ML19249E499
| ML19249E499 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1978 |
| From: | Bosnak R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910010603 | |
| Download: ML19249E499 (9) | |
Text
l 1:/k.0 JUN - 71NB d"k i
?DDR%Di'gni 1
Docketlios.* 50-416/917 V
I M EA Gull F03:
J.F. Stolz, Chief, U.R Branch #1, DPH FRG't:
R.J. Cosnak, C!ilef, l'cchanical Enginecring Eranch, DSS SUc.1ECT:
[11SSISSIPPI POWER /S9 LIGl!T COMPANY GPR'0 GULF !!UCLEAR PLA'IT UNIT I;0S.1 & ?. (OL)
Plant M me: Grand Gulf Plant Units 1 & 2 Liccnsing Stage: OL Docket !!os.:
50-416/417 Respcasible Cranch ar.d Project Manager:
LC-1, C. Thcas Responsible Branch and Technical Reviewer: ME3, R. Stephens l
Requested Completion Date: May 19,1973 Descriptica of Response: fr.ccptance Revicu Rsylew Status:
Cenple te 1.
Areas of Review i
The I!echanical Engineering Cranch has reviewed Sections 3.6, 3.9, and 3.: '.c t*m 7:' ' R...;
c.
Ti m ' '. = I
'~!~
'"c
~
7 u
V,2 "midard Tcmat ud Catent ci hi2ty T.n& lysis i..,Ms iur.. miar Poucr Plaats" dated September 1975.
2.
As_ cosine _nt_ of FSAR lhterial i
As reasured against the Star.dard l'omat the applicant has supplied over 951. of the infornation necessary for the l'EG revic!.
I 3.
Revieu Conclusion l
L'c have concluded that the applicant has provided an FSAR sufficiently cmplete to proceed with the detailed revicw.
4.
Technical A:cep_tability,freliaingry Assemant
/)y.,
" (r/
Enclosed are requests fcr additional infonction that vill be regired during the initial question pMse after Docket '!as. 50-416/417 hava been i
accepted. This assasswrt is Insed on a preliainary review caly. An indepth review at the time of acceptance of the application ray result in additional requests for infenution.
Contact:
R. Stephens,'3R X-27533 k
oFrece y
{
su====<>
~~~~ "~~
oava r
~
-~
NkC IORM 318 (N6) NRCM 0240 Y( u. s aove v.w es t ramnu o r me n t e7e - e n-e 24 7910010603 1032 a
J.F. Stolz E'I'7IM l
S.
FSAR Revfeu Schedule
\\l i
Due to r.anpower ce<Taittents for the Systcaatic Evaluation Program anJ l
other high priority work, ua do not foresco being able to comit to a revleu schedule fcr this plant for at least the next six r.onths.
l r,
i R.J. Eosnak, Chief i
j linchanical Engincaring Eranch j
Division of Systcn3 Safcty
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/cnc1:
R. l'attson, SS J. :'afght, SS j
D. Vassallo, Pil l
C. Thoins Fil l
F. Che,ny, SS
- . C'
' z, SS J. L.jan, SS cc v/o enc 1:
R. Boyd, PW i
- 11. Fike, i!PA Dist. :
i Docket Files 50-416/417 ilRR Rdg. File
- 5B Rdg. File i
l 1
- SEE PREVIOUS YELLO'.1 FOR C0!!CURRE! ICE DSS:!!EB DSS:!KB.
DS S :E3.
o r,,c +
g l
%jephens/it FCh.erny _
RBosnak._..
.u..- c w j
_ /..
/7a
/
/7a
./
/78
.. +
NRC IORM 318 (9 76) NRCM 0240 O u. s. oov r n su rst rn.stms c r r,cri s *7e - e me:4 1032
,;7
J.F. Stolz.
Although lacking sufficient runpower for pie task, MEB has performed this acceptance review to aid the staff in meeting the 30-day deadline. Consequently, this acceptance review did not achieve (he depth we would 'have liked. We cost caution that due to the Systematic Eva[uation Program we do not anticipate allocating rasnpower for the full F
/ review in the foreseeable future.
R.J. Bosnak, Chief ikchanical Engineering Branch Division of Systms Safety
Enclosure:
As stated cc v/ enc 1:
R. !!attson, SS J. Knight, SS D. Eisenhut, OR D. Vassallo, PM C. Thma s, PM F. Cherny, SS R. Stephens, SS cc w/o enc 1:
R. Boyd PM R. Ilarield, MP Dist.:
Docket Files 50-416/417 NRR Rdg. File MEB Rd.g Fi,le o, r.c.,
._D"_ i C B DSS:MEB DSS:MEB j
' ' apt. ' /jt FCherny RBosnak 5/ /b /78 5/
/78 5/
/78 g
vo c m. u...
,e.,,
vo n, n,,a
,s... -...............- -...............
i032
,c3
110-1 110.0 MECHA?41 CAL EtlGI!1EERiflG BRAtlCH 110.1 Recent analyses have shown that certain reactor system components (3.9.1) and their supports may be subjected to previously underestimated (3.9.3) asymmetric loads under the conditions that result from the postulation of ruptures of the reactor coolant piping at various locations.
It is therefore necessary to reassess the capability of these reactor system components to assure that the calculated dynamic asymmetric loads resulting from these postulated pipe ruptures will be within the bounds necessary to provide high assurance that the reactor can be brought safely to a cold shutdown condition.
For the purpose of this request for additional information the reactor system components that require reassessment shall include:
a.
Fuel Assemblies, including Grid Structures I
c.
Control Rod Drives d.
ECCS Piping that is attached to the Primary Coolant Piping e.
Primary Coolant Piping f.
Reactor Vessel and Pump Supports 9
Reactor Internals h.
Biological Shield Wall i.
Pump Compartnent " ell The following information should be included in the FSAR about the effects of postulated asymmetric LOCA loads on the above-mentioned reactor system components and the reactor cavity structure.
1.
Provide arrangement drawings of the reactor vessel and pump support systems to show the geometry of all principal elements and materials of construction.
2.
Consider all postulated breaks in the reactor coolant piping system, including the following locations:
(a)
Steam line nozzles to piping tenninal ends.
(b) Feedwater nozzle to piping terminal ends.
(c)
Recirculation inlet and outlet nozzles to recirculation piping terminal ends.
Provide an assessment of the effects of asymmetric pressure differentialsl_/ on these systems / components in combination with all external loadings including safe shutdown earthquake loads.
flote that we require that responses from these loads be combined by the Absolute Sum method unless acceptable blowdown jet forces at the location of the rupture (reaction forces), transient differential pressures in the annular region between the vessel and the shield, and transient differential pressures across the core barrel within the reactor vessel.
I 1032
/
m
110-2 justification is provided for use of an alternative methed.
This assessment may utilize the following mechanistic effects 110.1 (3.9.1)
(3.9.3) as applicable l
(Cont'd.)
limited displacement break areas a.
b.
fluid-structure interaction actual time-dependent forcing function c.
d.
reactor support stiffness e.
break opening times If the results of the assessment required by 2. above indicate 3.
loads leading to inelastic action in these systems or dis-placement exceeding previous design limits provide an evaluation of the following:
Inelastic behavior (including strain hardening) of the material used in the system design and the effect of the a.
i load transmitted to the backup structures to which these systems are attached.
For all analysis performed, include the method of analysis, 4.
the structural and hydraulic computer codes employed, drawings of the nodels employed and comparisons of the calculated to allowable stresses and strains or deflections with a ' asis for the allowable values.
Demonstrate that active components will perform their safety 5.
function when subjected to the postulated loads resulting from a pipe break in the reactor coolant system.
Denonstrate the functional capability of any essential piping 6.
when using service level C or D limits. Guidance on acceptable methods for proceeding with the demonstration are attached.
Most of the operating BWR plants have reported finding radial cracks on the reactor vessel feedwater nozzle and the CRD return 110.2 Describe what design modifications will be made to eliminate line.
In addition, provide a description of the analyses this problem.
that will be performed to demonstrate the adequacy of the reactor vessel feedwater nozzle and CRD return line to withstand the imposed service condition without the cracking experienced in the operating plants.
Subparagraph NCA-ll30(b) of the ASME B & PV Code Section III requires non-code mechanical or electromechanical devices such 110.3 (3.9.3) as valve operators to be covered by the code when these devices Provide a conmitment to insure that act as component supports.
the design of devices which become attachment points for component supports, thus providing component support load path, will adequately consider these support loadings.
1032
',J
110-3 Describe the allowable buckling loads for Class 1, 2, and 3 component supports subjected to normal, upset, emergency, and 110.4 (3.9.3) f aulted load combinatior.s.
l Provide the basis for selecting the location, required load i
capacity, and structural and mechanical perform 110.5 (3.9.3) level of operability assurance, including:
A description of the analytical and design methodology utilized to develop the required snubber locations and (a) characteris tics.
A discussion of design specification requirements to assure (b) that required structural and mechanical performance characteristics and product quality are achieved.
Procedures, controls to assure correct installation of (c) snubbers and checking the hot and cold settings during plant start-up tests.
Provisions for accessibility for inspection, testing, and (d) repair or replacement of snubbers.
I I
03?
E0EKIli; PAPQ S/3//78 DE!!0!iSTRAT10N OF FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY FOR PASSIVE PIPl!1G COMPONENTS MECHANICAL ENGir1EERIN'i BRANCH DIVISION OF SYSTEiiS SAFETY 1.
DE F INIT IO!!S Functional Capability - Capability of piping components to deliver rated flow and retain dimensional stability when the design and service loads, and their resulting stresses and strains, are at prescribed levels.
j I
Piping Conponents - These items of a piping system, such as tees, elbows, bends, pipe and tubing and branch connections constructed in accordance with the rules of Section 111 of the AStiE Code.
(Systems designed to AN5i B31.1 or B31.7 are included as appcopriate)
Piping System - A group of connected piping components and other associated Code components (i.e. pumps, valves, vessels) performing jointly a specified plant function, or in the case of multi-functional systems, more than one function.
11.
SITUATIONS IN WHICH FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY IS ASSURED WITHOUT FURTHER PROOF A.
Class 1 Piping Components:
1.
Functional capability may be considered assured without further proof for any class 1 piping component when the level "A" or "B" or "C" limit is used with Equation 9 of NB-3650 provided Do/ts 50, where Do is the outside diameter and t is the wall i
1032 i.
l'ioRKIFG PAP Q '
thickness of the piping component.
The level "C"
limit 1
to be satisfied for the above verification procedure is:
1.5 Sy for austenitic piping components and 2.25 Sm for ferritic piping components.
For tees and branch connections the level "D" limit may be 2.
used with equation 9 of flB-3650 without additional requirenents for functional verification, provided Co/t<50.
I~
The level "D" limit to be satisfied for the above verification i
procedure is:
2.0 Sy for austenitic piping components and 3.0 Sm for ferritic piping components, B.
Class 2/3 Piping Components:
Functional capability may be considered assured for Class 2/3 1.
piping components for Levels A and B linits in Equation (9) of flC-3652.1 or flD-3652.1 provided Do/t<50.
For tees and branch connections, level "C" limits may be used 2.
without additional requirements for functional verifications.
However, for elbows or bends, the following additional require-ments shall be met whenever level "C" limits are specified:
(a) Use (0.8 B ) instead of (0.75 i) 2 (b) Use (1.5 S ) or (1.8 S ) whichever is lower for the right-h hand-side of Equation (9).
}
- n,,
)
O J i-r NE N'L3 In each of the above cases, Do/t shall be equal or less than 50.
3.
Class 2/3 piping components may De evaluated as Class.1 piping components fnr verifying functional capability, provided the ru'es and limits as specified in Item II.A. above are met.
111.
SITUATIONS It{ LHICH FUNCT10lML C%PABILITY R_EQUIRES ADDITIONAL DEMONSTRATION A.
Class i Piping Components:
1.
Piping components other than tees and branch connections, such as elbows, pipe bends and straight pipe, using level "D"
limits as I
defined in Item II.A.2.
2.
Any piping components with Do/t>50.
B.
Class 2/3 pipino Components:
1.
Straight pipe using level "C"
lim:ts.
2.
Elbows or pipe bends which can not meet the requirements specified in Item II.B.2.iave when level C linits are specified.
3.
T:.'s and branch connections when level "D" limits are specified.
4.
Any piping components with Do/t>50.
5.
Level "D" limits shall not be used for elbows, pipe bends and straight pipe.
i
(
l 1032 i