ML19249B073
| ML19249B073 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1979 |
| From: | Creswell J, Hunter D, Marsh R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290539 | |
| Download: ML19249B073 (76) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
}
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
E In the Matter of:
2I IE TMI INVESTIGATICH INTERVIEW l
3!
of Mr. William Zewe Shift Supervisor 4
i Si 4
6i 71 Si Trailer #203 9j NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10j Middletown, Pennsylvania lli Aoril 23, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13; July 2, 1979 (Date Transcript Typec) 14!
60 and 61 15i (Tape Numoer(s))
16i 17' 18!
19!
0 l
20:
21j NRC PERSONNEL:
i h.
22!
Bob Marsh 23l Dorwin Hunter L
Donald Kirkpatrick 24 Joe Creswell ggl
}gg 25i i
l l
I i
l 1l MARSH:
The date is April ^'.
The time is now 11:54.
This is Bob Marsh, 2{
Investigator for the U. S. i,uclear Regulatory Com;nission, Region III, 3
Chicago and we are about to commance an interview of Mr. William Zewe at 4
the Three Mile Island site.
Before we begin, I would like each of the 5l individuals at the table to indicate their name, spell their last name, and 6
identify their position.
Dorwin, if you will start.
7 HUNTER:
Darwin Hunter, Inspector Specialist, Region III, Performace Appraisal 8
Branch g
10 KIRKPATRICK:
Donald Kirkpatrick; Headquarters, Nuclear Engineer.
I 12!
l CRESWELL:
Joe Creswell; Reactor Inspector, Region III.
13l i
14i ZEWE:
Bill Zewe; Shift Supervisor, Three Mile Island, Metropolitan Edison 15 Company.
17)
MARSH:
Also initially gentlemen, if when you choose to make a statement if 18!
you would initially start out by mentioning your last name to assist the 19l l
girl wno has to type this.
Bill, if I may, Bill 0.K. or do you want Mr.
20l l
Zewe or what's your pleasure?
218 22
- 23l, Bill is fine.
24l 891 267 i
25l I
i 2
1;
- 0. K.
Bill, before we turn the tape on, we sat here arid discussed this i
2:
letter for a moment or two, I do want to discuss this a little bit on the i
3 tape.
I've shown you a the two page letter and asked you to read it and 4
then sign the second page.
That more or less sets down the ground rules 5
f r the investigation, at least the interview portion of it.
And on the 6
second oage, were a series questions which I would like to get your response to now.
The first question reads, "Do you understand the above content of 7
8 the two page letter?"
9 es.
10 11!
And the second question indicated, "Do we have your permission to tape the interview?"
13l 14!
Yes, you do.
15i 16; And the third question reads, "Do you want a copy of this tape?"
18l 4
Yes, I do.
191 1
20!
- 0. K.
I will provide you with both a copy of the tape and the transcription.
As soon as that's available.
There's a fourth question that doesn't 22 appear on the second page, but is covered in the body of the first page and 23 that addresses your right if you would like to have a company representative 24 or a union representative present when I get you to respond to that material?
i 891 M8 i
3 l',
It really makes no difference to me.
l 2i
- 0. K.
I'd like a yes or no answer.
3 I
i 4l No.
Not at this time.
5 6
Fine.
7 If you should desire one at any point, as we go along, feel free to indicate that move.
We'll get one in here.
g 91 1
1
- 0. K.
10l i
11l
- 0. K.
At that point then, I would like, one thing on this if you will just 12!
give me an initial on the edge of the first page and Darwin, I guess you are going to start off and pick up with your questions.
14!
15l
- 0. K.
Bill, just to get started I want to ask a specific question.
In one of your previous interviews, and at the morning of the 28th, and you were at the point in the incident where you were attempting to restart a reactor 18l l
coolant pump, 0.K.
And you have trouble restarting that fuel pump.
You 19t tried a number of pumps, befo"e you were able to get the last pump started.
20j And one of your comments, as I read it, was that we had had trouble with i
21l pressure switches and different things in the control circuit on the pump i
22l l
before.
And you sent somebody to could check H3 relays on the reactor 23l coolant pump.
24 i
25j b
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i
4 l
K3 relays.
2, I
3j Would you explain that, what you were referring to?
i 5
Alright.
The K-3 relays were located at the coolant pump breakers themselves Si and they actually are either picked up if all the starting interlock require-7 ments for the reactor cooling pump are met or not, so that normally if the coolant pump does not start we normally check to make sure that the K3 8
relay which monitored the starting interlocks is energized.
g 10
- 0. K.
An example of these inputs to that relay circuit would be what?
I 12!
I Seal injection flow, intermediate cooling flow, power level and so forth.
131 14' I
- 0. K.
Thank you Bill.
Would you, we have some special coints we want to 15:
make tonight and we will, just to get started, let's, I wanted to talk a 16,i little bit about the, the reactor coolant drain tank operation, the night 17}
of the incident and to get your input as far as at what time you had noticed 18{
that the reactor coolant drain tank pressure had increased, temperature had 19i increased, relief valve had lifted and whether or not the ruptu*ed disc had I
blown.
Could you try to recall at which point one of the operators or 21!
I yourself had noticed that the drain tank had in fact, seen hot water?
22 23 I was not sure of the exact minute, because based from the other interviews 24 that I've had, I've seen that my time frame has really been quite far off.
25 I
I 89!
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,i 5
1 But I would say within, you know, within the first twenty to twenty-five 2
minutes, at least that we noticed that the drain tank had a high temperature i
3{
and a very low water level.
And that the recirc pump on the drain tank had a very low discharge pressure.
5 More important again, is what you noticed, rather than time frame.
O 7
9 8
9
- 0. K.
101 l
11!
I And also the pressure was very low.
12l 13 Was the drain pump run, the pujap itself run as indicated?
15l It was running.
16!
171 And it had'a low suction pressure?
18l 19 A low discharge pressure.
i 20l 21 A low discharge pressure.
That would indicate to you that the was what?
22 Dry? Or it wasn't - had no suction?
23 i
24' l
891
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6 1
Right.
That it had a very low water level in it.
2 3
Is there anything available to you at that time to verify the condition of 4
the reactor coolant drain tank? What the condition was?
i 5!
I 6
Well, we have pressure level and we have a temperature gauge level.
7 Do your recall those, the conditions of that tank at that time?
8 9
Yes.
The level was off-scale level low.
The pressure, as I remember, was 10 zero, or pretty close to it.
And the temperature was over 200 degrees.
12
- 0. K.
In my review, I seemed to have picked up a point where there's a flow
,3 1 recording available for the water pumped out of the reactor coolant drain 14!
tank.
Is that a fact, or 15!
16l l
Yes, there is.
Periodically, we pumped on the RC drain tank, and we pump 17l 1
it down using the closed loop cooling water pump.
And then there's a valve 18j we open up, and it's a flow control valve and right above the valve we have 19!
I a stripped chart flow recorder, where you can record the flow that your 20l feeding on a system.
21 22, It' a - and this is located on the panel, I presume.
23 24 25!
891 H2 i
7 i
1 Yes, it is, i
2!
l 31 Which panel?
4 5
This would indicate the amount of steam that was in the reactor cooling I
6l drain tank?
i 7'
8 It isn't on three or four or five.
9l 10 While you are looking, I'm am going to indicate that we are making a
[
11, reference to two loose leaf binders containing a se. ries of color photo-12 graphs that the investigating team has secured from Med Ed training branch.
13 This is the flow recorder right here.
74 15i 6l That flow recorder would indicate water pumped from the reactor cooling drain tank over to where?
181 Over to an RC bleed tank.
191 i
20
- 0. K.
And that's the normal lineup?
22 And here's another one here.
This is the top of your first? One right here.
This here on the back.
Right here.
So we have the level, the 25l temperature and the pressure of the tank right here.
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1,
- 0. K.
2:
3 And then our two closed loop pumps, which situate - right here, right.
4 5
- 0. K.
6 7
And then you pump here, out through here.
8 Just a moment.
We should identify some of this equipment.
The pumps that g
10l Mr. Zewe is referring to are WDL-P-9A and 98.
11 Then 0.K.
The right Reactor Building right beside the RC drain tank 12, themselves.
13 14!
And they pump through coolers - individuals coolers - they can go through 5
a fl w recorder which to the reactor to the miscellaneous drain.
6!
i 17!
RC drain tank.
18j i
19i RC drain tank.
20j 21l
- 0. K.
23 And here's another, two others 2'
891 1/4 25 i
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9 l!
The tank i
2; 3
We're down here yet, I want to see if we have any more of the 4l 5
- 0. K.
Would you identify the names of the recorders and so forth, i
O!
f We aren't there yet.
8 Go back one.
g 10l Here's a flow recorder here.
11 12' Is that the one?
13 i
14!
No. No.
This is the one, that's on the radwaste panel where the RC bleed 151 16l tanks are at.
Which I beleive are second.
That is this here portion of j
this plan, here.
18j Alright.
191 i
20 I don't believe you have one of the lower section which includes that.
21!
22f Right.
That's 0.K.
24 bhl
)[b 25 i
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10 1
The pumps pump flow through the flow recorder and they go the miscellaneous 2
drain?
,I 31 4
RC drain tank.
5l l
6 The RC drain tank.
7 8
They don't show it here at all.
9l
- 0. K.
10 Go back through the line up again.
If you run the pumps and you' re 11l pumping water, you would go through a flow recorder.
12!
That's right.
13 I
14i 15,;
And the water would go to the Auxiliary Building.
I 16!
Right.
18l Through to the isolation valves, on that particular system.
g 20l Uh, uh.
21l 22 Right.
And where would the water go then?
24 25 891 176 1
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F
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11 1,
It would i
2 3
Normally?
4 5
To the RC drain tank.
61
~
7 W uld it have been lined up to the drain tank that night?
8 g
It probably should have been lined up, except for the isolation valve right there at the flow control.
And at the time of the incident, we were not 10 pumping down the RC drain tank, to my knowledge.
12 "9
13 t
14!
Normally, when we have a high level alarm in the tank, we have the operator 15 go back and manually pump the tank down to the required level.
We normally 16.,
maintain about 74 and a half inches to 77 inches in the RC drain tank.
And 17!
the operator, to my knowledge, and they have also told me that they had 18l not recently pumped it down.
Alright, so, that that valve wasn't back 19t shut, at that point.
And the valve was shut, and when I remember looking 20l at the RC drain tank there, for the pressure and the high temperature conditions, the valve was shut.
22 23
- 0. K.
And is my understanding that the valve is closed, is controlled on 24l j
low level.
If you have a low level, the valve will not open?
2 51 891 J77 l
I
12 1{
No.
That's true.
That's true.
2!
31 If it maintains a minimum level, then the reactor drain tank goes to 74 and i
4l a half inches or so, whatever that number is whatever the level is?
5 6
Correct.
7 g
- 0. K.
And it is a manual operation, if you get a high temperature, the gl operator has to put it on recirc to cool the tank down?
l 10!
f 11' Well, we normally always ha've it on recirc.
12 On recirc?
- 0. K.
13{
14!
But then we just manually pumn it down, as required.
15 16!
Creswell:
Could you briefly describe what the effect on the reactor l
coolant drain tank, of say, leaking safety valves or the EMOV on a pressur-181 izer would have on the reactor coolant drain tank, if you were to have some leakage through those valves?
21 That is the main reason why we have b6en pumping the RC drain tank down so frequently is cause we have leakage from the safeties c; the pressurizer.
Alright.
We have thermocouples down stream of the safty valves and the electromatic valve and they are high normally in the neighborhood of 180, I
h-i 891
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13 1,
170 degrees, which indicate that they do leak by.
And then that water goes l
2 right into the RC drain tank and we have been pumping it down, a couple of 3
times per shift, because of this leakage.
4l 5l How much would you transfer each time you pumped out? Just a rough estimate.
I 6
7j Well, just from the high level point down to the low level point of 7 8
inches, down to 74 and a half.
And I don't recall exactly how many gallons gj per inch that is.
10 Alright.
g 12!
We could get that out of the tank right, yeah.
That's no problem.
13 14!
5{
We i ked that up today and it shows 300 gallons approximately, if the numbers that we had were correct.
I 17l That sounds very familiar.
19l If you pump from the high to the lowest, it's 3'3 gallons or something.
So 201 i
everytime you pump it then.
How much would you feel like, how did you 21l I
pump, would you think per shift?
22' 23 Well, at times it, it was more than that.
And I can't recall the exact 24l number that we had been doing as of the time of the incident.
Because 25l l
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j 891 u9 l
14 1
really, the does that on an automatic type basis.
Ar.d we knew that 2
we had a leak.
And we had been pumping like once every couple of hours.
31 4
Right.
So it could have been pumped four or five times per shift.
5 6j Kirkpatrick:
Were you also getting leakage from the cold safety valves?
7 It appeared to be so.
But we weren't positive, because the discharge line 8l g
downstream, where the thermocouples is, alright.
There's a - we weren't 10 sure exactly how 11any for sure, or exactly which ones were leaking, except 11; by their discharge temperatures. Alright, and depending how accurate they were.
We dont' know for sure.
12 13l igj Do you know about what they were reading? Normally?
r 15i We had - they had fluctuated a little bit, but they had basically been in the 170 or 180 range.
i 17l l
181 That's what you said previously.
Didn't you say also that you thought that you had a safety valve leaking some into the reactor coolant drain tank?
20,;
I 21l Yes.
Safety or electromatic and -
23 But you didn't know which one it was?
24 25l 891 180 1
f
15 1
Or all three or two or three for sure.
I 2'
3 0.K.
4l 1
5 And our really big indication other than this, was that our pressurizer 6
boron samples were coming back a lot hig..
than the reactor coolant 7
system boron.
Meaning that we ware, in fact, leaking past and concentra-8 ting the boron in the pressurizer.
And that's why at the time of the g'
problem, we also had the heaters and spray in manual.
And continually 10l springed the pressurizer to try to equalize the boron concentration.
We have also had the same problem in Unit I before.
So it was a problem that 11 12 I had been used to in Unit 1, during the first fuel load that we had exactly that same problem.
13 14!
Hunter:
Bill, has this problem existed since Unit 2 started up last fall?
15 16i j
Yes, it has.
I 18j
- 0. K.
In the case of the boron concentrating in the pressurizer, what type of differential boron were you used to seeing between the primary and the 20l pressurizer when you got your samples?
22 Normal basis, you mean -
241 l
25l 891 J81 i'
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16 1:
Right.
l 2'
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Well, normally they should be less than 100 ppd or ppm.
4 5
Is that where you actually maintained it, less than a 100, or attempted to 6
or did you maintain it much less than that?
7 8
Well, we'd like to have it as low as we could.
Al right.
Because ideally, g
the concentration in the pressurizer and the RC system should be the same.
10, But we had had sampled differences that approached 3b0, 400 vpm between the I
lli pressurizer and the RCS.
And whenever we would recirc the pressurizer 12 then, the baron would then come into the system and we would see a reactivity change in the reactor compensation.
13 145 Your indicating that tne boron in the pressurizer is specifically as 15 higher than the coolant system
?
6 I
17l 0" #
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leaving the baron behind so it's acting like a big concentrator, really.
20 21;!
Right.
And so this would give you a negative reactivity insertion when you put the pressurizer on recirc?
23 l
And o'.
ontrol rods would come out to compensate for and that has been the 24l case all along that our, all rods are configuration with boron control 25 l
891
]82 l
17 1
results that are rod groups, six or seven that we control on is always out 2'
at greater than 90%.
Alright.
And it really doesn't have that great.
3 amount of reactivity that far out.
So that if you have a boron change of 4
any significant amount you end out with the all the rods fully out of core.
5 6l So how would you countei ', hat situation?
7 8
Then, we would add demineralized water to reduce the bcron concentration, g
and bring the rod back in to an acceptable rod index.
10 11 And this is a normal procedure for deluting and reducing the boron concen-tration.
13!
Yes, it is.
p 15i
- 0. K.
In the case of the power operated relief valve in the RD 2 valve and
,6 the reactor coolant drain tank, can you recall when it came to your attention 17; i
that you had a problem with the - let me make a couple of points.
The ISl first point is, that when you had the reactor trip, I think. it was generally understood that you did in fact, lift a safe, power operated relief valve a safety during that trip.
22, Yes.
Our pressure recorder went up in the neighborhood Jf 2350 or so.
23 Alright, Electromatic should have lifted.
Alright, se the electromatic 24; lifts before the trip.
Alright, before the reactor trip, so we. did ha,e a 25j 891
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high pressure trip and the recorder showed higher than the setpoints for 2
the electromatic, so it should have lifted normally, but we did get high enough to lift a code safety valve.
3l t
4!
5 Have you been involved in other trips at Unit 2?
3 7
Yes, I have.
k gj Has the power operated relief valve before?
F 10l 11l Yes.
Depending at what power levei your at.
12l 13l yu ave a e r
a, a: far as on most any trip would you expect 1+, ;
the power operatad eelief valve to lift or would it be a different type of trip.
16l 17l Well, it depends on a - if the trip involves anything to do with feedwater l
t beir.g less than what is required for your power level.
Alright.
Or your 18j l
heat remaval capaaility on the secondary side is less than the primary heat 19h addition., <h.u always result in a higher pressure in the primar; side beause you'll heat up, ber?use your no longer transferring '5e heat.
So it 21!
wo'id re ult in a higher pressure.
22l 1
23; In your case, in your experience at the plant, in the trips that you have 24!
been involved in, did they include feedwater type transiential trips?
25i i
891
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19 1;
We have had, right now I can't remerber a feedwater induced trip in Unit 2, i
2 other than tripping the turbine for testing.
Alright, I have had a couple.
31 of feedwater action baited trips on Unit 1, which is basically the same 4l type of Unit itself and the resporise is the same.
SI I
6i Do the power operated relief valves lift in most cases?
7l 1
gl Yes, they do.
I 9
10l The feedwater trio, in this particular event, caused a loss of heat sink, 11 caused the heat pump to start we'd been through the sequence.
I 12l 13l Yes.
14; The auxiliary feed flow (?) did not start, although the pressure came up 15 l
because the feedwater, the 12A and B valves were closed.
- 0. K.
So the reactor had a l' of beat sink.
I 18i Exactly.
19{
20-21}
And then this resulted in primary system pressure increasing and lifting of j
22li the power operated relief valve and the RV2 valve on the pressuri:er or and/or a safety valve.
It depends 24 25!
891 185 11
i
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20 1
Yes.
2; 3
Can you tell if you lifted more or both or by looking at the pressure?
4!
Sl Just by right.
Just from the pressure recorded.
Looking back on it now, I
gl I would think for not having feed for the period of time that we did, that i
I would have expected maybe, a higher primary pressure.
But from our 7
8:
re: orders, the highest that we seen was about 2360 or 2370, at the most.
g' And l
10i i
O. K.
11, I
12l Maybe, well just looking at it now, I would suspect that if Ihave a total 3
iy loss of feed where I didn't regain feed for 8 minutes, which in this case was s, that I'd expect maybe the pressure to have gone even higher.
15 Because I have seen pressure that high on a trip where we really didn't 16 lose total feed.
18l
- 0. K.
19j i
20t i
Let's pursue the question concerning the reactor coolant drain tank sump.
And the fact that since the power, the RV2 valve, the pressurizer relief 22' l
valve, the electromatic relief valve would lift it.
Did this, the fact 23 that the read coolant drain tank pressure or, temperatures were indicating 24l i
high, did that bother you or did you consider it normal?
25!
l 1
891 186 t
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21 l
1 1!
Well, the pressure should have been high, not very low like I seen it.
And l
2(
we should have water level in it, alright.
But we should have had a l
31 higher than normal temoerature because of relieving all of that energy into i
4 the RC drain tank, it would heat it up considerably.
But the pressure 5
should not have been low.
It should have contained the pressure from the 6i volume of steam.
i 7l gf With the pressure being low, what would that indicate to you.
91 10 Well, plus the level low and the temperature high was either that we 11 either had lifted the relief valve on it and it was still open or we blew 12j the ruptured disc on it.
Or something else happened to the tank.
We blew ff a line.
I didn't know at that point.
13 14) 15iy Right.
But that night were you, fairly early in the event, were you aware of that condition?
g 181 Well, like I mentioned before, as far as I can recollect, something like 20 19!
or 25 minutes into it, is about when I remembered.
It could have been earlier and it could have been a little later.
I'm not sure at this point.
21l But -
22' 23 l
You ended up with a reactor coolant, the Reactor Building sump pumps 24l pumping over to the Auxilary Building.
25j f
i 891
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22 If Correct.
2!
3l During this time frame, shortly there after that also.
And later on you i
4j isolated the you turned the reactor coolant -the reactor sump pump, the t
5l!
Reactor Building sump pumps off.
61 7
That is correct.
I gave direction to have that done and the operator g
reported back that he had in fact done it, yes.
91 10j
- 0. K.
The extra amount of water level in the reactor containment sump i
11{
will - h w about expound on that some and what that would have meant to hl you, and where the water was being pumped to also.
t i
131 Well see, that's why it, we had the sump pump secured because they alarmed n the c mputer saying that they were both running.
And we knew at that 15 9 "'
9 99'"
16 the water from the RC drain tank was going into the sump.
And we didn't g
want to send all that water over to our Auxiliary Building misscelaneous
,9I waste holdup tank because we really didn't have a great amount of capacity.
1 I
And I didn't know the extent of the problem, either, so we just had them 20j secured until we knew more about it.
So that was really just a precautionary note.
I said yes they should be on because there is something wrong with 22l the drain tank and that would put water into the sump.
But I just wanted to keep the water for now in the Reactor Building and not bring it over to the Aux Building.
25, j
891 288 4
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23 1!
Let's go one step further.
On the pump discharge line there are contain-l 2l ment isolation valves.
31 4j Yes, there are.
5 I
6l On the sump pump discharge.
Also on the reactor coolant drain tank disc :arge 7
valves.
8 gj That is correct.
10 11' Also on the vent, there are isolation valves goes over.
These valves will close on a ES system.
12l 13, i
We had that problem in Building 2.
15)
Did you ever get that?
6; 17 Yes we did.
But not until about 9 o' clock.
181 19l
- 0. K.
In between 6 - in between like 4:30 and 20l 1
21!
i 6 o' clock?
22' 23 9 o' clock - then those valves are open.
25j 8)}
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I l
1 Yes, they would be 24 2
3 0, K.
I In betw Building out ofeen this time, is thi 41 i
s the floor drains?
when you got 5
the 6l water in the Aux Yes, we did.
i a.
into the buildingThe water well 7
, I'm
, we convinced 81 gl and Fuel Handling Buildiseen it from that as t
our soon to where, with Because theactivity monitors in tha enough ng.
t 10 this activity of e Aux Building we would have so, that we first seen tseen it right aw the water 11 was high And this and as high as it was 12, Fuel Handling Buildi activity problems in thoccured abo he I
to sev 131 ng.
en, or So this is the time f e Aux Building and th 14;
- 0. K.
At that time, did yo rame before 9 o'clo k e
15 c.
water from going acros u take do you Yes.
16; s the Auxiliary floorrecall any action to stop the Well, I or didn't at the ti attempting to i
stop?
g that it was because me when the radiation le the building and c llof water in the Aux B 19, evacuated 1
vels u lding until came, I did not know water a
coming up out of ed the Control Roomoperators the i
21l the drains.
and said that And was that from T there was erry Dorherty or was it 23 from It was from Terry D operators?
other ougherty and I believe 25l the other one was George Servich(?)
l I
'l 891 290
/
25 l
1l
- 0. K.
Let's take a break and then we'll start again.
I 2
3; The time is 12:24 and I'm reading about 470 on the meter.
And I'm at this 4l time going to break for a moment and change these tapes.
5 Gi 0.K The time is 12:26.
Same people are present.
We are going to continue.
7 Dorwin, I think you finished with a question.
Will you continue.
I 8l 0 K.
We were still discussing the flow paths from the reactor coolant gl 10-d ain tank to the Auxiliary Building after the reactor coolant drain tank 11!
.Ju.9ps were secured aad the sump pumps were secured.
And the fact that the i
12{
contaii. ment isolacion valves on the discharge lines of those two tanks and also the vent line off of the RC drain tank.
Even though they have isolation 13 valves on them, they are in fact, isolated at full pounds on the containment and you did not have an isolation until 9 o' clock and also between that 15 6:30 and 9 o' clock is when the water showed up in the Auxiliary Building.
6i i
17!
18{!
That is correct.
19l l
That's a fact.
Q. K.
In the case of the water in the Auxiliary Building -
20!
once you said you knew radiation levels, were you, were you convinced or did you have a feeling that it was the reactor coolant?
223 1
23 I was convinced that it had to be based on the activity.
We didn't have 2 41 any other water in the system in the Aux Building that really that high in 25!
l 891 191 t
j
i I
I i
t i
26 lj activity to cause the increase that we observed in the radiation instruments 2f in the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Building.
I was cer'.ain that it had to i
3l be some transmittal between the reactor coolant system and the Auxiliary 4f iia ruel Handling Buildings themselves.
Si Si Kirkpatrick:
Did the activity that you saw at this time, could that be 7
accounted for by normal activity levels in the reactor coolant?
8I l
gj I wouldn't see how.
Because as I remember it, we had pretty close to 100%
10l of etery alarm in the Fuel Handling Building and Auxiliary Building.
i 11j Normally, the only system that really transfers much coolant in and out 12 fr m the Reactor Building to the Aux Building is the makeup and purifica-tion system through the letdown and purification path and reinjected 13 1+[
through the seals and through normal makeup.
Al ri ght.
And this would not be seen in all the other monitors that I had seen.
It had to be more 15 widespread throughout the Aux and Fuel Handling Buildings at this time.
16!
17 18:i What time are you talking about now?
19i Just about 6:40 or a quarter to 7.
21f O. K.
This is after the primary coolant pumps were shut off?
22!
23l Yes.
24{
23!
891 292 m
i
(
27 1[
Alright.
During this time looking at this same type problem, did you see 2{
any - was there any* unusual problems associated with the letdown system, I
3j the letdown flow or the makeup flow?
4!
s Sj Pri r to this, you' re saying?
I Gi 7l During this time period was there any unusual conditions that you recall i
g relative to letdown flow system?
10j I d n't remember any abnormal letdown flow indications at all.
I learned k
later from the one operator, which I didn't personally observe, but he did g
have some pulsing of the flow signal.
Alright - from our gauge there in the Control Room of some pulsing of the letdown flow.
But I did not in fact, observe that.
15!
This information wasn't provided you that morning? You found out later, later in the day or later during discussions with this operator?
18f Yes, exactly.
i..
20 0.K.
So, that at that time you thought, well you didn't have any indica-I tion that there was any problem with letdown at all?
22l 23 I did not.
24 891 193 25j l
i i
I
{
28 1;
- 0. K.
The site emergency came about, general emergency, site emergency, l
2f general emergency that occurred.
Now, you said at 9 o' clock, you in fact, 3
had a building isolation.
In that time frame?
Both panels?
5 Yes.
61 7
Now did all those vent valves and all the containment isolation valves go I
g shut at that time?
9!
i 10 We did a check of the isolation for the ES per our normal procedure.
11; Yes.
12 13 3;
And I did not have a report from the operator who verified it.
Saying that 15l there were any valves that were out of position, alright.
We have an ES 16; panel there, alright, that as matter of fact, is right underneath here, alright.
77 18 Could you describe what you said right underneath here? What panel number g
would you be talking about?
i 21!
l Well, here's panel 15, too.
They have - see this here shows the va. cc 22j 23l that go into the Reactor Building and this shows that go out of the Reactor Building.
Alright.
And then on panel 13, which is the one here, monitors 24l all our ES components for both high pressure injection and for building 25!
891 294 i
q
(
29 1
isolation.
And right under here, which you can't see trom the photograph 2l here, but there is strings of component lights that monitors the position I
3l of the components, alright.
And it should go to the ES position which 6
4 would be a white light.
So he just looks down for the actuation that we 5
get, and he says, "/es, I have all the white lights for the various actua-6 tions." And I'm not sure if you have that in here or not.
7 8
- 0. K.
Bill.
He indicated, while we're looking through there, he indicated g
that all, you got it, I realize being supervisor, he did not indicate that 10 y e had any abnormal conditions, so you assumed that they are all closed.
11!
That is correct.
12 t
13 Alight.
On building isolation, they reset the building isolation fairly 14!
quickly.
Because for whatever reason it was coming up, and then also you 15 had some other things to do.
16 17i Well see, during the course of the incident, alright, we got up as high as 18l gf about 2 and a half pounds maybe, whenever we had isolated the B steam I
generator and also had isolated the electromatic block valve, RCV 2.
20l i
Alric.t.
So that we had pressure then was coming down.
So the pressure
,c war,n't a problem until, and I'm sure that it was close to 9'oclock, when I
d,cussions after that was that we had our first building isolation.
And 23l l
cnat was somewhere where we were, were probably reventing the coolant 24l 25l system into the Reactor Building again, causing the pressure in the Reactor l
Building i
891
~)9 5 i
l t
30 l
1 So it was a direct vent?
i 2l l
3l Exactly.
4l 5
0, K.
When you reset the ES signal containment building isolation signal, 6
did any of the valves change position or did the operators have to change 7
the valves.
In other words, all the vent valves and the isolation valves 8
that are closed, do they remain closed, even though you isolate the, even g
though you defeat and even though the signal cleans?
10l l
11' We've taken control of them and then we manually repostion t' hem, then.
12 13 Did you in fact, or do you call repositioning any of the valves, did you reposition any of the valves?
15; Only the valve that we needed.
lo_ :
i 17l Like, as an example?
8 19f Then it wasn't ones well, the lines going to the reactor coolant pumps, alright.
We had problems trying to start them to begin with, alright.
But I
we did unisolate the valves going in and out to the Reactor Building, 22I alright, for the nuke service cooling, which coels the coolant pump, oil coolers and the air coolers.
24 25l l
891 296 I
I
.I 31 1!
Alright.
2!
3 72 and 81 and so forth, alright.
Then we open them up as required.
But I 4l do not remember opening up other valves, just for the sake of opening up 5
all the valves.
6 7
What about the Reactor Building's sump pump valves and the reactor coolant 8
drain tank valves?
i 9~
No.
We did not to my knowledge.
No.
10 I
11!
12 Then at that point you have completly isolated the containment, with the 3
exception of the essential service valves that you indicated that you need to continue operation on the reactor coolant pumps, the intermediate c ling system, that type of -
15 16i And so forth.
Right.
17l l
18[
19l
- 0. K.
So at that point then, all leakage from the containment should, no i
i matter what its source, should cease.
From any source, other than the 20i letdown system.
The letdown system was still operating.
That's the one path that comes out of containment under pressure, goes through the filter, 223 back to the demineralizers in the makeup tank and is pumped back into the 23 coolant system via the normal makeup valve, and the seals to the pump and 24' the actual 16 valves, which are your injection valves, depending on what 25!
f the mode that you are operating in.
- 0. K.
I 891 197 i
l I
32 1.
- Exactly, i
2' l
3' So we're down to the - after that point, we're down to a let down flow 4j system and the makeup system, as far as the source of any activity outside -
i Si outside of the containment.
That's what I'm trying to establish.
6lj i
7l Exactly.
l 8l g
- 0. K.
I want to make sure that I understand.
10 11l Can you go into that l
12l 13 Certainly.
14!
Creswell:
When you got the building in isolation was that when you got the 15 16l pulse of pressure in the containment?
l 17!
No.
It $asn't.
18 The peak that your probably referring to, was the time that we actually started the building's spray pumps automatically, on a g
high pressure signal which was right around 30 pounds.
I think the recorder 20l i
showed about 28 or 29 pounds.
But that wasn't till a couple of hours 2 11 later.
Somewhere around 2 o' clock, a quarter to 2, or something like that in the afternoon.
Because we were then attempting to depressurize the plant and try to get down to the pressure, so that we could get on to decay I
heat removal.
So we had the electromatic lock valve opened and we were 25!
l 891
]98 I
.i 33 1!
opening up the electromatic valve manually with our switch in order to i
2!
reduce pressure so that we could get down there.
And it, it was one of l
3l these times when we had cycled the RC RV2, the electromatic valve, that I 4l was right in front of the Reactor Building pressure recordert.
We have two 5
recorders there.
And I was right in front of them.
And I believe it was 6
Fred Scheimann, my shift foreman, that was operating the valve.
And I 7
said, " Alright Fred, vent now."
You see, we were trying not to get high g
enough in pressure to have another building isolation, but yet reduce the g
pressure to come down.
So he hit it, and I was right on the recorders 10f themselves and they just went (whistle) up and right down.
And I said, 11l "What the heck was that."
And then the Concrol Room operators off to my left, in the building spray pumps, are probably three and a half to four 12 i
'3' feet over from the RB pressure recorders at the very end of the panel
- !y there.
And he said, " Bill, we've started the buildings spray pumps." And I said, "What?" And so I looked over, and they were running and I pondered 15 that for about 30 seconds.
I guess, because I thought, there just must have been some electrical fault surge from the electromatic, that caused the building spray pumps to come on.
And I thought, that's something we'l?
have to look into, but then I had the operator secure the building's spray pumps and then we went on with trying to depressurize then.
And we didn't have any more problem in that time period of the high pressure.
I learned later on that sometime I believe later that night, after I had left, they had had another pressure spike in the building.
And also had started the I
reactor coolant pumps.
So, 24i l
25!
891 399 i
i
.i
.j 34 i
If What's the reactor coolant pumps?
t 2:
3 I mean, when we cycled the electromatic relief valve, rather.
I'm sorry.
4 And it wasn't until the next morning that I came in, that we were still 5
trying to find out why we had that pressure surge.
So we were talking with 6i the electical engineers on how we could possibly go from that DC operated 7
valve over and trip the pressure switches, which are set at 30 pounds for g
the building spray pumps and their on a logic of 2 out of 3, before you'll g'
start a pump.
So, at least we had picked up 4 of those, plus both of the 10 pressure recorders showed an increase.
So, he lcoked at it, and he said, 11!
" Bill, there's no way that the, that cycling the electromatic could cause i
12l an electrical fault to cause the pressure switches in the building spray to come up."
So then we thought, I wonder if the real reason was a hydrogen 13 g
explosion, because in order to pressurize a volume that large so quickly, it was almost like an explosion.
But at first, then I thought, no, 2.1 15 6{
milli n cubic feet like that no way.
But then I guess we have determined now, pretty well, that it probably was a hydrogen explosi.on inside the I
building.
18i i
19j Did you hear anything in the Control Rocm when that happened?
21 I did not.
No.
22 23 891 100 24 25l 3
(
35 f
1!
I learned later that at least two other people did.
I 2!
3l How did they hear it?
I mean -
4l 5l Well.
I 61 7
How did they hear it? Do you have noise monitors or something? Or -
8 g
We do have noise monitors that are in the Reactor Building, loose parts and 10f n ise monitoring system.
I don't recall hearing on that.
But the person 11 in question, who I first learned it, they had heard something.
Pardon me, l,,l it was Gary Miller, who is the Manager of the Island.
And he said tnat the q
had heard something.
And that he had mentioned it to whoever was beside 3
,g him at that time.
And they thought that it was dampers in the ventilation system which sit directly above the Control Room.
And he didn't think lo, i anything more of it, at that time.
But then as he looked back on it, 6i that's what he feels it was the same time.
181 l
Bill, did these pressure spikes were proceeded by the operation of the 19l
~
EMOB?
20!
i 21l 22;l Well, maybe I should clarify that.
The one that I was there for was from the electromatic, alright.
24l 25l l
891 101 r
(
36 i
1!
- 0. K.
2:
I 3j I assume that the other one was too.
Though I'm not sure of that.
It may i
4!
have been from operating something else from inside the containment.
I i
Sj don't know that for sure.
61 7
Hunter: We're interested in, in you know the - it's important you saw i
gj the you had the electromatic cycle, Fred opened the valve?
i 9!
Right at that instant.
10 11l t
12(
And at that instant you had the pressure spike.
You saw the pressure spike?
13 14i I'm p sitive.
Because he was waiting for my direction on when to open it 15 16!
17l
- 0. K.
18J 19l Alright.
And I said, " Alright Fred, open it up now."
As soon as I said now, you know within a fraction of a second, the spike went boom.
21l I
22l l
Alright, you saw the spike.
You saw it come back down?
2 31 1
24i l
25l l
891 102 l
I a
f 37 l
1[
Yes.
It came up and came right back down.
I 2l l
31 Then it leveled out?
4!
5{
Yes.
61 7
- 0. K.
And so then having the operators disappear in the containment spray 8
pumps - the operator.
You - did you - what was your basis for securing the gl pumps?
10f p*!
Well, at the - I thought then that it was just a faulty indication and the pressure had come back down to 12 i
13l g
Do you have - how many channels of pressure do you have in front of you 9'
' "G' 15 16i For the Reactor Building itself?
17l 18{
Right.
19l 20!
i Two.
Two separate recorders.
21l 22l l
0.K. then.
So you were sure then the pressure was back down?
24 25l t
i 891 103 t
f e
38 lt Yes, I was, i
2.
31
- 0. K.
4f 5
I was convinced at that time that it was just a false electrical type 61 signal.
i 71
- 0. K.
8 9l l
10!
It never entered my mind that it was a hydrogen explosion, at that time at i
all.
11, 12l I - can I - can I - I'll ask you the question of hydrogen analyzers on the 13 containment building - on the Reactor Building.
Do you you apparently do YP*
15 16; We need a sample for hydrogen.
7 i
13!
You, I'm sorry go ahead.
,9l 20\\
21l We sample for the hydrogen, alright.
22 Later on?
23l 24j 2s!
891 104
?
b
39 If We did later, yes, but I mean normally that's the only way we can determine 2f what the hydrogen concentration is in the Reactor Building.
Is through i
31 sampling.
Or if we run the hydrogen recombiner, we can take - there's a i
4{
formula for figuring out, based on the reaction chamber temperatures and gl the heater chamber temperatures.
You just take the Delta T and divide it i
6j by a constant.
You can come out with a relative percentage of hydrogen i
7 based'on the reaction volume of the chamber, knowing the flow rate through 8l it and everything else.
9l 10l
- 0. K.
Had you ever had to take a hydrogen sample of the containment before i
11j that your aware of? Had you yeah - did you ever, before?
l 12!
13{
I'm sure that we have.
And, well, the only time that I can remember actually doing that is anytime that we have the building closed for any period of time, alright.
We normally go in an take an air sample for the 15 quality of the air.
And then they get the results and the shift supervisor reviews the results, to make sure you have the least enough oxygen to i
support life and that you don't have any combustible vapors in the Reactor ISj Building before you send people in.
20l And that would include hydrogen in an analysis?
21!
22 I think it's just combustible vapors.
There's oxygen on it and I believe the other one is just combustible vapors.
Like 24 25 891 105
.l l
40 l
t 1l
- 0. K.
I 2;
I 3
If you'll excuse me at this miaute, but hydrogen being a combustible, it 4
would be considered in that.
5l 6
Creswell: What would the radiation levels have been in the area of where 7
you could have drawn a hydrogen sample?
8 g
Well, our normal sample point for the building, alright, is a monitor that 10{
is right down on the 305 elevation of the Aux Building.
Right near the i
11l intermediate CRD filters.
Right next to the seal return filters and the 12 seal return coolant from the coolant pumps.
And at this point in tine, I'm 13 n t sure of the radiation levels, but throughout the building.
They were -
14 I had heard numbers and not just certain areas, but pretty well generally in the 50 R range, at this point.
15 16l 17 So from that information, what would your decision be about drawing a sample or asking for a sample?
8 19l Alright.
Your referring to - I seen the pressure spike and did I think 20 about drawing an air sample, at this point or what?
l 22 What things entered your - what sort of things did you have on your mind at point of time regarding that?
241 1
2 51 891 106 i
l I
l 41 i
I 1l I didn't.
I totally thought that it was just an electrical problem.
I 2!
3
- 0. K.
4:
5 I didn't even pursue it any further than that.
I 6!
7
- 0. K.
8 gj I - I just didn't.
10' l
11l
- 0. K.
Lets assume that you had thought of drawing a sample, would it' nave 12 been practical to have drawn a sample?
13 h
No.
Because at that point, I had learned - and I'm not sure if it was I
before that or after that, but that the - I believe that it was the Health
,5[
ysics technician had saW that we had had water Mowing from De Reactor 16 Building containment monitor.
g 18l
,a:
That was very early on in the morning thouqh.
That was four or five
.y o' clock apparently.
Say five a.m. in the morning, wasn't it?
21-I'm not sure of the exact time of that.
But that stuck in my mind - like 22l now that your asking it, alright.
But at that time, I didn't even consider sampling.
But just looking back on it, I did recall that they did report 24!
{
that it was blowing some water and we knew that the building was hotter 25!
891 107
42 ll than normal.
At a higt.?r pressure than normal.
And that we would have i
2; some condensation and water come back through the cont & nment monitor l
3; itself.
.t 4l 5-Hunter:
You've had this trouble before with water - this problem before 61 with water in the Reactor Building sample system?
7 g
We haven't - to my knowledge I have not been involved in any problem with g
the Unit 2 Reactor Building monitor, alright, the containment monitor.
We 10 have in Unit 1 but we have not that I've been involved in in Unit 2.
11, 12j But you did have water in Unit 1, that's your opinion?
I 13l Yes, we have.
Many times before, i
15
- 0. K.
Now let me ask you.
If I wanted to read the - if you wanted to read 6:
the humidity at that time in the containment, was that available to you?
I 18l Yes, it is.
20h l
Well is it reported, indicated?
21!
i 22l On panel 25.
It's just an indicator.
24l 2 51 891 108 l
t t
43 t
I 1!
Alright.
Would you, in fact, have looked at that during this incident -
i 2
during this time frame?
3l 4[
I remember going back and looking at the building level temperatures.
5 Looking at the penetration temperatures at which your looking at right now 6l nere in the log.
These are penetration temperatures -
7 g
But were're now looking at the Photographs.
91 10j There you go.
There you are.
1 11 i
Alright.
We re icoking at four indicators.
13 Relative humidity Reactor Building elevation 305 south and north and at p
"9 Y
"9 Y'
15 Y"
"' "9
'" "U 16 17!
I rememoer icoking at the building temperatures.
The high - the recorders 18l over there ir the penetrations and so forth.
I do not recall specifically looking at the relative humidity.
No, I didn't.
I don't remember that at all.
21, 22' Have you in either Unit 2 or Unit 1, ever had a problem with relief valves, topple relief valves, safety valves blowing down and getting into the 24l t
humidity problem in the Reactor Building, to your experience?
2Si 891 109 i
f a
I 44 1;
No, I haven't.
The only - the problem that we arrive with, with humidity, 2
is just that if we don't purge the Reactor Building for rather long periods
{
of time.
3l Just the heat from outside, air temperature and the heat from 4f within the building creates a humidity problem inside.
You go into the 5
building, all the cooling water lines coming in and out have the floor 61 completely wet, you know, from just dripping from the humidity.
7 8
The Reactor Building cooling system is not adequate to maintain a lower gj humidity in the containment?
i 10; i
11; I w uld say it maintains an adeqate humidity but still the pipes themselves I
that bring the cooling water into those cooling fans, the elevan fans just sweat.
And the mixed service line sweat, so that it is - constantly just a 3
,4; mass of sweaty pipes that are just dripping on the floor.
A 15l Have you ever, during ycur, in your experience, entered the containment immediately after shutdown or during operations?
17!
18!
Yes, I have many times.
i 19!
20j
- 0. K.
For leak detection - that type of 21 22l Right.
I have been in Unit 2 Reactor Building at 90% power or greater on 23 several different occasions and I'm saying like maybe 4 or 5 times.
25 891 110 I
i I
45 l
1!
What were the activities that you were involved in at that time?
I 2!
3 Radiation wise?
4!
i St No.
What were you looking for? Why were you il the containment?
l Gi 7
We had indications'of greater than normal rsector coolant system leakage.
8 And I was going in to try to find out where the leakage could be fre.m arid g
evaluate the leakage.
I 10t l
l 11l And what did you, and generally, what in tnese cases did you find?
I l
12{'
- Well, ne time around Christmas, that I remember the most is that we had a 131 74[
line that a fitting had been blowing steam right inside the D ring (?)
underneath the pressurizer.
Another time we had - there was a bennet leu <.
15l n the pressurizer level lower tap instrw ent, that I went up along side f
16 the pressurizer and manually isolatec it.
7 18i k
I am not concerned about radiation levels at this time.
You went up you g
obviously appropriately protected and kn a the. taciation levels and got in and got out.
How did you detect those particular leal's? What was the 21!
method which you detected them and you used to accide to go il the cc'ataia-22l ment?
23 24I 2sl 8?l ll) l i-l l
\\
f
{
46 l
1l Alright, Well, we do a leak rate test every shif t, alright, to where it's 2
really a program on our computer.
And to where we give it the information l
3l ud then just ask for a leak rate and then an hour later, it will compute 4
ctr water inventory, just doing a mass balance, alright.
And then it will 5'
come out with a generated leak rate that we have, alright.
These were 61 higher than normal, greater than a gallon a minute.
And we didn't have any
/l other indications that'we had a leak outside containment because we sent 8l cperators into the Auxiliary Building to check on valves, packing, leaking gl by drains and so forth.
So that once we explore all the possibilities 10) utside, alright.
And then plus,,4e had been pumpling the R8 sumps, say f
11!
m re frequently than normally, and if t.he activity in the building may be a little higher.
And there are variour reasons that you put together.
And 12
,3) then, af ter that I finally, in my own mind, I exhaust all the possibilities
.t outside.
So then I get permission to make an entry at power and I go in there ciid normally what I do is that, I go in and I try and locate whether J
its inside the D rin3;s or autside the 0 rings just to minimize my own Im exposure.
g 18!
Right.
20l Normally I start or tne ground level, 3u5, and then I'll just walk around and see if. can her.r anything.
See if I can see any water.
22l 22i
- 0. K.
24 2sf 891 l12 r
l o
- l
47 l
!lj We'll take a break.
I 2l i
3l
- 0. K.
I have 12:55 on reading 925 on the meter, so that at this time,12:55 4
a.m. I'm going to cut this tape and change tapes.
5 6i MARSH:
The time is now 1:02.
We've changed to April 24.
This is Bob 7
Marsh, and we still have the same people:
Jim Cresswell, Don Kirkpatrick, 8
Dorwin Hunter, and and we are goirs to continue nith the interview with Bill Zewe.
You're on, I think you had the floor.
g 10l l
HUNTER:
OK, thank you, Bob.
Bill had just been describing entering the containment and making his tour around the outside the D rings, outside of I
the radiation areas, specifically listening and trying to determine where a 13l f
leak might be.
And I would assume then that you would pursue that particu-lar leak, if you saw steam or heard any noise.
16l 7rWE:
Right. And then from the ground ievel then, I would go up to the 17) operating floor and then do the same thing there.
And tnen from there, up l
to the top of the 0-rings and walk around them to see if I could hear 19l anything or see any puffs of steam or what not.
And then, I would go down 20) to the basement and check the reactor building sump, you know, to see what, how much water was coming into the sump and from what lines.
And then go 22' inside of the 0-rings and walk around the basement floor of the D-rings and 23 Icok for water, listen.
All right, so basically, on every time that I've 24l l
done this on either Unit 1 or 2, and it's been many times considering both 251
,i units at various power levels.
That's basically what I do.
I l
891 11.5
48 i
i 1!
HUNTER:
Okay, and I want to get back, Bill, to the humidity indicators 1
2j provided you in the control room, and they are available to indicate relative 31 humidity in the containment.
Did you normally look at those and use those 4
4l as an indication for leaks in the containment-steam leaks, water leaks, 5
that type of activity?
Si i
7l ZEWE:
I look at them very infrequently.
Very, very infrequently.
8 gj HUNTER: Would there be any procedure, to your knowledge, that would include 10 those humidity indicators?
l 11' l
ZEWE:
q One does not come to my mind, no.
I 131 HUNTER:
Okay, thank you.
That's adequate to get through that item.
I 5
think... Jim, do you have any questions concerning the drain tanks, or anythi ng?'...
Okay, I think we've gotten through that adequately.
I'd like 6
g to change the subject and look at, and talk somewhat about the makeup system.
And I'll set the stage, okay, a little bit.
Where we are is the 18:
makeup system at 4:00.
You've gone through, apparently, the normal proce-19!
dure and the B pump was on; the A pump was started by the operator; the letdown flow system, the letdown valve was isolated due to pressurizer level--normal procedure; and the makeup system, tnen, was in a two pump mode, anticipating the drop in pressurizer level, to try to recover and bring the pressurizer back on scale or get the level back up.
25 891 114 9
i
[
I
49 1
ZEWE:
Correct.
2t 3
HUNTER:
In the incident, it appears that within a few seconds, the pressur-4 izer increased, dropped down to about 158 inches and then started to increase, i
5 and then increased on a fairly substantial, at a fairly substantial rate, 6
with at this time two pumps running.
Can you give me, to the best of your 7
recollection, the method that the letdown system and the makeup system was g
operated? The pump configuration and the flows, at that time? And walk gl through the first few minutes of the event, the best that you can recollect, 10 the way it happened.
11; i
12l ZEWE:
All right, well, we started the A makeup pump to catch the shrink, i
13l just as you said, and then we opened up the one high pressure injection h
valve, 16-B.
And then we were then running with 16 Bravo open and the letdown isolated and A and B pumps operating.
15 16j HUNTER:
Can you, excuse ma, elaborate? At that particular time, can you give me the makeup flows?
g i
19!
ZEVE:
No, not really because we weren't really looking or adjusting for a specified flow number. All right. Like, wi.en you have a ES actuation you set your flows so that you do not exceed the pump capability of the makeup pumps.
So you would adjust it for about 500 gallons per pump or 250 per leg, all right.
But in this case, we only had the one valve open plus the normal pressurizer makeup valve.
All right, so that we weren't really in a 251 i
891 115 f
50 1
condition to where we going to run out our capability of our pump, so there 2
is no real need at this point to really monitor our flows.
And I really 3l didn't look at it, as I remember, other than verify, 'yes, we are putting 4
it in through the high pressure injection leg'.
5 Gl HUNTER:
What would the flow be, as an example, I'll give you.
If the 7
pressurizer level is up, then the makeup valve the 17 valve is closed.
8 Okay, as the pressurizer level came down, that valve opens because it sees 9
a low level and you need to charge--
10 ZEWE:
Automatically, right.
ll!
I 12!
HUNTER:
13
--and there would be a certain amount of water flow through that 14j particular flow path.
Do you have a feel for that?
15i ZEWE:
Well, that line is approximately the same size as the high pressure 16, injection lines, and that's about 2-1/2 inches.
So, I would assume that in the neighborhood of 200-300 gpm.
8 19!
HUNTER:
And then also, you opened up the 16B valve, and with two pumps 20 running you obviously have the capability of 1000 gallons per minute--
l 22 ZEWE:
Exactly...
23 891 116 24 25 l
t
+
i
I i
51 lj HUNTER:
--without even running the pumps out.
During this time, I under-2 stand that you have seal water injection going to four reactor coolant 31 pumps.
4l Sj ZEWE:
And about 40 gpm total.
61 1
7 HUNTER:
Right. And that, we'll always assume except during building pressure g
it would drop some and then when you reset it, it would come back on.
But gl basically that amount of water or a little more, depending on reactor 10 coolant pressure, generally operates throughout the incident, as long as 11l the charging system, the makeup system, is operating.
l 121 ZEWE:
Right.
13 14' HUNTER:
If you have the 16 8 valve open, the operator, does he just open 15 the valve, it just comes wide open?
6 17i
,y ZEWE:
He can throttle it.
4 19f HUNTER:
Okay, would you have any--
20j i
2 11 ZEWE:
He has a switch where he can just have the throttling capability.
22' 22 HUNTER:
Okay.
24d 891 117
- sj t
l
52 lj ZEWE:
And in fact, on the back vertical panel, then, he has his high 2;
pressure injection flows for each of the legs, so he can adjust it and look i
3 back and adjust where a desired flow that he would like.
4l 5
HUNTER:
What's your understanding that the operators would do or did do 6l during this incident? Specifically, when the pressurizer level is coming 7
up and they're trying to control levels, what was your understanding of how 8
they were operating the makeup system, either through Fred or talking g
directly with the operators?
10l i
11l ZEWE:
Well, shortly after we went to an A and B pump configuration, all 12 right, the pressurizer level did turn and begin to come up.
But a short 13, time after we had the two pumps on, we did have high pressure injection.
14!
HUNTER:
Okay, and--
15 16i yl ZEWE:
Which in turn then, initiates all our high pressure injection com-p nents.
8 l
19i 20l 21l ZEWE:
And for the makeup system, that would have the A and C makeup pump running and the B makeup pump would stop running.
24!
25!
891 i18 i
1 i
l
I i
(
53 HUNTER:
I understand.
And in that case, all four 16 valves then would l{
2!
swing to their 250 gallons per minute cpen position?
l 3
ZEWE:
Right, and we would normally then take manual control and readjust 4j t
5 the valves for 250 or less, all right.
61 I
HUNTER:
If the pressurizer level is increasing, what would the operators 7
8l do normally, or are you aware of what they did?
i 91 t
ZEWE:
Yes.
0 They would then secure the extra makeup pumps and then go back to operating one makeup pump, all right.
And the try to increase the letdown flow to reduce the high pressurizer level.
13 HUNTER:
Okay, and what about the makeup flow itself? How much makeup flow would the operator normally..
Would he maintain one pump at 500 gallons per minute?
16;
~
17!
ZEWE:
No, he would reduce his high pressure injection flow, all right.
, 8 l.
1 l
And increase letdown and try to recover the pressurizer level.
191 20!
21,l HUNTER:
Reducing high pressure flow down to where?
22l ZEWE:
As I recall, as low as we did reduce it was in the neighborhood of 23 like 150 gpm, because I remember that we were trying to go down to 100 gpm 2 41 but it was difficult to throttle at that range.
So we ended up at about 25l t
150.
891 119 i
I 54 1,
HUNTER:
And so, then you would end up with 150 plus reactor coolant pump i
2:
seal water injection?
3\\
4 ZEWE:
Yeah, 190..
5 6l HUNTER:
In that range?
7 8
ZEWE:
Uh-huh.
9l 10l HUNTER:
Do you recall ever being below that? And you can take--
1 i
1 11 ZEWE:
Specifically, no.
12 13l HUNTER:
All right, you can take the time frame with one pump or two.
If, and I bet, I'm very honest and straightforward, by the way, you know.
Ed 15 had the panel for a specific period of time working directly under Fred 16!
Scheimann.
18j ZEWE:
Yes, right.
191 20j l
HUNTER:
They were there together.
Was it then your understanding or your 21; assumption that the high pressure injection flow then was maintained at approximately 190 total flow during that period of time? Were you aware of I
if they went below that at all?
25 891 120 l
i I
I 55 i
t 1[
ZEWE:
I really don't know the exact number, all right.
And he may have 2
throttled back further than that.
I don't really know, because at this 3
point was when I told Fred and Ed, you know, to try to catch the pressurizer
.;j level, and it was about this time that Craig was having problems with 5
emergency feed and I went over to help him.
I Gi f
_ HUNTER:
Okay.
81 i
ZEWE:
g So, during this time period, you know, the exact flow, I'm really 10' n t aware of, because we really weren't throttling for a specified flow again.
We were reacting to what we had as far as the pressurizer level so that we were reduced flow alright, but we really weren't..
if we had had a low level problem, looking at how much flow we had would really have been a problem to say all right, keep increasing flow but don't exceed the pump runout capability.
151 16r j
HUNTER:
By increasing the letdown during that period of time, what would 1,/ l you suspect the normal letdown flow would be.
the maximum letdown flow 18!
that you would see in your system?
201 ZEWE:
140 gpm.
21; 22 l
HUNTER:
And that would be through the normal orifice, or through a bypass, or how would that be obtained--the letdown?
2g 25{
891 121 l
I i
l 56 i
i 1{
ZEWE:
Well, that would be through the normal orifice, plus through the i
2 bypass valve that we have control of.
31 4
HUNTER:
Okay, and the operator has control of that, and he would take care 5
f that:
Si 7j ZEWE:
Yes, and also through two letdown coolers.
I 8i HUNTER:
All right.
Okay.
Then, when you went, when you moved over to g
I 10f help Craig Faust on the secondary system, then we have Fred and Ed -- Fred Scheimann and Ed Frederick -- on the makeup system.
,1 12; ZEWE:
They were right there the whole time, a's I recall, yeah.
3 14!
HUNTER:
Okay.
There's a point in time when-again I'm picking specific 15r points, okay, changing speed a little bit, changing position.
There's a point in time when you were discussing securing the reactor coolant pumps,
.7 the first two and then the other two, the next two.
And it was like securing 18!
the two, and then 40 minutes later or 30, securing the other two.
But before you secured the first two, during this decision to secure the pumps, you were discussing this particular issue of securing the pumps with George Kunder, I think.
22l l
23l l
ZEWE:
Yes.
891 122 24{
25j t
i i
I i
57 1!
HUNTER:
With the net positive suction head curve, as I recall right?
2; 3
ZEWE:
Yeah.
4!
Sl HUNTER:
Okay, during this time was there any discussion about high pressure i
Gi 1DJection, increasing high pressure injection or changing high pressure 7
injaction flow? Or did you initiate manual high pressure injection? Or..
8 gj ZEWE:
We did increase the high pressure injection flow at about this point i
10l because then we started to think that the pressurizer level was not really 11 high, that it could actually be low and we weren't seeing the two conditions, 12 so that we stopped the increased letdown and increased our makeup flow back 13 into the system. All right. And that was before George and I were discussing 14j with Ken and Fred and, well, everyone really was in the discussion about the pumps, all right, about the coolant pumps.
15; 16i HUNTER:
Okay.
And when you increased high pressure injection, I think at l
that time with two pumps running, then you were going through four valves 181 even, the available flow path.
But what was your reasoniac ;esides.
excuse me, your reasoning was that the pressurizer levels might not be Indicating the true condition.
Did you get any results from that or did 21!
you see any results from increasing the high pressure injection flow?
23 ZEWE:
Not immediately, no, we did not at the time.
24l 25i i
891 123 I
I
58 1
HUNTER:
Okay, later, did you see anything or do you recall any.
2 3
ZEWE:
No, well, we did later on, after we had shut the RCV 2, the block l
valve for your electromatic.
Then we did see the increase in pressure in 4
5 the system.
But it wasn't until that point that where we really seen any l
6j significant change in pressure.
7l HUNTER:
g Were you charging it, was the makeup system running during that time...?
g l
10t ZEWE:
Yes, it was.
n 12}!
HUNTER:
13)
..quite, I mean, after the injection condition where you had 14!
maximum flow, or had it been throttled back again?
15; ZEWE:
At that particular point, I don't believe that we had maximum injec-tion flow, now.
17!
i 18l HUNTER:
Okay.
19l t
20i KIRKPATRICk:
When you raised this flow, do you have any idea at all what 22j the flow rate might have been?
I presume that before you turned on the C I
pump you would have increased the A pump flow or the 8 pump, whichever one 23 was running at the time.
So that that pump would be above 190 gpm before your turned on the C pump? Would that be right?
25j I
891 124 a
i
't
59 I
l 1l ZEWE:
Well, each pump is capable of 550 gallons per minute.
All right, 2'
that we can feed the two legs.
See, what we have is, we have isolation 3
valves that are between the B makeup pump and the C makeup pump.
And the A 4l or B can feed through the 16A high pressure injection valve or B together.
5l And that the C can only feed through the C and D legs, so that we spent the 1
6i greater part of the morning, which is after we had the coolant pumps off, 7
with the A and C running, and then feeding the C through C and D leg and 8
the A feeding through the A and B leg, all right, just to make sure that we g
have flow in all legs.
10l KIRKPATRICX:
I see.
So just the fact that you turned on C doesn't mean I
that you wanted more flow.
It means that you wanted it going into all egs.
13 14!
I ZEWE:
Exactly.
15i 15!
KIRKPATRICX:
So you would not necessarily have increased A above the t
minimum before you did that?
i 19!
ZEWE:
Exactly.
And it's just the throttle effect, then, of the high 20!
pressure injection valves.
So it's strictly an operator type setting.
21!
22 HUNTER:
Alright, let's go back a minute to the throttling the valves, specifically.
When you get that valve down to throttling through A loop--
any valve through like A or B through the A, B, C or D--what's the minimum 25!
i 891 125 i
i 60 i
I 11 position that you could throttle that valve?
I mean you could shut it off, I
2!
obviously.
Okay what about down, is there is a point where it loses l
control? Where you have... is there a point where it becomes unstable, or 3l 4
do the operators normally... have they to your knowledge throttled them 5l closed?
6 7
ZEWE: We have throttled them closed, but usually anything less than 100 8
gallons a minute, it isn't very stable.
91 HUNTER:
That's 100 gallons through A loop, right?
10 11:
ZEWE:
Through one of the four legs.
12l
'I 13l HUNTER:
It isn't very stable.
15i ZEWE:
Yeah, well the indication that we have is so low on the meter that 6
you're really not certain of staying at one set flow rate.
It oscillates a little bit, so it could be 50 to 125, yot know, it's oscillatiag.
And then 8
as you can open further, like anything more than, I would say,125 gpm, you f
have better throttling capability of the valves.
You get steadier flow 20f indication.
21f 22!
HUNTER:
All right.
Would it bother you that you were feeding two loops at 125 or four loops at 125, even though the pressurizer was full? Wereyou concerned about taking the system solid?
25j l
891 126 i
I I
l
1 t
61 i
Ilj ZEWE:
Yes, I was.
And then we kept a very close eye, all right, along i
2 with the pressurizer level, on coolant system pressure too, looking for, if 3
we did start to go solid, to look at the indications very carefully.
4l 5l HUNTER:
And what did you see, looking at pressure?
61 i
ZEWE:
Pressure did not change that much.
It oscillated around about 1100 7
8 p unds, you know, give or take 25 or 30 pounds..
i 9
HUNTER:
10 What did that mean to you, as the shift supervisor?
11 ZEWE:
That the pressure was holding relatively stable.
I 13!
I HUNTER:
And what would that..
what would that be.
for what reason would 14i it hold stable?
16i 17ll For what--well, just that the pressure controlling medium at that ZEWE:
time, which I know now was the steam bubble that was in the hot alright, IS{
l was actually controlling pressure.
But at that time I didn't realize that 19lI we had shifted our steam bubble from the pressurizer over to the loops 20 themselves.
21, 22l HUNTER:
During that time, were you able to look at core thermocouple 23 temperatures?
24 b)} l2[
t
62 11 ZEWE:
I was able to but I really did not.
Quite soon into it, once the 2
other shift supervisor, who was on Unit 1 at the time, came over to Unit 2 3
and he was there within about 6 or 7 minutes after we tripped, I had Ken --
4 Bryan's his name -- to look at the computer and to look at some of the 5
temperature, the discharged of the relief valve, and so forth, and to l
6!
monitor the alarms that we had so that we didn't miss anything.
So I did 7
not go over to the computer and specifically call up for the thermocouples 8
of the incores.
I did not.
HUNTER:
What about watching T and T nd T 10 H
C avg 11l ZEWE:
We watched T, T and T and they were fairly normal at this time.
12 H
C avg 13 The time just before I left the control room, which was within probably 15 minutes after the trip, I left to go out to try to handle the problem with e
we an e condensate polisher bypass valve.
Just as I was about 15 to leave, I noticed that T was about 528, and our criteria for running 16i avg four pumps is that we must be above 525.
And I remembered saying ' Don't forget to stop the one pumo if you get below 525'
,8I 19!
HUNTER:
And the reason for that?
20!
21 I
ZEWE:
Well, we have a--it's due to core lift.
All right, because as the 22l I
water is colder, it's more dense, so that if you run four pumps at a lower 23l 1
temperature, you have a higher DP across the core, and you're worried about lifting the core itself.
The core has large springs on the upper end
{
891 128 i
(
{
63 l
1l fitting of each of the fuel assemblies, which is loaded by the upper plenum, 2
which sits right down on it and Icads it, and if you shift the fuel assem-l 3!
blies and lift them up, you compress the spring.
And if you compress it I
4j too much, the spring will lose its spring tension to come back down and t
5l r perly load the fuel assembly.
6i f
HUNTER:
Okay.
8 ZEWE:
g So, that's what they call--it's just core lift due to a certain temperature and that's.
so, up until 525, we always operate on a three 10 i
pump configuration and after that, then, we can start the fourth pump.
12!
HUNTER:
Okay.
14
]
ZEWE:
And it's part of coolant interlock, again, for starting the reactor coolant pump.
17l HUNTER:
Ukay, good.
At that point you ended up, I believe, going down and 18!
I doing some more work in another area, okay? No problem there, I have no 191 questions at that point.
Again, I'm picking out some questions.
If you take the incident from 4:00 up until that time, did you realize that you 21l had a LOCA, a loss of-coolant accident, at any time?
That day now, don't 22!
try, try to run back.
Did it enter your mind that you had a loss-of-23 coolant accident going on?
24 25I 891 129 j.-
64 1
ZEWE:
It really did not enter my mind that we had a loss-of-coolant accident.
l 2l I didn't fully understand what I had, but I always think in terms of a l
31 loss-of-coolant accident, all right, is that your pressurizer level is a 4l big key.
But I had the reverse of what it would have been for a loss of 5'
level-6l 7
HUNTER:
Okay.
Is there a time where you then, during the first eight g
hours, excuse me, during the first four hours or five hours, you stayed g'
on during that day, I guess, and worked.
But, during that first four or 101 five hours, was there a time you realized that you could have had a loss-11 f-coolant or that you were having a loss-of-coolant?
I 12!
ZEWE:
Certainly.
Once we isolated the electromatic block valve, hit me 13 like a ton of bricks that that's where the water was going and that's exactly what caused the high level in the pressurizer.
I had--well, we had 15 16l ked at the discharge temperatures on the relief valves earlier and they really didn't seem like they were high to where the valve was open and I had indication on the valve that the valve was not still open.
l 19l HUNTER:
Okay.
21l 22l ZEWE:
So I dismissed that and went on, and I didn't go back to that until, I
it was probably some time after 6:00 that I went back and I said, 'the 23l 24l thing's still high, so let's go ahead and shut it anyway' So we just shut it and that's when the building pressure turneo rapidly and came down.
And 25j I
891 130 1
!i
l 65 1
1 at that point, then, I knew that the electromatic was not fully seated, 2l that it was leaking through and, through the ruptured RC draining tank and 3l into the building.
4 5l HUNTER:
Okay, one more question concerning that.
At that point, did you l
6i discuss initiating high pressure injection again fully and taking the flows 7
up to 1200, up to 1100, 1200 gallons a minute? Or why not, if apparently g
they still were throttling because of the.
?
i 9{1 ZEWE:
10 Yes, we were still throttling at the point, all right.
And I felt g
that we still had sufficient water in the system. All right.
And then, with the high pressurizer level, that we still had water boiling in the g
3 1C HUNTER:
The pressurizer level, af ter you closed the EMOV, was still up?
15!
ltii ZEWE:
It was still up, yes.
17l 18l HUNTER:
You were able to maintain pressurizer level at that time?
20l I
ZEWE:
No, the pressurizer level was still high.
21l 22 HUNTER:
Right, you were able to maintain it?
It didn't go out the bottom?
24 25 89l ljl i
66 1.
ZEWE-It did not.
2 3
HUNTER:
Okay, indicating a loss of coolant or that it was, that you had a 4l problem somewhere, that you had a problem elsewhere?
l 5
6i ZEWE:
Exactly.
7 8
HUNTER:
Okay. We'll drop that particular subject presently, and then I've gf got some more research to do and then, I hate to say it, but probably get 10 back with you again to do a little more in that area for now.
Okay, let me 11l ask you a couple more questions and we'll try to get going.
In the event, t
12j coming down around 6:50 or in that range, at that point you were considering 13 this a site emergency.
Right?
14 ZEWE:
I certainly did, yes.
15!
16l HUNTER:
General..
or local, then site, then general right, in that order, y7j I guess.
You had an auxiliary building problem, and then you had a site 8l problem, and then what, did you go into a general emergency after that?
19!
20i ZEWE:
Yes.
2 11 i
22p HUNTER:
Seven something..
Did you have any problems or delays getting in contact with the agencies and the people that your procedures require you to contact?
25' l
891 132
I 67 1
ZEWE: Well, all of the notifications were made by other people other than 2
me, because at this point where, at 6:50 you said, I believe that that is 3{
the exact time that I announced a general, the site emergency, rather.
And 4j at that point, and long before that point, we had most of our senior plant 5
people there already on site.
At that point we had the Unit Superintendent, 6
the Unit Superintendent-Technical Support, the Unit 1 Supervisor of Opera-7 tions and various other engineers and support people that were already 8
there.
So that as soon as I had seen the increase in the radiation alarms, g
all right, that I told George Kunder, who was there with me, that I wanted 10l to announce a site emergency, then he says 'Yes'.
l 11l HUNTER:
Okay, let me ask you a question concerning that.
Did you consider site emergency before that at any time?
13 ld 15l ZEWE:
I did not.
I did not have any of the criteria for a site emergency.
16l HUNTER:
Criteria meaning.
what would you coristrue to mean, to require
,7 the criteria for initiating a site emergency? What were you key points 18l that you were looking at?
191 20l ZEWE:
Well, this one here was basically from the monitor in the reactor 21; building, or the dome monitor, which isn't actually in the dome, but from 22l l
that monitor if you reached the alert point, that is one of the criteria 231 for a site emergency.
24 25 l
891 133 i
f
68 i
Il!
HUNTER:
Did you reach that at that time?
l 2.
3 ZEWE:
Yes, we did.
4 5
HUNTER:
Okay.
Then George Kunder and whoever they had appointed in the 6
back room, they then, would be making the notifications?
I 7'l ZEWE:
Exactly.
8) 9 101 HUNTER:
Okay.
All right, let's stop here for a minute...
t 11!
I 12 MARSH:
We'll break at this time.
I've got 1:32 on time and about 477 on 13 the meter. We're going to break and turn the tapes here.
14!
MARSH:
It's 1: 33 a.m., 4/24/79.
This is Bob Marsh.
We are continuing the 15l 16l interview -- Darwin, you had asked a question.
I'll turn it back to you 17 and let you continue.
I 181 HUNTER:
Okay, the one criteria is the dome monitor; another criteria?
7g i
20l ZEWE:
If the reactor building evacuation alarm, which in Unit 2 is a 221 manual actuation, in Unit 1 is automatic on the source range.
We have other ones, based on alarms in the buildings and radiation alarms set the sites security fence of 125 mr/hr, and so forth.
4 24,1 25l 891 134 I
i i
l
l 69 1.
HUNTER:
Okay.
To your knowledge, did anybocy attempt to call NRC Head-l 2t quarters in Washington?
3 4
ZEWE:
To my knowledge, we notified our Region I NRC people.
51 6
HUNTER:
Okay.
When you go back and look at the time where the motor-7 operated valve on the electromatic relief valve was closed, you realized g
you then had been blowing out, did that put you into a specific emergency 9'
procedure? A loss-of-coolant procedure?
10r i
llj ZEWE:
Well, I didn't think of it in terms of going to a loss-of coolant 12l pr cedure because once we had shut it we had already isolated the loss-of-coolant, if you will.
All right. And that we still had level and that we 13 14l still had considerable pressure.
So I really didn't go the the loss-of-coolant procedure, per se.
15 16i HUNTER:
Okay, and, if you didn't go through the emergency operating proce-dures, the loss-of coolant procedures, then the key to get into your emergency g
l plan then would be just the radiation alarms, the procedures for high g
radiation alarms in those areas or in the dome, or evacuation alarms--those type of procedures?
22 ZEWE:
That's what I used, yes.
24 25l 891 135 l
70 11 HUNTER:
Okay, I want to make sure we got that.
Okay.
In the case of the 2l installed instrumentation for accident classification, you indicated that i
31 you had the dome, the containment reactor building dome monitor, available 1
4 to you.
Did that go up gradually or did it just go up high, and go to the 5f high alarm condition?
6 7
ZEWE:
Prior to the time frame of about quarter to 7 or ten to 7, in that 8
neighborhood, I do not recall any significant alarms on anything except the g
intermediate letdown cooler monitors that were on high alarm.
10f 11l HUNTER:
Another question--at this time the pressure in the primary system 12 was still running fairly low, was running low, at 1250, 1300 pounds, maybe 13 cycling around that area.
Did that indicate to you an emergency or loss-14; of-coolant condition or a condition that would indicate requiring a site emergency or a general emergency?
15 16i ZEWE:
No, it did not.
7 18f HUNTER:
Earlier in the morning, you called, on a normal unit trip, you 9""'
20 21, ZEWE:
Yes.
22 23 HUNTER:
And, who else did you call?
25l 891 136 i
71 1!
ZEWE:
Well, I personally didn't call anyone, but I directed other people I
2!
to do that--
I i
4 HUNTER:
Okay, fine.
5 6
ZEWE:
--but I had asked for Joe Logan to be notified and George Kunder, 7
Gary Miller, Jim Floyd and Mike Ross.
8 HUNTER:
Why notify these people? You did that earlier.
gj I
10l ZEWE:
Right.
I did that shortly after it happened, all right? One wts 11 Iy just to notify them that we did have a trip.
And then, I knew that we had a pr blem with the drain tank at this point, or close to this point, and I 13 p;
wanted some more help with the problem that I had.
I really didn't realize the extent of the problem that I had, all right.
15 16:
17l HUNTER:
When did you get that feelirg, what time, about.
.?
I i
18j ZEWE:
Well, initially, I had asked to have these people called, to inform 19!
them and to explain what I had and then for them to come on in.
- Within, i
l'd say, about 10 minutes after the trip, with the high pressurizer level, 21;i and not being able to reduce it to where it would be something normal, I
22!
knew that I had a problem there that I wasn't too familiar with and I 23 really couldn't grasp what the problem was.
So at that point, I really 24 wanted some more help one that.
25 :,
I l
891 137 I
i
I 72 1
HUNTER:
And who was the first one to get back in touch with you personally?
2!
l 3l ZEWE:
George Kunder.
4f 9
5 HUNTER:
And what time was that about?
6 7
ZEWE:
As I recall, it was some time shortly after 4:30.
8 g
HUNTER:
Okay, and how long did it take him to get in?
To--
10i 11{
ZEWE:
Well, no, that's when he arrived.
12{
HUNTER: Oh, okay...
13 14!
ZEWE:
15 Because George, well, George used to be the Unit 1 Supervisor of Operations..
16 17i Img HUNTER:
Yes.
19l ZEWE:
...and the Unit 1 Superintendent of Technical Support, and he's in 20!
ig Unit 2 now under that same capacity.
And George only lives less than a mile from the plant, from the north gate.
So I usually rely quite heavily 2a[
on George from his technical background of an engineer, and so forth, plus he's so close and accesses there that he comes in very quickly.
I I
25j l
891 138 0
il
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'(.
1 HUNTER:
Okay.
'l 2'
3 ZEWE:
And that I rely on him first, in that case, bccause.ever3ene else 4
lives, you know, a much greater distance from the site.
5 6i HUNTER:
Who was the next guy you saw, after George, tresides ;he Unit I l
7 PEOP e?
8 l
g!
ZEWE:
I think it was probably Mike Ross and Bryan Mehler and Jo'a 'oga'n.
,1 e
10 HUNTER:
Okay.
I don't have any more questf)ns, go ahead and talk.
11 i
12}
ZEWE:
13 And those three were varying times, that I'm not sure ex>:tly' which
,4j one showed up first.
Because George was al-, George LJnder was already in 1
e control room when I came up from the proolum yith the cJr. den.iate polisher 15 bypass valve in the hot well.
6 I
17!
l HUNTER:
Wha + was he doing at that time?
18(
l 19!
ZEWE:
He was up there talking with the )perators and the shift foremen and 40 Ken Bryan and the shift supervisors.
22 HUNTER:
What's his position?
89Ii39 a
25i i
t t
t i
t
l 74 1
ZEWE:
Whose?
2 3
HUNTER:
George Kuader.
4!
5 ZEWE:
George is the Unit 2 Superintendent of Technical Support; he's in 6
charge of all the engineers and_he's the Chairman of PCRC, our Plant Opera-
/
ti onal--Re s e are.? --
U' g!,
HUNTER:
Is h'e a senior licensed indiv'idual?
b 10l 11f ZEWE:
He is senior licensed, but on Unit 1, not Unit 2.
I 12; HUNTER:
Okcy.
Was Fred Schiemann in the control room at that time?
I 14 y
ZEWE:
Oh yes, Frad came up to the control rocm within about a minute and a aalf after the trip; as quickly as he could when he heard the trip go, then
,6, 1 ;
he ran up t:, the control roc.n and he remaired t.here the whole time.
18l HUN 7F3:
How long did you stay at the Shiit Supervisor position in Unit 2 191 that day?
00i 21 ZEWE.
I left the control room at about 6:30 or 7:00 that evening and I was 22!
~.
I sharing the duties at that time with ar.other shift supervisor, Joe Chwastyk.
23{
24 2s; 891 140 l
s k
N.
75 1.
HUNTER:
Okay, all right.
2:
l ZEWE:
I was assisting him and he was helping me, and so forth.
He actually 3l 4
had the shift, but I was still there helping out.
5 6{
HUNTER:
All right, I have no more questions.
Do you have any comments or 7
any questions or anything that you would like to say? You know, anything gi that has come to your min.d during the inter.'iews or in your off time, i
gl because I have the feeling we're going to have to talk again.
t 10l l
ZEWE:
Okay.
11j 12!
HUNTER:
I'm not going to apologize for it because we have a certain amourt 13 of things we've got to get through, and you guys are the best sources that 14:
we have.
So certainly we'll be getting back with you again.
Any--
15 16; 17!
ZEWE:
However I car, help, fine, i
18l HUNTER:
Okay.
Jim...
19{
20j CRESWELL:
Nothing.
I 22' l
HUNTER:
Don...
23{
24l 891 141 25j i
l l
k
e
=
l 76 1,
KIRKPATRICK:
No, I don't think so.
I 2'
l 3t HUNTER:
All right.
4l I
Sl MARSH:
Oksy, Bill, we appreciate your time, and as Dorwin says, if anything l
6{
comes to mind or any comments you want to make, feel free to put it in the 1
7; record.
We do want to draw out of this anything that we can to benefit us i
8 in the future.
So if anything comes to mind that you want to mention, feel gj free to bring it up.
10f f
11l ZEWE: We all want that, I feel.
We have to, so...
i 12!
MARSH:
Okay, then.
The time being 1:43 on April 24, I am reading 671 on 13 t
74; the meter.
At this time we're geing to shut the recorders down.
15; 16i (END OF CASSETTE]
171 l
181 891 i42 191 20i i
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