ML19252A034
| ML19252A034 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/05/1979 |
| From: | Creswell J, Martin R, Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290273 | |
| Download: ML19252A034 (44) | |
Text
/
s UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 11 In the Matter of:
2' IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of Mr. Ed Frederick Mr. Craig Faust 4
Mr. Fred Scheimann Mr. Bill Zewe 5'
Mr. Mike Ross 6i 7
8 Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11 May 29, 1979 12 (Date of Interview) 13 July 5, 1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 269 and 270 15 (Tape Number (s))
16 17l i
18l GG(Db 21I NRC PERSONNEL:
Mr. James Creswell 23 Mr. Robert Marsh Mr. Robert Martin 24 Mr. Darwin Hunter Mr. Tim Martin 25 i
l t
1
7 o
MARSH:
The date is May 29, 1979.
The time is 1:32 p.m.
We are located in 1;
2:
Trailer 203 located outside the south gate of the Three Mile Island Nuclear 3
Plant.
My name is Bob Marsh.
I am an investigator with the U.S. Nuclear 4
Regulatory Commission, assigned to Region III, Chicago, Illinois.
We are 5
at Three Mile Island today to conduct a group interview of count 5, operational 6
personnel from Metropolitan Edison, along with the staff of the investi-7 gative team from the NRC.
To start off with, I would like to have each 8
individual identify himself, spell his last name and identify his position.
g Ed, do you want to start off for Med Ed?
10 FREDERICK:
My name is Ed Frederick.
I am a control room operator for g
Metropolitan Edison.
y 13 FAUST:
My name is Craig Faust, and I am a control room operator for Metropolitan Edison.
15 16 SCHEIMANN:
My name is Fred Scheimann.
I am shift foreman for Metropolitan l
Edison.
18 19 ZEWE:
Bill Zewe, shift supervisor for Metropolitan Edison Company.
21' ROSS:
My name is Mike Ross, supervisor for operations for Unit 1.
23 CRESWELL:
Jim Creswell, I am a reactor inspector from Region III.
24 i
25' "O
136
2 1,
MARTIN:
Robert Martin, Chief,. Nuclear Support Section, Region II, Atlanta.
2 3
HUNTER:
Darwin Hunter, inspection specialist, Region III.
4 5
MARTIN:
Tim Martin, inspection specialist, Region I.
6 MARSH:
Thank you.
Before we begin gentlemen, before we turn the tape on, 7
8 we discussed this two page memo which each of you have in front of you and g
I think we have all have been through this before, so I'm not going to go ver it in any amcunt of detail.
But in essence, it covers the purpose of 10 this investigation by NRC, covers the scope of the investigation, and our authority.
Included in there are several questions, which I'd like to get g
the responses of each of the Met Ed employees to at this time, starting 13 with you, Ed, and then if each individual would just state his name and his response.
The first question reads:
Do you understand the above?
15!
16 FREDERICK:
Yes, I do.
18 FAUST:
Yes, I understand it.
I 20 SCHEIMANN:
21 Yes, I understand it.
22 ZEWE:
Yes, I understand it.
23 24
"^0 137 25 e
i
3 1
ROSS:
Yes, I understand it.
2 3
MARSH:
The second question reads:
Do we have your permission to tape this 4
interview?
5 6
FREDERICK:
Yes.
7 8
FAUST:
Yes.
9 SCHEIMANN:
Yes.
10 11 ZEWE:
Yes.
12 13 0%:
Yes.
14 15 16l MARSH:
- 0. K.
I think all of you have indicated that you would like a copy of this tape which will be provided at the end of the interview.
One other g
question, Which is not brought out at the end of the tape, the end of the i
letter, but is covered in the body, is your right, if you so choose, to g
have a representative from Met Ed present, or from the union.
Do anyone of you want a anyone additional to the five of you that are in the room at this time.
22 23 "O
138 FREDERICK:
No.
24 25 i
e 4
s.
1.
FAUST:
No.
2 3
SCHEIMANN:
No.
{
4 5
ZEWE:
No.
6 ROSS:
iio.
7 E
MARSH:
Fine.
If, at any time during the course of the investigation or g
10 during this interview, you feel you woul,d.like someone else present, just let me know and we will have a break and to get whoever we have in here.
11 In addition to the two page advisory memo that we used, we have also discussedf another single page form, which I handed out which addresses 18 USC 1001 g
and addresses fraudulent false statements.
The lead sentence indicates that I have done by myse.'f to you people and before we went on tapa, I discussed the implications of it.
Do you people have any questions on this now?
17 18 FREDERICK:
No.
19 20 "O
139 FAUST:
No.
21 22 SCHEIMANN:
No.
23 24 25 3
I
i t
5 a
1 ZEWE:
No.
2, 3f ROSS:
No.
4-R
.g MRSH:
On tilat form this is a place for each of you to sign, and I under-n 6-stand aach of you have signed it.
If any questions do come up, just raise 7
the.a uith ma and we'll try to get you an answer.
OK, at this time, then, I would like to turn it over to the NRC people and I understand we will have g
two lead individuah presenting the questions and that will be Tim Martin r Do min Hunter.
As we discussed before, I would like the individual to 10 whom the question is proposed to answer it first.
If the others do wish to g
y expand on it, if you'd raise your hand, I"ll recognize you and I'll give you the floor at that time.
We would like to have each individual responding, g
state his name before he responds, to aid in transcribing the tape.
15 MARTIN:
All right, gentlemen, in reviewing the sequence of events, we have a period of time approximately at 7:00 to 10:00 in the mornirg; we really have very little testimony-type information.
We pulled some information off the computer printout, and wnat I'd like to do is try to walk you i
,9l J.
through this period of time and, if you can, assist me in what overt actions were taking place.
I will address my questions first to Mr. Frederick and ther go down the line if anyone else has any additional pieces of infor-mation.
LEt me get you back in the saddle.
At approximately 100 minutes into the event, we tripped off the last of the reactor coolant pumps.
24 Pressure is continuing to drop.
At about two hours and 20 minutes from the i
l "O
140 r
C.
1 1[
event, we've shut the EMOV and WE see the pressure increasing.
By the way, 2
I'm looking at the widerange pressure chart.
That's what I'm using to cue 3{
me.
At approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 54 minutes into the event, we started the 4
reactor coolant pump.
It looks like we've rewet the core, a quick rise in 5
pressure, and at about 7:13 in the morning, we tripped two RB reactor 6
co lant pumps.
From this point on, is where we have very little information 7
f r I had a emergencies.
Shortly thereafter we going to go into a general g
emergencies, but the thing that is curious to us is, one, the pressure g
turning so rapidly, and dropping quickly and the extent of the dro;:.
We do 10 know that the source intermediate range are on scale now and they've come yyj up and Ed, I'd like to address this first question to you.
Do you know why the pressure dropped? Was E0V reopened or were you doing anything special 3
with the makeup pumps?
14!
FREDERICK:
How did you correlate that at that point in time when you shut off the reacotr coolant pump? How did you know that?
17 MARTIN:
181 From the computer printout.
19f FREDERI(.K:
Did it say RCP 2B tripped?
21 22 MARTIN:
Yes.
23 24 "O
141 25' l
f 7
1 FREDERICK:
That point should be verified.
It is probably a false one.
I i
2-do not remember securing the pumps after the site emergency.
3 4
ZEWE:
Had to be before.
Yes.
l 5l l
6-MARSH:
Excuse me.
Can we get your 7
ZEWE:
Yes.
Uh, just prior to the site emergency, and I'm saying about 20 8
g after six or so, is about when we fed the B steam generator, and then 10, shortly thereafter is where we finally were successful in running the 12 Bravo pump, which we had that off.
As I remember it, before I declared the 11 i
site emergency, we had already had off the 28 coolant pump.
13 FREDERICK:
Often when the 2B reactor coolant pump is running, you will 15l receive intermittant 28 reactor coolar.t pump trip alarms, but the pump will i
continue to run.
Now the source of alarm, I believe, Dick Bencil was 16:!
investigating why we kept getting an alarm it was not only on this day...
18f MARTIN:
The alarm tha comes in quite frequently happens to be the 1A, and we have confirmation of that and show that it comes in approximately 20 times at times when you obviously know that it couldn't have run.
This is shown on the sequence of events and you just can't close a breaker that fast to get the same trip.
When 1A shows this type of behavior, the 1B doesn't.
,4l
,c l no0 142 as i
i i
l
i A
8 1
Excuse me, the 28...
l 2
l 3
FREDERICK:
Further, it is clear that we have steam generation in the core 4l at this very time.
That's the only way you can get this rapid an increase 5
in pressure.
This part shows where EMOV shuts, a gradual expoential-type 6
rise, whereas the almost vertical pseudo steam explosion within the reactor 7
occurs at approximately the time the computer says 28 starts, and it starts 8
at 6:54 which happens to be 4 minutes after the logs say a site emergency g
was proclaimed.
Further, in testimony from other sources, we have indication 10 that the site emergency probably claimed slightly before that 28 pump was started.
Let me continue.
At any rate, key yourself to, not the site 11 y
emergency, to the reactor coolant pump fipping.
Key yourself to that.
13 What did you do... did you open EMOV again? At approximately this period of time?
Either connect it to the event or to the time period?
g l
15j ZEWE:
All right.
I gave the direction to start the pump and I was alse 16!
the one who declared the site emergency.
Personally, I did that, all right.
And the pump was, in fact, started before I declared the site emergency.
We did again start at least two other pumps, all right, sometime later.
I would say 7:30 or quarter to 8:00 or so, we did start other pumps.
But, in fact, we did have the 28 on before I declared the site emergency.
I can't explain why the graph doesn't support that.
That in fact was true.
I would not start that pump 3 minutes after I declared a
' site emergency.
I was on to too many other things.
And that is not true we were contacting Unit 1 for their liquid release, we were trying
" O 143 n
9 1,
to do a lot of other notifications offsite, and at that point, I was still l
2!
the Emergency Director, and I did not have them start the pump that close 3
to the site emergency.
It was before the site emergency.
That I am positive of.
y I
5 6
MARTIN:
By 7:18, the source intermediate range has dove offscale agair.
7 By 7:20, we have an emergency system actuation, A and B emergency injection 8
manual test, Groups 1, 2, and 3.
My question is why, again I put this to i
g you, Ed, why did we test the system at that point?
10 FREDERICK:
We did not.
g 12 ZEWE:
That test was computer if, I don't believe I was thinking, but when 3
you actually manually actuated, you get the test printout on the computer, but that's just the logic that it monitors on the computer for the system, It isn't actually tests, it is really actuation.
i 161
[
17l MARTIN:
Then what you are telling me is that that was actually actuation 18[
at 7:20, that that computer printout is, in fact, an indication of an 19!
l actuation and not a test?
20 21 ZEWE:
All that I'm saying is, I'm not sure of the 7:20 timeframe that you are referring to, all right, but it's just that when you get the test on manual actuation of ES, if I'm not mistaken, you do get tests that comes up 24 on the computer for those channels.
It doesn't say manual actuation initiated or manual actuation on it says test.
0 144 i
10 1.
MARTIN:
By 7:23, we do have a computer alarm that says ES actuation.
By 2
7:25 we do ilave an ES bypass.
So, it indicates 3 minutes after this test 3
sequence, when the pressure is much lower and much closer to what this trip 4
point should be, that we do get an ES actuation.
I 5'
6.
ZEWE:
That's the auto actuation.
7 MARTIN:
Yes, that's correct.
8 9
FAUST:
10 This would be the manual actuation which would be right around when we were stopping the pumps.
The one I could think of.
So that would be 3
earlier than what it should be.
13l MARTIN:
0,K.
At 7:20 which is shortly, approximately the same time that we get this test indication on the computer, we also get an indication that 151 16l the makeup pump 81C starts.
And does this coincide with possibly increasing
}
the makeup to the plant, possibly emergency borating, I'm leading you, I admit.
I'm looking for information.
Ed.
i 19l l
FREDERICK:
If there was an ES actuation, that would have started the C 20 makeup pump.
It would have given us...
22 l
MARTIN:
ES actuation doesn't occur for another 3 minutes.
Pressure is 23 dropped.
Level and pressurizer is dropping.
24l ncn 3-25j U
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I
11 1.
ZEWE:
I'm a little bit confused now.
You're 7:20 or so, right.
l 2!
3 MARTIN:
That's correct.
4 ZEWE:
5 And we have just had a manual actuation followed by 3 minutes in 6
auto actuation with the C makeup pump starting.
7 g
MARTIN:
If the test is, in fact, a manual actuation.
ZEWE:
OK, so what are you asking now then?
10, 11 MARTIN:
12 My question is, If we did a manual actuation, or when we start the 13 makeup pi:mp 1C at approximately the same time, are we trying to increase the makeup to the core? Are we emergency borating? What are we doing?
15 ZEWE:
6:
High pressure injection., which is a form of emergency boration from the BWST.
18(
l MARTIN:
All right.
191 i
20 ZEWE:
And I'm not sure, at this point in time, whether we were still using the high concentration boric acid mix tanks to put a higher concentration of boric acid into the makeup at this point.
We had it on earlier, but I'm 23l not sure, at this point in time, at 7:20, if we were still feeding from the 24 boric acid mix tank or not, but it wouldn't make much difference because 25l l
'U 146 i
[
w
.I 12 1
you go on and isolate the outlet makeup tank, anyway, so the baron that 2
you're putting into the makeup time, you really aren't getting it out 3
anyway.
4 5
MARTIN:
By 7:2.5, the computer shows that the ES system was bypassed, and 6
we see pressure hangup at about 1500 pounds, and it doesn't drop below that 7
point.
In fact, it appears that pressure is being maintained at that p int.
We see the pressurizer level has reached its bottom point and is 8
starting to recover.
It dropped down to about 250 inches.
How is pressure g
being maintained at this point?
Ed, I'll direct the question to you again.
10 11 FREDERICK:
I don't know what we were doing at this point.
This may have been when we were trying to control pressure with the relief valve.
I j
really don't know.
14 i i
15!
6l MARTIN:
Let me give you another data point.
By 7:31 we get the RB1A and R818 outlet temperatures returning to normal which, I guess my gut feeling is, that that ind'icates we may have shut and EMOV block valve again or something.
Bill, I believe you had a copy...
19{
20 FREDERICK:
What do you call normal...
22 ZEWE:
Yeah.
We had shut the RC82, the block valve for the electromatics, 23 somewhere around 6:15.
All right.
I just think that it took that long for that temperature to get back down below 200, which wouldn't be uncommon.
i 25{
"~0 147 1
13 1
I feel there that the pressure reduction was that we partially collapsed 2
the steam voids, due to all the flow from the high pressure injection and 3
all that cold water, and until it heated up again to where it came back up 4
in pressure, we were actually not controlling pressure at that point.
We 5
were just on high pressure injection and the pressure was just reacting, I 6
believe, to the cold water injection from the high pressure injection which 7
is also what we'd seen earlier whenever we've shut off them coolant pumps g
and went on high pressure injection.
The pressure came down, all right.
g As soon as we tripped the pumps and were on high pressure injection, that 10 f rce is down, too.
I think that this here is just more of the same.
11 FAUST:
12 This is also around a period when I was feeding up the steam gener tors.
If I remember, at that time, we were cooling TC off as it was 13 too, it was dropping, at least the steam generator downcover temperature 15 w s oropping pretty well, at the time, from where I was at, looking at
- this, t
17(1 MARTIN:
It's 7:35 which is 4 minutes later.
We do start the emergency 18j!
The computer shows that i has restarted...
19{
i 20 FAUST:
But we restarted that.
The thing of it is, we started feeding up the generators, before we started that pump.
We still had, I believe it was the B pump, or the A pump, running.
You had 82, B2A running at that time? That's what I was feeding up on, s er that time period.
25
""O 148 l
h
14 1
MARTIN:
The time period you speak of occurs approximately 6:40, 6:30, and 2.
the time you can see the level in the A steam generator rising during this 3
period of time.
B should have been following it too.
It was probably all 4
ready up at this point.
5l 1
6 HUNTER:
A generater level coming up. B generator level is also coming up.
7 FAUST:
It seems like it would be awful hard, I'think Bill was trying to 8
g indicate that the system was actually, the way I term it, floating around instead of finding its mediums at this time.
We were actually watching, at 10 this time, for a mode of some indication that we on a natural circulation yy r getting some achievement to that direction.
We were waiting -- I think 12 it was almost a period of an hour there -- before I think we came up and 13 said were not doing it, weren't getting on it.
I 15l l
16 17
"~0 149 18{
19l i
20 21 1
22 23 2 41 25 l
t l
l i
15 1,
MARTIN:
By approximately 7:40, we again see a very rapid rise in pressure, i
2!
approximately 300 pounds.
We have not seen previously to shutting the EM08 3
as we did approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes.
It's almost a vertical 4-pseudo steam explosion within the reactor during this period of time.
Do 5
you guys remember seeing the pressure jump like that.
Ed, again I'll start 6
with you.
7 8
(Frederick)
No, I have never seen the pressure jump like that.
9 t
MARTIN:
At approximately the same time, we do see that all reactor coolant 10 11 pumpm all of the pump discharge pressures show that all reactor coolant pump backstop wall flows show low.
We don't see any indication that the 12 52s of the reactor coolant pump breaker shut, so we my gut feeling is that 13 the reactor coolant pump was not started at this time.
g 15l y
Those are just (multiple speakers)
Yeah. Looks like all pumps dropped off there.
g 18l l
FAUST:
What you were saying was I was starting during the I can't put it 191 right on time, but you're seeing me probably starting oil pumps on the reactor coolant pumps and preparing to start them again.
22 MARTIN:
- 0. K.
We do see that a little bit later, by the way.
24 "O
150 25 l
l
16 1
FREDERICK:
Uh, we may have been turning them off then.
2 MARTIN:
Yeah.
It looks like they were being turned off right then.
3j 4
That's what I didn't understand why they were going off at that point.
5 6
MARSH:
Excuse me.
That was Faust and I am Frederick.
7 8
MARTIN:
- 0. K.
By 7:41, which is shortly after that rapid pressure increase, g
we again receive the RB1A and 1B outlet temperature hot, and whether it is 10 the result of this, someone took action and tried to dampen out this pressure spike or something, we don't know.
Uh, was it reopened? Was there any 11 7
time subsequent to this shutting at 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 20 minutes and prior to 13 controlling pressure at around 2000 pounds, that the EMOV was reopened, or a block valve?
15 "9
- 16 up on makeup pumps, right.
Some of these spikes might have been due to me just backing off on a system and the response at the time, all that I could come up with, I think I was following what Fred was directing me as far as 19l what he was seeing possible.
But, I ended up, anyway, cutting back the makeup flow to the point where I said, I was thinking along the lines of the RC pump seals right now they had been taped off at the meters, of the beavers, and I said to myself anyway, since I was getting back so far on it, I'd go to one pump combination.
Now whether you can relate that in here somewhere, I believe I ended up on the, with the 8 makeup pump on at that time, I think, and the C off.
g, i
t i
17 1
MARTIN:
All right.
Tim Martin again.
By 7:56 in the morning, which is 2.
almost this red line right here, we have an ES and building isolation 3
signal, and by 8:00, we have the ES building isolation defeated, and I 4
guess my assumption has to be at this point then the EM08 is still shut.
5 At 8:05, which is just right in this area right here, we get all reactor 6
coolant pump backstop oilflow, and liftpump discharge pressures have been 7
returned to normal.
And at 8:09, about right here, we start RCP1A and it g
shows that 52 doesn't close and it apparently is run for about 30 seconds.
9 FAUST:
10 What I said earlier then didn't come in yet because I was still ver in the generators at this time.
11 12 13
, RCP 1A operates for about 30 seconds and is then tripped off the line.
By 8:17, we see makeup pump P1A and Plc tripped.
Why?
Ed.
i 15i I
P*"'
16 17 TIM MARTIN:
At this point, the pressurizer level has essentially returned I
fullscale and is very close to 400.
19{
i 20 FAUST:
You're getting to a point right now, somewhere in here is where Ted was no longer on the makeup system, then I was.
Now, I can make a statement like this, that as far as I can remember, I cannot remember turning off all makeup pumps.
I always had a makeup pump going.
And I was shifting pumps 24 during that time.
25' "O
152 I
t 18 1.
TIM MARTIN:
At about 8:22, makeup pump P18 was started and I wonder if 2!
this might correspond to what you were talking about running the B makeup 3
pump.
4 FAUST:
It probably is because I've been trying to sort out when it fit in 5
here.
6 7
8 Like I said, that's why Ed can't answer it, more then likely.
Now I can g
remembcr shifting due to cutting back flows back that far in other works, it was well within the capacity of one makeup pump, which is talking about 10, 300-400 gpm that I figured I would try to normalize seals for the pump right now, then going with onto the B makeup pump which I controlled with a 32 valve at that time, a MEV-32.
It didn't get me anywhere, by the way.
But that was that pump shift in there then probably, but I don't know about, well OK, C and A would have been off, but it sounds like you're 16;l saying all makeup pumps wore off and I do not remember that.
17 MARTIN:
We're keying on the computer printout and that's all we have to go on and that's why we need your testimony in this area.
By approximately 8:24, which is approximately the bottom of this pressure drop, we see that 20 all pressurizer heater groups are returned to normal 1 through 5 and I'm
[
wondering again, is the EMOV shut at this point?
22' 23 SCHEIMANN:
I can't really remember reopening that isolation valve until 24 some later point there we were actually trying to control pressure around 23 l
2000.
"^0 153 l
19 1.
MARTIN:
OK.
That's all the questions I have.
Darwin, I'll turn it cver 2
to you.
Oorwin, befr a you start Marsh speaking, I'm going to break for a 3
moment and turn this tare.
Reading 439, the time being 1:59 p.m.
4 MARSH: Go ahead, Dorwin.
We're up at 2:00 p.m.
5:
i 6
HUNTER:
Ok.
I'd like to direct my questions to Fred Scheimann initially, 7
8 and I want to again to, in the beginning of the sequence as the primary g
system reactor coolant flow is decreasing, two pumps were taken off, and 10 then after the second set of pumps were taken off, pressure decreased rather quickly down to approximately 650 pounds.
OK.
That's close to the g
core flood tank discharge pressure, and in a previous interview, we've determined that the breakers for the core flood tank valves, the 1A and the 18, were closed during the early morning because, it was an interview with 15l a fellow who was just in there in the morning and also that the valves were seen closed.
I'd like to ask Fred, if you recall, during this prior to the 7:00, it was prior to the last pumps coming off, do you recall the sequence l
where the core flood tanks valve breakers were unlocked, energized and the 18' core flood tank valves were closed?
191 20' SCHEIMANN:
I do recall hearing that the core flood valves had had the 21 breakers closed.
However, at no time until somewhat later during the day 22 do I recall those valves being shut.
23
'"O 154 y
25i l
t I
t
4
\\
20 11 HUNTER:
Ed, ycu were on the makeup panel also, and in that area, do you 2 :
recall actually manipulating or closing the core flood tank valves at that 3
time?
4 5
FREDERICK:
No, I don't.
6 HUNTER:
What's the normal pressure on the core flood tanks? Tech Spec 7
g maintenance of pressure on the core flood tanks?
9 10, A
00 25.
11 HUNTER:
Can you recall that morning what the pressure was?
I 13.,
FAUST:
I had taken the readings on it earlier.
I remember, let's put it this way, when I was taking the readings, you know, they were normal.
16 HUNTER:
OK.
650 puts you fairly close to the opening of the core flood tank valves.
Do you recall discussing that issue, Fred? Uh, Ed? FREDERICK:
The pressures I normally saw on those tanks were 585 to 620, by those pressure gauges.
Now there may be enough inaccuracy to get open to 650, I don't know.
21, 22 FAUST:
You're talking about, this spike you're looking at, is right when 23 we turned the pumps off or if you're trying to figure out if...
24 25 "0
155 r
21 1l HUNTER:
All right, the pumps were turned off at this point and the pressure 2
decreased.
This is where the...
3 4.
FAUST:
But that could, that whole thing be due the fact that we were high 5
pressure injecting during this time period and you are just saying it's 6
finally getting to the core.
7 HUNTER:
Don't get me wrong.
I am not asking you if core flood tanks 8
g injected at that time, because if they had of, we would have seen it on the 10 computer as we did later in the day, when they did inject.
That's not tne question.
The question is we've had indications that the electrical 11, breakers were, in fact, the locks actually, well, they were locked.
The 12L electrical breaker locks were taken off and the breakers closed.
OK.
And 3
to close the breakers, the intent would appear to be to close the core flood tanks.
Quote, unquote; There's enough water in the pressurizer, we don't need any more water.
That type of logic.
Do you recall any logic 16 that would go along that line?
18j FREDERICK:
No, I don't.
I certainly would have stopped it from going-in there that way, isolated the core flood tanks.
21 HUNTER:
0K.
Bill, you were in the Control Room early, and then you left and went out into the Turbine Building, and then you came back.
But do you recall any discussions between yourself, George Kunger, or anybody, Kim Bryant came over from Unit 2, Unit 1, excuse me.
Do you recall any discussion; 25
{
"O 156 l
22 1
in this early timeframe to electrically energize the core flood tank valves 2
and possibly close them?
3 4
ZEWE:
No discussions at all concerning shutting the core flood valves, it 5
was never discussed to my knowledge, no.
6 HUNTER:
All right, Bill.
When do you recall the core flood tanks valves 7
8 were closed; were energized, or considered to be needed to be energized.
9 ZEWE:
10 Later that morning, and I'm not sure of the timeframe, when we were 3
going to depressurize the plant and try to go decay heat removal.
We had thought that we may want to have those breakers operable from the control room.
14.
HUNTER:
15{
Bill, you're indicating in the morning around noon, the plant was repressurized and maintained at 2000 pounds.
17 I
ZEWE:
0K.
18[
l 19l HUNTER:
But in the morning would put you in this time frame.
Do you 20' recall?
21 22 ZEWE:
I do not know.
The kind that I'm referring to is when we were trying to depressurize to go and try to go on the decay heat system.
I don't recall, in other words, the time frame, the early here, that you're referring to.
I do not, at all.
ncg j
7 l
23 1
FAUST:
You only want facts stated, right?
I don't want to say anything, 2
but maybe I'm just, it's just something that appealed to us and it might 3
not have been right.
Forget it, you know, I just...
4 5
HUNTER:
In the afternoon when you were getting ready to depressurize, do 6
you recall, Bill, do you recall having to energize and/or open the core 7
flo d tank valves?
8 g'
ZEWE:
The core flood tank valves were opened the whole time to my knowledge 10 and we never did even attempt to shut them, though we did make preparations 11 to energize the breakers so that we could operate them remotely from the 3
Control Room if we chose to do so, but we never did.
13 HUNTER:
p Fred, you were on the makeup panel early, if my sequence was 15 right, coming up from the Turbine Building early, and basically you stayed
- * ""E
" "9 "9'
16i 17 SCHEIMANN:
Yes, that is true.
i 19f HUNTER:
Do you recall having to seeing the core flood tank valves closed?
20t 21 SCHEIMANN:
No, I do not recall seeing the core flood tank valves closed.
To my knowledge they were open throughout the whole course of events.
24
^^0 158 25l i
t l
l i
24 1
HUNTER:
OK.
So my understanding is that they were open, and even though i
g!
they were, even if they were energized, to your knowledge, they were not f
3 closed.
4 5
SCHEIMANN:
They were not closed to my knowledge. HUNTER:
And in the 6
evening when you, well right before noon, I think it's 11:00 or something, 7
and you decided to depressurize the plant and go down to core flood and 8
possibly decay heat, if we have our sequence right, you did not have to open the core flood tank valves at that time.
g 10 SCHEIMANN:
No, at that time I did not have to worry about the core flood g
tank valves being open as they already were.
13 HUNTER:
OK.
15i BOB MARTIN:
Let me ask a question.
Is there any difference in the type of 16i indicating light used between units 1 and 2 on those valve status such i
that, of course, anyone more familiar with the other unit might look at unit 2 and misinterpret the valve status light such as on those core flood tank valves.
i 20' 21 SCHEIMANN:
It's been awhile since I've been over to Unit 1, so I'm not 22 really too familiar anymore with what they do have over there as far as 23 indication.
n, 25j l
I r
25 1
ROSS:
The difference between indication between Unit 1 and 2 is mainly on l
2 an ES panel, which the operator really couldn't see without standing on his 3
tiptoes to go over it in Unit 2.
There would be no difference really on s 4
local indication on the back panel.
5 6
. HUNTER: Let me go back to trake sure that I'm following what's going on.
7 Apparently, the core flood '.ank valve breakers were, in fact, closed early g
in the morning, if we are getting the right information.
Was there any i
g discussion of going down and going on decay heat this early in the morning?
10 yyj FAUST:
Well, that's what all my him-hawing around was a little bit earlier 12 I thought we, I just vaguely feel like I don't remember hearing here.
13 something like that--like we were thinking about preparing, trying to go on decayed heat and just getting in that lined of it; but as far as that goes, it just goes to shutting the breakers so that we have control up in the controi room.
1g 17f QR2:
Does anyone else have any recollection similar to that?
yg l
19l SCHEIMANN:
20l My knowledge, to my memory, we didn't have any plans of going down on decayed heat until sometime later towards noon, in that vicinity.
22 CRESWELL:
Do any of you remember sending an auxiliary operator down into the cable room to manipulate a switch on the SFAS panels, associated with a 320 lb interlock?
25
" O 160 I
26 1
ZEWE:
I do not.
2; I
3' SCHEIMANN:
I do not either.
4 5
FAUST:
I don't remember any.
6 7
FREDERICK:
I don't remember that either.
8 g
HUNTER:
At this time in the morning, you were there, the shift was there, 10 Ge rge Kunder was there, and Ken Bryant had been over from Unit 1, and at a yy poisit in the morning, Mike Ross, you came in nearer, when the pumps were either--
12 electromatic had been closed, the pumps had been off, and at a
me, e, was Joe, Joe Logan was %ere at % at d me?
13 14j ROSS:
Yes, sir.
That's correct.
15 16 HUNTER:
Okay.
I have another area I want to cover before I conclude my questions.
We've intereviewed, probably as you fellows are well aware of, we've interviewed a lot of people and we've gone through an enormous amount of records, and we've come to the conclusion that there's a possible problem with the way the emergency feedwater system is being operated or has been operated in the past, and we want to clarify this particular issue and we have.
We asked most, we felt like we've covered most of the status book.
23 I want to go back to the beginning of the shift and let's talk about, for instance, the first thing I want to talk about--and I'd like to talk with 25 "O
161 r
27 1;
Craig a minute.
We'll pick you up first.
I want to talk about the emergency 1
2!
feedwater valves, the EF 12's A and B.
Going back to the beginning of the l
3l shift, Craig, do you recall looking at those valves at anytime between l
4l 11:00 in the evening and 4:00 prior to the event when we actually had the 5
trip?
Do you recall looking at the valves?
6 7
FAUST:
No I don' t.
8 g
HUNTER:
Ed, do you recall looking at them?
10 FREDERICK:
Prior to the event?
11 12 HUNTER:
Right.
13 14 FREDERICK:
No, I didn' t look at them.
15 16!
HUNTER:
Fred, do you recall seelag the valves?
7 18j SCHEIMANN:
No, I don't recall seeing the valves position prior to the g
event.
t 21f f
HUNTER:
Bill.
2 24 23 ZEWE:
No, I do not.
24
""O 162 25 I
l I
I
28 1
HUNTER:
They're normally open.
Also, the EF-ll valves are normally in 2
automatic and they're normally closed.
Craig, do you recall looking at the 31 EF-11 valves during the 11:00 to 4:00 time frame--on routine tour, or i'
4 anything?
5 6
FAUST:
It's hard to really say.
I take readings that go right across the 7
indicating lights on, and in that particular area, unless you are looking 8
right at it, I would say no.
Like I'm saying, right in that area, they are g
the only two lights like that.
If there would have been duel indication 10' n, I think I would have noticed it because I take the readings off the 11 steam generators right there, and you're looking right at that area.
12 HUN 13
, in fact, the 11 valves were in manual, is that predominant?
Could you tell, or would you have noted that the 11 valves were in manual I
and closed?
151 16!
FAUST:
That's hard to say, They were in auto when, prior to this happening..,
18 HUNTER:
Alright, we'll try to go through that and work our way through it.
g Another thing that we would like to look at is that, to your knowledge, Craig, were the emergency feedwater pumps in the normal position; in other words, the control switches in the normal position?
23 FAUST:
Yes.
24 "O
163 25 f
i l
29 1
HUNTER:
Ed, as far as your knowledge, was the emergency feedwater system 2
in a normal position?
the pumps, steam driven by (unintelligible) also the 3
motor pumps, breakers?
4l 5
FREDERICK:
Yeah.
I would like to point out that in the months prior to 6
this, I recall one other time when I did notice this system was... I feel 7
confident that I would have noticed it because I did one other time.
The 8
ll's were in manual and I noticed that just in the normal scan of doing the g
panel.
I feel confident that in looking at the panel now, that I would have noticed it then too, because I did once before.
11 HUNTER:
Okay.
I would like to pursue your comment, because that was my next question that I have that we want to get to, is that through our review and our interviews, we have indications from certain individuals, 15j!
that they have, in fact, found an emergency feedwater system in other than a normal position, and I would like to present you with that particular 16 question and we can specifically look at the pumps being in the pull-to-lock or the EF-ll valves being in manual, or the 12 valves of the 5 valves being closed, which would line the system up other than normal.
- Craig, 20 have you ever found it in other than normal?
21 FAUST:
Yes, I have found it in other than normal positions.
It was 22 usually during times during a startup on the plant.
In other words, when 23 we were going down the Procedure, this step should have already been done 24 and I would have lined it up when I found it out of position, but usually 25
"'O 164 l
30 1
it was just as far as the pumps being not being in pull-to-lock or not i
2,'
being taken out of pull-to-lock at the time, the one time I can remember.
3 FREDERICK:
4 We did many startups and shutdowns in Unit 2, and in the 5
course of all those startups and sn;tdowns, we very often didn't go all the Gl way to cold shutdown; we may have stopped in mode, shutdown part of it in 7
mode 2 and then went back up and a lot of checks that would have done in a g
full shutdewn are not done because you don't go down far enough in the g
procedure, alright; but in order, so some stuff may have been taken without 10 being signed off, okay, and the operator thinking that he would be on the 3
panel when they went back up, he would do that, and it wasn't done.
We have had startups or shutdowns and we found that steps were forgotten and sometimes it was emergency cases.
I 14l HUNTER:
In the case you indicated that the EF-11 valves were in manual.
I 15l know that that will stand out in your memory if you find any piece of 1 61 equipment not in normal position, because it is unusual.
Can you recall the circumstances that you found it in manual?
the plant conditions?
or was it actually during a recovery?
19{
20 FREDERICK:
It was during a startup.
The time I had done it.
22 HUNTER:
Okay.
Now let me ask you, Ed, what do you do when you find the 23; I
valves, like the EF-lls in manual? What is your action?
24 2s
'"O 165 t
t t
31 1
FREDERICK:
I remember what I did that time.
I looked at the valves to 2
make sure that the boxes were energized.
I thought perhaps there was some 3
maintenance going on.
Then I looked in the caution tag book to see, if 4
there was a caution tag it was pulled off and not put in the book, and it 5
said that there was some maintenance going on or do not operate these until 6
we get it fixed or something like that.
And I notified Fred and we both 7
decided, well, if there's nothing going on, we might as well just put it in automatic.
8 9
HUNTER:
10' Fred, do you recall Ed reporting to you that the valves were in manual?
12 SCHEIMANN:
He indicated it, yes.
14l l
HUNTER:
Okay.
When he returned them to the auto position, what do you do 15!
I with that information?
16j i
17' SCHEIMANN:
At that time, I really can't recall what I did with it.
i 19 HUNTER:
Okay.
Bill, do you recall having anybody report to you that the EF-ll-12 pumps on the emergency feedwater system were in an other than normal position?
22 23 0
166 ZEWE:
I do not.
24 25 l
3
32 1
HUNTER:
Moving down a little further now, and let's try to get back to 2
the beginning of this particular transient or right prior to the transient, 3
I don't mind indicating te you that, and you probably are aware, that we've 4l completed a set of interviews which indicates the valves were open, okay, 5
after the surveillance.
So I have no reason to doubt that, except they 6
were closed, apparently, and I want to keep on the fact that the valves 7
were closed when tne Unit tripped.
When you have a reactor trip caused by 8
a turbine trip, one of the problems that it's gotten into, that it looks g
like is being used--is that the operators and the people here at the plant 10, have, in fact, beer, using the alternate feedwater system to contral primary system pressure.
Nou, you can listen to what I'm saying, 1kay, because I'm 17 going to talk about it, and I want to make sure that we unders'tano eac!,
- "Y 13 that's the cause of the trip, and that catses the turbine to trip, if you lose main feed pumps, the aux feed pumps and the emergency feed pumps do in fact come in automatically, and when the emergency feedwater pumps spray on the steam generator tubes, the effe:t t. rat that had on the reactor sys tem is very effective, it is a very effective way of removing heat from the i
steam generators and the primary system pressure suffers in this particular 19I type plant when the auxiliary feecwater system, in fact, is allowed to come in.
Andat30inchesontheoperating$1nd,theywouldinfact,theEF-11 value shoeld in fact come opers automaticaliy and maintain 30 inches.
And we have reviewed a nuder of reactor plint trips, and turbine trips, and 23 seen that the level on the steau' generators had in fact been altered, and 8 24 flow had in fact been turned off.
Specifically, when the turbine trip 25 i
I i
33 1
cccurs,-the reactor pressure goes high a.i it normally would.
And then, at 2
the top of tnat peak, the auxiliary feedwata system could be throttled or 3[
- 4intained or neld back to limit the, not the pressure rise, but limit the 4]
pressure decrease and stay above ES on the ey down.
And I would like to 5
ask you if, Craig, if you are aware, or have you ever seen, or have you 6;
ever actually prevented the emergency feedwater system from coming in 7
automatically?
8 FAUST:
I've never prevented it during a trip.
g 10.
11!
' HUNTER: Ed.
l 121 FREDERICK:
13 I imagine what you' *,i talking about, you' re talking about pf losing a main turbine.
Main turbine...
15l 16l HUNTER:
Main turbine, due to a less of feedpumps, for instance, which gives you a main turbine trip, and it can end up with a reactor trip x number of seconds after the start of the event due to high pressure, and 18l if you had a number of them here, and we've gone back and r! viewed each one of them, and we're still reviewing them, and we have seen something that we 20l have t,1at we haven't put our finger on it, but we're working on it, and it, 22,l in fact, appears '.he 11 valves could be put in manual and prevent aux feed tlow from coming in, the pumps could be put before the lock and prevent aux i
23l reed water from t eing supplied to the steam generators.
And I'm not going to tell you, I'm not going to say yes or no, or whether we've seen it by 25(
k n
0 168 i
l l
l 34 1,
the records reviewed, but something has our attention right now and you can 2
think about that, but the 12 valves could have been maintained closed.
3 Have you ever seen, in your shift turn over, have you ever seen the 12 g.
valves closed? OK.
q 5'
FAUST:
Du-ing the trips?
6 7
HUNTER:
Yes.
8 9
have never seen it cicsed in any trip except this one.
10 11 HUNTER:
Did you ever have the case, Bill Zewe, where you had to uke manual action like open the 32 valves, bypass a failed 11 valve if it failed to open, or you found the 11 valves in manual?
i 15!
ZEWE:
I have never seen that to be the case, no.
17 HUNTER:
Bill, you had a trip similar to this type trip before, I believe; the loss of feed flow that actually en. fed up with a turbine trip reactor 19l 20 trip.
In that case, the systems operated normally, or functioned normally?
l 21, ZEWE:
Yes, they do.
22 23 HUNTER:
Move one step further now.
Le t ' ', 't i ! ' sbout specific points now.
24l l
On the morning of...
25j
,I c, - pa 1 69 l
l
35 1
ZEWE:
Turns oJt sir 2
3 HUNTER:
Yes, go ahead.
4 5
ZEWE:
All right.
From what you've just said, all right, from reviewing 6
ur past feed water flow transient type trips, you have seen this indication 7
then of some possible interruption of emergency feedwater?
Based on just a review f ur plants, or is this other facilities?
8 9
HUNTER:
10 Let's say, at the present time, our review of records and personnel during interviews, are here.
OK.
Let's just leave it at that, because 3
that's what we're involved in.
Yes, we have indications that the emergency y
13 feed water system has been off during a trip, and ZEWE:
I want to make sure is that in the morning, and I told you guys before, I shoot straight 15 from the hip, the next question is, OK, Craig, during this trip...
16!
HUNTER:
When I was at, here, all right, is that you are relating this, you know, in several words and several sentences saying this and this and this and this, and we're just saying yes or no to the whole postulated or factual data that you're saying.
But I just want to make it clear that I'm totally unaware of and at loss in really what this is leading to, or that what you're saying is factual or not.
It's a completely new ball game for me.
23 MARSH:
I want to ask...
24
"~0 170 25
36 1l (Marsh) Excuse me, before we proceed, I want to break at this point and 2
chcnge the tape, the time being 2:27 and reading 849 on the meter.
3 MARSH:
The time is 2:27 p.m.
New cassette.
Continue with the group 4;
5 discussion; Don, you were about to pose a question.
6 HUNTER:
Okay, I'd like to pose a question again; very straightforward now, 7
8 I want an answer, is that during this event, okay? Craig, you indicated to us that when you went to the control board that the EF-12 valves were in g
fact c.losed.
10 That was the way, the end result was you noted that the steam g
generators were not getting feedwater, the end result of your analysis was that the 12 valves were closed and then you opened them.
g 13 FAUST:
Right.
15 HUNTER:
6[!
That was approximately 8 minutes into the transient.
1 17 FAUST:
Yes.
18 191 20j!
HUNTER:
Okay.
Do you have any knowledge, or do you know or have any idea l'
how those valves got closed?
2 11 22 FAUST:
No, I don't.
2
" O 171 24 25 l
i
37 1
HUNTER:
Ed, do you have any idea of how the 12 valves were closed or could 2!
have been closed?
3 4
FREDERICK:
I don't know the circumstances under which they were closed; 5
now I know how they were closed...
6 HUNTER:
Okay.
7 8
FREDERICK:
I just turned the switch.
g 10 HUNTER:
Alright.
12 FREDERICK:
They can be closed remotely, you understand this.
3 14, HUNTER:
They can be closed locally...?
15 16' FREDERICK:
Other than in the control room.
17 18(
l HUNTER:
And with valves in the control room.
Yes.
Fred, do you have any 19!
knowledge of the 12 valves being closed?
21, i
SCHEIMANN:
This stretch now, to my knowledge I had no idea when they were 22' closed, or why we found them in a closed position.
23 24 "O
172 2s i
38 1
HUNTER:
Bill Zewe i
2 3
ZEWE:
I do not know.
4 5
HUNTER:
Okay.
We're down to the point now that the transient, the trip 6
has occurred, and there's one other point that I want to clarify Craig 7
Faust, with you:
into the transient, after you had completed your turbine 8
trip type of immediate actions, you in fact looked at the F-11 valves and g
the 12 valves also, but you ended up putting the 11 valves in manual and 10 running them open, I think is the way your interview, you know, your statement bef re.
11 Could you clarify just looking at the 11 valves what you saw en 11 valves from the time you passed the panel?
The indications, dual indications, y
or Whatever; and then when you put them in manual, you did with them?
14 FAUST:
When I first came across the panel, the indications to me were that 5
the 11 valves were travelling.
This was initially when I first went across, 16(
and made this decision that the EM generators were going on low-level limits.
I had indications that they were travelling and that all three emergency feed pumps were on.
When I came back, one of the first things I looked at was steam generator level; it was indicating 10 inches.
Once again, I said the generators were dry or they were at least lower than 10 inches anyway.
That's when I looked at... also they were just aoout down to each other.
The gauge is down where I can see the 11 valve indicators, and they were indicating shut.
That's when I took the demand singles for 24 the Bailley stations to manual and started running them open.
When I think 25 I
"O 173 i
I t
39 1
about it I actually did it in steps, I was running these 11's, because I 2,
expected to feed and I didn't w2:.c to hit it too hard.
Anyway, before I 3
looked down further, I had actually went abcut... I'd say almost three 4
steps on opening those valves up, hitting the demand singles and finally 5
saying that I'm not getting anything in there.
It was right in that period 6
also that I was watching steam generator pressure, you also heard me say.
7 I went over; I actually cracked the bypass valves at this time, right in g
this period.
And that's where you'll see that pressure drop, that's what that was.
And it was right after that that I come over and determined them g
10, still not feeding; I looked over the rest of the panel, on to 12.
By this 11 time the 11 valves I had already driven all the way open now, and they pened at 12.
12 13 HUNTER:
The 11 valves then, didn't,... even though you were obviously below the 30-inch low-level control point, were you saying this 11 valve 15 did not function properly...?
16;,
17 FAUST:
...right...
19 HUNTER:
You actually had to put them in manual and open them...?
21 FAUST:
Open them.
Yes.
23 HUNTER:
Do you recall discussing that with anybody? You know, I realize 24 that events..
"O 174 i
40 1
fA.llST:
Uh, at that time, I think... I don't remember telling anybody that 2,
I :ook the 11's to manual and opened them, no.
They... I don't know, 3
you'll have to ask Bill or Ed if they saw me throttling on the 11's.
I 4
don't remember saying I took them specifically to manual.
I just remember 5
saying "I'm still not feeding" and that was one of the actions I did to try 6
to establish feed.
7 g
HUNTER:
Craig, have you ever seen the 11 valves fail to function like that g
on a trip?
10 FAUST:
11 The 11 valves failed to function properly on a trip once, before 12 f r us where they... I'm trying to remember the trip.
I had problems with 13 tN 1, and that's about the best I can say about it right now.
Once before g
we ended up getting... it wasn't that they weren't functioning, it was that we didn't know what position the valves were in; and that's where two 15 limit lights came from, out of that incident.
That's what that had decayed to.
What I'm referencing to is the problems of... we couldn't tell what g
p sition the valves were in except for the demand single on the Bailley 8
would indicate, which is just indicating a demand single.
20' HUNTER:
Bill, do you recall discussing the 11 valves failing to open that morning?
23 ZEWE:
As I remember it, I knew that Craig went to hand to fully open them, but as I remember he said that he had dual indication on the 11 valves and 25 l
" O 175 i
t
41 1.
that they were somewhere between open and closed and I had assumed moving 2
in the opening direction, and he did go to hand when he didn't have response 3
or steam generator level.
That's as I remember it.
4' 5
HUNTER:
Bill, have you ever seen the 11 valves fail to open and had to use 6
the 32 bypass valves or...
7 ZEWE:
I have not before, no.
8 9
FREDERICK:
I saw him put them on manual.
I was... When he said he was 10 having trouble feeding generators, I went over and stood behind him for a 3
minute or so to see what he was doing.
I looked at the feed pumps to see g
if they were running and I looked at the steam generator levels and pressure.
3 He was telling me that it didn't look like he was feeding.
At that time, he took control of the 11 split and then they opened.
He was again just 15 going to start monitoring to see whether or not the level had recovered because he was opening the 11's.
At that time he was complaining that he had dual indication on the 11's and that's why the demand was opening more.
I didn't stick around to see what happened because I figured it would be a minute to see the level come back, and in back of the makeup system.
And that was shortly thereafter that he shouted that the 12's were shut.
22
[ LOTS OF VOICES AT ONE TIME!!!]
23 24
'^0 176 25 i
i
42 1
FAUST:
I would tend to agree with what Ed said because I can remember 2
saying when they came back over to that station, that was one of the things 3
that I saw dual indication on them again, with 10 inches in the generator, 4
and that's what wasn't fitting with me.
I think what I was actually thinking 5
was that below that this valve should be wide open.
And that's probably 6{
what it was; and I just took them to manual then and started feeding further 7
more than anything.
8 FAUST:
g We discussed that, because he had seen the levels come down, and he 10 said "the valves aren't open," and we had decided, well, maybe they couldn't 3
go up there because the level was still high.
But it's going to control on 1 w level limits.
2 When I saw him taking the manual later on and open them, it was in response to wanting the one level to turn around sooner because 3
it was coming down.
I don't ever remember discussing with him chat the 11's had or failed to operate, or should eb operating now and they weren't.
It was all in an effort to maintain 30 inches in the generator.
17 HUNTER:
Did you have the 11 valves on automatic later in the morning during the event controlling 30 inches, or did they...
I 20 FAUST:
I put the 11 stack in when I regained 30 inches on the A generator.
I remember putting that one back in auto, but it didn't seem to be controlling it.
Now maybe I just didn't give it a long enough period, I can't remember how long I had them in auto, but I ended up putting them back in manual 24 again because... I think it was... I think I boiled the generator dry I
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twice, and I think that's when I came back... that's when I put it back in 2.
manual because I was getting around the reactor coolant pumps at that time.
3 You know, I remember going back into auto on it, I think it was just the A, 4
because by that time we were discussing.a possible leak in the B.
I ended 5
up anyway later on with both of them manual all the rest of the day.
6-7 HUNTER:
Alright, I don't have any further questions.
8 MARSH:
Let me ask one question which is sort of a summary questien on this g
10 topic of emergency feedwater.
Am I correct in interpreting what you have 11 told me that each of you, to your knowledge, is not aware of a technique or 12 aware of a practice at this point that we believe exists of blocking, 13 m difying, or modulating the availability of emergency feedwater flow for 7y the purpose of limiting the extent of a pressure transient when you're into a ee a er pr em s cat a correct assessment, 2 at you are not aware 15 f any such practice at the site?
16 17 FAUST:
That's correct; that's the first time I've heard it.
18,!
19l MARSH:
Is that "yes" you have never heard of it before?
21 FAUST:
That's true, I have never heard of it before.
23 SCHEIMANN:
I've never heard of such before either, and my CR0 and I would probably have problems if I did.
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MARSH:
Ed, just for the sake of being on the record, so that I'm sure, is 2
that a fair assessment on my part, that you have not heard of that practice 3
before?
4 5
FREDERICK:
Yes.
6 MARSH:
I have no further questions on this matter.
7 8
5 ROSS:
Any background on that?
g 10
[] No, Mr. Ross, I have never seen anybody throttle emergency feedwater 11 12 fl w to control RC pressure other than very begirning test program from the Various tests established for it.
14 HUNTER:
Mike, I understand it can in fact include putting the pumps full 15 block; that is a very effective way of ceasing that sort of feedwater flow.
17 ROSS:
I understand.
18(
19 HUNTER:
Okay 201 21 MARSH:
Anyone else have any other questions or statements? Any comments from any of you people?
Then we'll turn the mikes back over to you people at this time.
Well if there is no other comment or no questions, the time 24 being 2:b p.m., re2 ding 235 on the meter, we'll terminate the tape at this 25, i
i time.
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