ML19249D445

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IE Insp Repts 50-295/79-14 & 50-304/79-13 on 790602-0702. Noncompliance Noted:Violation of Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement
ML19249D445
Person / Time
Site: Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date: 08/06/1979
From: Kohler J, Spessard R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML19249D440 List:
References
50-295-79-14-01, 50-295-79-14-1, 50-304-79-13, NUDOCS 7909240666
Download: ML19249D445 (6)


See also: IR 05000295/1979014

Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-295/79-14; 50-304/79-13

Docket No. 50-295; 50-304

License No. DPR-39; DPR-48

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

P. O. Box 767

Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At:

Zion Site, Zion, Illinois

Inspection Conducted: June 2-July 2, 1979

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Inspector:

J. E. Ko ergy

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Approved By:

R. L. Spe sard

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Inspection Summary

Inspection on June 2-July 2, 1979 (Report No. 50-295/79-14; 50-304/79-13)

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of plant operations,

maintenance, licensee event reports, and Unit I and Unit 2 reactor trips.

The inspection involved 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> of onsite inspection by one NRC inspector.

Results: Of the areas inspected, one item of noncompliance (infraction

- violation of TS surveillance requirement, Paragraph 12) was identified

in one area.

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DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted

  • N. R ndke, Station Superintendent

C. Schumaan, Operating Assistant Superintendent

  • E. Fuerst, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
  • R. Ward, Unit 2 Operating Engineer

F. Stetkar, Shift Foreman

T. Boyce, Shift Engineer

K. Garside, Shift Foreman

J. Harbin, Shift Engineer

R. Landrum, Nuclear Station Operator

D. Kaley, Nuclear Station Operator

N. Valos, Shift Foreman

F. Pauli, Shift Engineer

L. Pruett, Shift Engineer

J. Brandice, Nuclear Station Operator

E. Murach, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent

L. Soth, Assistant Superintendent Administrative Support Services

J. Marianyi, Technical Staff Supervisor

  • T. Parker, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
  • Denotes those present at the exit interview on July 2,1979.

2.

Monthly Reactor Operations Summary

Unit 1

The unit operated at our levels up to 100% through June 8, 1979,

when the unit tripped due to the 1(C) feedwater pump tripping from

100% power. During recovery from this trip, water hammers were

experienced followed by a spurious safety injection. The unit >

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placed in cold shutdown after June 8, 1979, for steam generato-

feedwater nozzle to pipe inspections. The unit started up on

approximately June 18, 1979, with the 1(A) and 1(C) feedwater lumps

in operation. Shortly after this startup, high vibration alants

were received from the turbine generator. The unit was shut down on

June 24, 1979, for turbine vibration investigation. Unit I startup

commenced on June 28, 1979, and was limited to approximately 50%

power due to availability of only the 1(C) feedwater pump. The unit

has varied between 50%-90% power since June 28, 1979.

Unit 2

Power levels up to 90% have been achieved during the month with

routine power operation. The unit is the swing unit and has not

reached base load operation at 100% power because of conservatism in

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the axial power distribution monitoring system. One reactor trip

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occuired on June 13, 1979, due to an electrical switching error.

Reactor operation has been continous since June 13, 1979.

3.

Review of Plant Operations

During the month, the inspector spent time in the control room and

reviewei shift performance, shif t logs, tagging practices, compliance

with LCO's and plant startups. Tours of the auxiliary building,

turbine building, and site perimeter were conducted. Unit I contain-

ment was entered by the inspector on June 8 to witness a portion of

the visual inspection performed on the steam generator feedwater

lines. No items of noncompliance were identified during the monthly

review of plant operations.

4.

Maintenance

During the month, certain jobs were reviewed by the inspector.

The

maintenance packages associated with the below listed jobs were

reviewed for completeness in order to determine if work control

procedurcs were being followed.

The following jobs were being

reviewed.

Job

Work Package Number

Turbine Generator Vibration

00876

1(C) Feedwater Pump Maintenance

00593

Unit 2 Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker

00685

Unit 1 Steam Generator Nozzle Inspection

00660

00661

00662

00663

The inspector identified no items of noncompliance regarding the

maintenance items reviewed.

5.

Licensee Event Report Reviewed

The following licensee event reports were reviewed during the month

and are considered closed.

Unit 1

Unit 2

79-32

79-29

79-31

79-31

79-29

79-33

79-12

79-25

79-44

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No items of noncompliance were identified, except for the matter

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discussed in Paragraph 12 below relating to LER 304/79-29.

6.

Unit 2 Reactor Trip of June 13, 1979

During performance of periodic tests PT-5A and B which tests the

reactor trip breakers, a reactor trip from approximately 35% power,

occurred on June 13, 1979, at 2:30 a.m.

The cause of the trip is

attributed to personnel error.

While in the process of racking out

the train B reactor bypass trip breaker and racking in the train A

reactor trip breaker, the bypass breaker jammed and movement was not

possible.

In order to free the stuck breaker, and in an effort to

return the train A reactor trip breaker to service in routine alignment,

an equipment man used a metal pry bar to gain leverage to free the

stuck breaker.

This action, which was performed on an energized 480

volt system, caused a ground to occur. The ground caused a ground

relay in the rod control system to actuate leading to a reactor trip

and damage to the rod control system.

The individual involved in the event has been instructed not to

perform electrical switching withcut supervision in the future.

This item is considered closed by the inspector.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

7.

Unit 1 Reactor Trip of June 8, 1979 (LER Nu 295/79-44)

On June 8, 1979, approximately 0600, a Unit I trip occurred resulting

from low ID steam generator level which was caused by a trip of the

steam driven IC feedwater pump. The pump trip occurred from a high

thrust bearing wear signal.

Sixteen minutes after the reactor

tripped, four water hammers were experienced signified by spikes on

all four feedwater flow recorders.

Subsequent to the water hammers, a momentary safety injection signal

originating from the high steam line delta P safety injection signal

was received. However, no automatic safety injection occurred. One

and a half minutes later, operators manually initiated safety injection.

The safety injection ram for 100 seconds before it was terminated by

operating personnel, having concluded that the cause of the safety

injection was spurious.

The inspector was at the Dresden facility in Morris, Illinois, at

the time of the Unit I reactor trip. The inspector was dispatched

to the Zion site and arrived at approximately 11:30 a.m.

The licensee investigated the events associated with the failure of

the SI to actuate automatically. Review of the annunciato printout

by the inspector showed that the safety injection signal was present

for less than 1/60th of a second. This signal duration was sufficient

to activite the safety injection annunciator and typer which are

composed of solid-state electronics, but the time was insufficient

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in duration to activate the mechanical relays associated with the

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safety injection. The relays were subsequently tested by special

performance of PT-10A and B and found to be satisfactory.

Had a real event occurred in which safety injection was required, it

is assumed that the initiating event would have lasted more than

5/60ths of a second, the time required for automatic SI relays to

actuate. The inspector reviewed the alarm typer output, discussed

the event with the cognizant engineer and har no further questions

regarding the failure of the SI to automatically actuate.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

8.

Unit 1 Steam Generator Feedwater Nozzle Inspection

Unit I was taken to cold shutdown immediately after the June 8,

1979, reactor trip in order to inspect for possible cracking in the

steam generator feedwater nozzle piping and welds. No cracks were

found and the unit was cleared for service. Results of the piping

investigation are covered in Region III inspection report 50-295/79-12.

9.

Unit 1 Turbine Vibration

Following the Unit I reactor startup af ter the steam generator

nozzle inspection, high vibration at the number 11 main generator

bearing was recorded. The unit was taken off the line on June 23,

1979, to investigate the cause of the vibration.

Investigation

revealed seieral perimeters in the exciter area that were out of

tolerance. These were corrected according to Westinghouse

specifications.

A unit startup was commenced on June 27, 1979. At approximately

1:30 p.m. with the main generator at 1800 rpm, while in the process

of picking up loads, a turbine trip reactor trip occurred.

The

first out panel declared the trip to be caused by a thrust bearing

failure.

Investigation by the licensee revealed that the alarm was

spurious caused by a malfunction in the thrust bearing alarm network.

The alarm was repaired and the unit was in service on June 28, 1979.

The inspector has no further questions regarding this item.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

10.

Spent Fuel Expansion Hearings

During the month, the inspector participated in public hearings held

in Waukegan, Illinois. The inspector presented testimony on June 11

and June 12, 1979, and June 21 and June 22, 1979, on behalf of the

NRC regarding contentions 2L and 2F2.

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11.

Feedwater Pump Trips

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The inspector met with Mr. Wandke and others of his staff on June 20,

1979. During this meeting, the inspector discussed the performance

of the IB feedwater pump. The inspector stated that a review of

plant transients since January showed that IB feedwater pump trips

themselves were responsible for two safety injection-water hammer

(SI-WH) transients and the IC pump was responsible for one SI-WH.

It was the inspector's conclusion that IB feedpump operation was

erratic and should not be used until proved to be more stable.

The licensee agreed with the inspector's conclusion and had previously

substituted the 1A pump for the IB pump. According to the licensee,

the IB pump control system wac being overhauled and would not be put

into full operation until stable operation was achievable.

The inspector will continue to follow the operation of the IB feedwater

pump.

(295/79-14-01)

12.

2C Containment Spray Pump (LER 304/79-29)

The licensee notified RIII on May 22, 1979, that Technical Specification 4.6.1.c for Unit 2 was violated when the 2C containment

spray pump was rendered inoperable without first performing the

required surveillance on the redundant A and B containment spray

pumps. The licensee performed the required surveillance upon discovery.

The cause of the event is classified as personnel error.

Corrective

action consisted of placing warning signs on control boards and

local panels informing the shift that automatic pump actuation upon

safeguards only occurs when the battery switch is in the automatic

position. The licensee is also investigating modification of the

battery switch. A similar event occurred previously in 1978 (LER 295/78-66). This event is considered an item of noncompliance

against TS 4.6.1.c and is classified as an infraction. Since

corrective and preventive actions have already been taken, no response

to this item of noncompliance is required.

13.

Management Exit

An exit was held with Mr. Wandke and others of his staff at the

conclusion of the inspection on July 2, 1979, in which the results

of the inspection were summarized. The inspector stated that there

,was one item of noncompliance regard.'.ng inoperability of the 2C

containment spray pump without performing the required surveillance

(LER 304/79-29), but that no response would be required because

corrective and preventative actions had been taken.

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