It was predicated really on the '.ang term, whenever you got 231 a bubble back.
And of course the sprays would be used to decrease the 241 s1:e of the bubble, or lower pressure in the RCS, which really wasn't 25i a concern at that time, but later on you felt it might be.
t.tg) ig s
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I 29 y)
FLINT:
That is correct.
I 21 2
3j CRESWELL:
Was the spray valve open throughout this whole event?
i 4l FLINT:
I have no knowledge of the position of the spray valve at this 5
time.
7 CRESWELL:
8!
In our previous discussion with you, you had gone into the plant on the 27th, March 27th to change a reactimete cable.
g And we discussed with you certain of the points that were placed on the I
reactimeter, the type of data that you wanted to collect on the reacti-11l i
meter.
12!
We discussed with you the reactor coolant drain tank was one of the points that was on the reactimeter, and that you had placed it i
on there.
You mentioned that there had been some experience at Acony 14!
where the EMOB had lifted before and stuck, and that this was a con-sideration in the data that you wanted to collect.
i 17j M:
I do not believe I used the word, " stuck".
18f I think my words 19i were that we had had a ruptured disc go during blowdown.
There is a difference in the design capacities of the two tanks.
20#
21!
CRE5WELL:
22l Would the ruptured disc rupture, John, if the MOB didn't stick open?
23; 24j 25i b
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30 ilj FLINT:
If you had an extended blowdown, there is a possiblility of 2
the ruptured disc going.
31 4j CRESWELL:
In other words, pressures so high in the reactor coolant g
system for a prolonged period of time, that would also cause a ruptured i
6l disc, too.
7' FLINT:
g It has a potential for causing it to go, yes.
9(
CRESWELL:
101 Even if you had a reactor trip on high pressure?
11!
FLINT:
On a trip from high pressure, I would say it's unlikely that
,dl it would go, but that would require a detailed analysis of the initiating i
13l transient, and available heat sinks.
15, CRESWELL: Were you aware that the relief valves were leaking going 16i into this transient?
171 181 FLINT:
One relief valve was suspectad of being leaking prior to this 19!
20(
i 21!
CRESWELL:
And that one being...
22l 23 FLINT: One of the code safeties.
24}
25!
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31 i
1 CRESWELL:
It was not suspected that the MOS was leaking?
1 2l 3j FLINT:
No one told me that that was the valve that they suspected,
\\
no.
=!
l CRESWELL:
Gi Did you yourself look at the temperatures on the outlet piping of the valves to see... to try to determine which valve was leaking?
8,
g FLINT:
No, I did not.
)
CRESWELL:
In our previous interview with you, you said that whenever 12!
t you got into the Control Room, you looked at the computer printouts, ul 14!
processed computer printouts. And you said that they were normal for a turbine reactor trip.
16i FLINT:
I believe what I said was that the indications for the apparent 17l alarms on the back panels, were normal for a reactor trip.
181 19f CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
I evidently misinterpretated what you said, John.
Let me go back to the transcript, and see if I can recall.
21l C
22l SHACKLETON:
Jim, we're getting close to the end of this side of the 23 cassette, so while you're doing that, if I may, I'll go ahead and 24i' change the tape.
The time is now 9:48 a.m., EDT.
And our meter 25!
reading on the tape recorder is 686.
cui (j 5 u
1 l
32 1
SHACKLETON:
This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. John H.
2 Flint.
The time is now 9:51 a.m.
I 3\\
4
_CRESWELL:
John, here's the particular statement that I recall, and 5
perhaps it's in error.
You stated:
"On eatering the Control Room,' I Gi n ticed that the normal alarms were lit.
And that the typers were
{
printing out as normally occurs following a turbine reactor trip."
7 t
81 FLINT:
That is correct.
That is not an evaluation of the data on the 9l I
,0j typers, merely the conditions as I walked into the Control Room ui i
CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
So, it's not after you looked at the data coming out 12l t
13l of the typers that you made that judgement.
14!
FLINT:
No, I believe that was in response to your question about what 15!
I saw when I first walked in the Control Room.
16i 171 i
CRESWELL:
And your statement of normal alarms, that's the annunciators 18{
on the panels?
191 20\\
FLINT:
That is correct.
i 21; 22; CRESWELL:
And there was nothing abnormal about those alarms, when you 1
231 6
walked in?
24l i
25i f
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1 I
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33 1
FLINT:
The one abnormal factor, was the numerous radiation alarms 2j that were at that time.
I 3:
4 CRESWELL:
So, it was... there was some abnormality in what you saw?
f s
6l FLINT:
That's correct.
s i
71 l
CRESWELL:
Let's see, you, in one discussion with Lee Rogers, Ed g
Fredericks and Bill Zewe, did state that you thought the core was g
uncovered, and when did you first realize that there was substantial 11i core damage in time?
12!
i FLINT:
13l Well, substantial core damage was apparent in probably one hour with the large. number of radiation alarms that they had in 141 existence.
15i 16:
17:j CRE5WELL:
So what you're telling me is that as soon as you walk into the Control Room and see those radiation alarms off-scale, or radiation 18t alarms you felt there was substantial core damage, right at that point?
20j 21i FLINT:
No, at this time, I had looked at the indications from the j
23l source intermediate range channels, had reviewed some computer printouts, had called up some incore temperatures, had seen the cold leg thermoccuples l
24!
relatively far down-scale the hot leg thermocouples up scale, above 25j
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I j
34 I
lj 620 degrees. One generator bottled up, and I believe at this time, 2)
Ivan Porter showed me a special setup with a 1 RTD, that was approxi-1 3l mately 724 degrees.
I had looked at the two RTD indications printing ut on the strip chart recorder that's continuously monitoring up 4
gj there, and therefore, a large number of factors went into this.
Gi CRESWELL:
nid you make a recommendation to anyone specifically to 8
91
.Aj FLINT:
I advised them that I would be monitoring the incore thermocouples.
11:!
And I believe that Ivan Porter was also looking at them.
And somebody else later on was looking at the incores at the time that I first came 12, l
in the Centrol Room, although stated that I would follow the incore 131 temperatures.
l 15:
CRESWSELL:
I believe in our previous interview with you though, that you stated that you weren't aware that anybody else was monitoring 17 them, before you got them.
18f 19t FLINT:
That's right. When I first came into the Control Room, I was 20l r
not aware and did not learn for quite some time that somebody else had 21l already been looking at the incore temperatures.
22' f
23 CRESWELL:
When did you first find out that somebody had?
24!
25i Y
A
i L
f i
I 35 i
1!
FL_IJLQ: It was weeks. When I found out that they had gone down to the 2
Cable Spreading Room, and had actually gone down.
They had disconnected and looked at the temperatures down there in the Cable Spreading Room.
3 4i
[.
CRESWELL:
So, whenever you talked to Ivan about them in there, he
~t made no mention whatsoever, that he had parformed this work on the 6
incore thermocouples, or accumulated this data?
8f i
FLINT:
I do not remember him saying that he had done this.
101 CP.ESWELL:
And of ccurse, he wouldn't have made any statements along 11:
i the effect that we took some measuremer.ts, and we felt the core was 12!
i uncavared in those measurements?
131 14:
FLINT:
He did not make that statement, no.
At least, I do not rcmember.
IS:
CRESWELL:
Do you recall who you made the recommendation to, to monitor the incore thermocouples? When you did start that work.
I8I 191 FLINT:
Lee Rogers.
201 21:
22.
CRESWELL:
Do you know whether Lee communiated that to Gary Miller or anyone else there?
2 31 i
24t 25!
ND'
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l 4
I b
36 I!
FLINT:
No, I do not.
l 2:
i f
CRESWELL: What did Lee feel about doing that? Did he feel that was a 3
4j good idea, or did he say go ahead do it?
si FLINT:
He left it up to my judgment, since that was the' area I was 61 f
following?
7 81 CRESWELL:
Did he... I believe you already stated though that he g,
would not have indicated titat some of that work had already been done.
101 That's correct.
Right?
11!
12!
l FLINT:
131 He did not indicate that to me, That is correct.
14!
CRESWELL:
You stated that you looked at the backup incore detector recordars.
What did you ree whenever you looked at those?
17!
FLINT:
Immediately, at the time of the trip, the incores had gone down scale, and stayed down-scale.
There were then, as I remember, 191 some unusual indications on the printout.
But, I could not correlate 20!
j them to anything at that time.
2li 22 CRESWELL:
23l Did you look at what particular detectors were responding at what time?
24!
25l GU rb J "
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a
4 I
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37 llj FLINT:
I could not read them on the strip charts, I could just see d
that some detectors had given indications.
I do not remember being
{
able to pick out, or at that time picking out any particular incore 31 4!
level, ur location in the core.
f 5
6l CRESWELL:
Did you feel that they had failed.
I'm trying to get an idea of... when you looked at the ru;.crt, and you saw these indications, 7,
did you feel that they failed to give those indications, or what was g
g causing what they were?
101 FLINT:
I did not understand why they were giving that response.
l 12
]
CRESTWELL:
So, not understanding it, I assume that you discounted I
.what you were seeing.
14:
15; FLINT:
I went over and started getting data _out of the computer, which would be a direct ndication of points in the core.
1Si CRESWELL:
For the self powered nuclear detectors.
1p 20i FLINT:
That is correct.
21:
I 22f CRESTWELL:
And again, that would be scme of the data that's mirsing.
I 24}
25i
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38 1
!lj FLINT: That is correct.
I 2;
3j CRESTWELL:
Did you request a point by point display for the whole core?
4 Si FLINT:
6 No, that's 364 points, and that would too many to call from the computer.
It would tie it up for too long.
I called up a few 7
g points in locations, H8, H9, for in the center of the core, and two or three on the 'eriphery of the core.
g i
101 CRESWELL: Why did you select ones on the periphery.
1.!
12l t
FLINT:
Core power distribution across the care, I wanted to try and 131 get an idea of what if looked like, because at this time, I had also 14!
looked at the thermocouples and those in the center of the core were essentially reading all off-scale high.
The only one that I had indicating down on-scale were some in the peripheral locations.
17!
1Sr CRESWELL: When you say you looked at some of the in:: ore thermoccupies, 19!
and they indicated off-scale high, what did that mean to you?
20l 21:
FLINT:
Temperature was in cxcess of 700 degm
. indicated.
22!
23 CRESWELL: What would cause that?
24:
?
25{
l P
c o1 I
39 FLINT: That the core would be extremely hot.
11 i
2!
l CRESWELL:
And what sould cause the core to be extremely hot? Was the 3!
1 4j core covered at that point?
I Si FLINT:
I felt the core was covered at that point.
6 7
8l en what would be causing those high temperatures?
9f i
FLINT:
Q It could be reduced flow through the core giving you high temperature water, or it could be essentially no flow through the l
core.
12l 13 CRESWELL:
14:
Would those temperatures that were being indicated, indicate i
l high temperature of water or steam, or super heated steam, or...
IS' 16i FLINT:
Could be, well under the pressure that we were at, if the 17l temperatures were valid, it would have to be super heated steam.
19!
CRESWELL:
Did you inform anyone of what you had found? What you 20!
thought?
211 22!
FLINT: Well, this was the end result, with my conclusion that the 23{
core had been uncovered, or had at least had voiding during this 24l increase of leakage flux.
But, I felt at the time, the core was 25i covered.
()b U c.,t
40 l
lj CRESWELL:
Did you inform anybody out here the results of your analysis?
2 3i FLINT:
I informed Lee Rogers, but I'm not positive of the words that I used to tell him.
4 5'l CRESWELL:
Gi About what time would you have completed this evaluation?
i 7\\
FLINT: Approximately 1000.
81 4
9!
CRESWELL:
I'd like to digress back to a subject we discussed ettlier, 11.!
and that was the points that were put on the reactimeter.
And spray valve position was also one of the points, as I recollect on that reactimeter. Why did you want the spray valve po;ition?
13i 141 l
FLINT:
The spray valve gives you an indication of how long you're 151 spraying down on a over pressure transient.
17f CRESWELL:
I get the idea it was a consideration that the ruptured 18i disc on the reactor coolant drain tank... that was the consideration 19i about putting the reactor coolant drain tank pressure on there.
And 20t l
one of the considerations for putting the spray on there is its perfor-21!
mance due to high pressure trip... it was the fact that they could 22l l
have a high pressure trip a consideration in your mind, in putting 231
[
these points on the reactimeter?
24l 25!
n
'6 t
l
{
41 lj FLINT:
No.
The spray valve is on there for our personnel in Lynchburg j
to monitor the effectiveness of the plant response during any transients.
2 l
3!
CRESWELL:
But, if I understood you correctly, the consideration that 4
Sj you gave was for a high pressure trip... the performance during a i
Gi high pressure trip?
i 71 FLINT:
The flow of the reactor coolant drain tank...
8 91 CRESWELL:
10l And I believe you said, as far the spray valve was concerned, they wanted to take a look at what the resonse would be after a high 11',
pressure trip.
I 13i FLINT: Well, during a high pressure transient... I don't know whether 14' I used the word " trip".
16i CRESWELL:
High pressure transient... would that include a high i
17l I
pressure trip, ordinarily?
18t 19!
FLINT: Well, that would include a high pressure trip, but, it's not 20t exclusively... you can have a pressure transient, and not necessarily 21!
l a trip.
22l 231 l
CRESWELL: Were you aware that the leakage from the safety valves, or 24i l
the safety valve was on the order of, say, 6 gallons per minute?
25!
QOU a :,
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c se
^
42 i
l FLINT No, I was not.
1 i
2!
CRESWELL:
3 Were you aware that there was a distillation effect taking place in the pressurizer due to the leakage through the safety valve,
'+ t, gj thereby conscentrating baron in the pressuirzer?
61 1
FLINT: This had occurred before, I was not aware of directly thinking about it this titre, but I was aware of it, and that occasionally they 8
i were spraying down to equalize boron with the rest of the system.
g 10i CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
But, this is not a consideration in your putting that 11:
point, the spray valve position...
12 I
13!
FLINT:
No, it is not.
14!
15 !
CRECWFLL: Owen, that's all I have.
16i 17!
SHACXLETON:
Mr. Flint, is there anything you'd like to say?
18!
191 FLINT:
No.
20!
21!
SHACXLETON: We'll bring this interview to a close then, John.
The 22!
time is now 10:05 p.m., EDT, and the reading on our tape is 259.
23i l
241 25!
4 c..
.