ML19249B008
| ML19249B008 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1979 |
| From: | Kunder G METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290149 | |
| Download: ML19249B008 (49) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1l In the Matter of:
}
2!
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of 4
George A. Kunder Superintendent, Technical Support 5
6 7
8 Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant 10l Middletown, Pennsylvania 11 May 17. 1979 12 (Date of Interview) 13!
Julv 5. 1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 246 and 247 15 (Tape Number (s))
16 17 18 qa0 W 2
21{
NRC PERSONNEL:
22 Domin R. Hunter, Inspection Specialist 23i l
Thanas T. Martin, Inspection Specialist 24i 25{[
Mark E. Resner, Investigator l
896 104 I
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RESNER:
The following is an interview of Mr. George A as in Apple, 2'
Kunder, KUNDER.
Mr. Kunder is employed with the Metropolitan Edison 3
Company at the Three Mile Irland Facility.
His job title is the Super-4 intendent, Technical Support for Unit 2.
Present time is 10:45 a.m.
5 Eastern Daylight Time.
Today's date is May 17, 1979.
This interview 6
is being conducted in Trailer 203.
It's located just outside the South 7
Gate to the Three Mile Island Facility.
Present for this interview, a 8
Mr. Darwin R. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter is an Inspection Specialist with 9
Region III of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Also present is 10 Mr. Thomas T. Martin.
Mr. Martin is an Inspection Specialist with 11 Region II of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Moderating this 12 interview is Mark E. Resner and I am an Investigator with the Office of 13 Inspector and Auditor, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Head-14 quarters.
As you recall, Mr. Kunder, you were given a two page advise-15i ment document with your prior interview at which you signed and dated.
16 And on that document you answered three questions, do you understand 17 the above and you indicated, yes.
Is that correct?
18l i
19f KUNDER:
That's correct.
20' 21 RESNER:
Question 2 do we have your permission to tape the interview 22 and you also indicated yes.
Is that correct?
23 24 25 896 105 j
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1 KUNDER:
That is correct.
2 RESNER:
Question No. 3, do you want a copy of the tape? You indicated, 4
yes.
And you would like a transcript ' Is that correct?
5 6
KUNDER:
That is also correct.
7 8
RESNER:
Ok.
Mr. Kunder has already provided in the previous interview 9
his educational job experience in the nuclear industry so we'll forego 10 that and also like to be on the record that you are also aware of the 11 fact that you're entitled to a representative of your choice should you 12 desire one.
13 14 KUNDER:
Yeah, I'm aware of that.
I 15; I
16i RESNER:
Also that you're not compelled to talk to us should you not 17 desire to.
18, 1
KUNDER:
I'm also aware of that.
20l 21 RESNER:
Ok, at this time I'll turn the questioning over to Mr. Hunter.
22 23 896 106 24 25
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1 HUNTER:
George, just to get back in the frame of mind that we were...
2 our previous interview, you arrived onsite morning of the 28th fairly 3
carly, would you give us that time again and then we'll start from 4L there?
5 0
KUNDER:
My best estimate is that I arrived in the Unit 2 Control Room 7
about ten minutes of five.
8 9
HUNTER:
O k.
And when you came in the Control Room give us your general 10 impression of what you saw and what was going on.
11 12-KUNDER:
Ok, I..when I arrived in the Control Room the people that I 13 recall in the Control Room were Ken Bryan.
Also the...I believe there's i
14!
two Control Room operators at or near the console rid the shift foreman.
15l And I recall in particular that the shift foreman along with the operator 16l who was assigned to the primary were observing the pressurizer level 17 indication and upon questioning them I learned that the pressurizer 18[
level was high or out of sight on the quarter indication and they were 19 attempting to re establish level indication through as I recall letting 20 down to the normal letdown path and attempting to draw a bubble presum-21 ably by using the pressurizer heater.
I don't think I recall really 22 looking at the heaters to see if they were on but most of what I learned 23 24 896 107 2s f
1 f
4 was by questioning the operators and then attempting to locate the 2'
instruments in the panel and confirming in my own mind that what they 3
were telling me was indeed the case in terms of plant conditions.
5 HUNTER:
George did you recall looking at the makup pumps and the high 6{
pressure injection or the makeup flow system at that time?
7 0
KUNDER:
No, I don't recall.
9 10' HUNTER:
You indicated that they were in the process of letting down to 11' obtain a bubble, heaters whatever, do you recall looking at the letdown 12 flow at that time?
13 14; KUNDER:
No, I don't recall looking at it specifically.
I 15) 16!
HUNTER:
Moving to another area, in time, through other interviews we 17 have indications that early in the morning that the coolant flood tank 18{
valves were closed.
Can you give us information in that area or weren't i
191 you involved in that activity at all?
i 20 21l KUNDER:
No, I don't ever recall being aware that any valves in the 22' core flood tank were closed and I presumed that you are refering to CFV 23 1A and B which would be the isolation...
24 2s' 896 108 t
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l HUNTER:
They had been energized and closed due to the low pressure 2
during your interview with the operator say in fact indicate that to 3
you at that time?
4 KUNDER:
No.
Are you referring to early in the morning?
6 HUNTER:
Yes, early in the morning, it probably occurred according to 8
the.inteviews a few minutes before you arrived.
If you arrived at five 9
at four fifty or so we're looking in that time frame of four thirty...
10[
11 KUNDER:
I'm not aware of that at all.
12 13 HUNTER:
...though maybe that as part of the plant status that you had, 14f in fact, picked that up or been given that at that time.
I 15!
16 KUNDER:
No.
Right now as I sit here I would have presumed that those 17 valves were never closed but I have no knowledge of that.
18[
19 HUNTER:
Ok. And we're going to pick on events so we'll take a little 2
time in between these events and they are they may appear some frag-21 mented to some degree but we're going to take them one at a time.
Make 22 sure we get your impression of at that time as best as you can recall.
23 24 896 109 2s i
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KUNDER:
O k.
2 3
HUNTER:
At 4:45 approximately five o' clock to five fifteen a boron 4
sample was called to the Unit 2 Control Room and the boron sample was seven hundred part per million do you recall getting that information?
6 KUNDER: Yes.
8 9
HUjiTER:
Do you know who reported the seven hundred into the Control 10 Room and then who reported that information to you?
11 12 KUNDER:
I received a call from Dick Dubiel.
Let me...before I answer 13 that ask you the time again that you...
14 15f HUNTER:
Ok.
There was two samples performed that day.
One sample was 16 around five to five fifteen and that was seven hundred parts per million 17 sample.
Now there was another sample performed around six o' clock or a 18l little later than six end that one was four hundred ppm.
To~ refresh i
191 your memory again Scott Wilkerson came across from Unit 1 and you may l
20 have seem him there you know or whatever but he was all he did apparently 21 was pull the sequence of events post-trip review and he was collecting 22 data but he also give a shutdown margin calculation on both of those 23 those, based on both of those boron samples.
The earlier one and then 24 25j 896 110 i
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he signed the second one he signed it off at six thirty that the shutdown 2
margin was complete at that time and there was the shutdown was like 3
2.445 percent shutdown even at 400 parts per million.
4 f
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KULUER:
Ok. I think I'm with you.
61 7
HUNTER:
Ok, go ahead.
8 KUNDER:
I was not aware of the times that those samples were drawn.
10 But I did recall asking or confirming with Scott.
He was doing a lli shutdown margin calculation.and he needed to get a boron sample.
My 12, involvement with getting those numbers, came I believe it was within 13 about a half an hour of arriving at the site and I had asked for shut-14!
down margin calculation to be made and perhaps he did ask for those i
15 samples to be taken and he may have independently gotten the results.
16 I was aware of the boron numbers following Dick Dubiel's arrival to the 17 Control Room and I asked him to help out with getting information that 18i we needed down in the Lab and at that time I recall contemplating the 19 potential need to send somebody in the reactor building to assess 20 conditions in there and that we would be needing to get reactor building 21 samples and that sort of thir,g.
I can't recall if I specifically asked 22 for that but it was somewhere in the region of six thirty perhaps six 23 twenty that Dick Dubiel called me in the Control Room and I believe he 24l was in the Lab in Unit 1 and he indicated that he doesn't understand 25f I
896 111
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t!.e sample results.
He thinks there in error and he sai j the first 2
sample result was somewhere around seven hundred ppm borca.
And the 31 i
second one they drew sas in the range of 400 to and some ppa borori.
I4'
' And as I indicated on the previcus interview that that reuelatica 5
really struct me as a serious disc epancy and I begin to considct if we 6(
were de-borating the rad coolant systen through soma process that I 7
didn't as yet understana.
So that's the time I became sware of those 8)u numbers.
g it 10 HUNTER:
0 5., both the numbers then were given to you by Dick Dubiel 11 when you asked him to go to the lab end do some wo. k for you.
12!
13 XUNDF.R.
Well, I was asking him really to go dcwn and help coordinate 14; the raciochemistry activities, make sure I trad a su.ior guy that I 15I ceu!J depze; upon.
16l l
17 HUNTER:
One question, George, cunearning this particular time frame.
18l The possibility if de-borating the source re.; were in fact, actieg were 19l in fact, incre5s< rc.
You had some level cbangrs that push you so low s
20' bcron then you were losing boron or possib?s dilutinq did you request 21 samples > from other tanks so;h asmakecp tank, BW5f, actual boron levels 22{s.
.'at that t'me;?
4 22 896 112 2$
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KUNDER:
I don't think I did, I know I didn't consider getting samples 2'
from the makeup tank but I did recall in my own mind I was concerned 3
about the possibility of low boron concentration in the BWST.
I can't remember if I asked for a sample of the BWST.
It may have gone +,hrough my mind and I may have thought that it would take quite a long time to 6
get a representative sample anyhow and then you know the information 7
wouldn't really do me much good at that point because we had an immediate 8
pN blem I.couldn't wait.
I did ask Dick to get another sample in the 9
RCS however, at that point.
And he may have intended to get that 10 anyhow or it may have be~en in progress, I'm not really sure.
But at 11 that same mcment after I got off the phone with Dick I went over to the 12 status board and tried to learn what the boron concentration had been 13 prior to the trip.
And that status board is located behind the shift 14 foreman's desk in the Control Room and I observed the concentration a I
151 little bit higher than 1000 ppm and I cecame very worried that we were i
16!
de-borating the core and somewhere along that same time frame I became 17 aware of the count rate on the source range being very high in the 18' intermediate range indication was coming on scale.
And that those 19{
indications lead me very strongly to believe that we were somehow 20 de-borating reactor coolant system.
And I couldn't understand at that 21 point the..how that would occur.
22 22 896 113 24 25 I
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HUNTER:
George, was your immediate concern of possible de-boration, 2
l did you how did you satisfy yourself that if you were de-borating what 3
did you see being done or what did you do to counter that particular 4
phenomenon or that particular activity?
5 6
KUNDER:
The first thing I did was to consider borating the system and 7
I can't recall the specific conversation I had with Bill Zewe but I 8
learned from Bill Zewe that upon hearing the low baron concentrations 9
he did start tha emergency boration from the boric acid mix tank.
So I i
10 was satisfied that at least we were putting boron into the system and 11l hopefully that would counter the apparent de-boration that I thought 12 had been occurring.
I also requested Bubba Marshall, who is in the 13 Control Room at that time to review any possible means of getting 14 demineralized water into either makeup purification system or the BWST 15j or anyway that we can be diluting the concentrations of the fluids that 16 are either being fed to the RCS or that may have been fed to the RCS 17 through the high pressure injection.
18l l
19l HUNTER:
Did Bubba report back to you at some time later?
2 21, KUNDER:
No, I think...he never did report back to me and I think that 22 the developments from that point on moved along pretty quickly in the 23 direction of finally injecting BWST water into the core.
You know, we 24 2s 896 114 l
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got into the emergency plant rather quickly and I don't think he would 2
have the time to do a thorough job of researching what I was asking him 3'
to do.
4 5'
HUNTER:
A short time thereafter the reactor coolant pump was restarted 6
jumped or restarted and the source range intermediate range went decreased 7
in value and it went back offscale back down to normal.
The source 8
range came back down to some level lower more than normal value, did 9
you in fact look at those particular numbers at that time-and did that 10 in fact, did that satisfy you at all or as far as the dilution of the 11 boron in the primary coolant system?
12 13 KUNDER:
It satisfied me that whatever was causing the apparent reactivity 14 increase and actually under those conditions the core would be critic (~
15!
at a very power level since we were to go up in power level to get one 16!
decade indication from the intermediate range.
That would be very low l
17l power level but you would indeed be critical based on criticality l$1 conditions that you've experienced in the past.
So the fact that it 19li went down and the source range was back down in mid-range and apparently 2d' decreasing satisfied me that whatever had caused that excursion had 21 turned around.
And I sometimes confuse myself with what I've learned 22 since that time with what I think I saw at the time.
But at the time 23 I'm pretty certain I did not recognize the real cause of the increase 24 in the source range intermedite range accounts and believe that I 25j i
896 115
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I recognized what we thought the phenomenon was when I talked to John 2
Flint a little later in the morning.
He pointed out that it was probably 3
due to the fact that at that time we had perceived that we did in fact, 4
uncover the core and he felt that was due to the extra leakage that had 5
tremendously extra leakage that occurred due to uncovering the core and 6
losing the moderating effect of the water.
7 HUNTER:
Ok George let me ask jou, have you since determined why you 9
had a lower than normal boron concentration?
10 11 KUNDER:
Oh yeah, well, its per, its been...
12 13 HUNTER:
What, what's your perception, why you would of gotton a 400 14 and a 700 and a 400 parts per million boron concentration?
t 15l 16 KUNDER:
The explanation that I've, I've heard and I guess I have 17 subscribed to, is the fact that as we were indeed boiling in the reactor 18l coolant system, we were pretty much in a mixed phase, kind of flow for i
19 a period of time and that meant it became worse and worse as time 20' developed and as we continued to letdown from the reactor coolant 21 system, we were apparently getting steam into the sample lines which 22 condensed and left the boron behind in the RCS of course and that 23 24 25 f
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gradual increase in steam phase that was being circulated through the 2
core with time caused a lower boron concentration to be in the fluid 31 entering the sample line.
4 5
HUNTER:
Do you still believe the samples to be valid that tne operator 6
took, that the technician took, he actually read 400, 700 parts per million.
I know Mr. Dubiel indicated that he had two samples taken on 8
that second time and he split the samples and had two different gentlemen 9
take the samples, and I noticed on the reactivity calculation the 10 number is actually 407 and 402 divided by 2 or an average number of 11 404.5 parts per million. They actually used that average number for the 12 calculation. Ok, so you would, it would be...
13 14 KUNDER:
If it makes sense.
15i 16!
HUNTER:
.. Be dense steam.
At at that, at that time of day, in the 17 morning of the twenty-eighth that in fact had not, the voiding, the two 18l phase ' steam water mixture hadn't entered your mind at that, that particular 19l time?
i 20' 21 KUNDER:
No it didn't.
2 ?,
22 24 896 117 25 i
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HUNTER:
Ok.
You touched on something that I'd like to pursue also, at 2
six thirty approximately you had talked with Mr. Dubiel and you had in 3
i fact indicated that the possibility was, to enter the containment 4{
existed and that you had asked him to pursue that particular activity, 5
by getting the appropriate samples and, as I, like we followed through, 6
Bubba Marshall ended up asking for an RWP and actually asking to go 7
into containment.
What was your reasoning for asking to.
. reasonsing 0
for making an entry at that time? What did you want to do or what did 9
you have in mind?
10 11 KUNDER:
Well I don't think, I had intended to make an entry at that 121 moment because we had pressure in the reactor building and we wouldn't 13 have sent anybody in there but I wantad to make all preparations for 14l that entry such that when the, conditions in the reactor building 15 permitted that is, the radiation level, the 0 and hydrogen samples 2
16!
that we typically take per one of the HP procedures and that the tem-17 perature and steam conditions that most probably existed in there 18!,
through the, through the.
. rupturf. cf the drain tank rupture disk.
1hl Once those condition were -
'e enough to permit entry, we wanted to 20 have all that information ready so we could send a team in to inspect 21 the damage and determine how much water was on the floor and things of 22 that nature.
We of course never, I don't think the thought entered my i
23 24 25!
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mind after that because we continued to evolve into you know, progres-2 sively more serious proceived situation and I don't think we really 3
pursued sending a guy in.
4 5
RESNER:
This is Resner speaking.
Mr. Creswell has now joined us, 6
that's James Creswell, C-R-E-S-W-E-L-L.
Mr. Creswell is a Reactor 7
Inspector with Region III of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
8 9
HUNTER:
Ok George, continue again,... was Dick aware that tile 10' intention was just to prepare to to make an entry later?
Not to make 11 an, make an entry fairly quickly? Did you, didn't you discuss that 12 that, yeah this was in preparation for an entry at at some time later?
13 14 KUNDER:
I'm I'm only presuming it was.
I I don't think we may have, I 15!
may have indicated to him that... it was desirable to send somebody 1
16!
in as soon as we can...without really specifying a time, I guess in 17 my own mind my intent was as soon as it's safe to send a guy in there 18 we would attempt to do so.
We have done this very same thing in the 19l past, following a trip or unusual circumstance we we prepare to go into 20 the reactor building to inspect for any leakage, with you know, in 21 hopes of identifying anything that may be unsafe or that needs corrective 22 action, prior to presuming normal operations and startup activities.
I 23 don't think this, that somebody, had somebody come and asked at that 24, moment if they could go into the reactor building, I'm sure it would 25 j
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have been denied because of the fact we had pressure in the building 2 :
and we weren't sure what the airborne contamination levels were and in 3
my own mind I expected to see significant airborne levels which would 4'
prevent entry with without anything other than full PC's and Scott Air 5
Pack and full protective clothing.
6 7
HUNTER:
Ok, George, along the same line did at some time later or did 8
the events that occurred fairly quickly after that, did some time later Dick Dubiel get the sample and get the word back to you or was the 10 sample never was never taken.
11 12 KUNDER:
I have heard since that time that sample was attempted to be 13 drawn on HPR 227, the location which I'm now aware.
And they were 14 unable to draw a sample of anything other than water.
We just had 15l apparently enough condensation that occurred in the sample lines that t
16' you couldn't draw mean per sample.
And I don't think I recall ever 17 speaking to Dick or anyone else in following that event about going 18 into the reactor building.
I don't think we discussed it at all.
The 19{
reason that I got Dick started on that evolution is typically it takes 20 anywhere from one to two hours except for an emergency entrance.
It 21 takes that long to you know take care of all the administrative checks 22 and sampling and RWPs prior to making the actual entry.
So I felt we 23 were you know some period of time away from actually having to send a 24 person in.
895 120 25,i l
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HUNTER:
O k.
2, l
3 KUNDER:
It would be more of a team rather than a person.
4 HUNTER:
Right. Ok, George.
Change the subject again.
When you came 6
in they had a trip.
They had an emergency injection initiation for low pressure.
They were sitting at certain at a pressure of 1200 pounds by 8
the time you got there.
The pressurizer level was up.
Did you at any 9
time look at the BWST level so that you're aware of the actual level of 10 the BWST as point of determining your plant status when you came in?
11 12 KUNDER:
I recall that I went around to the back panel and I can't 13 remember for sure.
I might have.
14 15 HUNTER:
You didn't note that or write it down anywhere?
Or tell 16 anybody to write it down?
17 18l KUNDER: No.
19{
20 HUNTER:
That type information?
21 22 KUNDER:
I do recall in Unit 2 the BWST level was maintained normally 23 somewhere around 55 to 56 feet.
And the level indicator if I had 24 looked at it I may not I don't think I could have distinguished between 25 896 121
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a few thousand gallons cause the tank holds about 450,000 gallons.
So j
2t slight level change would not have meant too much to me because I would 3
not have had the reading prior to the injections to make a difference 4'
in calculation.
I think I might have looked at that level.
I think I 5
may hve gone around there and just recall something like that but I 6
just can't be sure.
I did ask the operators from behind the panel how long they had injection going because it seemed to me it was a long 8
time. I felt that they probably filled the system up with solid.
That 9
was my perception of the plant status after I had a chance to confirm 10{
what they were telling me about pressurizer level and pressure.
I 11l 12 HUNTER:
George, let me, Hunter speaking, make sure that I understand 13 that when you looked at the status that you felt like the operators had ik in fact, safety injection of, emergency injection on adequate amount of i
15!
time to actually fill the system up and that they had that it was solid 16!
at that time?
l 17l l
18l KUNDER:
Yean, bas.J on my observations that was the only conclusion 1Nl that I could reach but they maintained that they didn't have high 2d pressure injection on for that long and I think I asked them for the 21 amount of time that they thought it was on.
They couldn't be sure.
22 23 24 896 122 25
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HUNTER:
George, the... Hunter speaking, the indication of the words 2
that they gave to you, did they, did you discuss the initiation turning 3
off the pumps, throttling the high pressure injection anc going back to 4
normal makeup and then establishing letdown, you indicated that when 5
you got there the letdown was on and but did you discuss the sequence 6j of events to get where they were when you came on into the Control 7
Room?
8 KUNDER:
I don't believe I discussed the details of the high pressure 10' injection evolution and subsequent throttling at all.
11 12 HUNTER:
And who were you leaving those details to when you came in 13 were you leaving those to the shift supervisor or Ken Bryan or Bill 14 Zewe who probably were there at that time when you came in?
15!,
16!
KUNDER:
I'm not sure what you mean who I was leaving with.
17 18{
HUNTER:
Were they actually the ones that were actually.ontrolling the 19!
plant?
20' 21 KUNDER:
Yes, the shift foreman when I first arrived was in charge of 22 the panel operations if you will.
Fred Scheimann was operating at the 23 console sort of as an overseer for the operators.
He, too, appeared to 24 be trying to figure out what..
2s!
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HUNTER:
Did Fred and you have some discussions at that time?
Did he 2.
ask for your help or advise?
3 4
KUNDER:
I can't recall any specific requests.
I think I asked questions 5
of he and the operators to try and understand what had transpired and 6
what they were seeing.
But I don't request... don't recall any specific 7
requests for assistance of any type.
8 9
HUNTER:
Ok.
10 11 KUNDER:
I think probably presumed do whatever I could to assist them.
12!
13 HUNTER:
Some general questions George, concerning...were you familiar 14 with the Licensee Event Reports which occurred in 1978 for instance 15 there was some report... License Event Reports that actually that speci-16l fically addresses the initiation of safe emergency injection on Unit i
17 trips as looking back on your routing system or training or retraining.
18!
Were you familiar with the any special reports or Licensee Event Reports 19l that had been written up concerning unit trips, low pressurizer level, 20 ES, emergency safeguard system actuation on Unit 2?
21!
22 KUNDER: Yes, I was familiar with the I believe two or three incidents 23 where safety injection was involved.
The one specifically I recall the 24 events from a somewhat distant perspective which were involved with the 25 896 124 i
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l I think it was April 23rd trip from 30 percent power or the secciiaary 2
side safety valves lifted and continued to flow dcwn the system pressure 3
and cause a rather significant reduction in RCS temperature pressure.
4 I wasn' t in Unit 2 at the time but I was aware of the scenario and the 5
fact that pressurizer level had gone low and safety injection was 6
initiated to restore the pressurizer level and you know the coolant 7
inventory.
There was another trip that had occurred and I believe it 8
was due to loss of feed. But I can't recall offhand precisely how.
9 That occurred early November and I think there was another incident 10 that had occurred in December and I'm pretty certain both of those 11 involved safety injection due to transient performance which reduced 12 pressure sufficiently to bring off safety injectier.
And both those i
i 13 instances the pressurizer level did go by the low but was restored to 14 normal level conditions and safety injection was secured.
I 15 16i CRESWELL:
George, I've seen some information associated with a trip, 17 reactor trip that occurrea on November 3, 1978.
Reactor power was 18l around 90% when the loss of feedwater condition occurred.
Could you 19 elaborate on the recollections of what was involved in that trip.
Are 20 you saying during that trip there was a substantial cooldown in reactor 21 coolant system?
22 89b 125 23 24 25j t
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KUNDER:
I don't recall the transient performance in sufficient detail.
2 j
I'd have to review the trip report to be able to comment with some 3
degree of intelligence at this point.
4 5
CRESWELL:
You don't remember that anything significant came out on the 6
review of the event?
7 8
KUNDER:
I don't recall the specific recommendations offhand.
9 10 CR6 SWELL:
In other words it would have been anything of real signifi-11 cance or you could have recollected what had happened?
12 13 KUNDER:
Let me think.
I believe in that situation we did have a very 14!
low pressurizer level.
I believe it I'm not mistaken we uncovered the 15!
heaters and there was some question as to whether or not we did go 16!
below zero and get above coolant system from the pressurizer.
17 181 CRESWELL:
I see.
l 19l 20 KUNDER:
I think that was the same event that caused high concentra-21 tions of sodium in the system due to the fact that the DHV AA and B 22 valves opened as a result of the safety in.jection that lead to a rather 23 lengthy shutdown after that transient occurred.
24 2s 896 126 i
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CRESWELL:
What was the nature of the lengthy shutdown what necessitated 2.
the lengthy shutdown?
3 l
4!'
KUNDER:
I believe it was probably a ten or two week shutdown and that 5
was due principally to the need to clean up the reactor coolant system.
61 l
7 CRESWELL:
That's to remove the sodium...
8 KUNDER:
Remove the sodium.....demineralizers.
And offhand I can't 10 think of any other significant findings as a result of that.
I do ll!
recall that the logic for the opening of the DHV AA and B valves was 12 modified such that you had to have the safety injection plus a low 13 moderately low level in the BWST concurrent with the safety injection i
14) in order for those valves to open.
I 15j 16i CRESWELL:
George, a general question in the same area.
What type of 17 system of formal management mechanism if there's a full mechanism would 18{
did in fact make you familiar ~with these particular events realizing 1N!
your own Unit 1 possibly you ended up on Unit 2.
Was there some formal 2d routing or training that was used to familiarize you with previous 21l events on Unit 2 or Unit 1 either one?
22 23 896 1il 24 25 l
1 1
24 1
KUNDER:
Yeah, I think the formality of informing myself and Unit 1 2
personnel would have come No. I through the training program the requali-3 fication program where in a portion of that program deals with operating 4'
experience in other units and plants.
5 CRESWELL:
Are you saying George that that is the way you did get the information?
8 9
KUNDER:
No, I don't think that I got the information through that 10 mechanism.
I don't think that the timing was such that all the operators 11 were briefed immediately.
I became aware I believe through either a 12 copy of the trip report that I received or one that I reviewed when I 13 took over in Unit 2 shortly thereafter.
My transition to Unit 2 began 14 when I became aware that I was going to Unit 2 I of course took an 15l interest in starting to figure out what was going on over there and I 16' think it was about the tail end of that outage.
And I was formally 17 involved with Unit 2 activities beginning of December.
18l l
19 RESNER:
At this time we'll break the tape.
It is now 11:24 p.m.
20 21 RESNER: This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. George A. Kunder.
22 The time now is 11:25 a.m.
23 896 128 24 25 l
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25 1,
CRESWELL:
This is Jim Creswell speaking again.
George, going back to 2
the November 3rd, reactor trip the one we're talking about loss of 3
Do you recollect whether any changes were made to the 4
emergency feedwater system regarding level setpoints or anything in the 5
control system that would affect the flow of auxiliary feedwater to the 6
reactor coolant system I'm sorry to the steam generator?
7 8
KUNDER:
No, I'm not aware of any charges.
9 10 CRESWELL:
I understand that there's presently a thirty inch level 11 setpoint for the emergency feedwater system.
As far as you know that's 12 always been 30 inches?
13 14 KUNDER:
The nominal figure is 30 inches, that's the same number that's 15j exists in Unit l's setpoint upon loss of the normal feed pumps and 16l that's the number that's utilized out to B&W simulator.
Yes.
I 171 l
18f HUNTER:
George, I want to clarify something.
When you came in basically 19i did obtaining status of the plant discussing with the operators during 20t the period of time apparently from five o' clock or so until six o' clock l
21 up until seven o' clock was Bill Zewe and the shift foreman Fred Scheimann, 22 and I believe Ken Bryan was there and then later on Mike Ross came in 23 24 8 'f b l / C) 25!
26 1
also but were those fellows the did you leave the operation of the i
2; plant to those fellows or did you get specifically involved in any 3
operations at that time?
4 5
KUNDER:
The operation responsiblity for operation and direction of the 6
plant was in the hands of Bill Zewe and Fred Scheimann, the shift 7
foreman.
And that's purely because I'm not licensed in the Unit and I 8
don't I wouldn't be able to direct specific operations very easily with 9
that kind of knowledge.
In a broad sense I would imagine...I can't 10 recall specific instances of this but I think in a broad sense I may 11 have made recommendations or participated in understanding what moves 12 they were going to make and passive concurrence.
I agreed with what 13 they were doing.
14; 15I CRESWELL:
Jim Creswell, again.
Regarding to your recommendations and 16) so forth some of the other interviews would indicate that at one time i
17 you studied a draft of Net Hodge's suction heads the requirements for 18 the reactor coolant pumps versus the pressure in reactor coolant system.
19 Do you recollect that?
20 21; KUNDER:
Yes.
22 23 CRESWELL:
Ok.
What did you find when you're going through this process 24 review?
25l 896 130 i
27 1
KUNDER:
I again want to confirm that the reasons that it was desirable 2:
to shut the pumps off were valid and I recall observing the pressure 3
and recall pretty sure I looked at the temperature and I can't remember 4
if I looked at the cold leg temperature or hot leg temperature.
I 5
might have even looked at TI.
I just can't see it in my mind anymore 6
but I took the two temperature in pressure relationship and went to the 7
curve that was attached to the procedure laying on the operator desk 8
and I picked the point out and verified that that point was it was at 9
or just slightly below the upper MPSH curve for four pump operation.
10 And that...just looking at that that data in my own mind I verified for 11 myself that yeah it was ok to stop the pump.
12 13 CRESWELL:
It was Ok to stop it...
14, f
15;;
KUNDER:
to take two pumps off because we were getting in a region that i
16!
was not permitted by the E&W amendments and precautions from which 17 those curves are derived.
18l 19i CRESWELL:
If I recollect properly that graph also has minimum pressure 20 limits plotted on it.
21 2
KUNDER:
It does.
896 131 23 24 25 l
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28 1
CR25WELL:
What did they look like I mean what did the pressure temperature 2'
relationship look like compared to the minimum pressure limit?
3 4
KUNDER:
I can't remember focusing to be honest with you so I can't say 5
but recalling the curve along side of that as well.
I at that 6
moment I don't think in my own mind I was focusing on anything other 7
than rationale for tripping two pumps.
8 9
CRESWELL:
Ok, you mentioned it was procedure laying on the operator's 10' desk there? What was the title of that procedure, do you recall?
11 12 KUNDER:
No, the procedure was opened to the page which showed the 13 graph knowing the ways the graph are drawn up and inserted in various 14 of our operating procedures.
Their all the same.
And I didn't really 15!
look to see if it was in the shutdown procedure or I would presume it 16i was in the not the shutdown but rather the cooldown procedure ; presume 17 it was that but that's only presumption.
18l l
19I CRESWELL:
That it may have been...
20 21, KUNDER:
It may have been another one which gave us the same curve.
22 The same curve does appear I would estimate six or seven other procedure.
23 If it's laid out the way it is in Unit 1.
I have not gone through and 24 read all the Unit 2 procedures to confirm that.
25 i
896 132 t
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CRESWELL:
Do you recall making any notes on that graph?
2 3
KUNDER:
I don't recall doing so, no.
4 5
CRESWELL:
George along the same line in Unit 2 that minimum pressure 6
temperature curve series of curves saturation in temperature pressure curves fall into a number procedures.
One procedures that it falls in 8
concerns is specifically concerns natural convection or going to natural 9
convection and there are some words in that particular procedure that 10 discuss going to natural convection.
You were present in the control 11' room when they shut off the second two pumps the last two pumps that 12 were operating.
Did you see the procedure for natural convection did 13 you in fact have that available or did you see someone using that 14!
procedure?
15; 16 KUNDER:
I don't ever recall....
17 i
i 18!
CRESWELL:
I'm under the assumption that if you shutoff the last two I
19' pumps that the next step is natural convection and did you discuss that 20; issue with Fred Scheimann or Bill Zewe concerning natural convection or 21 was the concentration on shutting the pumps to prevent damage to the 22 pumps and the discussion that you had during that time frame what were 23 you keying on?
24 896 133 25 I
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1
30 1
KUNDER:
I think we were keying on protecting the pumps and not violating 2'
the MPSH curve and in my own mind I fully expected natural circulation 3
to occur.
At that juncture sr.ill was not aware that the reason for the 4
reduction in flow on the loop with the pumps running. I didn't tie that 5
reason to the fact that we had steam in the loops but rather it was 6
presumed that we were losing suction because we didn't have the condi-7 tions getting cavitation of the pump suction and that was the reason 8
for the reduced flow.
9 10' HUNTER:
George, Hunter speaking again, after shutting off the two 11 pumps then the B loop did you recall or did you recall discussing the 12 parameters in the B loop at that time, temperature cold, hot, with the 13 shift supervisor?
14, 15 KUNDER:
No, I don't recall discussing that and I don't think I focused 16i on those parameters at all if I had looked at them I don't think I 17 really was trying to you know access what...
18I i
19' HUNTER:
Another general question...are you familiar with the require-20 ments of the procedures which states utilization of natural convection 21 of these steam generators or decay heat removal.
Are you familiar with 22 that procedure?
23 24 89b 134 25 i
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31 f
1, KUNDER:
Yeah.
2.
3 HUNTER: Are you familiar with the requirements -of the procedure as far 4
as prerequisites for natural convections? And I'm not looking for 5
details I'm just...
6 7
KUNDER:
I'm generally familiar with it, yes.
8 9
HUNTER:
Are there any highlights of that procedure that stand out in 10 your mind today as far as what would be required to insure natural 11 convection?
12 13 KUNDER:
Yeah, I guess the one thing that sticks out in my mind is you 14
... limitation in there on the temperature differential between the 15l1 pressurizer in the loop to assure that you do indeed keep the hot leg I
16' candy cane top of the generators sub cool so that you don't form a 17 steam bubble in there.
And you basically guarantee the you know solid 18 water in the loops by keeping enough pressure in the system or if the 19 pressure is decreasing in the system for instance if you were to lose 20 pressurizer heaters or something like that you would have to cool the 21 generators and keep a good lead on that cooling so that you don't get 22 into the condition where you'd form a boiling the loop.
That is some-23 thing that would I think have taken time presuming we were going into 24 natural circulation and my thought process was that thing.
I auto-25 896 135 i
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32 1:
matically assumed that natural circulation would be inherent and automatic 2'
l at that point.
Because I didn't recognize that we had steam and loops 3
already and the implementation of that procedure would be to go to the 4
computer go to thd console, check temperatures and start making methodical checks that you would have to make but it would be sort of a followup 6
kind of action not an immediate very concentrated concern on the panel.
I did not at least I didn't approach it that way.
8 9
HUNTER:
Hunter speaking again.
Would our presumption be that after 10 the last two pumps were secured that that the fellows or you did in 11 fact start looking for natural circulation?
12 13 KUNDER:
I didn't begin looking to confirm the parameters that would be 14j necessary to assure natural circulation.
I think at that moment I t
15i assumed that natural circulation was inherent and would be automatic 16!
and that checking to assure we had natural circulation would follow 17 events occurred in the revelation that we had the high activity the 18l intermediate range indication and things-like that were I guess taking 19 up my attention span to the point that I didn't really concentrate on 20I whether or not we indeed had natural circulation by a methodical check 21 on the primaries.
22 23 896 136 24 t
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33 1
HUNTER:
I've got one more general question I guess we're going to run 2
out of time as far as you wanted to pretty quick.
During this 3
time frame now we're down where the pumps are off.
We're sitting 4
natural convection should be going.
It isn't because we found out that 5
the hot legs flashed the steam right away and locked everything up.
6 One question that would like to discuss and that would be decay heat.
7 Did during the time between when the last two pumps operated was six 0
twenty or whatever.
During the time that you came in and until the six 9
twenty with Bill Zewe on the conference call or with Fred Scheimann or 10 the Control Room operators, did you fellows discuss decay heat? The 11
" requirements to maintain the reactor coolant" and were you actually 12 removing heat from the reactor.
13 14, KUNDER: I don't think I recall discussing that at all or even considering i
15!
it, you know, with any great amount of deliberation.
l 16' 17 HUNTER:
If you didn't consider it would we assume that you consider 18l decay heat was being removed?
19[
20 KUNDER: Yes.
21 22 HUNTER:
Would you explain what you would assume to be the normal 23 method at that time what your assumption would be as far as removal of 24' decay heat at that time?
25 896 137 4
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34 1
KUNDER:
Well the mode of decay removal is through the steam generators 2
to the secondary side steaming into the condenser initially.
3 4
HUNTER: With the reactor coolant pumps on the A pumps also then earlier 5
the B pumps.
6 7
KUNDER:
All four pumps initially when I came in were running and circulating coolant and removing the decay heat through that fashion.
9 And without again doing a without being able to focus in all indica-10 tions and really calmly analyze methodically analyze let's put it that 11 way what the indications were telling me.
I just assumed that things 12.
were working as they would on any particular shutdown except for the 13 fact that the level was high and pressure was low.
14!
l 15 HUNTER:
Are we almost through with the tape?
16t 17 RESNER:
Mr. Creswell will be leaving the interview.
18!
l 19!
MARTIN:
This is Tim Martin speaking.
George, when you arrived we had i
20 all four reactor coolant pumps operating.
And we had both steam gener-21 ators on the line.
Shortly after securing the reactor coolant pumps in 22 the B loop we isolated the B steam generator, do you remember the basis 23 for that decision?
24 896 138 25, I
I
I 35 1;
j KUNDER:
I recall that Bill Zewe or someone got word that we...had an 2
alarm...I'm not sure the...how...they were aware that they were seeing 3
radioactivity out of one of the generators or out of the B generator.
4 I don't recall if they saw the vacuum pump exhaust monitor going up and then through sampling or through local monitoring of the steam lines 5
concluded that the B generator was the one that had the apparent tube 7
leak or not.
The conclusion was made that the B generator had a tube 8
leak and the crews isolated that generator.
It's very difficult for me at this point without looking at the course of the curves and so forth 10 to remember exactly when in sequence that was done.
But that's my 11 recollection.
12 13 MARTIN:
Martin again. George, then you're saying that at least at one 14 time the B steam generator was isolated based upon some radiation level 15l or contamination limits that the shift became aware of.
16 17 KUNDER:
That's correct.
18l l
19l MARTIN:
After we had secured reactor coolant pumps in both loops and 20 it's approximately six, six fifteen, you were involved in a conference 21 call with among other people Mr. Miller.
During that time there was a 22 discussion of the status of the EMOB, electromatic relief valve, block 23 valve, do you remember that?
24 09b
}j9 25 i
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=
Y, 26
~
1 KUNDER:
Yeah, I seem to recollect that on Cae last interview.
And I 2
seem to' recall that Lee Rogers asked me if the EM valve was open.
I 3
think in my h st interview by the way when I was li3tening to the tapes 4l I thi v I may have'said that the..may have referred tb the block 5
vah e.
I can't really remember which br. I think he probably said 6
asked me excuse me what the position of the EM valve was if it was 7
closed.
And coming out of the shift supervisor's office and asked the operators at the console.
I didn't go up to the console and look for '
9 myself.
I asked them if it was closed and they indic1ted taat it was 10 and I came back in and told Lee Rogers that it was cic;ed.
And I 11 believe we were refering to the EN valve rather than the block valve.
12; 13 MARTIN:
So when you asked the cperators you may have asked them what 14 the status of the EMOB was versus the block valve.
Do ycu have knowledge 1
15l of when the block valve itself was shut?
16; 17 KUgDER:
I don't.
Other tnan through my subsequent review of the 18-information, you know, after the event was pretty much terminated.
19l g
20i MARTIN _:
George, isolating in on the EMOB much later in the event 21 around noon we had been at 2000, 2l00 pounds pressure and had made a 22 decision to try to have the core flood tanks inject.
Do you remember 23 the mechanisa utilized in dropping pressure to the point where the core 24 flood tanks would come on the line?
896 140 l
6
37 1(
l KUNDER:
Yeah. we...the block valve was opened.
And the EM valve was 2
apparently deliberately failed open in order to vent off the steam or 31 water that was in the pressurizer and attempt to blow down the RCS to i
4l reduce pressure.
Up until that time they had been cycling the block 5;'
valve with apparently the EM valve open.
So that is the mechanism they 6
used.
7 O
MARTIN:
George, at any time during the extended event was the pressu-9 rizer vent valve utilized?
10{
11' KUNDER:
I'm not aware of it ever being utilized during that period of 12!
time.
13{1 l
14!
HUNTER,:
George, you mentioned that the block valve was cycled with trie i
15j EM08 opened.
Do you recall whether the EM08 at that time they had 16; actually taken the position to switch and actually open the EM08 and 17 maintained it open or was it in the same condition that it was before 18!
the block valve was closed earlier?
19f i
20j KUNDER:
I uid not know ho they were doing it.
I assumed that they it 21 opened through a switch in the console.
22 896 141 23 HUNTER:
Okay.
24 25j f
I f
38 1;
MARTIN: Once Miller arrived and Rogers arrived which is approximately 2
seven, seven fifteen in that time frame.
We have reports that there 31 I
was another attempt to start reactor coolant pumps.
To your knowledge 4[
did that occur?
5 6
KUNDER:
I can't be sure.
I recall one attempt to start the reactor 7
coolant pump and that was successful.
We started a pump and I think it 8
occurred before the time that Gary came in if the pump was attempted to be started later on I wasn't directly aware of it.
10l' 11 MARTIN:
George, referring to the earlier start of the reactor coolant 12!
pump before Mr. Miller arrived computer printouts would indicate that 13 one was started that it was run for approximately nineteen minutes.
14 !
During this period of time there's also some discussion or indication i
15j that the B steam generator was unisolated and allowed to steam.
Are 16l you aware of this occurring?
17 18f KUNDER:
No, I know the B steam generator was again through hearing the 191 operator's conversations was isolated in two occassions.
Earlier 20j}
apparently just af ter the trip occurred because it was thought that the 21!
and I even t:iink it was about the time that I came in.
It was secured I
22l because it was believed that perhaps we had a steam leak in the B 23 generator that was contributing to the building pressure.
And that 24 conclusion was arrived at because of the fact that the B steam generator 25 6
896 142 t
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39
(
l l!
j pressure was lower by some 100 or 200 pounds pressure than the A generator.
2 And I think I recall Bill Zewe being involved ir, that and I didn't pay 3
real close attention to the efforts in the secondary side.
That was my 4j perception of the first time it was isolated.
And a little bit later S
l subsequent to that event the believe it was concluded that since the 6
pressure didn't decrease in the building that and that the generator 7
level and pressure was fairly well maintained in the B generator that 8
maybe we didn't have the leak and the decision was made by Bill or I'm 9
not sure exactly who, it wasn't myself I know that.
The decision was 10' made to try and place it back into service because maybe they were 11' wrong and that was done.
And then it was subsequently isolated the I
second time due to the pparent indications of tube leakage in the B 13 generator.
The timing of that is very fuzzy in my mind so I'm not sure 14; I can answer your question very clearly.
(
15!
16 RESNER:
You referred to Bill.
Bill who?
17l i
18l KUNDER:
Bill Zewe.
191 20!
RESNER:
Thank you.
I 21!
t 896 l43 22 23 24 251 l
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40 1
6 MARTIN:
George, early in the event when you arrived I believe we were 2h l
steaming through the turbine bypasses to the condenser.
Were you 3
involved in decisions to shift to atmospherics dumps and back to the 4
turbine bypass and if so can you provide us any indication of the basis 5
for those shifts and tactics or where this team was to be put?
6 7
KUNDER:
I was not directly involved in the decision to do that.
I was 8
aware that the operators and Bill Zewe were very concerned about the high level in the hotwell.
And the impact of that high level might be 10 that we could induce water hammer or some other type of damage through 11 continuing to bypass steam into condenser.
As it turns out from the 12 Unit 2 design the bypass lines go into the condenser and exhaust steam 13 beneath the two bundle and just above the normal water level in the 14, hotwell.
And with the hotwell level very high that line would have I
15!
been either close to or actually fully submerged.
The decision was 16!
made pretty much by the crew.
I'm just guessing that Bill made the 17 decision to go out the atmospheric dump valves and as I recall the 18f manner in which they did that was to trip some of the circulating water i
194 pumps rather than break vacuum.
I think later on in the morning.
I 20 can't recall exactly when vacuum was lost because of the loss of the 21 adequate amount of steam needed to seal the turbine shaft and the Unit i
22' 1 aux boilers were attempted to be started by the operators in Unit 1 23 but they had problems with the boilers and they couldn't get them up to 24 25 I
896 144 l
I
41 Il j
pressure and as a result we lost vacuum in the condenser as well.
So 2'
for a period of time we were removing heat through the atmospheric dump 31 valves except for the one that was isolated from the B generator.
4 S
MARTIN:
Alright, George, subsequent to this we returned to the turbine 6
bypasses, do you remember the basis for that decision?
7 8
KUNDER:
Yeah, I recollect that that move was made I believe closer to 9
noon.
And that was done after we were able to re-establish sealing 10 steam to the turbine and establish vacuum in the condenser.
And as I 11l recall I'm pretty sure this was the time it was late in the morning.
12 At that point in time the knowledge of the accident was at the state 13 level, the upper levels and someone offsite and onsite was able to l
14, observe the steam being exhausted to the atmospheric dump valve.
I was 15l never outside the Control Room to see that but Gary Miller had gotten 16i orders over the phone to close those valves because it was believed 1
that they were a source of the radiation leakage released to the envir-181 onment.
And through I believe readings with dose rate meters and ld!
perhaps other indications that I just wasn't specifically aware of it i
20l was cor.cluded pretty firmly that there was very little if zero contami-21 nation in that steam coming from the A generator and I guess Gary was 22 ordered to close those valves, just close them period.
I believe he 23 24 896 145 25j l
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.f
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(
(
42 1
delayed long enoug: that we were able to finally get established and 2
then re-establish heat removal to the condenser.
That was my recollec-3 tion of that event.
4 MARTIN:
Early in the event sequence we were feeding the steam generators 6
using the emergency feed pumps.
This was after we had found and corrected 7
the problem with the twelve valves.
At some point in the event we 8
shifted our feed from the emergency feed system to the condensate pumps 9
can you clarify or give us a feeling for where that might have occurred 10 either time wise or connected to some event?
11 12l KUNDER:
No. I'm sorry. I didn't remember making that switchoff.
I 13 wasn't following the exhaust operations that closely apparently at the 14; time.
15l
(
16!
MARTIN:
George, Tim Martin again.
Between the time approximately 17 seven o' clock shortly after the site emergency had been announced to 18j ten o' clock when we had returned to 2000, 2l00 pounds cycling the EMOB Idl block valve to maintain pressure we don't have a heck of a lot of 20 information of what went on and try to figure out what events might 21 have occurred during that period of time that allowed pressure to 22 esentially...it looks drift aimlessly.
Obviously it had some direction.
23 Someone was making decisions and I'm trying to find cut what went on 24 during that period of time.
25 1
896 146 I
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43 1
l KUNDER:
I don't understand that, it seemed like that was only about 2
five minute time span there.
Do you wish me to try and through...
3 my activities.
4 5'
MARTIN:
As best you can during that period the beginning of the site 61 emergency until we have repressurized and are operating on the EMOB 7
block valve.
If you can remember anything that might have occurred during that period it would help.
9 10 KUNDER:
Ok, my main responsiblity at the time we declared site emergency 11, was to try and assist Joe Logan and afterwards Gary Miller and starting 12 the communications offsite I had previously asked for a number of 13 people to be called in which I believe we discussed in my previous i
14l interview.
And I assigned two of my engineers to make the phone calls 15 that were required by the emergency plan.
16l 17 MARTIN:
George, Tim Martin again.
I would like to focus in on the 18{
operational aspect if you have any knowledge of it.
i 19!
20 KUNDER:
I see what you say.
I guess I bounce back and forth so I 21 can't give it very consistent accounting of the operations that occurred 22 over approximately two or three hour period.
Although I do know once 23 the emergency plan activities notifications were fairly well in gear 24 which probably involved my time for about an hour or so, I'd say around 25' 896 147 I
t i
44 1
8 o' clock we consulted as a group with Gary Miller in the shift supervisor's I
2; office and variously out in the Control Room and I think the key members 3
of that group were Mike Ross, Miller and Lee Rogers and I think Jim 4
Seelinger had arrived in the Unit 2 Control Room and Bill Zewe.
And we 5
discussed our tried to discuss our strategy for the time period to 6
follow.
I believe we were all concerned that indications in the core 7
were... indications in the reactor coolant system showed that we had 8
very high temperatures on the hotlegs.
As a matter of fact the hotleg 9
temperature indications was pegged at 620 degrees.
At that moment I 10 was not aware that we had wide range temperature indication and Ivan 11 Porter, who's my lead IC engineer was in the process of trying to 12 review some of those indications and I was also unaware that Unit 2 had 13 the incore temperature indications or if I was aware of it it was not
)
14 very... I wasn' t very clearly aware of it.
And he was trying to get 15j that kind of information.
And he was pretty much feeding that information i
16l to Gary for the most part. So it's apparent that we had high temperatures 17 and I was concerned as well as the rest of the group that the high 18[
pressure injection may not be doing an adequate job getting enough 19l water to the core to keep it cool and we I think we became of the frame 1
20' of mind that we did have a vapor binding effect in the core.
We had 21 recognized that after all the scenario transpired at that point we were 22j indeed without a lot of water in the core in the reactor coolant system 23 and we had to charge a lot of water into the thing and try and keep it 24 cool and at that poh* we were not certain that we had a clear blow O()b ISO i
i
i 45 l
,I
^j path through the core.
I indicated before that I personally was very 2'j concerned about the pontential for continued feeding the water into the 3t core and subsequent steaming of that water leaving behind baron, high 4
boron concentration to get t'o the point of crystallization.
And I was 5
very deeply concerned that you know we really didn't have things under 6
control as yet and we stil1 had a lot of work to do plan our strategy 7
and Gary Miller pretty much led the way on getting the group together 8
and discussing alternatives.
I can't recall the specific discussions.
9 I just recall my.....
10 11; RESNER:
This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. George A.
I 12 Kunder. The tape cut us short and we--George was in the middle of 13 answering a question. If you would please continue.
After he finishes 14!
answering that particular question, due to his time scheduled we will 15 continue this part of the interview at a later date, George?
16l 17 KUNDER:
0.K.,
thank you.
I believe I was discussing the process of 18 determining our strategy with respect to the operation of the reactor 19l and recovery.
i 20 21 MARTIN:
That's correct.
22 23 24 g g(g j4g 25 i
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f
46 1
KUNDER:
0.K. I believe, as I indicated on the previous date, somewhere 2
around 45 minutes to an hour after declaring the site emergency and 3
l getting the emergency plan fairly well underway we--we being Gary 4
Miller, Jim Seelinger and Mike Ross, Lee Rogers, and myself--met generally 5
ds a small group to discuss strategy and our perceptions about where we 6l were and where we thought we should be going. Because it was pretty 7
clear based on the hot leg temperatures existant in the core at that 8
time that we were into a very serious problem, that we did not ;, at have 9
the cooling of the reactor well under control.
I think the general 10 perception at the time was that we intuitively thought that we nad the 11 core covered.
I think by that time we felt that we were getting water 12!
into the core, but there was no indication that hit you in the head and 13 said " Yeah, you are covered."
So, that concern was under consideration.
14 I also, I know, was personally concerned about the potential for concen-15!
trating boric acid in the core through the process of just cooling the 16!
core by steaming. And we were somewhat in a boiling pot mode, or so we 17l thought, at that point.
I recall specifically expressing that concern i
18i to the group.
We were also concerned and discussed the fact that we 19l had been using high pressure injection to get water into the reactor 2
for, perhaps, an hour or an hour and a half, at that point.
I don't 21 recall seeing any real clear or substantial changes in RCS parameters, 22 such as pressure and temperatures. Temperatures were still high and the 23 pressure was still low.
We were fairly well convinced in our own minds 24 that we had a bubble of steam in the top of the reactor and in the hot 25' 89b 150 i
i
47 1
legs. We were trying to consider ways in which we could vent off steam 2
l to effect a better cooling, or ways that we could assure ourselves that 3'
high pressure injection water was indeed flowing preferentially into 4
j the reactor versus some other sneak path.
At that point, we wer.e somewhat concerned that maybe there was some sort of a sneak path 6
existing, which could bypass some of the flow around the reactor, such 7
as perhaps leakage around the plenum assembly and out into a hot leg 8
and right out the pressurizer vent or the pressurizer EM valve--let me 9
think--no, I guess that was closed. But at any rate, we were concerned 10 that we weren't getting--we may not be getting enough cooling to the 11 So, all those concerns, put together, were the subject of our core.
12; discussions. And we were also afraid that since these parameters weren't 13 changing very readily that we may end up being in this mode for a 14 considerable period cf time and then run out of water from the BWST, t
15 and then the next choice would be to go on reactor building recirculation 16!
type of cooling.
I think we all felt that that was very undesirable, 17 from the standpoint of drawing whatever contaminants that you can 18l potentially pick up in the reactor building in through the decay made 19l system and then through the makeup purification system and into the 20' reactor again.
Long term, we were hoping to avoid that, but that was 21 not a real major consideration, I don't think. We were concerned about 22 running out of water in the BWST ultimately, and having to go to another 23 mode of cooling. We finally, I think mutually, came to agreement that 24 we should try and raise pressure in the system.
My memory really fails 25 l
896 151 i
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e 48 1
me now, I can't remember now if the electromatic valve was...I think at 2
some point we opened the valve.
I can't remember if we opened it prior 3
to pressurizing up to the 2,000 pound point where we cycled pressure, 4
or not. It's just not clear in my mind, I guess I can review the curve 5
but as I sit here now it's just not clear in my mind anymore.
But we 6
did decide to raise pressure. We must have had the valve open because I think I recall we closed it. I believe we probably had it open because 8
we were figuring,... yeah, it's starting to come back a little bit. I 9
think we had the valve open because of the concern for getting flow 10 through the core, not just putting water into it and having the water 11 flash to steam and leave all the boron behind.
We were trying to come 12 up with a way of getting, water through the core, guaranteeing we're 13 getting flow through the core and sweeping it in that fashion.
I 14j believe that's the rationale that was used to keep that valve open.
I 15!
Later in the morning, we mutually agreed that it might best to pressurize i
16 up and then continue that venting, because you would tend to, of course, 17 achieve the higher saturation temperature effect, that would hopefully 18j minimize boiling and any of those effects in the core.
So, at that 19 juncture we closed the valve, left it cicsed, allowed pressure to come 20 up in the system, and then continued to vent out the pressurizer, which 21!
was the only place we could see that it was possible to get a flow 22 through the system. And that's what we did.
I guess that takes us up 23 to the point that you are interested in.
24 25f 096 l'J2 r
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49 l
HUNTER:
One question, during this time did you guys, fellows discus.
l 2l' restarting the reactor cooling pump? Do you recall any discussions, 31 l
realizing that it was started, that it was off and you're sitting... At 4f this point you were getting ready to go down to core flood, or depressurize.
5 In this time frame while the pressure was up, do you recall any discussion 6
as far as restarting the reactor coolant pump?
Consideration of restarting...
7 O!
KUNDER:
I vaguely recall, various times throughout the day, we may 9
have discussed that, I just can't recall specific discussion any more 10 in my mind, to start the pump.
I seem to recall, in discussing this 11l thing after the fact, many days after the fact, that there was a reluc-12 tance on the part of either B&W or others to try and run the pump for 13 fear of failing seals, and that sort cf thing, but that's all very i
14) vague and it's purely speculative at this point.
15; 16l HUNTER:
Thank you George.
I have no further questions, we'll continue i
17]
this again at a later time.
I 18i 19l RESNER:
The time now is 12:15 p.m. and we picked up this portion of 20!
the tape at 12:04 p.m.
21 896 153 22, 23 24 25j r
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