ML19253C973
| ML19253C973 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000516 |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1979 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18081B361 | List: |
| References | |
| RULE-PR-50 NUDOCS 7912120455 | |
| Download: ML19253C973 (35) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E]
EMERGENCY PLANNING AGENCY:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatcry Commission ACTION:
Proposed Rule Changes
SUMMARY
- 'The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is proposing to amend its regulations in order to provide an interim upgrade of NRC emergency plan-ning regulations as well as to specifically:
a.
Require, that an applicant's emergency plans, including State and local governmental emergency response plans, be submitted to and concurred in by the NRC as a condition of' operating license issu-ance.
Additionally:
1.
An operating plant may be required to cease operation or reduce power levels if a State or local emergency response plan has not received NRC concurrence within 180 days of the effective date of the final amendments.
2.
An operating plant may be required to cease operation or reduce power levels if a State or local emergency response plan does not warrant continued NRC concurrence and the State or locality does not correct the deficiencies within 4 months of notification of NRC concurrence withdrawal.
b.
Require that emergency planning considerations be extended to Emer-gency Planning Zones.
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Enclosure (2) 7912120 C
[7590-01]
c.
Require that applicants' and licensees' detailed emergency planning implementing procedures be submitted for NRC review.
DATES: Comments should be submitted on or before (45 days after publi-cation).
ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit written comments and suggestions on the proposed rule changes and/or the supporting value/ impact analysis to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch. Single copies of the value/ impact analysis may be obtained on request from Mr. I. C. Roberts, 301-443-5985.
Copies of the value/ impact analysis and of coments received by the Comission may be examined in the Comission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street,.M., Washington, D. C.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mr. I. C. Roberts, Assistant Director for Siting Standards, Office of Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Regu-latory Comission, Washington, D.C.
20555 (phone:
301-443-5981)
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: By memorandum dated July 31, 1979, the Comis-sion requested that the NRC staff undertake expedited rulemaking on the subject of State and local emergency response plans and those of licensees.
The rulemaking described in this notice responds to that request.
Time constraints have precluded the careful review and consideration normally given to proposed rulemaking actions of comparable significance.
Conse-quently, considerations related to the workability of the proposed rule changes may have been overlooked and significant impacts to NRC, appli-cants, licensees, and State and local governments may not have been 1536 133 2
[7590-01]
uncovered. Therefore, the NRC seeks comments particularly addressed to these points and intends to hold a workshop during the public comment period (to be announced) to (a) present the proposed rule changes to State and local governments, utilities, and other interested parties and (b) to obtain comments, for inclusion in the public record, concerning the costs, impacts, and practicality of the proposed rule changes. The NRC believes it is likely, as a result of expected public comment, that significant changes may have to be made in the rule as proposed.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering the adoption of amendments to its regulation, " Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," 10 CFR Part 50, that would require that emer-gency response planning considerations be extended to Emergency Planning Zones (discussed in NUREG-0396, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants") the amendments also require, as a condition of operating license issuance, that State and local govern-mental emergency response plans be submitted to and concurred in by the NRC. The proposed rule changes would also require a determination on continued operations of plants where relevant State and local emergency response plans have not received NRC concurrence.
In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering revising 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, " Emergency Plans for Production and Utilization Facilities,"
in order to clarify, expand, and upgrade the Commission's emergency planning regulations.
The NRC presently requires that power reactor licensees and appli-cants plan for radiological emergencies within their plant sites and make 3
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[7590-01]
arrangements with State and local organizations to respond to accidents that might have consequences beyond the site boundary.
In this way, offsite emergency response planning has been related to the nuclear licens-ing process.
To aid State and local governments in the development and implementa-tion of adequate emergency response plans, the NRC, in conjunction with several othe-Federal agencies, has attempted, on a cooperative and volun-tary basis, to provide for training and instruction of State and local government personnel and to establish criteria to guide the preparation of emergency response plans.
However, in the past, the NRC has not made NRC concurrence in State and local emergency response plans a condition of operating license issuance; the proposed rule changes would do so.
They would also require a determination on continued operation of plants where relevant State and local emergency response plans have not received NRC concurrence.
The accident at Three Mile Island has raised a number of questions about the adequacy of radiological emergency response plans.
Even before the accident the GAO had recommended that "NRC not license new power plants for operation unless offsite emergency plans have been concurred in by the NRC" (Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General, " Areas Around Nuclear Facilities Should Be Better Prepared For Radiological Emergencies,"
EMD-78-110, March 30, 1979). The proposed rule changes adhere to that recommendation. The Commission is also proposing to incorporate in its regulations the concept of the Emergency Planning Zone which is based on a joint NRC/ EPA Task Force Report, " Planning Basis for Development of State 1536 135
and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0396/ EPA 520/1-78-016, December 1978.
Furthermore, Congress has voiced its concern about the problems associated with the emergency preparedness area in the Senate Bill S.562 as well as in the House Report No.96-413 titled, " Emergency Planning Around U.S. Nuclear Powerplants; Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oversight." The Commission's proposed rule changes address many of the concerns mentioned in these Congressional documents.
Advance Notice of Rulemaking On July 17, 1979, the Commission published an Advance Notice of Pro-posed Rulemaking (44 FR 41483) on the subject of State and local emergency response plans and those of licensees. The Commission directed that an emergency planning rulemaking be considered a matter of high priority and that the rulemakinQ procedure be completed expeditiously.
To date, approximately 90 comment letters have been received from the public in response to the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
A NUREG containing analyses of these comments will be publi,shed shortly.
The Commission is now publishing for public comment the proposed rule changes in the Federal Register. We consider that the ~ proposed rule changes meet many of the concerns discussed in the above mentioned reports and publications.
However, the Commission notes that the pro-posed rule changes are conddered as an interim upgrade of NRC emergency planning regulations and, in essence, clarify and expand areas that have been perceived to be deficient as a result of past experiences.
These 1536 136 5
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proposed rule changes are deemed interim because the Commission antici-pates that further changes in the emergency planning regulations may be proposed as more experience is gained with implementing these revised regulations. Also, changes may be proposed as the various Three Mile Island investigations are concluded and the results become available for efforts in such areas as instrumentation and monitoring and generic studies of accident models.
The action taken by publication of the proposed rule changes in the Federal Register supersedes and thus eliminates the need to continue development of the proposed rule change to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E (43 FR 37473), published on August 23, 1978, regarding Emergency Planning considerations outside the Low Population Zone (LPZ).
In cases where a construction permit has already been issued, the emer-gency plans will be reviewed at the operating license stage. The Commis-sfon regards dealing with this matter at the operating license stage, as opposed to reopening construction permit reviews, to be appropriate.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and section 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amend-ments to 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 is contemplated.
Copies of comments received on the proposed amendment may be examined in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
1536 137 g
DISCUSSION OF MAJOR PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE EMERGENCY FLANNING REGULATION 1.
Major Procosed Change - That an applicant's emergency plans, including State and local governmental emergency response plans, be submitted to and concurred in by the NRC as a condition of operating license issuance.
Additionally:
An operating plant may be required to cease operation or reduce power a.
levels if a State or local emergency response plan has not received NRC concurrence within 180 days of the effective date of the final amendments.
b.
An operating plant may be required to cease operation or reduce power levels if a State or local emergency response plan does not warrant continued NRC concurrence and the State or locality does not correct the deficiencies within 4 months of notification of NRC concurrence withdrawal.
Discussion:
In carrying out its mandate to protect the public health and safety, the NRC has, to date, focused its primary attention on the site characteristics and design features of nuclear facilities which are proposed by license applicants.
Our licensing process has been structured accordingly, with 1536 138 1
Enclosure (3)
a view toward ensuring substantial conservatisms in the design and opera-tional safety margins of nuclear power plants.
In addition to ensuring that the proposed facility site and design meet our licensing standards and criteria, we review the applicant's emergency plans, which are designed to provide an additional margin of protection for the public living in the vicinity of the facility.
The NRC's licensing requirements related to an applicant's emergency plans are set forth in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, " Emergency Plans for Produc-tion and Utilization Facilities," and in Regulatory Guide 1.101, " Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants." In addition to establishing plans and procedures for coping with emergencies within the boundary of the nuclear power plant site, applicants are required to make certain emer-gency readiness arrangements with State and local organizations to cope with plant related emergencies outside the site boundary, with particular emphasis on the low population zone.
In this context, we have regarded offsite emergency response plans to be related to the nuclear licensing process.
The NRC, with the cooperation of several other Federal agencies, has had some success in assisting State and local governments in the preparation and evaluation of their radiological emergency response plans and in other activities to improve State and local preparedness efforts.
This activity does not rest on any specific statutory authority, however, and has been accomplished on a cooperative and voluntary basis.
Such plans are desirable since they do provide an added assurance to the State and local officials 2
1536 139
and to the general public in the vicinity of nuclear power plants that appropriate protective measures are available in the event of an accident with offsite consequences.
NRC has formulated basic guidance documents to assist State and local governments to improve their capabilities to respond to the offsite effects of a nuclear power plant. radiological accident.
However, until now, we have not considered it necessary to require that State and local radio-logical emergency response plans contain all the Commission's essential planning elements as a condition precedent to issuing a nuclear power plant operating license.
The GAO has recommended that the NRC should not license additional nuclear power plants for operation unless the associated State and local emergency response plans have been concurred in by the NRC.
On the other hand, one must consider that a State that has an NRC
" concurred-in" emergency response plan does not in itself necessarily provide any more "... reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency to protect the public health and safety..." than now exists as a result of our current licensing and inspection process.
The concurrence function, in fact, only indicates that a State has adequately addressed in its emergency plans the " essential elements" in NUREG 75/111.
This was brought up in the hearing on May 14, 1979, before the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources, when Chairman Moffett asked what it really meant to have an NRC concurrence.
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Does it indicate that a plan is a good one?.Or are we just creating an
" illusion of protection"? That was a phrase used by Mr. Moffett several times--an " illusion of protection." Mr. Moffett noted that three counties surrounding Indian Point did not have taergency plans for dealing with a nuclear accident despite an NRC concurred-in State plan.
He asked how a State plan can be considered adequate if it does not include local govern-ment involvement.
He noted that the GAO will be investigating what it means to have an NRC concurred-in plan and just how adequate such a plan might be for responding to an actual emergency.
The staff has also looked at the history of past evacuations and notes that evacuation of people is a common occurrence (about one per week) in our society.
These evacuations, many times, occurred without plans or drills, some of which are noted below:
On January 19, 1973, 3,000 out of an overall population of 3,300 people were evacuated from Morgan City, Louisiana, in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
On June 2, 1972, 8,700 out of an overall population of 9,000 people were _vacuated from Rapid City, North Dakota, in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; and in 1971, 80,000 out of an overall population of 81,000 people were evacuated from an area in Los Angeles in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
The first two of these evacuations were conducted with the use of existent evacuation plans.
The Los Angeles evacuation was performed due to an impending collapse of a dam and without the benefit of an evacua-tion plan.*
" Source:
EPA-520/6-74-002, " Evacuation Risks - An Evaluation."
\\fh\\
Nonetheless, since Three Mile Island, our current way of doing business has raised a number of questions about the requirements for and the adequacy of NRC's, licensees', and State and local governmental emergency response plans.
Several arguments can be offered in support of changing the regulations to require, as a condition of operating license issuance, that an application include State and local emergency response plans concurred in by NRC and that the Commission deternine whether to allow continued operation of plants where relevant State or local plans have not received NRC concur-rence or such concurrence has been withdrawn.
The following are supportive arguments:
o The linkage between licensee and offsite organization emergency response plans and preparedness for response to radiological emergencies is formalized.
o There is a growing sentiment in the Congress to legislate NRC concurrence.
o There would be an increased recognition of the importance of offsite consequences of accidents at nuclear power plants.
The following are arguments for not supporting the recommendation:
o State and local authorities could thwart licensing process (and shut down facilities) by refusing to develop emergency plans, particularly 5
\\S% \\42
those in States which have no nuclear power plants within their borders, but are adjacent to States having such facilities, o
Commission and staff have not sufficiently evaluated the implementa-tion of the proposal to know enough of the implications and ramifica-tions that are necessary for a knowledgeable decision.
That is the operational feasibility and practicability of the regulation have not been determined.
The present voluntary procedure of dealing with the States is working o
reasonably well and is producing acceptable results.
States have shown increased and renewed interest in plan preparation and NRC con-currence since TMI.
o NRC staff requirements would increase because of the need for formalizing regulatory procedures to implement this proposal.
o Further delays in licensing of plants could result.
o Greater strain will be placed on State and local governments to meet the more formal, and perhaps more stringent, requirements that would result if proposed change is adopted.
2.
Major Procosed Change - That applicants' and licensees' emergency prepared-ness implementation procedures be submitted to NRC for review.
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Discussion:
In the past, the staff has not found it necessary to have detailed'imple-mentation information submitted for review along with the emergency response plans provided in the FSAR. These details have been kept onsite where specific items such as phone numbers and personnel assignments can be promptly modified to reflect various minor day-to-day changes.
This detail can be provided to the staff (or in a hearing, if relevant) if there should be some serious question as to whether the applicant can actually carry out the plans set forth in the FSAR.
The implementing procedures maintained onsite are reviewed customarily by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) to determine whether they are consistent with the plans set forth in the FSAR.
Prior to issuing an operating license and annually thereafter for the life of the plant,,the NRC inspection program looks into the adequacy of the details of the emergency response plan and the implementing procedures.
Assurance is provided through these inspections that the commitments made in the emergency response plan are, in fact, met, and reasonable assurance is obtained that appropriate measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency.
The inspection program includes verification that implement-ing procedures have been developed, and representative procedures are reviewed by NRC personnel, at this time.
Furthermore, the NRC inspection program verifies by observation and review of records that the implementing procedures are testad and evaluated for adequacy when actually used.
The staff believes that effective review is provided by IE inspectors who are familiar with the individual site specifics.
Accordingly, the staff recommends that the implementing procedures be submitted to the appro-7 1536 144
priate IE Regional Office for review.
This submittal should occur at least 180 days prior to operating license issuance.
For licensees holding operat-ing licenses, this submittal should occur within 30 days of the effective date of the final amendments.
The staff does not believe that the amend-ments should require approval as a condition of operating license issuance or continuance since other site-specific implementing procedures (e.g., in operations, radiological protection, safeguards) are not subject to approval as a condition of license issuance or continuance.
Arguments in favor of the staff's recommendations include:
1.
No added burden and effort for the NRC staff.
2.
No added burden and effort for licensees or State and local agencies.
3.
No added burden for the Office of Inspection and Enforcement; they will continue to review the licensee's detailed implementing procedures.
The argument against the review-only requirement is that it does not provide the NRC staff an opportunity to approve an applicant's or licensee's detailed implementing procedures as part of the licensing process.
Arguments against an approval requirement, in addition to review, include:
1.
An added burden and effort for licensees.
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2.
A substantial added burden and effort for the NRC staff.
3.
Additional Commission and staff evaluation of the implementation of the proposal to know enough of the implications and ramifications that are necessary for a knowledgeable decision.
3.
Major Prooosed Change - That emergency planning considerations be extended to Emergency Planning Zones.
Discussion:
In December 1978, the Joint NRC/ EPA Task Force on Emergency Planning issued its report, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Govern-ment Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0396/ EPA 520/1-78-016). The report provides a basis for Federal, State and local government emergency preparedness organizations to determine the appropriate degree of emergency response planning efforts in the environs of nuclear power plants.
The report introduces the concept of Emergency Planning Zones as a basis fer the planning of response actions that would result in radiological dose savings in the environs of nuclear facilities in the event of a serious power reactor accident.
Application of the Task Force guidance should result in the development of more uniform emergency plans from site to site.
The Emergency Planning Zone concept provides a needed framework within which existing planning elements can be developed for 1536 146 S
State and local governmental authorities as well as applicants and licenses.
The concepts of Emergency Planning Zones have received wide acceptance and a number of States nave indicated that the planning basis is already being used in their current emergency preparedness efforts.
The Task Force concluded that both the design basis accidents and less severe core-melt accidents should be considered when selecting a basis for planning predetermined protective actions and that certain features of the more severe core-melt accidents should be considered in planning to ensure that some capability exists to reduce the consequences of even the most severe accidents.
The staff believes that our emergency planning regulations should take into consideration the principal characteristics of a spectrum of design basis and core-melt accidents (such as nuclides released and distances likely to be involved).
This need for a capability to accommodate emer-gency situations beyond the design basis accidents used in plant and site evaluation makes emergency planning zones in the emergency planning regulation appropriate.
However, the staff recommends that judgement should be used in determining the distance and configuration based upon considerations of local conditions such as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and local jurisdictional boundaries.
The staff concludes that the recommended Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) will include those areas which could require immediate protective actions for the releases of radioactive material from design basis accidents used in the safety evaluation of nuclear reactors as well as from some core-melt 1536 147
accidents. The distances recomended in NUREG-0396 are large enough to provide a flexible response base that could support actions outside the planning zones should this ever be needed.
In developing perspectives on the extent to which the consequences of core-melt accidents would be encompassed by tne various planning areas, the task force used part of the methodology developed from the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) to illustrate the likelihood of dose levels at various distances from a reactor site which could result from a spectrum of core-melt scenarios. The task force properly noted the uncertainties in the probabilities and consequence models and did not rely solely on the Reactor Safety Study in reaching its conclusions.
The staff regards this use of the Reactor Safety Study as warranted and appropriate, taking into account the report of the Risk Assessment Review Group and the Commission policy statement on this subject.
Therefore, the staff recommends that the Commission approve publication of the enclosed proposed rule changes in the Federal Reaister which will promulgate this major change to our emergency planning regulations.
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For interim use and coment - 9/14/79 BASIS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES This document is provided for interim use during the initial phases of the NRC effort to promptly improve emergency preparedness at operating nuclear power plants. Changes to the document can be expected as experience is gained in its use and public coments are received. Further, the Comission has initiated a rulemaking procedure, now scheduled for completion in January 1980 in the area of Emergency Planning and preparedness. Additional requirements are to be expected when rulemaking is completed and some modifications to this document may be necessary.
Four classes of Emergency Action Levels are established which replace the classes in Regulatory Guide 1.101, each with associated examples of initiating conditions.
The classes are:
Notification of Unusual Event Alert Site Emergency General Emergency The rationale for the notification and alert classes is to provide early and prompt notification of minor events which could lead to more serious consequences given operator error or equipment failure or which might be indicative of more serious conditions which are not yet fully realized. A gradation is provided to assure fuller response preparations for more serious indicators. The site emergency class reflects conditions where some significant releases are likely or are occurring but where a core melt situation is not indicated based on current information.
In this situation full mobilization of emergency personnel in the near site environs is indicated as well as dispatch of monitoring teams and associated comunications. The general emergency class involves actual or iminent substantial core degradation or melting with the potential for loss of containment.
The imediate action for this class is sheltering (staying inside) rather than evacuation until an assessment can be made that (1) an evacuation is indicated and (2) an evacuation, if indicated, can be completed prior to significant release and transport of radioactive material to the affected areas.
The example initiating conditions listed after the imediate actions for each class are to form the basis for establishment by each licensee of the specific plant' instrumentation readings which, if exceeded, will initiate the emergency class.
1536 M9 Enclosure (4)
_2_
Some background information on release potential and expected frequencies for the various classes is provided in this material. Note that there is a wide band of uncertainty associated with the frequency estimates. The release potential given reflects the amount that could be released over a long time period or under favorable meteorological conditions without exceeding the exposure criteria of a more severe class. Release of these amounts in a short time period under. unfavorable meteorological dispersion conditions might trigger the criteria of a more severe class.
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State and/or Local Offsite Class Licensee Actions Authority Actions Notification of unusual event 1.
Promptly inform State and local off-1.
Provide fire or security site authorities of nature of unusual assistance if requested Class Description condition as soon as discovered 2.
Standby until verbal Unusual events are in process or have 2.
Augment on-shift resources closecut occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety 3.
Assess and respond or, of the plant.
4.
Close out with verbal sunmary to 3.
Escalate to a more severe Purpose offsite authorities; followed by class written summary within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Purpose of offsite notification is to (1) assure that the first step in any or response later found to be necessary has been carried out. (2) provide 5.
Escalate to a more severe class current information on unusual events, and (3) provide a periodic unscheduled test of the offsite communication link.
Release Potential No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
Expected Frequency
~}k Once or twice per year per unit.
u CP
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT 1.
ECCS initiated 2.
Radiological effluent technical specification limits exceeded 3.
Fuel damage indication. Examples:
a.
High offgas at BWR air ejector monitor (greater than 500,000 uci/sec; corresponding to 16 isotopes decayed to 30 minutes; or an increase of 100,000 uci/sec within a 30 minute time period) b.
High coolant activity sample (e.g., exceeding coolant technical speci-fications for iodine spike) c.
Failed fuel monitor (PWR) indicates increase greater than 0.1% equivalent fuel failures within 30 minutes.
4.
Abnormal coolant temperature and/or pressure or abnonnal fuel temperatures 5.
Exceeding either primary / secondary leak rate technical specification or primary system leak rate technical specification 6.
Failure of a safety or relief valve to close 7.
Loss of offsite power or loss of onsite AC power capability 8.
Loss of containment integrity requiring shutdown by technical specifications 9.
Loss of engineered safety feature or fire protection system function requiring shutdown by technical specifications (e.g., because of malfunction, personnel error or procedural inadequacy) 10.
Fire lasting more than 10 minutes 11.
Indications or alarms on process or effluent parameters not functional in control room to an extent requiring plant shutdown or other significart loss of assessment or communication capability (e.g., plant computer, all meteorological instrumentation)
- 12. Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage
- 13. Natural phenomenon being experienced or projected beyond usual levels a.
Any earthquake b.
50 year flood or low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche c.
Any tornado near site d.
Any hurricane 1536 152
. 14. Other hazards being experienced or projected a.
Aircraft crash on-site or unusual aircraft activity over facility b.
Train derailment on-site c.
Near or onsite explosion d.
Near or onsite toxic or flaninable gas release e.
Turbine failure
- 15. Other plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part of State and/or local offsite authorities or require plant shutdown under technical specification requirements or involve other than normal controlled shutdown (e.g., cooldown rate exceeding technical specification limits, pipe cracking found during operation)
- 16. Transportation of contaminated injured individual from site to offsite hospital
- 17. Rapid depressurization of PWR secondary side.
15 % 1 9
State and/or Local Offsite Class Licensee Actions Authority Actions Alert 1.
Promptly inform State and/or local 1.
Provide fire or security authorities of alert status and reason assistance if requested Class Description for alert as soon as discovered 2.
Augment resources by activating Events are in process or have 2.
Augment resources by activating on-site near-site E0C and any other occurred which involve an actual technical support center, on-site primary response centers or potential substantial operations center and near-site degradation of the level emergency operations center (E0C) 3.
Alert to standby status key of safety of the plant.
emergency personnel including 3.
Assess and respond monitoring teams and Purpose associated communications 4.
Dispatch on-site monitoring teams and Purpose of offsite alert is associated communications 4.
Provide confirmatory offsite to (1) assure that emergency radiation monitoring and personnel are readily available 5.
Provide periodic plant status updates ingestion pathway dose to respond if situation to offsite authorities (at least every projections if actual releases becomes more serious or to 15 minutes) substantially exceed technical perform confirmatory radiation specification limits monitoring if required (2) 6.
Provide periodic meteorological assess-provide offsite authorities ments to offsite authorities and, if 5.
Maintain alert status until current status information, any releases are occurring, dose estimates verbal closeout and (3) provide possible for actual releases or unscheduled tests of response center activation.
7.
Close out by verbal sunmary to offsite authorities followed by written summary 6.
Escalate to a more severe class Release Potential within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Limited releases of r.to 10 or curies of I-131 equivalent or up to 104 curies of Xe-133 8.
Escalate to a more severe class equivalent.
Expected Frequency tri (24 Once in 10 to 100 years per C7s unit.
4
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: ALERT 1.
Severe loss of fuel cladding High offgas at BWR air ejector monitor (greater than 5 cifsec; corresponding a.
to16isotopesdecayed30 minutes) b.
Very high coolant activity sample (e.g., 300 uci/cc equivalent of I-131) c.
Failed fuel monitor (PWR) indicates increase greater than 1% fuel failures within 30 minutes or 5% total fuel failures.
2.
Rapid gross failure of one steam generator tube with loss of offsite power 3.
Rapid failure of more than 10 steam generator tubes (e.g., several hundred gpm primary to secondary, leak rate) 4.
Steam line break with significant (e.g., greater than 10 gpm) primary to secondary leak rate or MSIV malfunction 5.
Primary coolant leak rate greater than 50 gpm 6.
High radiation levels or high airborne contamination which indicate a severe degradation in the control of radioactive materials (e.g., increase of factor of 1000 in direct radiation readings) 7.
Loss of offsite power and loss of all onsite AC power 8.
Loss of all onsite DC power 9.
Coolant pump seizure leading to fuel failure 10.
Loss of functions needed for plant cold shutdown
- 11. Failure of the reactor protection system to initiate and complete a scram which brings the reactor subcritical
- 12. Fuel damage accident with release of radioactivity to containment or fuel handling building
- 13. Fire potentially affecting safety systems
- 14. All alanns (annunciators) lost
- 15. Radiological effluents greater than 10 times technical specification instantaneous limits (an instantaneous rate which, if continued over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, would result in about 1 mr at the site boundary under average meteorological conditions)
- 16. Ongoing security compromise 1536 155
. 17. Severe natural phenomena being experienced or projected a.
Earthquake greater than OBE levels b.
Flood, low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche near design levels c.
Any tornado striking facility d.
Hurricane winds near design basis level l'8.
Other hazards being experienced or projected a.
Aircraft crash on facility b.
Missile impacts from whatever source on facility c.
Known explosion damage to facility affecting plant operation d.
Entry into facility environs of toxic or flammable gases e.
Turbine failure causing casing penetration
- 19. Other plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary activation of technical support center and near-site emergency operations center
- 20. Evacuation of control room anticipated or required with control of shutdown systems established from local stations 1536 156
State and/or Local Offsite Class Licensee Actions Authority Actions Site Emergency 1.
Promptly infonn State and/or local off-1.
Provide any assistance site authorities of site emergency status requested Class Description and a on for emergency as soon as dis-k n
cation of egency Events are in process or have 2.
Augment resources by activating on-site occurred which involve actual technical support center, on-site status and provide public or likely major failures of emergency operations center and near-periodic updates plant functions needed for site emergency operations center (E0C) 3.
Augment resources by activating protection of the public.
near-site E0C and any other 3.
Assess and respond primary response centers 4.
s key er enc rson el 4.
Dispatch on-site and offsite monitoring Purpose of the site emergency teams and associated connunications warning is to (1) assure that associated connunications response centers are manned, 5.
Provide a dedicated individual for plant 5.
Alert to standby status other (2) assure that monitoring teams status updates to offsite authorities emergency personnel (e.g.,
are dispatched, (3) assure that and periodic press briefings (perheps those needed for evacuation) personnel required for evacuation joint with offsite authorities) and dispatch personnel to near-of near-site areas are at duty site duty stations stations if situation becomes 6.
Make senior technical and management more serious. (4) provide staff onsite available for consultation 6.
Provide offsite monitoring current infonnation for and with NRC and State on a periodic basis results to licensee and others consultation with offsite M
en h authorities and public, and 7.
Provide meteorological and dose estimates 7.
Continuously assess infonnation (5) provide possible unscheduled to offsite authorities for actual from licensee and offsite
' test of response capabilities releases via a dedicated individual monitoring with regard to in U. S.
or automated data transmission changes to protective actions already initiated for public and Release Potential 8.
Provide release and dose projections mobilizing evacuation resources based on available plant condition 8.
Reconnend placing milk animals Releases of up to 1000 ci of infonnation and foreseeable contingencies w
I-131 equivalent or up t within 2 miles on stored feed u
106 ci of Xe-133 equivalent.
9.
Close out or reconnend reduction in and assess need to extend dMance emergency class by briefing of offsite Expected Frequency authorities at E0C and by phone followed 9.
Provide press briefings, perhaps by written sunnary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> with licensee w
Once in one hundred to once
- 10. Maintain site emergency status N
in 5000 years per unit.
E until closecut or reduction of
- 10. Escalate to general emergency class emergency class E
- 11. Escalate to general emergency class
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE EMERGENCY 1.
Known loss of coolant accident greater than makeup pump capacity 2.
Degraded core with possible loss of coolable geometry (indicators should include instrumentation to detect inadequate core cooling, coolant activity and/or containment radioactivity levels) 3.
Rapid failure of more than 10 steam generator tubes with loss of offsite power 4.
BWR steam line break outside containment without isolation 5.
PWR steam line break with greater than 50 gpm primary to secondary leakage and indication of fuel damage 6.
Loss of offsite power and loss of onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes 7.
Loss of all vital onsite DC power for more than 15 minutes 8.
Loss of functions needed for plant hot shutdown 9.
Major damage to spent fuel in containment or fuel handling building (e.g.,
large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level) 10.
Fire affecting safety systems
- 11. All alarms (annunciators) lost for more than 15 minutes and plant is not in cold shutdown or plant transient initiated while all alarms lost 12.
a.
Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to greater than 50 mr/hr for 1/2 hour or greater than 500 mr/hr W.B. for two minutes (or five timesThese levels to the thyroid) at the site boundary for adverse meteorology b.
These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g., radiation level in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure) or are measured in the environs 13.
Iminent loss of physical control of the plant
- 14. Severe natural phenomena being experienced or projected with plant not in cold shutdown a.
Earthquake greater than SSE levels b.
Flood, low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche greater than design levels or failure of protection of vital equipment at lower levels c.
Winds in excess of design levels 1536 158
. 15. Other hazards being experienced or projected with plant not in cold shutdown a.
Aircraft crash affecting vital structures by impact or fire b.
Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from missiles or explosion c.
Entry of toxic or flamable gases into vital areas
- 16. Other plant conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency centers and monitoring teams and a precautionary public notification
- 17. Evacuation of control room and control of shutdown systems not established from local stations in 15 minutes 1536 159
State and/or Local Offsite Class Licensee Actions Authority Actions General Emergency 1.
Promptly inform State and/or local offsite 1.
Provide any assistance requested authorities of general emergency status 2
Activate imediate public Class Description and reason for emergency as soon as discovered (Paral,lel notification of notification of emergency status Events are in process or have State / local) and provide public periodic occurred which involve actual updates or iminent substantial core 2.
Augment resources by activating on-site 3.
Recommend sheltering for 2 mile degradation or melting with technical support center, on-site radius and 5 miles downwind potential for loss of contain-emergency operations center and near-and assess need to extend ment integrity.
site emergency operations center (E0C) distances 4.
Augment resources by activating Purpose 3.
Assess and respond near-site E0C and any other Purpose of the general emergency 4.
Dispatch on-site and offsite monitoring primary response centers wdrning is to (I) initiate pre-teams and assoCla'ted Communications 5.
Dispatch key emergency personnel detemined protective actions including manitoring teams and for public, (2) provide S.
Provide a dedicated individual for associated comunications continuous assessment of informa-plant status updates to offsite 6.
Dispatch other emergency tion from licensee and offsite authorities and periodic press personnel to duty stations within measurements, (3) initiate briefings (perhapsjointwith 5 mile radius and alert all additional measures as indicated offsite authorities; by event releases or potential others to standby status releases, and (4) provide 6.
Make senior technical and management staff 7.
Provide offsite monitoring current information for and onsite available for consultation with results to licensee and others consultation with offsite NRC and State on a periodic basis, and, jointly assess these authorities and pubitc.
8.
Continuously assess infomation 7.
Prov de meteorological and dose est W tes from licensee and offsite moni-Release Potential to offsite authorities for actual releases via a dedicated indlyidual or toring with regard to changes
'ct ea ns a ready Releases of more than 1000 cj of automated data transmission j
e 1-131 equivalent or more than mobilizing evacuation resources 106 ci of Xe-133 equivalent.
8.
Provide release and dose projections based on available plant condition 9.
Recomend placing milk animals Expected Frequency information and foreseeable contingencies within 10 miles on stored feed and assess need to extend Less than once in about 5000 9.
Close out or recomend reduction of distance years per unit. Life threatening emergency class by briefing of offsite
- 10. Provide press briefings, perhaps W
doses offsite (within 10 miles) authorities at E0C and by phone followed wit Mcensee W
once in about 100,000 years by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> per unit.
- 11. Consider relocation to alternate E0C if actual dose accumulation in near-site E0C exceeds lower 7
- 12. Maintain general emergency status until closeout or reduction of emernency class
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: GENERAL EMERGENCY 1.
a.
Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to 1 rem /hr W.B. or 5 rem /hr thyroid at the site boundary under actual meteorological conditions b.
These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g.,
radiation levels in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure with some confirmation from effluent monitors) or are masured in the environs.
Note: Consider evacuation only within about 2 miles of the site boundary unless these levels are exceeded by a factor of 10 or projected to continue for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 2.
Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier, (e.g., loss of core geometry and primary coolant boundary and high potential for loss of containment).
Note: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.
If more than gap activity released, extend this to 5 miles downwind.
3.
Loss of physical control of the facility.
Note: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.
4.
Other plant conditions exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g., any core melt situation. See the specific PWR and BWR sequences.
Notes:
a.
For sequences where significant releases are not yet taking place and large amounts of fission products are not yet in the containment atmosphere, consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.
Consider 5 mile downwind evacuation (450 to 900 sector) if large amounts of fission products are in the containment atmosphere. Recomend sheltering in other parts of the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone under this circumstance.
b.
For sequences where significant releases are not yet taking place and containment failure leading to a direct atmospheric release is likely in the sequence but not iminent and large amounts of fission products in addition to noble gases are in the containment atmosphere, consider precautionary evacuation to 5 miles and 10 mile downwind evacuation (450 to 900 sector),
c.
For sequences where large amounts of fission products other than noble gases are in the containment atmosphere and containment failure is judged iminent, recomend shelter for those areas where evacuation cannot be completed before transport of activity to that location.
1536 iM
,. d.
As release infonnation becomes available adjust these actions in accordance with dose projections, time available to evacuate and estimated evacuation times given current conditions.
1536 162
EXAMPLE PWR SEQUENCES 1.
Small and large LOCA's with failure of ECCS to perform leading to severe core degradation or melt. Ultimate failure of containment likely for melt sequences.
(Several hours available for response) 2.
Transient initiated.by loss of feedwater and condensate systems (principal heat removal system) followed by failure of emergency feedwater system for extended period. Core melting possible in several hours. Ultimate failure of containment likely if core melts.
3.
Transient requiring operation of shutdown systems with failure to scram.
Core damage for some designs. Additional failure of core cooling and makeup systems would lead to core melt.
4.
Failure of offsite and onsite power along with total loss of emergency feedwater makeup capability for several hours. Would lead to eventual core melt and likely failure of containment.
5.
Small LOCA and initially successful ECCS. Subsequent failure of containment heat removal systems over several hours could lead to core melt and likely failure of containment.
NOTE: Most likely containment failure mode is meltthrough with release of gases only for dry containment; quicker and larger releases likely for ice condenser containments for melt sequences or for failure of containment isolation system for any PWR.
1536 163
EXAMPLE BWR SEQUENCES 1.
Transient (e.g., loss of offsite power) plus failure of requisite core shut down systems (e.g., scram or standby liquid control system). Could lead to core melt in several hours with containment failure likely. More severe consequences if pump trip does not function.
2.
Small or large LOCA's with failure of ECCS to perfom leading to core melt degradation or melt.
Loss of containment integrity may be iminent.
3.
Small or large LOCA occurs and containment perfomance is unsuccessful affecting longer term success of the ECCS. Could lead to core degradation or melt in several hours without containment boundary.
4.
Shutdown occurs but requisite decay heat removal systems (e.g., RHR) or non-safety systems heat removal means are rendered unavailable. Core degradation or melt could occur in about ten hours with subsequent containment failure.
5.
Any major internal or external events (e.g., fires, earthquakes, etc.) which could cause massive comon damage to plant systems resulting in any of the above.
\\S% \\b"
PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION 1.
Palo Verde 1/2/3 50-528, 50-529, 50-530 2.
Perry 1/2 50-440, 50-441 3.
Cherokee 1/2/3 50-491, 50-492, 50-493 4.
Beaver Valley 2 50-412 5.
St. Lucie 50-389 6.
Vogtle 1/2 50-424, 50-425 7.
River Bend 50-458, 50-459 8.
Clinton 1/2 50-461, 50-462 9.
Forked River 50-363 10.
Wolf Cree,k 1 50-482 11.
Jamesport 1/2 50-516, 50-517 12.
Nine Mile Point 2 50-410 13.
Millstone 3 50-423 14.
Bailly 1 50-367 15.
Limerick 1/2 50-352, 50-353 16.
Hope Creek 50-354, 50-355 17.
Marble Hill 1/2 50-546, 50-547 18.
Seabrook 1/2 50-443, 50-444 19.
Sterling 50-485 20.
Hartsville 1/2/3/4 50-518, 50-519, 50-520, 50-521 21.
Phipps Bend 1/2 50-553, 50-554 22.
Yellow Creek 1/2 50-566, 50-567 23.
North Anna 3/4 50-404, 50-405 24.
WPPSS 1/3/4/5 50-460, 50-508, 50-513, 50-509 25.
Callaway 1/2 50-483, 50-486 26.
Harris 1/2/3/4 50-400, 50-401, 50-402, 50-403 1536 165
PLANTS UNDER OL REVIEW l.
Farley 2 50-364 2.
Byron /Braidwood 50-454, 455, 456, 457 3.
LaSalle 1/2 50-373, 374 4.
Zion 1/2 50-295, 304 5.
Midland 1/2 50-329/330 6.
Catawba 50-413, 414 7.
McGuire 50-369, 370 8.
So. Texas 1/2 50-498, 499 9.
Shoreham 50-322 10.
Waterford 50-382 11.
Grand Gulf 1/2 50-416, 417 12.
Diablo Canyon 1/2 50-275, 323 13.
Susquehana 1/2 50-387, 388 14.
Salem 2 50-311 15.
Summer 1 50-395 16.
San Onofre 2/3 50-361, 362 17.
Bellefonte 1/2 50-438, 439 18.
Watts Bar 1/2 50-390, 391 19.
Sequoyah 1/2 50-327, 328 20.
Comanche Peak 1/2 50-445, 446 21.
North Anna 2 50-339 22.
WPPSS-2 50-397 23.
Fermi 2 50-341 24.
Zimmer 1 50-358 1536 166