ML19249B000
| ML19249B000 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1979 |
| From: | Shovlin D METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290067 | |
| Download: ML19249B000 (94) | |
Text
1*
T' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
In the Matter of:
1 2!
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW l
3' of Mr. Daniel M..Shovlin Superintendent of Maintenance 41 l
5 6'
7 81 Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11 Mav 21, 1979 12-(Date of Interview) 13 Julv 3,1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 14 234, 235, 236 15 (Tape Number (s))
16 17
- 18i, 19 i
20l 21
/
NRC PERSONNEL:
'22 Mr. F. N. Fasano 23 Mr. James S. Creswell M. Dale E. Donaldson 895 048 24 Mr. William H. Foster 25I i
1
,I
L'.
1
. COSTER:
The following interview is being conducted of Mr. Daniel M.
2 Shovlin.
Mr. Shovlin is Superintendent of Maintenance at the Three 3
Mile Island nuclear Power Facility.
The present time is 10:02 p.m.
'4 Today's date is May 21, 1979.
The place of the interview is trailer 5
203 located immediately outside the south gate to the TMI site.
6 Individuals present for the interview are interviewers:
F. N. Fasano, 7
Inspection Specialist, Performance Appraisal Branch, Office of Inspection 8
and Enforcement; James S. Creswell, Reactor Inspector, Region III; and g
Mr. Dale E. Donaldson, Radiation Specialist, Office of Region I.
My name is William H. Foster.
I am a Senior Inspector Auditor, office of 10 Inspector and Auditor, NRC.
I'll be monitoring the interview.
Prior g
to the interview being recorded Mr. Shovlin was provided documents explaining his rights concerning information he obtained regarding the t
incident at Thren Mile Island.
In addition Mr. Shovlin was apprised 15{!
of the purpose and investigation's scope and the authority by which the Congress authorizes the NRC to conduct an investigation.
On the 16j second page of the advisement document Mr. Shovlin has answered three questions.
The questions and Mr. Shovlin's answers will now be recorded as part of the interview.
Mr. Shovlin, do you understand the document?
19l 20' SHOVLIN:
Yes, I do.
21 22 FOSTER:
Do we have your permission to tape the interview?
23 24 2s 895 049 i
2 1
SH0VLIN:
You do.
2 3
FOSTER:
And would you like a copy of the tape?
4 SHOVLIN:
Yes, I do.
5 6
FOSTER:
Okay.
Then, at this time, would you please give us a brief 7
8 summary of your academic background and your employment history as they relate to the nuclear field.
g 10 SHOVLIN: I had 27 years in the United States Navy.
I retired as a Lieutenant Commander.
I have been employed with Met Ed almost 6 years.
14 I
FOSTER:
Thank you. Dan, at this point on I'll turn the interview 15j l
over to the I&E personnel.
16!
17!
FASANC:
Dan, when were you notified en March 28, 1979, about the occurrence?
19 20 SHOVLIN:
It was after 5:00 in the morning.
22 FASANO:
When did you arrive here?
23 24 895 050 2s i
3 1
SH0VLIN:
It was after 6:00.
Normally I got a call as the superinten-2 dent of maintenance as it relates to the problem, why did it trip, and 3
how long a period of time will the plant be down; what other work y
could be scheduled during that time frame that it's going to be down.
5 And that's basically the purpose of my getting involved at that particular time.
6 7
FASANO:
g So it was routine at that time that you would be notified.
9 SHOVLIN:
That's correct.
10 11 CRESWELL:
Who called you?
(
13 SHOVLIN:
I don't recall.
It was someone on the shift.
I don't know if it was a shift foreman or one of the control room operators, or...
15l 16l CRESWELL:
From Unit 1 or Unit 2?
17 18t SH0VLIN:
I believe it was from Unit 2.
19 20l i
FASANO:
When did you realize that it was an unusual situatio.t In 21l other words, when did you really get involved with the occurrence?
22 23 SHOVLIN:
Well when they...actually they declared it as a site emergency.
24l When I came to the plant I proceeded to the Unit 2 control room.
My 25 i
895 051 t
i
4 I
recollection is, at that time the superintendent of Unit 2 was in J;;
charge, was there.
Joe Logan, and of course supervisor of Operations--
f 3
well the shift supervisor is Bill Zewe.
They were carrying out the 4
shutdcwn procedures and when they declared a site emergeny, Joe asket I
S me to get a hold of Gary Miller.
That was about a quarter of 7; 6
quarter to 7 or 10 to 7, I believe it was.
7 FASAN0:
George Kunder was there already?
g 9
SHOVLIN:
George Kunder was there, yes.
I don't recall that Jim 10, Seelinger was there.
I don't believe Jim Seelinger was there at that g
time.
I got a hold of Gary Miller at a quarter of 7, which I believe he was in previous telepncae contact with the Unit 2 contrul room.
And I told -- Gary was previously scheduled to go to Oyster Creek that I
day, or that morning.
I told him that they just declared a site 15j emergency and I don't recall at that time if I gave him any particulars...I'm on my way...I'm on my way in.
From that point on my function was in charge of the emergency repair party.
And we really did not get actively involved until there was some parameters that they -- I guess the relief value on the makeup tank was lifting and they wanted to get 201 I
some jumper hoses from the makeup tank connected into the reactor 21 building.
I believe that was performed by my I&C people.
I believe 22 Doug Weaver, who's a foreman and Wilson, who's a foreman, were activcly 23 involved with that evolution.
Also I think was after -- I don't 24 believe it was parallel, it could have been -- was the reactor coolant 25 895 052 l
l
5 1,
bleed tank.
They also were hooking up tubing to vent off into the 2
reactor building from the reactor coolant bleed tanks.
And this was 3
because of the pressure buildi..g up and blurping off right into this 4
space.
That was the major activity as far as the emergency repair 5
party.
It was with my I&C group.
I believe they needed some electrical assistance.
Whether there was -- I can't recall.
We have log books, 6
I know a lot of it can be identified.
Whether there was some fans 7
8 tripped or they needed some electricians to go and check out the circuitry.
g 10 FASANO:
Fr.ns on what.
12 l SHOVLIN:
They are nandling fans and I don't recall wha _t system.
But la_
l I belicve they called my -- they needed electrical assistance, though.
14j 151 FASAN0:
Ok.
Let's get back a little bit.
Wher you did arrive, this 16 time you went right to Unit 2 control room?
18f l
SH0VLIN:
Because that was one of the trips.
19l 20 FASAN0:
Yeah.
21 22 SHOVLIN:
The unit that tripped.
23 24 895 053 25 i
6 1
FASANO:
Yes, and that would be different than what you normally 2
would do?
3 4
SH0VLIN:
No it's no different.
I would go to the unit that tripped 5
to find out just what happened, okay? And when I do, I go up and see 6
what the problem was; whether it was the turbine it tripped you, or 7
was it the reactor it tripped you; how long it's going to take to get g
back to restore the casualty; or if it was going to be down for any g!
appreciable time.
I have what you call a "no-name outage list," which is work, that i: identified and is on a continuing basis that we 10 prepare the procedures and have the parts ready in the event there is g
g an nonplanned outage as this could have been called.
13 FASAN0:
In your opinion when you got there then it is not unusual for you to go into a control room?
16' SH0VLIN:
Oh, no.
I 18[
l FASAN0:
After a trip?
191 20 SH0VLIN:
No.
21, 22 FASANO:
How did the people in the control room, how did it seem to 23 you they were behaving?
24 25j i
f f
7 1
SHOVLIN:
There didn seem to be no one running around in panic.
2 And looked like the CR0s and shift supervisor and they were over on 3
the control panels.
I didn't see any really...the major concern is 4;
when Gary Miller came into the control room, then I could see they had 5
assembled people into the shift supervisor's office and they talked 6
about the plant condition, what thef thought were resolved or where the levels were in the pressurizer.
That was discussed between Gary, 7
Kunder, Mi b Ross, I believe was there at the time, Seelinger, of 8
course Bill Zewe...
g 10' FASANO:
When you were in on this kind of a meeting, was this when you were assigned to oversee the emergerg repair?
e 13}
l SHOVLIN:
Soon as they declared a site emergency, the emergency 14l repair party is in fact a reality.
And I report to the emergency 151 control station which was effective which happened to be -- well I was there.
17 1 81 FASAN0_-
Did you report to the emergency control station or center?
i 19!
20 SHOVLIN:
No, no.
It's the station.
21 22 FASAN0:
And which is where?
23 24 895 055 2s i
i t
8 1:
SHOVLIN:
Actually I happened to be in the control room in Unit 2.
2l Normally we go down to the c:ntrol point in jour Unit 1, that's the 3
emergency control station there.
And then from there they could 4
declare you to go, well it all depends on the conditions to go to the 5
alternate emergency contrcl station, which is adjacent to your shift supevisor's office up in the Unit 2 contro s room.
I DONALDSON:
Could I just back up and pick up something here? When g
gl the site emergency was declared, did you report to the emergency control station that is the Unit 1 chem HP area?
10 11 SHOVLIN:
No, Unit 2.
That's where I formulated my -- I gathered my repair r.1rty which actually was the shift maintenance crew that are on g
duty okq:
1 151 16ll DONALDSON:
The emergency control station and I will make sure we got this term right.
The emergency control station is in fact the Unit 1 health physics chemistry check point, is it not?
19f l
SH0VLIN:
That's correct.
20!
21 DONALDSON:
Then you did not in fact report to the ECS.
You remained 22 in what is the ECC, and that is the effective unit control room?
23 24l i
2s!
893 nS6 l
I
9 1.
SHOVLIN:
No.
The alternate ECS is right off the shift supervisor's 2
office in Unit 2 control room.
3 4
DONALDSON:
I guess what I'm saying is, were you aware of the fact 5
that the ECS was in fact located at tne Unit 1 chem HP area, and that 6
a repair party came and had formed in that area?
7 SHOVLIN:
Well tney had, that's correct.
And I requested that the 8 j g!
emergency repair party report to the Unit 2 emergency control station 10 where I was present at the time.
11 DONALDSON:
Now who in the emergency organization do you report to on the organization chart?
3 14' SHOVLIN:
I report directly to the emergency control center, which 15 would be the station superintendent or whoever, or the unit superin-tendent whoever is the person in charge of that.
18f I
DONALDSON:
19l I'd like to show you a chart here of the emergency organi-l zation.
Just let me know if this is right or wrong.
20' 21, SH0VLIN:
Okay.
23 DONALDSON:
All right?
Emergency diagram from procedure 1670.2 and if you'll notice the way it operates, the...
l 895 w7
10 lj SH0VLIN:
My verbal communication goes through the emergency control 7
station.
.s 4
00NALDSON:
In terms of your --
5 SHOVLIN:
In turn it's relayed to the control center.
6 7
DONALDSON:
What is the significance? Could you explain to me the g
significance, then, of having the emergency repair party as one of g
10 the off shoot blocks underneath the radiation protection supervisor, who in fact directs the activities in the ECS.
I 12l SHOVLIN:
And he does, he does.
My communication is directly to him 3
up through to the station superintendent, who is in the control room.
15i 16l DONALDSON:
Then is it safe to assume, then, that you were coordinating r
or communicating with him even though you were located in a position or place different than he was.
19 SHOVLIN:
I was 'cordinating emergency repair efforts as a direct result of communications between the unit superintendent Logan, Bill 21 Zewe, Mike Ross through me at the Unit 2 control room.
22 23 CRESWELL:
Who declared the site emergency.
24 895 058 2s I
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i
11 1
SHOVLIN-Oh, I believe it was -- I believe it was either Ross or 2
Logan, I can't...
3' 4
CRESWELL:
One of the two...
5 SHOVLIN:
One of those that were in the control room at~the time.
6 7
CRESWELL:
Were you in the control room?
8 9
I SHOVLIN:
I was in the control room at the time.
10 11 CRESWELL:
Did they consult with you when they declared the site emergency?
14 SH0VLIN:
No, except that I was -- See, the thing was that this was the normal working hours all right, for maintenance would be like 0730.
So this was prior to that so what you would do is you utilize your maintenance shift people; I&C electrical.
And basically there's only like three, two and three.
You have a total force of about no 191 i
.more than eight people.
20' 21 CRESWELL:
And the breakdown of the three is...
22 23 SH0VLIN:
You have three repairmen, two electrical...
24 25!
i 895 OS9 i
I
12 1
CRESWELL:
Three mechanical repairmen?
2:
3 SHOVLIN:
Mechanical, that's correct.
There would be tuo electrical 4
and you would have three or four I&C type.
5 :
6 CRESWELL:
Okay.
7 SHOVLIN:
And during that time at the Unit 2 control room there were 8
g foremen that came, normally come to work a lot earlier, who became a 10 part of my repair force effort.
These were the gents who hooked up 3
the attempted to hook up the tubing on the makeup tank and reactor coolant vent tank.
g 13 CRESWELL:
Were you working on -- I'm sorry.
Were the people assigned 15l to you working on the relief valve on the makeup tank and hooking up j
the plastic tubing to the reactor coolant bleed tank?
17 SHOVLIN:
Yes.
18i 19l CRESWELL:
20 Prior to the emergency?
Declaration of the emergency.
21 SHOVLIN:
The site emergency?
22 23 CRESWELL:
Right.
25 l
13 1.
SH0VLIN:
If they had it was not too much before the site emergency 2
was declared, I would say.
Let me you say in fact, the normal path l
3 during the night or other than any type of emergency would be for the 4
shift supervisor / shift foreman go directly to the maintenance foreman 5
to carry out a repair function.
Now that could have been carried out 6
during that particular time.
7 CRESWELL:
8 Did you personally give these people instructions to go do that work?
g 10 SH0VLIN:
No, I did not.
12 yu eca
, did someone reporting to you give the 13 instructions?
l 15j 16l SHOVLIN:
No, but it was reported to me what they were doing.
The first indication I had was when my foreman, Hal Wilson, notified me that this was what he was going to do and I can't' recall whether it was just before the site emergency or it was after.
20 CRESWELL:
Do you recall who assigned those men to do that work?
21 22 SHOVLIN:
I'm sure it was either the shift supervisor or shift foreman, 23 either/or, I would...
24 2sl 87S 061 i
f
14 1
CRESWELL:
Were informed that they were going there before they were 2
dispatched to do that work?
3' 4
SHOVLIN:
Was I informed whether they were before from the shift 5
supervisor? No, that's negative.
I was not.
That was direct communi-6 cation from them to either with Doug Weaver or Wilson, who in turn 7
notified me just what they were doing with it.
8 CRESWELL:
That would have been from the local areas where they were g
w rking?
10 11 SH0VLIN:
The I&C shop is right adjacent, right off the Unit 2 control g
room so they were physically right in the control room at the time.
13 14)
CRESWELL:
Okay.
Now you can't remember whether it was Logan or Ross that declared the site emergency?
16,j l
17 SHOVLIN:
That's right, I don' t...
19f i
CRESWELL:
Do you what basis upon which they declared the site emergency?
21.
SHOVLIN:
I believe the basis on the site emergency was a...I might be wrong... a reading of 125 mR right at the security fence.
i believe that.
Either that or a monitor going into a high alarm.
24 25l l
895 062 i
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15 1
CRESWELL:
Okay.
2 3
SHOVLIN:
Okay?
I know one way or the other but soon after they said 4
I have 125 at, I believe, at the security fence.
5 6
CRESWELL:
After they declared the emergency, either Logan or Ross, 7
did they give you instructions of something to do.
8 SH0VLIN:
Yes.
Someone told me to get my emergency repair party and g
10 I called usually, my electrical shop where they hang out or in the g
mechanic shop where they work and I believe I got a hold of Hilary Mitchell, who just happened to be in there earlier, okay? Together and tell them to report to me up at the Unit 2 control room.
14 DONALDSON:
Let's back up there, I'm a little confused.
Having 15 observed several drills here at Three Mile Island, it has always been my observation and understanding that at the time a site or a general emergency is declared, that the repair party automatically musters at the ECS, which in this case is the Unit 1 chem HP...
20 SHOVLIN:
That's correct.
21 22 DONALDSON:
Control point.
That they stand underneath a little red 23 sign on the wall that says "Repaic Party Team."
Is that correct?
24 25 895 063
16 1,
SH0VLIN:
That's basically right.
2, 3
DONALDSON:
All right.
Now my understanding is also that the main-4 tenance supervisory foreman, whoever that would happen to be, would be 5
the immediate team director, as it were.
6 SHOVLIN:
During those conditions, right.
7 8
DONALDSON:
During those conditions.
And that he would in fact or in g
10 turn report to the emergency control station director, if you will, who in this case would be the radiation protection supervisor...
g 12I SH0VLIN:
That's correct.
g 14 DONALDSON:
Now.
I guess where I'm confused is how the repair party 15l l
team, it doesn'c appear that it ever formed at the ECS.
Now, did it 16l ever in fact form at the ECS?
18l SHOVLIN:
I'm not sure when I got a hold of my supervisor to direct 19f l
the maintenance shift people.
21 DONALDSON:
Who was the maintenance supervisory foreman that you 22 placed in charge of the emergency repair team?
23 24 2si 895 064 i
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17 SHOVLIN:
When they reported up to me at the Unit 2 control room, I 1
2 was directly in charge at the time.
Because they all didn't gather at 3
the one -- they came in in dribs and drabs, so to speak.
But once the 4
people had assembled and I directed them right off of the shift super-5 visor's office out of the way of the activity that was going on.
6 00NALDSON:
7 Let's back up again, I want to try to get my mind clear still.
Now according to training records and drill records, you 8
participated in two radiation emergency drills within the last six g
months.
11 SHOVLIN:
That's correct.
12 13 DONALDSON:
What method or procedure did you follow in mustering the emergency repair team during those drills?
16 SHOVLIN:
I mustered them at the Unit 1 HP control area.
17 18l l
DONALDSON:
Could you then explain why in this particular situation 19 in implementing the emergency plan, why you mustered your team in the 20' control room?
21 22 SHOVLIN:
I took it upon myself I, suppose.
The emergency -- I was 23 there in the control room.
The number of people is a minimum number 24 of people, are the maintenance shift people.
And there was activity 25 875 065 t
i
18 1
requiring, to me, requiring people to effect roairs or put in jumpers 2
or...that I asked them...I directed them to repor? to me up in the 3
Unit 2 control room, which is the alternate emergency control station.
4 CRESWELL:
Did all people report to you at that point?
5 6
SHOVLIN:
No, I don't believe they all mustered up there.
7 8
CRESWELL:
Okay.
Where were the other people?
g 10 SHOVLIN:
You mean...?
12 CRESWELL:
You mentioned that you would normally have eight people with the breakdown that you gave earlier; mechanical, electrical and instrumentation.
Now if the eight people didn't show up, where were 151 the other people?
17 SHOVLIli:
I didn't inquire.
They were either out on a job, some particular job, or... it was getting close to.
you know, their shift 19 is over at 0700, okay?
Site emergency...
20!
21 CRESWELL:
They were getting ready to go heme?
22 23 SHOVLIN:
Either getting -- in their locker or getting washed up or 24 whatever, I would think.
23 895 066 l
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19 1
CRESWELL:
Did ar.ybody call you from this ECS in Unit 1 to tell you 2
that they were there?
3 4
SHOVLIN:
No, the only time I... they could of contacted -
not me 5
directly, but they contacted your, either the shift supervisor, whoever 6
was then director of...the emergency control director that there were men down there.
I was not, at the particular time when the site emer-7 8
gency went off, it seemed to me that they were still trying to restore their casualty, their trip.
And I in turn, because I knew the shift g
maintenance on shift, I needed people to support my effort and I was 10 in Unit 2 control room, I knew that's where the casualty was and I directed the...
13 CRESWELL:
Is it possible that some of these people were out working on the relief valve on the makeup tank and the reactor coolant bleed 15j l
tank?
16l 17 SHOVLIN:
No...
You mean before?
You mean during the, putting in i
the line to vent off?
19{
20 CRESWELL:
Right.
21 22 SH0VLIN:
That's possible.
23 24 895 067 25j i
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i
20 1,
CRESWELL:
Okay.
2 3
DONALDSON:
You mentioned that you decided that you needed the people 4
in the control room because that's where the trip had occurred and 5
where the problems were being experienced.
Again going back to past 6
drills, had you not experienced that same need during drills? What 7
made this situation so much different than drills that you had been in 8
before that you would not meet your repair party in the assigned location?
g 10 SH0VLIN:
Well first of all, I think now there is a big difference between a simulation and the real thing, all rignt?
It was real to me.
And real to eu meant I was there in Unit 2 control room, they 1,s were having problems.
It was quite evident to me they were having i
problems either interpreting levels, instrumentation.
So it was 15l prudent on my part to -- the predominance was to me to have I&C people over and above that which was a part of the repair party, and I turned to the I&C shop that's right adjacent to Unit 2 contr 1 room to augment the number of people that I required and the expertise that was required.
They were there and I utilized that expertise.
They were not a direct 20 member of the repair party.
21 22 DONALDSON:
Okay.
You mentioned ove. and above.
Then, the people 23 who you mustered in the control room were in fact sort of like a, oh, 24 side group you felt would be needed to do things over and above.
25 i
895 068
21 1
SHOVLIN:
These were my (so to speak) experts, not a side group.
2 People who knew their business, okay?
These were the foremen; these 3:
were like Wilson, and Doug Weaver, who were foremen, who were well 4
familiar with the systems; who quite frankly, they were running around 5
taking action and taking steps, probably before I got there, they were 6
there.
And they became a part of my communications.
7 00!iALDSON:
Let me finish this line, if I could.
I wanted to try to 8
g develop what's happening here.
Alright now, then I assumed froa. what 10 y u're said that there in fact was a repair team or repair party g
formed and at the emergency control station with the official repair party.
The people you had were sort of like your assistants.
y 13 SH0VLIN:
Well I did request that the people that were on shift and was either I paged through the page system (and if I remember correctly 15i it was Hilary Mitchell, the individual that I got in touch with) and I told him and he said they are all, the people of the repair party were mustered down at the emergency control station at Unit 1.
And I said
~"I want you to direct those people to the emergency control station up 191 at Unit 2."
20 And I informed the emergency control director that my party has been mustered.
It was apparent that I have augmented my party with additional talent and we proceeded from there.
22 23 CRESWELL:
Who did you report to?
25 l
I
22 1
5"0VLIN:
I reported the repair party, Joe Logan was the individual 2"
at the time that I was mustering my repair party.
3 4
FOSTER:
We are going to take a break and change the tape now.
The 5
time now is 10:30 a.m.
6 FOSTER:
We are continuing with the interview of Mr. Shovlin.
The 7
time is still 10:30 a.m.
8 9
DONALDSON:
10 So essentially by what, 8:00 would you say? We have you with your repair party personnel in the control room.
Or was it earlier? Do you know?
13 SH0VLIN:
I'd say, yeah, about between quarter of and 8:00, prcbably they were assembled.
Maybe it was after 8:00, maybe it was like 10 l
after 8, but around that area they were assembled.
16i 17 i
DONALDSON:
All right, then we have you now in the control room and performing various repair type functions or maintenance functions at the request of Mr. Logan?
Is that correct?
21 SHOVLIN:
There was some conversation, yes.
Mr. Logan and Zewe and Ross.
There was various people.
23 24 895 070 25l i
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23 1
DONALDSON:
Okay, in other words there, any number of people were 2:
requesting your people to perform various actions?
3 SH0VLIN:
That's correct.
And I might say that some of those actions 4
5 went directly to the individual, to the foreman rather than go through 6
me to the foreman, okay?
7 DONALDSON:
Did the foreman then get in touch with you?
8 9
SH0VLIN:
They kept me advised, okay? Of what they were doing.
10 11 DONALDSON:
Did you keep a log or any kind of record?
13 SH0VLIN:
There is -- In the emergency -- in the Unit 2 control room, no.
We do have a log.
The I&C people kept a log of the work that was performed during that whole evolution.
17 DONALDSON:
Then after the time when the repair party was formed, I
let's say the morning of the 28th to start with, were there any repair 19{
functions performed by your team members in areas where...that either 20; later proved to be or that you knew beforehand had high levels of radioactivity?
Or any levels of radioactivity for that matter?
Did 22 they make entries to the aux building?
23 24 895 071 25j 1
J' 24 1
SH0VLIN:
You mean prior to the incident, prior to the site emergency?
2' 3
DONALDSON:
No.
We have you...
4 5
CRESWELL:
Asked to pursue this prior to the site emergency like these 6
guys that could possibly be working on the relief, the makeup...?
7 SH0VLIN:
I said that was possible.
They could be in that area.
8 9
CRESWELL:
10 Did they have health physics coverage when they went out there?
11, 12 SHOVLIN:
13 When they were putting in the... yes, I'm pretty certain tr.at they did, yes.
When they were putting in the tubing, and the...
15!
- # "" '"P'"# 8 #
16 is the work to be done and they would check to see if you need an RWP.
Correct?
18l 19l SHOVLIN:
Under normal conditions you work with a work request and a procedure, okay? Which takes a PORC review and so forth.
This was not done.
This was done in emergency conditions, okay?
23 DONALDSON:
Okay, Dan we've got you.
The emergency has been declared, 24 l
you have your repair party formed.
Were there any functions that any 251 l
895 0/2 i
25 1
of your team members performed either requested by Mr. Zewa, Mr.
2 Logan, anyone else in the facility; where did they enter the aux 3
building, anywhere where there was any radiation?
4 SHOVLIN:
The only work that was identified throughout the whole 5
6 morning was trying to install a line from your makeup tank to the 7
reactor building and from the bleed tank to the reactor building.
8 DONALDSON:
Okay, a line from the makeup tank.
Now prior to the g
initiation of that work, did you have any discussions either Mr. Dubiel or Mr. Mulleavy or Mr. Huwe or any of the rad protection personnel regarding radiation levels in the area of the makeup tank?
12 SHOVLIN:
I personally?
15 16l DONALDSON:
Yes.
17 SHOVLIN:
No.
18l' 191 DONALDSON:
Did your foreman?
20' 21 SHOVLIN:
I'm quite sure my foreman did.
22 23 DONALDSON:
Do you know for a fact?
24 2s 895 073 f
26 1
SHOVLIN:
No, I don't know.
But I'm sure that someone would have 2.
alerted them when they initiated that action, okay?
3 4
00NALDSON:
_0kay, and your foreman again would have been Hillary 5
Mitchell?
6 SHOVLIN:
No, the foreman would of been either Wilson, Hal Wilson 7
8 (he's the I&C foreman) or Doug Weaver.
Wilson is the one I have seen g
that was most actively engaged in that particular evolution.
10 00NALDSON:
3 Alright, now to your knowledge when Mr. Wilson directed 3
or assisted in performing any of these repair functions on the morning f the 28th, did he have a rad chem technician accompany the team?
13 14 SHOVLIN:
I couldn't tell you.
I don't know, i
16' DONALDSON:
Did you at all discuss with him the need to touch base I
with the ECS?
18 19I SHOVLIN:
I did not, because that work that Wilson was doing on the 20 tubing was initiated before I got actively involved in the formulation of the repair activity, the emergency repair activity.
That particular, 22 the makeup tank job was -- I don't know if it was directly instituted before the site emergency or if it was a little bit after, right after 24 it was declared.
But he was actively involved.
25, l
895 074 i
i l
i
27 1
DONALDSON:
And the work continued?
It continued?
2:
3 SH0VLIN:
And the work continued on.
That's correct.
4 5
DONALDSON:
Did you get any reports back from Wilson about how that 6
w rk was going?
7 SHOVLIN:
No, I did not.
8 9
DONALDSON:
10 The individuals involved, did they report back?
11 SHOVLIN:
In fact I can't recall on the makeup tank, or I can't recall on the bleed tank of the completion of that activity, okay?
141 15;l DONALDSON:
Did they say they were successful in what they were 16l attempting to do?
t i
17l SHOVLIN:
On the makeup tank or the bleed tank?
I believe on the makeup tank they were successful on that particular evolution, but I don't know, I can't say bonestly on the bleed tank, if that was installed and checked out and was doing...
22 00NALDSON:
I believe that when Gary Miller took over as the emergency 23 director when the site emergency was declared (he arrived somewhere 24 around 7:00, I believe), he designated four individuals who would be 25 895 0~/S
28 1.
in charge of various aspects of the emergency.
He directed someone in 2.
charge of operations, he directed someone in charge of health physics 3
and accident assessment for radiological.
4 SHOVLIN:
Uh-huh.
5 6
DONALDSON:
7 He also directed another individual in the operations area to advise him.
If I am hearing you say, is'it correct to say, that 8
g you were not receiving requests or direction from a centralized person, but rather from a number of individuals?
O 11 S10V!.IN:
Well when Gary first came in and called everyone in the control station, that's when he designated and I was the one wau was responsible for the maintenance functions.
That's when he gathered everyone into the control supervisor's office, and he designated in each individual as to what function they are going to perform.
You are in charge of the repair functions.
18' DONALDSON:
Was this -- again, you mentioned that in past drills your 19 normal position was at the ECS.
Then, did Mr. Miller at all ask you 20 why you were there? Or didn't it seem strange to him see you there 21 when normally he would expect to find you in the ECS? Or maybe he 22 didn't think about it?
23 895 076 24 25 i
i
29 1
SHOVLIN:
No, I don't know; maybe he didn't about it.
I think condi-2.
tions, knowing that it was a real thing, apparently a real thing to 3
all of them and certainly to me, you're looking to localize whatever 4
started the condition.
And...
5 6
DONALDSON:
Then Mr. Miller did assign you and did say to those 7
present that anything having to do with maintenance, go through Shovlin.
8 SH0VLIN:
Go through Shovlin, that's correct.
g 10 DONALDSON:
Go through Shovlin, okay.
g 12 SH0VLIN:
To those people that were in the office, I think if I 13 recall it was Seelinger, Logan, Zewe, Ross, myself and Gary.
And 8
- 9 9*
- 15 from B&W was...
17 FASANO:
Dan, as you said previously, that you do report to the control room where a trip has occurred so you could get the parameters.
So in this case you were in the control room.
21 SHOVLIN:
That's correct.
22 23 FASANO:
At the time of the emergency?
24 25!
895 077 l
30 1
SHOVLIN:
When they declared the site emergency.
2 3
FASANO:
Where did you assemble with your people in the control room 4
physically?
5 SHOVLIN:
Right adjacent to the shift supervisor's office.
As you 6
7 come in the entrance, that area right there.
8 FASANO:
How many people were in that area?
g 10 SHOVLIN:
11 On I would say roughly, at that particular time, about 10 people.
g 13 FASANO:
How many people were in front of the yellow line?
15 6l SH0VLIN:
The console?
17 FASANO:
Yes.
18 19f SHOVLIN:
I like about six or seven, roughly.
That included the 20' supervisor, the superintendent, I noticed.
But I kept myself away from the activity because I had no business up there.
23 00NALDSON:
You mentioned that Lee Rogers from B&W was also in the control room.
At any tima did Mr. Rogers request of you or any of 25 I
l 895 078
31 1
your people that certain repair functions or tours of the building be 2
made?
3 4.
SHOVLIN:
Not that I recall, no.
I 5
DONALDSON:
Alright.
Now again on the 28th, and I dont want to worry 6
7 too much about the specific time it occurred, but at any time do you 8
recall any discussions involving the need to change the seal injection filters?
g Were you approached by anyone and requested to perform that 10 11 SHOVLIN:
That morning you say, on the 28th.
13 DONALDSON:
On the 28th.
15 SHOVLIN:
What time?
16 17 DONALDSON:
Any time if you can recall.
19 SHOVLIN:
No, not during the time I was there.
But I have just found out when I got relieved I was there from the time after 6:00 until roughly 3:00 in the afternoon.
I previously thought I was there a lot 22 longer.
I got relieved and I came back.
I got relieved by Dick Sieglitz 23 who's the supervisor of Unit 2, Supervisor of Maintenance, of Unit 2.
24 25 895 079 t
(
32 1
DONALDSON:
Would Mr. Sieglitz be a normal alternate for you in 2
heading the repair party?
3 4
SHOVLIN:
Yes, yes.
5 DONALDSON:
He would be?
61 7
SHOVLIN:
g See, the thing is when the site emergency was declared I had no people on the island all right?
They were over at the observa-g tion center.
They mustered over there, okay? After I somewhat got 10 some assemblance, some people reported to work early and I utilized them; that was the I&C people.
I called -- I made a -- And I'm trying to think the communications.
I requested that my supervisors come to the island and muster and contact me.
Basically I wanted to see where I was going, what work had to be identified to do and where would my people work.
But they were mustered over at the observation center.
So I was able to get a relief for myself, I thought it was 3:00.
The 18 normal shift maintenance relieved the other individuals that were in the repair party, and we continued that arot:nd the clock.
20 DONALDSON:
On the morning here, nos (I guess by 9:00 or so) the health physics pople had pretty much determined that there were 22 significant radiological hazards within various areas of the building.
23 24l Do you recall Mr. Miller cautioning or discussing at all the command or control or authorization for various entries that were to be made 25l r
895 080 1
33 l'
by people? Who that was to go through? Any general policy that he 2
may have reiterated at that time?
3 4
SHOVLIN:
I believe there was some word that was given in the control m, general people in view of Miller I believe any entry into, and I r
5 6
don't recall if it including the aux building, but I do believe that, 7
not Dubiel but I believe Mulleavy...Mulleavy or Cubiel was the one g
that was supposed to be coordinating that effort, oke.y?
9 10 DONALDSON:
Was Mr. Mulleavy in the control room at this time?
11 SHOVLIN:
I don't recall that now.
I think Dick Dubiel was.
13 DONALDSON:
Was Mr. Wilson or Mr. Weaver were they present in the I
control recm when this announcement was made?
15!
16i SHOVLIN:
I can't say that.
I don't know.
18 DONALDSON:
Do you recall whether or not you reiterated that comment to them?
20 21, SHOVLIN:
To Weaver or, no.
22 23 DONALDSON:
Or Wilson.
25 1
l l
l
34 1
SHOVLIN:
No.
But I know -- there were so many things going on and 2;
y u know, to recall each individual... I remember when Gary came in he 3
took over, he took control, I remember that.
As soon as he stepped in 4
he took over and there was some vocalizing on his part to give out instructions.
But most of the time I spent was directly in the area 5
6 f where the repair party functioned.
And I know there were some 7
instructions given over in the area of the console right directly in fr nt of your reactor protection.
8 9
DONALDSON:
10 Now normally if you were located at the Unit 1 chem HP point and you had to make an entry into the Unit 2 auxiliary building, how would the repair team make that entry? Would it be through the Unit 1 HP check point and across, or would it be directly in from the Unit 2 side?
15 SH0VLIN:
No.
It could be through the Unit 2 side.
First of all 16li they would assign us an HP type to go and monitor the area well he'd be assigned as a part of the repair team.
They would give us exact directions where, what avenue to the take, okay? Whether it would ce 19 through the Unit 1 turbine building over into the Unit 2; or would it 20t be up over from Unit 1 to Unit 2 fuel handling building; that specific 21 directions would have been given there at the Unit 1 HP control station.
22 23 00NALOSON:
Then it's reasonable to assume that since the radiation 24 protection supervisor is located essentially right at the entrance, 25 895 082 i
35 1
that he could control entries and make such explanations before the 2
entry were made.
Correct?
3 4
SHOVLIN:
That's correct.
5 6
OONALDSON:
My memory serves me be right that about 9:00 in the 7
morning, the ECS did in fact relocate to the Unit 2 control room g
because of increasing radiation levels in the chem HP area.
Correct?
9' 10 SHOVLIN:
Yes, I am trying to recall the direct time that we did have g
airborne, that we had to put on respirators.
i don't know if it was around that time or not, right in the control room.
7 13 DONALDSON:
Once the 'CS had been relocated and Mr. Mulleavy anti the 15l ECS, and all the rad-chem technicians were in the control room, at any
(
16l time when they were located in the control room, do you recall seeing any of your repair party individuals being briefed as to routes to be taken, exposure times, protective clothing required, so on and sc forth?
19 20-I SHOVLIN:
From the time after 9:00?
I dan't recall any activity to 21 any extent after we put the respirators on.
I op 23 DONALDSON:
So basically --
25l
(
s
36 1
SHOVLIN:
As far as maintenance activity.
2{
3 DONALDSON:
S. on the morning as far as you were concerned, the only 4
maintenance activi~ ties you had been provided with or asked to accomplish 5
were completing the hook up from the makeup tank.
6 SH0VLIN:
To the reactor building, right.
7 8
DONALDSON:
And hooking up tubing from the reactor coolant bleed tank.
g 10 Those were the only two functions.
11i SHOVLIN:
And there was electrical request... I'm trying to recall...
to restart air handling motors and I don't know where -- the aux building,. reactor building or where but I know there was one.
i 15li CRESWELL:
You mentioned eariier that there was a problem with inter-16 preting instrumentati1n.
Did any of your people --
18, SHOVLIN:
Yes, there's times I've seen we were over by the console, 191 I
l okay? With several people and what they s.ere discussing I'm sure was
?
20 pressurizer levels aJd what time of the day now that was after we were 21 doing any -- it was rifter the involvement in, his activity with the 2.? l nakeup tank and reactor if I can recall.
And what I'm saying is that 23 many times the operatica shift foreman, or someone would directly call
, 24 the foreman and say "I want you to 1cok at this particular problem we
.25 have."
895 084 l
37 1
CRESWELL:
That was in the control room?
l 2
3 SHOVLIN:
That was in the control room.
4 5
CRESWELL:
That wasn't out in, say, the aux building?
6 SHOVLIN:
No, no, that was directly in the control room.
79 aj FASAN0:
g Were you knowledgeable of getting water treatment unit and water from Unit 1 to Unit 2? Apparently there were some valves on the water treatment system in Unit 1, I tr. ink it was B-52 or B-63, that g
requested to be tapped off and then water would be available to Unit 2.
Do you have any knowledge of that work?
{
14j l
SHOVLIN:
That was on the water treatment system? No.
15!
16 FASAN0:
You have no knowledge that Unit 1 supplied Unit 2 with makeup water?
19!
SH0VLIN:
No, if it was done, it was done through a normal valve line l
up that Operations would perform.
22:
FASAN0:
You have.;c knowledge that say, a...
23 24 25 895 085 t
38 SHOVLIN:
A repairman or someone assisted in that?
1, 2
3 FASANO:
Not a repairman but, say, someone at the foreman level actually did that in Unit 1.
4 5
SHOVLIN:
6 That could have happened, but it would have had to have been from direction of either an operation supervisor or a foreman who 7
Would recommend...
9 FASANO:
And you would not have been notified?
0 11 SHOVLIN:
I would not have been notified.
13 i
DONALDSON:
In that direction an operations foreman, you said.
- Now, 14)
, b, !
were operations foremen also directing repair or corrective actions?
A i i
16 SHOVLIN:
As they have in the past, I'm sure they have requested directly to foreman to foreman type of communication.
Yes.
l 19 DONALDSON:
Then requests for action were not being essentially taken 20' to a central authority for review and looking at it in light of the 21 overall situation?
22 23 SH0VLIN:
Not during the conditions that existed on that particular 24 day.
25{
i 895 086 t
I t
I
39 l
14 DONALDSON:
Are you aware of any people other than your maintenance 1
2!
people or those people. 'o would normally be on the emergency repair 3
team performing any valve line ups, assessment tours to determine 4j plant stttus in the aux building, things of that nature? When you 5
were on shift at any time? Any time during the 28th through the 30th.
6 SHOVLIN:
Not to my knowledge.
7 8
DONALDSON:
I wonder if you can recall any of the other specific g
actions that you might have been involved in in terms of repair type?
10 For example, laying down of plastic in the auxiliary building.
I think you also had a hose hooked to the waste gas decay tank so that that would vent into the auxiliary building.
14i SHOVLIN:
Now I remember the plastic and that was to cover water that 15j 16l!
was already spilled, I believe.
I remember that action.
But I don't know, right now I don't know whether it was in the aux building or what area of the aux building it'was.
18(
19l DONALDSON:
Did your repair team perform that function?
21 SH0VLIN:
I believe they were requested to do that.
I remember the 22 action being taken, and I remember because there was water that was 23 contaminated on the floor.
24 2si 89b 087 I
l t
l l
40 1
CRESWELL:
Where?
2 SH0VLIN:
I believe it was in the makeup room, or in that area.
I'm 3
4 n t certain, but I know that they did request and put plastic down to 5
particularly cover up contaminated water.
6 CRESWELL:
You say they requested.
Who is "they"?
7 8
SHOVLIN:
Operations.
Either the shift supervisor or someone from g
Operations requested that.
0 11 CRESWELL:
Through you or directly to you?
12, 13 SHOVLIN:
I believe it was through me.
15 16l CRESWELL:
Who did you assign to the task?
17 SHOVLIN:
These two or three people that were...
18 19 t
CRESWELL:
Next to you...
20 21 SH0VLIN:
In my repair party.
22' 23 CRESWELL: And they would have been mechanical, electrical, instrumen-24 tation...
25 l
895 088
41 1
SHOVLIN:
Or I&C, right.
2' 3
CRESWELL:
You don't recall who they were?
4 SHOVLIN:
And I can't to this day tell you who the names of the 5
6 repairmen were except for my talking to Hillary Mitchell ~and the I&C 7
types who were mostly actively involved.
Now it could have been the g
I&C types th'at went and laid down the plastic because they were the ones that were involved in the work.
In fact, the I&C group were, g
from what I Can recall, were involved in 99% of what activity that went on that day.
And they in turn could have put the plastic down in order for them to go in to do -- to be able to go in and work or whatever they had to do.
14 l
CRESWELL:
Is it a fair characterization that there's various number 15j of people beside you during the course of the event that morning; people are leaving and coming back and you mentioned that at this time there were three people there when the plastic was laid down.
18[.
t 19 SHOVLIN:
Roughly I believe there were three people.
20 21 CRESWELL:
You had a total of eight people available and this besided 22 the number of people...
23 24 895 089 25 I
i
42 1
SHOVLIN:
Yeah, there was a total of eight people were there during gj what time frame.
Eventually I had more than eight people, because I I
3 was augmented, initially augmented, I was utilizing the I&C people 1
4 that were already working or already there engaged in the problem that 3
existed.
6 CRESWELL:
To your understanding, then, Dan, the individual foremen 7
8 were keeping the maintenance activities that were being performed in their log books as they normally would?
g 10' SHOVLIN:
Yes I think most of that is documented in the I&C area, which I think...
13 CRESWELL:
Even if I guess in this case since they were I&C people 15l and were probably performing emergency type functions.
Anything might j
have been put in.
17 SH0VLIN:
If that plastic, if they laid that plastic I'm sure that's l
in their log.
Because that was...
20 CRESWELL:
Good.
Dan, on anytime through the 28th or the 30th because 21 of manpower shortage or because you felt there was a necessity, did you perform or assist any of the repair teams?
Did you accompany any 23 of them?
24 895 090 25 i
l
43 1
SH0VLIN:
I war. directly involved, personally supervised the hydrogen 2,
recombiner that was installed that's putting in the new piping; I 3
directed the whole function.
But that was, I think, on Easter, on 4
Sunday.
Whatever date that was.
5 6
CRESWELL:
About a week later.
7 SH0VLIN:
I w; personally involved in that evolution.
I airected 8
g four of my people and four of the contractor to install that.
That was Easter Sunday, I believe it was.
10, 11 CRESWELL:
You had a recombiner there.
y 13 SH0VLIN:
There was one; I was installing the second one, the standby one.
That's correct.
16l l
CRESWELL:
And that would be the only...
17l 18f SHOVLIN:
19l
- That was the only...
20 CRESWELL:
Action...
21 22 SH0VLIN:
Action that I personally was totally involved with.
24 5
895 091 l
e
44 1
DONALDSON:
If I could I'd like to just backup on a couple of other i
2!
things and then I'll leave you to these fellows.
I'd like to talk a i
3 little bit about the training for the emergency repair team.
Again 4
could you describe for me just a little bit the scope and the nature 5
of the training that your people received?
6 SHOVLIN:
Well it's heavy on the health physics involvement.
During 7
8 ur n rmal drills as you've been a party to, or at least witnessed g'
several times, the extent of the repair activity is a small part of 10 the overall drill.
Normally if you are simulating a valve is stuck open in a system, and you send a repair party in to unstick the valve g
.!1izing:
You're dressed up; all the precautions that you have to take; you have a health physics monitor monitoring the area for you; you know what the reading of the areas is what you're going into; but 15jl over and above that, we go through extensive -- before we go into our j
final drill, we go through extensive training prior to that.
In fact there's several weeks that we go through in preparation for the final drill.
18(
L9) 00NALD.c1NJ I believe you do conduct repair party drills.
Is that correct?
21 22 SH0VLIN:
That's correct.
23 24 2s 895 092 1
I l
1
45 1
DONALDSON:
Do you recall when the last repair party drill was held?
2' 3
SHOVLIN:
When we had our final drill for the State and NRC?
4' DONALDSON:
5 You halped the conjunction with the large scale radiation 6
emergency drill then, in November, I believe.
Is that correct?
7 SHOVLIN:
The latter part of last year.
8 9
DONALDSON:
10 Now, in looking through the training program I have a lesson plan that was provided - yes?
g 12!
SHOVLIN:
Let me back up a little bit now.
There are, my foremen are involved in giving individual -
not just training department...my 15l foreman in each discipline, on shift directly go through repair party 1
l function training or on-the-job type training.
While they're on...
16!
17 FOSTER:
The time is 11:00 a.m. We ran out of the last tape.
Mr. Shovlin 18[
was speaking.
Would you back up just a little bit please and pick up 19!
the sentence before we were cut off?
20 21 SHOVLIN:
We were discussing the on-the-job repair party training as 22 defined, and other definitions of actual drill type repair party 23 training which we've done.
24 as.
89S 093 I
46 l
DONALDSON:
Did you, or are you aware that of any formal training that 2
had beer, conducted? That is, a classroom kind of situation where 3
specific topics were covered and then student performance or student
....?
4 SH0VLIN: It was done, it was conducted by HP with my foremen who in 5
6 turn had to instruct each discipline on the repair partly functions.
7 DONALDSON:
g and... did you attend that particular class?
W H
N2 ere was, n, I can't, I personally?
10 11 DONALDSON:
Did you attend the formal class in 1978?
Conducted by either health physics and yourself or, by health physics?
14 SHOVLIN:
Yes, it was conducted I believe I was, it was conducted over 15l l
in the auditorium.
Yes.
... When in 1978, I can't say.
16 17 DONALDSON:
What I heard you say is then that... the one class was i
18{
j held and in turn then the foreman, who you designated, in turn trained 19 additional people.
Is that correct?
20 21 SHOVLIN:
That is correct.
22 23 DONALDSON:
I wonder if you'de take a look at this lesson plan that 24 it is a hand written lesson plan at the top, it's the emergency 25, 895 094 l
47 1.
repair party.
This is part of the official investigation record TM 2
- 469.
I wonder if you'd gltnce through the two pages of this and give 3
re a feeling as to whether or not the classroom trining that you 4
attended, number one, met the scope that's outlined in there and 5
number two, whether or not you had a7y input in the preparation of 6
that particular lesson plan.
7 SHOVLIN:
8 There's one area here that I, the second page, that I can't g
recall is the area, Formation Emergency Organization - talking about the day shift-back shift....
I mean as a part of the formal training.
10 11' DONALDSON:
You'd mentioned earlier that you didn't have any people there because of the change of shift, now, there are shift people working, maintenance people around the clock.
I 15!
l SHOVLIN:
Yes, around the clock.
16!
i 17 DONALDSON:
18
_ But because they were switching over they were, there were some lew ing and some trying to come oni 19 20; I
SH0VLIN:
I don't, I can't, I don't, Like I said there was like 10 of 21 7, when quarter of 7, 10 of 7, and I, normally they are.
22 23 DONALDSON:
Was that training roughly, the one you attended, the 24 25l classroom training was it roughly equivalent to that outline? Do you 09b 09b l
48 1
know whether or not your maintenance foreman, the one you designated I
2!
to train additional people used or followed that, this outline?
l 3[
4 SHOVLIN:
This guideline?
I can't say that for sure.
5 DONALDSON:
Who was tha individual that you designated, do you recall?
6 7
SHOVLIN:
Well, I left it up to the, I have a supervisor in each g
discipline.
A supervisor mechanic, who is John McGarry, supervisor in g
10 elect.rical who is Hilary Mitchell, and a supervisor in I&C is Pete Snyder.
And I know, I can remember because McCormick.
12 DONALDSON:
Who provided the health physics portion of that training?
That is, the ernrgency risk doses that could be accepted for, well I don't think could be accepted, but emergency risk doses that...
16 l
SH0VLIN:
I'm pretty sure it was Tom Mulleavy.
17I I
18 DONALDSON:
Did he also provide this training for the follow on training that your supervisors conducted?
21 SHOVLIN:
I'm not sure, I'm not perfectly sure of that.
22 23 DONALDSON:
Do you recall in your training class discussions relating 24 to emergency risk doses? Who would be authorized to direct certain 25 t
895 096
49 1
actions if it appeared that individuals would receive X amount of 2l exp sure?
3 SHOVLIN:
That's, that's your HP supervisor is tha one that would 4
S 95#'
6 DONALDSON:
Do you recall that being discussed?
7 8
SHOVLIN:
As part of it? No, I don't recall that.
Although I personally g
have read that, what the doses were.
0 11 DONALDSON:
Do you recall whether or not the training addressed follow on actions in the event that a person was overexposed during an emergency or the need for an individual to be a volunteer under certain circum-14, I
stances?
15l 1
16i SH0VLIN:
As part of that training? No, Idan't recall that.
18!
DONALDSON:
From your reading of the response plan and participation 19!
in drills, did you apply any of this prior knowledge during the emergency we are discussing, to the extent that prior to having one of your 21 foremen or maintenance supervisors conduct some operation, that they 22 were apprised of or aware of the fact that under certain conditions 23 the individual should be made aware that they... the participation or 24 action would be voluntary? Was that ever passed on to you at all?
25j l
I 895 097 i
l l
l
50 1
SH0VLIN:
Would you repeat that again?
2 3
DONALDSON:
Yea, did you ever say to your foreman, "0.K. we've got a 4
job to do," or "whatever iob you do, pay attention to the HP end and 5
remember that if the doses are, the dose levels are so high, whatever 6
number that would be, the guys would have to be volunteers, you can't make them do it."
7 8
SH0VLIN:
g No, we set a, in maintenance we set a 20 MR limit as a O
c ntrol but never with the stipulation on it you would not, you exceed that.
12 DONALDSON:
We're in emergency condition now.
You set 20 MR administra-tively during normal operations, what is the administrative limit set during emergencies?
I 16l SHOVLIN:
The three hundred MR per week was the normal administrative, we had 25 hundred MR during the emergency, as a...
19f l
00NALDSON:
Who set the 25 hundred?
20 21 SH0VLIN:
The station superintendant...
22' 23 DONALDSON:
Was this set on the day of the, of the incident of sometime 24 prior?
I don't see that written down anywhere, that's the 25 hundred 25 is sort of news to me, that's why I'm wondering where it came from.
895 098 J,
51 1
SHOVLIN:
No, well, the 25 hundred was, to me was the day of the 2
incident that Gary said I
3 4'
DONALDSON:
0.K., so you sort of remember Gary saying 25 hundred?
Do 5
you recall whether he designated an individual who could authorize 6
anyone to go beyond that?
7 SH0VLIN:
Dick Du8eil.
8 9
DONALDSON:
10 Do you remember him saying Dick Du8eil up to, did he cay n
up to how much, or just overall he gave that responsibility to Dick?
12t SHOVLIN:
Overall, 25 hundred was the maximum.
Above that it would 13 have to be Dick Du8eil would be the controlling factor.
g 15 DONALDSON:
So he issued a general administrative limit of 25 hundred with additional followup in order to go above that and Dick DuBeil was the clearing authority for that?
Do you recall any discussions that your foreman may have had or did you see them talking with Dick at all 19{
regarding any of these operations, to determine if these administrative limits that were set?
21 22 SH0VLIN:
Dick DuBeil was a very busy gent that particular day, 0.K.?
And it would be hard for me to pinpoint down what his activity really 24 was because he was heavily involved in trying to keep everyone notified 25; i
895 099 i
l
(
52 1.
of what was happening.
That not only included our own staff, it 2,
included the NRC, the state and... so whether some individual came up 3.
to him and requested from him that's possible.
But I wouldn't personally know.
4 5 :
DONALDSON:
To your knowledge, prior to the 28th, were there any 6
7 members of your repair party team, those who wocid normally be designated g
as members and those would be maintenance shift workers, repairmen, g'
and I quess it's maintenance I&C, I forget the other title offhand, any f the people normally assigned to the emergency repair party team 10 who had not received required training?
12 SH0VLIN:
That's possible.
It would be someone who just went into the discipline, that bid into a shift maintenance job in recent months?
I That's possible.
16 DONALDSON:
Do you recall prior to the incident now last year during 78, so on and so forth, do you recall any discussions or requests that 18{
lesson plans or certain training be conducted for the maintenance and i
19l i
repair party?
20{
21 SHOVLIN:
That maintenance, was actively involved in preparing the 22 lesson plans?
2 895 100 24 25 l
?
I i
53 1,
DONALDSON:
Yes, were you requested either through a memorandum from 2
the training department or either as a result of a drill were you 3
tasked with the responsibility of preparing a formal training program 4
for the emergency repair team?
5 6
SH0VLIN:
Now that through me as the superintendent of maintenance, 7
g no, but it's possible through the supervisor of maintenance for each g
unit that... that's quite possible.
10 DONALDSON:
n Would supervisor of maintenance for each unit report to you as the superintendent of maintenance, or how does that work?
l 13 SHOVLIN:
No, see the supervisor of Unit 1 reports directly to the 15;!
superintendent of Unit 1.
Supervisor of Unit 2 reports directly to the superintendent of Unit 2. Now there is a dotted line to me that I control what work goes through Met Ed maintenence or what work goes to the contractor.
Sometimes I referee who... what the priorities are.
But it's quite possible that all of these particular situations or instances that you speak of, were directed to the supervisor of that particular unit.
21 22 DONALDSON:
Now if I read this, going back to this chart again your 23 title as superintendent of maintenence.
That according to this che 24 supervisor of maintence would have been in charge of the emergency 25l l
895 101 i
i
(
t
54 1
repair party team, is that correct?
I believe that would have been 2
far Unit 2 Mr. Siegletz.
3 4
SHOVLIN:
That's correct, but not, that was my title until not too 5
long ago.
6 DONALDSON:
Until when?
7 8
SHOVLIN:
g Well I became superintendant of maintenance, oh, about a 10' Y'"# #9
- 11 DONALDSON:
Is this e new title, superintendent of maintenance?
13 SH0VLIN:
Yes, pretty much, so, you're going to see, you'll probably I
see some correspondence that still has supervisor of maintenance on 15i i
it.
16j 17 DONALDSON:
If we were to just look at this though, we would expect...
Mr. Sieglitz.
20 SHOVLIN:
No, looking at it you would look for the superintendent of 21 maintenance to be on it.
22 23 DONALDSON:
But while this is the current chart, I'm reading this says 24 l
supervisor of maintenance, prior to a year and a half ago was there 25j only one supervisor of maintenance?
895 102 I
i
55 1
SHOVLIN:
Prior to a year and a half ago, yes I was supervisor of 2
maintenance for Unit 1 and then I went into the startup of Unit 2, and 3
I promoted an engineer to supervise our maintenance, Unit 1, and 4
that's when I became superintendent.
5 CRESSWELL:
When was that that you changed your job title?
6 7
SHOVLIN:
I believe Jim it was January of 78.
8 9'
0 DONALDSON:
0.K., so this really I quess you're telling me this is 3
really not accurate reflection of the way things really work?
12 SHOVLIN:
What I'm saying is that the supervisor maintenance is really myself.
I am the superintendent of maintenance right now.
15 16l 00NALD50N:
Were you told that's what it's supposed to be?
I don't l
- know, 18(
SH0VLIN:
What do you mean?
20' DONALDSON:
Well, in other words, supervisor of maintenance is a very 21, specific title and now you have a Unit 1 supervisor of maintenance and 22 l
a Unit 2 supervisor of maintenance.
Since certain other positions are 23 designated by supervisor of the affected unit, I would assume that the 24 head of the repair party team would have been the unit 2 supervisor of
- 25l, i
895 103 i
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56 1
maintF.;nce.
I guess what I'm saying is had this ever been discussed 2
as to who really was going to be in charge of the emergency repair 3
party team?
4l 5
SHOVLIN:
I have been in charge of the emergency repair party team Gi from its inception since I've been here.
7 DONALDSON:
8 0.K. so then the person who's in charge of repair party g
team is not really a duty title, it's more of a specific name of an individual.
10 11 SH0VLIN:
That's correct.
13 DONALDSON:
0.K., Then I quess it's safe to assume that during the drills as late as November 11, 1978 that Mr. Sieglitz or, who's the 15!
I i
Unit 1 supervisor?
16l 17 l
SHOVLIN:
They could have, they could have, well now its, I was still 18{
an, as supervisor Unit 1, I was holding two titles.
That's where the problem comes in.
Tom Hopkins... he's right now, he's not officially, but he's going to be designated supervisor Unit 1, so I was really 21 filling two titles.
Supervisor of Maintenance Unit 1 plus Superinten-dent of both units.
23 24 895 104 25 I
t,
57 1
DONALDSON:
You wore two hats.
2 3
SHOVLIN:
I wore two hats.
4 5
00NALDSON:
One final question, as a result of any of these drills 6
that you conducted, or having gone through the training, did you 7
prepare any recommendations or critique comments following drills?
To g
highlight areas that needed to be improved in the response plan?
9 SHOVLIN:
Yes, we did.
After each drill and you probably were a party 10 g
to some of them, if you participated in any of our drills.
12 DONALDSON:
I won't ask you to recall what those specific comments were right now, but in general would you say that the comments that you addressed were in fact reviewed by management and either resolved or in some manner addressed to your satisfaction?
17 SHOVLIN:
Yes, because they were particular as a result of our overall drill there were particular problem areas that were identified that we had to comment on and not only in my own, I know there was in my area there was a couple of areas, but also in the health physics and other areas.
22 23 DONALDSON:
You mean areas, health physics areas that related to your 24 i,
activities?
25 895 105 l
58 l'
SHOVLIN:
Right, and even these were future tnese were looking after 2'
future... future drills or these were areas that we had to improve 0"-
3 4l 5
DONALDSON:
In a very general sense, can you recall any of these 6
comments or areas you felt needed to be highlighted for further drills?
7 SHOVLIN:
As related to repair party function?
8 9
DONALDSON:
Yes.
10 11 SHOVLIN:
I think in some of our communications... in communications, definitely in communications the communications from the individual g
who is out, either out in the area getting back the information back to emergency control station, as the assessment of the problem of 15]
difficulty, that was brought up.
16' 17 DONALDSON:
I said one final question, I've really got one more and I
then I'll leave.
There were some other actions, that at least to me 19l i
on the surface seemed as if they were really repair type actions that 20' occured on the 28th through the 30th.
I did mention one of them before one of them was the, I believe the seal injection filter work 22 there were some other tours made by various people to turn wheels and 23 turn valves and do various and sundry things.
I guess the point I 24 want to make is did you have any knowledge that somebody other than 25' your people were running around doing your function?
l 895 106 i
I
59 1
SHOVLIN:
You mean opening valves?
2 3
FASANO:
Let me just clear this up, I think what we're talking about 4
there were some cases where the turning gear on the feedwater pump, 5
apparently an operator was, an auxiliary operator was in the turbine 6
building and turning the turning gear, assisting the turning gear to 7
make sure that the shaft didn't warp.
Is this the kind of thing?
8 DONALDSON:
These kinds of things.
The emergency repair functions g
0 that repair people did not perform under the repair team.
Health physics people might have done it, for example the seal injection.
Originally the adjustment of some seal water ficw was to be performed 2
2.
by an auxiliary operator and a HP technician.
14 SHOVLIN:
You're well aware that you have aux operators as a part of the emergency control, emergency parties.
17 DONALDSON:
I'm well aware that they are not in fact a part of the i
emergency repair party.
19l 20' SH0VLIN:
But you are aware that when we conduct our drills we do have 21 auxiliary operators as a part of the emergency control station, standing 22 by to go out and assist the emergency repair party, in being familiar 23 with valve line-ups, opening and closing valves that...
24 25 895 107 r
l 1
60 1
DONALDSON:
What we're trying to get to is where there any situations 2,
where an aux operator on his own or a healtn physics technician on his 3;
wn, cr someone outside, totally outside of the repair party team 4
perf rmed your kind of function without your knowledge, without assist-5 ance from your people?
6 SHOVLIN:
That's quite possible.
And during this condition, there's 7
g probably a lot of action taken that they were not looking... in order g
to get immediate response... looking for the gent who was in charge f the repair party.
I'm sure there were some instances that they 10 went directly to an individual and said I want you to go down and close whatever valve or...
13
(
DONALDSON:
You've always had fairly ambitious scenarios in your 14l drills in terms of repair party activities.
You've done such things 15!
as lock doors behind the teams after they leave and actually have to 16j have the repair party open the doors through bolt cutters to get back in.
You've had major equipment failures where you've had to make re-entry's and perform certain functions.
Looking back over the drills 19[
20 that you've conducted and your experience in heading these repair l
party teams, how would you characterize the response of your group?
21 In comparison with those past drills the way you used to do it under 22 the drill and the way it had to be done or the way that you did it 23 during the emergency?
24 gg tj jgg 25 o
61 SHOVLIN:
1{
If you would go back and look at the scenario from any drill 2{
you would note that there was minimum repair type functional activity 3
required in support of the drill.
So, to your question was, the 4
overall drill as conducted I think is directly, is directed to the 5
those areas that are monitoring outside activities, communication 6
response from the various areas that they are monitoring, the conduct 7
of the emergency control station and your emergency control center, g
their performance under the drill.
The repair activity I think is a small portion of the overall drill.
g 10 DONALDSON:
During the emergency would you say that it turned out to be a significantly greater portion?
13 SH0VLIN:
From what I was involved in ? Yes, because during the drill it was isolated to a valve sticking open, or they lost air to an 15!
16i operator or this certainly, there was definitly more activity during this emergency then and it involved the response of, in most instances, of our I&C group, instrumentation group 19f DONALDSON:
Within your emergency duties with the repair party team, 20' would you like to make any general comments regarding the emergency 21) functions of that nature that may be of assistance here to others in 22 the industry or to your own organization in improving that particular 23 area?
24 895 109 23
62 1
SHOVLIN:
Yes, in retrospect you look at better coordination between 2
HP and the maintenance activity where you told me the question, "was I 3
aware of the radiation levels in a certain area?"
Perhaps that was 4.
not identified as explicitly as it should have.
At least to nave a 5
better control of the response by your repair party.
I know that you 6
react a lot dif ferent in the real thing than you would during the...
7 simulating type conditions.
l DONAL0 SON:
Is that more or a personal comment, or is that a character-g 10 ization of the crganization of a whole?
11 SH0VLIN:
No, I'/e personally been, I lived in the environment of simulating drilla in the Navy and I personally have been involved in 3
the real thing and I think your response and what action you take is somewhat different to some degree, you're bypassing the formal aspect 15!
of it in many cases.
And in so doing, bypassing the formal aspect, it 16; doesn't say that you're not jepordizing it's possible that you're doing things that, for example here, where they questioned this particular l
work function in a.high radiation area and if somebody identified that 19l with what the readings were prior to entry?
That could have been done, but, to my, as me directly knowing what the radiation levels were or a function being performed during that particular case, I 22 would say I was not.
2 895 110 24 25 I
i
63 1
FASANO:
You mentfored earlier that you donned a mask.
Did you find 2
it at that time more difficult to cr.mmunicate?
3 4
SHOVLIN2 Oh, definitely.
51 FASANO:
Previous people had said that the/ took their masks cff to 6
f communicate.
Do you have any, did you see people doing that?
7 8
i SHOVLIN:
g No, in the, several time; inside the shirt supervisor's office Where it was enclosed, I've seen that when Mmeone was trying 1
to answer a phone or that type of a sit.ation.
12 CRESWELL:_
Can I go back to any earlier period of time, you arrived at the site about 6:00.
14 i
15!
SH0VLIN:
16!
It was after six, I would say between six and six-thirty.
17 CRESWELL:
And I'de like to go back to the time where you first got to 18l the control room.
At thpt time I believe you said there were six or 19{
seven people in the contro' room.
20 21 SHOVLIN:
No, I said /cu mentioned how many people were around tb.o 22 console.
23 09b
}il 24 25l k
h 8
I a
f 64 l
l 1l CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
Well how aany people were in the control room when I
2!
you got there?
I 3'
4 SHOVLIN:
Well, I'de say it looked like about 12 or 14.
I 5
6 CRESWELL:
12 or 14?
- 0. K You mentioned earlier that there was about 7
150 MR at the security fence.
8 SHOVLIN:
I said greater than 125 MR.
That's one of the conditions g
that gets you a site emergency.
0 11 CRESWE U, -
I'd like to go back to th'e titre you entered the control 2
J.
room, you looked at the panel?
Did you look at the panel?
14l SHCVLIh:
!N, at no time did ! look. at any, I didn't get into the 15 r
area.
There's a certain division t.1at... there's people that get out 16; of the wa3, that so let those that are able to, evaluate the situation, without cluttering up and interfering with their normal process.
i
') 8 {
19 i
CRESWELL:
Who's the first person that you talked to when you got into tne control room?
21 22 SHOVLIN:
That's one thing I could never recall, either it was Logan 23 or it was Ross.
That's to my recollection.
24 251 Nb ll
?
I 3
65 1:
CRESWELL:
Did they brief you on what was going on?
2 3
SHOVLIN:
I tried, they were doing a thing, I tried to I think Mike 4.
Ross was the one that briefly told me what they were having well they 5
had a, told me what happened, why it, what started, precipitated the 6
trip.
He said they got water in the air system, the polisher valve 7
closed the feed pump tripped, the condensate pump tripped which in 8
turn of ccurse tripp'd the turbine and the turbine, consequently then g
the turbine, the reactor tripped.
I was aware of that scenario.
01 101 CRESWELL:
Anything between that and the time that you got there?
12 SHOVLIN:
No.
14 h
CRESWELL:
0.K. There was a short period of time before the site 15l j
emergency was declared.
17 SHOVLIN:
While I was there, that's correct.
1S CRESWELL:
20 Well, I'm interested in what went on during that short i
period of time.
22 SH0VLIN:
Well I was tnere, I stayed back out of the area and you know, I would say there's at least 6 or 7 around the console, looked 24 l
to me like they were doing just an orderly shutdown.
And, they got an 2 51 i
j 895 113 i
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66 1
alarm I am pretty sure they got an alarm from one of the monitors, a 2
high alarm which seemed to they, see the reactor very quickly the 3
condition existing that was not normal and from that it just seemed to 4
me that it went into the site emergency, and then it was a general 5
emergency...
6 7
FOSTER:
Let's take a break and change the tape.
The time is 11:28 a.m.
g 9
FOSTER:
10 We're continuing with the interview of Mr. Shovlin the time is still 11:28 a.m.
Mr. Donaldson has left the interview.
12 CRESWELL:
13 Did anybody discuss with you at that point in time whether they had problems with the reactor coolant pumps?
15 SHOVLIN:
No, the only time they discussed the reactor coolant pumps was that they were, I believe this was when we went into the shift supervisors they were discussing this. where, they were having a problem with the main vapor valve, I believe, or losing suction or 191 being vapor bound.
20' 21 CRESWELL:
And that would have been about what time that you had that discussion?
23 895 114 24 25 l
l l
t l
i
s 67 1.
SH0VLIN:
I'm quite sure it was after Gary Miller was there.
Shortly 1
2!
after he got there.
3 4
CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
Did you have any comments on the pumps being a vapor 5
bound?
Did anybody ask you anything about it?
6 SHOVLIN:
No.
Except that they were concerned about doing severe 7
8 damage to the pump, I think they were vibrating.
9 CRESWELL:
What type of damage would you expect?
10 11 SHOVLIN:
From the high vibration? Well you could have bearing damage, g
or seal damage.
I didn't go back into it I'm sure someone took the...
secured the affected pump.
I 15 CRESWELL:
0.K. What contributions did you make to this first conference that Gary Miller had?
18j SHOVLIN:
I was just party, I was superintendant of maintenance they was more in an operational aspect.
What should we do?
Should we kick the seal injection on or that type of...
22 CRESWELL:
What was that discussion? What, who asked whether they should keep the seal injection on?
24 895 115 25j l
l l
l
68 1
SHOVLIN:
Or shut it off, I think the people who were highly involved 2
in that discussion I believe was Kunder, Ross... with Gary, I don't 3
know if Zewe was or not, yes Zewe was involved in that too.
And I'm 4
trying to feel, you know this was... several times... I think Lee s
Rodgers was in at that particular time.
6 CRESWELL:
What was the consideration in whether they should shut the 7
seal injection off or not?
g 9
SHOVLIN:
I believe put it, yes, keep it on.
10, 11' CRESWELL:
It was decided to keep it on, but what were the considera-tions about whether you could shut it off or not?
14 SHOVLIN:
I don't recall.
15j 16, CRESWELL:
Were they concerned about plugging up the filters in the line or...?
18l 19)
SHOVLIN:
That was not discussed.
I mean it could have been discussed, but I didn't.
They were rallying, going back and forth and I was like 21 a like in the background listening to the and the... yes, B&W, they 22 had some input.
I know that Gary had some questions and Ross and 23 Kunder had some concerns and but other than..
24 2sl 895 116 I
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69 1
CRESWELL:
Do you remember what any of those questions were or the 2,
concerns were...
3 4
SH0VLIN:
No the only one I can vividly remember was of the continuing 5
with the high pressure injection.
That was discussed.
l 6
CRESWELL:
That was discussed thournughly?
7 8
SHOVLIN:
Yes, that was discussed.
g 10 CRESWELL:
Who was talking about that?
12, SHOVLIN:
I think it was Kunder and Ross, I think Zewe.
14 CRESWELL:
Do you remember what their position was?
16!
SHOVLIN:
No, it seemed that, like Zewe... I can't recall, Zewe or Ross of Kunder one wanted it off, and one wanted, two wanted it on, or I can't recall how that
.. which one of the ones, which one was the 19 gent that thought it should be secured.
20' 21; l
CRESWELL:
Thought it should be secured?
22l 23 SHOVLIN:
Once, right., one..
there was one that I'm pretty sure that 24 gave the indication that you know, that he wanted to secure the high 25l
[
pressure injection, the other two I thought they wanted to keep it on.
i 895 117 i
70 1
CRESWELL:
It was a kind of two and one situation.
2 3
SHOVLIN:
I think it was, yes.
From what I recall now who the one was 4
I can't...
i 5
CRESWELL:
Who won out? Do you have any idea?
6 7
SHOLVIN:
g The seal injection went back... either it was off or it went back on, 0.K.
That whoever... to put the seal injection back on g
or continue with it, that's who won out.
11 CRESWELL:
Did Miller make that decision?
13 SHOLVIN:
Gary could have... I wasn't... he could have made that I
decision.
15j i
16!
FASANO:
I have a few questions on... that Dale had left.
One of them is what contractors... you had contractors in... and what were 18{
these contractors doing during this period? You had contract maintenance 19 I believe.
20i 21 SH0VLIN:
Yes, there was no activity with the contractors, during this 22 time frame that this whole thing started, the whole scenario started.
23 24 395 );g 25 l
i
71 l'
FASANO:
Were they doing work, just prior to it?
2,
~
3 SHOVLIN:
No, there was no work function being conducted.
4 5
FASANO:
You left at 3:00, right? About 3 in the afternoon?
6 SHOVLIN:
I left at 3 and I came back oh, I left at 3 really to get 7
8 something to eat, so they told me.
I came back at about 5 or 6, as I recall.
g 10 FASANO:
7y So you were there about 2:00 and about that time the spike was noted on the wide range reactor building pressure?
13 SHOVLIN:
I've heard this and I heard people saying it was a hydrogen explosion and whatever.
But the significance of that never came to me until the next day or sometime after.
17 CRESWELL:
Did you' notice any of the group in the shift engineer's l
office, that would have been Ross, Miller, Joe Logan I believe you said was there, did you notice any of those people in that group go out and tell what had happened?
22 SHOVLIN:
Well, during, I don't even recall when that really happened.
23 In the afternoon, after ncontime, when, I was out directly controling 24 and getting reliefs in for my people who had to go over to
'e observa-i 25 l
895 119 i
72 1,
tion center or call, so I was not direct, I was more or less arour.d 2
the area of the outside of the shift supervisor's office, during this 3
particular time, and we set up our maintenance functions right there q
by the computer, if you recall, so that was actually where we worked ut of.
5 My shift foreman, that's where he sat and that's where he directed all the maintenance efforts around the clock.
From the time 6
7 I got relieved at 3:00 until several days we..
8 CRESWELL:
Do you remember when that pressure spike occured, whether g
anyone said there's been a pressure spike?
11 SHOVLIN:
No.
12 13 CRESWELL:
There wasn't any sound, anyone saying something?
15 SH0VLIN:
Not to my, not to the group I was discussing or talking with, no.
17 18l CRESWELL:
Did you hear the thing abnormal around that period of time?
20 SPOVLIN:
No, I did not.
21 22 CRESWELL:
Your group was around the computer, you said, during that 23 part of the day.
Did you notice anyone come around and get information 24 out of the computer while you were there?
2s;j 895 120 l
73 1
SH0VLIN:
Well, there was people going back and forth all, from the 2
various start of the trip, through the site emergency... through the 3
several days, that was the... that we sat to the very left of the 4,
computer.
We didn't block the area around the computer.
5 CRESWELL:
Do you remember any of the people who came over and got 6
7 information out of the computer?
8 g
I'm sure everyone of those in the control room of any authority SH0VLIN:
w s over on the computer.
10 11 CRESWELL:
Back on that pressure indicator of the reactor building, now, would your instrumentation man have been called to look at this unusual spike to see if this maybe had to do with the noise or whether it would be something that's real and how would he, do you have any knowledge what might have gone on?
17 SH0VLIN:
That's possible that he did.
I'm sure that if he was in the area... he could have been, because most of... we ran, but I sent them, I wanted the minimum number of people at the site, 0.K.,
after we started wearing the respirators, I was very concerned about the 21 numbers of people that I had.
So, I sent Weaver and Wilson, I'm sure 22 in the area 2:00, home, we had an I&C foreman by the name of Barry, a 23 Ukrainian name here.
2' 895 121 25
74 1
CRESWELL:
His first name is Barry?
2 3
SHOVLIN:
His first name is Barry, sometning like Rosanovich, it was 4
close to that, who was the foreman that relieved the shift foreman, S
who happened to be in of an IC discipline.
Now, it's possible that he 6
w uld know, and would be called on to look at that.
7 CRESWELL:
8 But you have no knoaledge of anyone going over there, or g
anyone asking... for anybody from your group?
10 SH0VLIN:
No.
g 12 FASANO:
Dan, do you, apparently, the EMOV valve was leaking and prior to this occurance,... the electromatic valve sometimes called the EMOV valve.
Do you have any, well did you know about this and had you, were there, plans to correct it or to OP list this difficulty?
17 SHOVLIN:
Yes, that would be identified on our no-name outage list, and I think I discussed as far as leakage, control leakage, I'm sure that that was identified and it was on the no-name outage list and 20' I'm sure they knew by the leak spec into the reactor coolant drain 21 tank.
And that they're able to identify the leakage, and certainly 22 identify if this leak got increased, that was under a controled nature, 23 I'm sure, so that wouldn't, that would not have been a real major 24 concern.
25 895 122 9
6
75 CRESWELL:
I have here some hand-written notes with eight items on it, 1:
that is entitled, " Jobs to do if Reactor Trips" and Dan I'd like to 2}.
3 ask you if you have seen that list before.
4 SHOVLIN:
These should be a part of our no.-name outage list, I would 5
6 think if these jobs were identified, and I'm sure Dick Sieglitz would 7
be familiar with, the supervisor of Unit 2, with this.
8 CRESWELL:
g 0.K. There, like I said there are 8 items here.
Let me go rst one, Pyrometers per press rod and safety valves ug e
10 readings were you familiar with some plans to use pyrometers on the safety valves?
13 S HOV L"'-
14
- We've done that in the past.
We've done that in Unit 1, I'm sure that's...
15 16!
CRESWELL:
Why do you do that then?
18(
SH0VLIN:
Well, that gives you an indication, it gives you temperature 191 I
of leakage.
20 21, CRESWELL:
So, have you done this on Unit 2 before?
22 23 SHOVLIN:
I quite frankly I can't, it was possible, I lef t Unit 2, I 24 wasn't involved in the startup of Unit 2 as I told Tony, I have been 25!
895 123 I
76 1.
up about a year now up involving Unit 1, but I'm sure the supervisor 2
of Unit 2 is knowledgeable of everyone of those, and should be on the 3
no-name outage list for Unit 2, in the event that they did have a 4
trip, these are the areas where they'd go in and they would work on.
5 CRESWELL:
There is an item here - tanks refilll, what does that mean 6
7 to you? Shield tanks refill?
8 SHOVLIN:
g I don't understand that, shield tanks refill.
I understand check all RCS insulation in place, we do that.
10 11 CRESWELL:
What does that mean to you?
13 SHOVLIN:
To me to be sure that its, there's none that's missing, that it's made up right, correctly, that you don't have no voids.
15!
16 CRESWELL:
Is there a previous occurence or event that may have affected the positioning of that insulation?
19 SH0VLIN:
No, it's just, the people install it... that they make it 20 up right... the workmanship more.
The dipping... I quess that has 21 to do with the seal leakoff.
Not that I know.
In mode 5 get CR0 22 stator cool back in of course mode 5 is when you can gain enterence to 23 the reactor building. And I'm not familiar with disconnect WDGV28AV.
24 25' 8h 124
77 1.
CRESWELL:
Well, we've been doing some looking on that Dan, those, 2
that construction there is involved with a vent line from the steam 3
generator over to the waste gas processing system.
Did you know of 41 any abnormal conditions in that area?
5 6
SHOVLIN:
No, personally not, but I'm sure if there was any, that 7
Sieglitz, supervisor of Unit 2 would be familiar with it.
8 FASANO:
g Dan, we gather that, in your current job that you have, Mr.
10 Sieglitz who really would know the details.
11 SH0VLIN:
Of each particular work function on Unit 2, right.
13 FASANO:
Because it was a list of items that the people were doing, 15 auxiliary operators, which appeared to require maintenance and apparently, it seemed like maintenance efforts were being directed toward Unit 1 16!
to get back it on line, at least this is the impression that I had.
There were which... some of the items that we had that apparently the l
auxiliary operators would take care of would be the turning gear on 19!
the feedwater pump, like ' think it was feedwater pump 18.
20!
21 SHOVLIN:
That's their normal function.
22 23 FASANO:
If it doesn't turn the... they go down and turn it.
Eventually 24 I quess you, maintenance, would get this as a job to probably correct.
251 I
l 895 125
78 1-SH0VLIN:
If they've experienced... getting it back on jack and gear, 2{
yes.
I 3
FASANO:
And the problem that existed was the hydrogen makeup on the M 4
5 UT, the makeup tank, where apparently an operator went down and...
Si valved to put hydrogen in.
7 SHOVLIN:
8 That's an operator's function, to open and close valves.
9 FASAN0:
But eventually its the corrective action that would have to 10 be made so that you could this couldn't, this wouldn't have to be done through an alternate route.
This would be my...
I don't know.
13 SHOVLIN:
If it was by virtue of an design deficiency they would put in a work request which would call for a change modification.
We have 15!
over, I'm sure there's over 400 and some change mods right now on Unit 2 and that could be.
17 18I l
FASANO:
This would be if... the work request would go to Sieglitz 19i i
20 SHOVLIN:
The work request should go to Sieglitz and he would identify 21 it as a change to a system.
23 FASANO:
And the pressurizer heater breakers, they seem to be giving 24 the operators a problem I guess this would be in the I&C or the electrical?
25 895 126 l
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..I 79 1
SH0VLIN:
No, it would be electrical.
2 FASANO:
Electrical.
And again this is... things that you wouldn't 4
be really involved in?
It would be Mr. Sieglitz.
5 6
SHOVLIN:
Oh yes, that would be true of a work request with the Unit 2.
7 8
FASANO:
g Do your subordinates discuss some of these things with you, 10 and how do they... reports that you see?
11 SH0VLIN:
g I get involved espacially when we prepare to go into an utage or a no-name outage list.
I review that, one of the main 3
reasons I would look at it is to see who am I going to assign the work to, it's going to be the contractor, or I'm going to assign it to my own people. And look at the man power requirements for Unit 1 or Unit 2 of where do I have to shift the emphasis.
18(
FASAN0:
From the information that your subordinates were suppling you 19l 1
or had supplied you prior to the event, what did you perceive as the maintenance activities that would be required on t?.a unit?
21 22 SHOVLIN:
First of all, I was involved when we found out that we had 23 main steam relief valve deficiencies.
The lonergan valves were not 24 designed to support our.. I'm heavily involved in a project like that.
25 l
895 127 i
80 1;
I don't get, he doesn't call me up and tell me that he has a slight 2
leak on a electromatic valve going to the reactor coolant drain tank.
3 Unit 1, we've had leaks from the reactor, from your code valves and 4
into the reactor, where we can no longer control the reactor coolant 5
drain tank overheating and the cooling system would not do it.
We had 6
to shut down because of that.
7 FASANO:
When was that?
8 S
SHOVLIN:
Back in the early part of Unit 1.
But, I'm saying that, it 10 was identified, there's a certain amount of leakage that you can have and it's controlled, and if you go beyond that, you've got to come to either a hot shut-down or a cold shut-down.
14 FASANO:
The reactor coolant drain tank for Unit 2 has been modified I
to allow cooling....
161 17 SH0VLIN:
Greater cooling capacity.
19f 1
FASANO:
Have you had any problems about the shutdown, the leakage, 20t l
after that?
21l SH0VLIN:
No.
23 24 25 i
(
l 1
81 1
FASANO:
How much leakage can you take now in the reactor coolant 2
drain tank, without shutting down?
3 4
SHOVLIN:
Right off-hand I don't have the numbers, but I know of 5
course that the leakage and the heat-up in the... you start building 6
up pressure in it and you know you have a rupture disc on there which 7
has a rated pressure so you certainly, you're not going to exceed that.
8 9
FASANO:
10 I have one other item here that the feedwater valve 16 recirc, g
it was tagged out, it was one of the ones where apparently the tag was 12 covering one of the lights on the emergency feedwater twelve valve, I believe on the console.
Did you know why that was tagged out, do you 3
j have any idea? This again would be your i
15i l
SH0VLIN:
Sieglitz would know that.
He should have some records that 16 support that.
18 FASAN0:
Let's see, I believe something came up on Furmanite, the use i
of Furmanite I guess then he still would be the person to check on the valve?
21 22 SH0VLIN:
Right.
We do use Furmanite.
It's under a controled fashion 23 that we use it.
24 asl 895 129 l
i
82 1
FASANO:
It's our understanding that while Furmanite was used on that 2
particular valve body that some of it got into the air...
3 4
SH0VLIN:
Some of it got into the air control system.
5 FASANO:
Do you have a problem with that?
6 7
SHOVLIN:
We didn't, have a problem with that.
Before we inject any g
S Furmanite in any valve, we'll have our engineering scrutinize it very closely.
And have their approval...
PORC approval.
10 11 FASAN0:
Did you make modifications to your procedures after that event happened?
13.
14, SHOVLIN:
That's possible that we have but I'm sure that it was because 15l of the workmanship and technique that the Furmanite engineer injects his Furmanite.
That certainly is, and the grooves and the area that he pumped it into, would be looked at.
18{
19l FASANO:
As your subordinates get their no-name work and no-name outage work list and they review it and also any of the current problems, do they discuss this with you if it appears to them that it needs to be discussed?
23 24 895 130 25l i
I t
83 1
SHOVLIN:
I usually sit in on the meetings, when it's a reality.
2.
Usually the jobs that we're going to do.
3 4
FASANO:
So you have time to...
5 6
SHOVLIN:
Oh yes, of yes, oh yes a no-name outage list you're meeting 7
n that at least once every two weeks during normal conditions and 8
review it, with each discipline, which includes engineers involved.
g It's not just, you just don't put down all what you want in.
So it is 10 scrutinized, continually being scrutinized on what you're going to do.
11 FASAN0:
12 So you have an overall feel for just what condition that plant is in.
What, could you sort of give us an idea of how you saw 13 Unit 2 at just prior to the March 28th event.
g 15 SHOVLIN:
Quite frankly I looked at Unit 2 as a better running plant 16i during the same time frame, the ICS, we had fewer problems with the ICS, that I think were, is probably was attributed to expertise that, I
things we've learned on Unit 1.
You got a better, a finer tune-up, so 19{
as far as the overall, the integrated contral system was a lot smoother during the same time frame as Unit 1.
My biggest problem on Unit 2 was 1 felt it was, in many areas, a maintenance nightmare, where you didn't have the room to work.
The valves were congested, close together, and if you're going to work on a particular valve, it's quite possible that you might have to work on two valves, I'm saying that, that's a design deficiency.
i 895 131
84 1
FOSTER:
We're going to take a break and change the tape.
2 3
FOSTER:
We're going to continue with the interview of Mr. Shovlin.
4 The time now is 11:55 a.m.
5 SH0VLIN:
We were limited in power when we first went commercial due 6
7 to heater drain pump problems that we've had. We got down to all 3 g
heater drain pumps, we had to work on and we got down to one, so we didn't have enough...
g 10 FOSTER:
You had...
12.
SHOVLIN:
Limitation in power.
14 FOSTER:
I think I took a walk in that area and I noticed there was I believe one heater drain pump out, now apparently was being pulled.
17 SH0VLIN:
It went to the factory and..
i 19j FOSTER:
So you did have one out during prior to March 28th?
20' 21, i
SHOVLIN: Yeah, but that would not,.. Two would give you 100 percent.
22 23 FOSTER:
In the condensate system and also the condensate polishers 24 and it is a different design than Unit 1 and apparently the operators 25{
l 895 132 I
i
85 1
were having a difficult problem unclogging the resins.
I guess your 2
men would be knowledgeable of this?
3 4
SHOVLIN:
Well, we would be knowledgeable as far as the change out S
system... changing out the resins and the resins.
Especially if it 6
g t into our instrument lines or unless...yes, they would be familiar with that.
We would be the one who have to blow out the lines.
That 7
8 problem is the backwashing of your resin beds.
Where the water pressure g
exceeds the air pressure that you're using.
10 FOSTER:
This takes me back just prior to the occurence and one of the things we'd like to know and I think you probably would, is the basic cause of the initiation of the trip just so that we have facts.
Do...this evolution of unclogging, unclogging lines, has this ever 15j!
caused a failure of the polisher valves to go closed?
16 SHOVLIN:
No, where they got water into the air system had been a problem before but I don't ever recall particularly the clogging of the resins. I know because of the water getting into the air system during the startup, I believe we did have the same situation.
Unit 1 I
you have a bypass around which if that valve closes the inlet closes 21 your bypass valve opens and you're still..
you don't lose suction 22 automatically you don't lose suction to your feed booster pump and 23 your feed pump.
And I think that would be a reasonable change to 24 make, look at the system to make the changes that have affect.
25 895 133 1
1 86 1
FOSTER:
What corrective action were taken after you had these problems 2
before?
3 4
SHOVLIN:
As far as the...
5 6
FOSTER:
... water in the air lines.
7 SHOVLIN:
The drainage and the blowing out of the the, that's normal...
g 9
10 FOSTER:
Just drain the water...
11 SHOVLIN:
Drain the water, yes, more frequent drainage of the water out of the system.
14l F STER:
But that really didn't correct the problem?
is 16 SHOVLIN:
Apparently the problem we just had that precipatated our...no, it didn' t correct the problem.
19 FOSTER:
Did you...have your people gone done there and looked at that system since the event?
21 22 SH0VLIN:
I can't say that...I don't know.
When you say my 23 people my I & C people or the supervisor...
24 2SI l
895 134 l
l 87 1
FOSTER:
People reporting to you?
2 3{
I'm sure that they've had and they will have recommendations SHOVLIN:
4 how to improve the...
5, 6
FOSTER:
In November, early November I believe its November 4, of 1978 7
there was a loss off feedwater event.
I think the reactor was about 8
90% power when it happened. Do you recall the outage that resulted from that event?
g 10 SHORIN:
In November?
11.
l 12!
FOSTER:
Right.
p 14!
SHOVLIN:
No, we had an outage, I don't if it was November, it was 5
because of the Lundigen valves, ok.
We had a complete changout of your...we had a mainsteam line rupture because of the valve. I don't know if that was November or...yes, it was.
19[
FOSTER:
20 Main steam line rupture? How did that happen, elaborate on that what caused it?
21, 22 SHOVLIN:
The Lundigen valves were not designed to take the reactor forces...of the valve...of the flow condition that existed when the 24 valve lifted.
And we've had the expansion joints carry away.
25 395 135 i
i
88 1.
FOSTER:
The liners.
2:
3 SHOVLIN:
Yes, right, so then they went in and of course they've 4
changed all the Lundigen valves out with Dresser valves.
5 FOSTER:
But that was done before November of 1978.
6 7
8 I'm trying to think if that was when we had the outage or SHOVLIN:
not.
I'd have to...
g 10 FOSTER:
You said something about a rupture, a steamline rupture...
12 SH0VLIN:
Well, I'm talking about that's mainsteam...these valves are 3
in your mainsteam line...where your expansion joint in the line, in the mainsteam line.
15 16' FOSTER:
But you can't recall any outage activity in November attribu-table to a loss of feedwater event?
18 19 SH0VLIN:
We did do a startup I had...the same condition...I'm sure at 20 least one other time that I know...now time frame I don't know...that 21 we've experienced water getting into the air systems closing the same 22 valve.
23 24 895 136 25 l
I l
..I 89 1
FOSTER:
That's on the condensate sy. stem.
2 SH0VLIN:
It's on the condensate system.
But I don't...I'd have to go 3
back and look at the...
4 S
FOSTER:
6 But have you had any safety relief valve problems after you 7
installed those Dresser type safety relief valves?
8 SHOVLIN:
Since we put the Dressers in have we had new problems?
g 10 FOSTER:
For instance if blow-back wasn't set properly.
12 SHOVLIN:
Ok, and it remained open. Yes that could have happen.
14 FOSTER:
Do you recollect anything like that happening in November?
16 SHOVLIN:
It happened... I don't know if it was November or not, pin 18 it down to a time frame but I know we had a problem I think at least two valves as I recall. They had a problem with the blow down. I'm 19 sure Sigmus could document and give you the exact time frame.
20 21 FOSTER:
I have no more questions.
Except to ask you if you have any 22 comments about anything including NRC?
23 895 137 24 25 l
l l
l
90 1.
SHOVLIN:
Nc, like I said I've tried to answer all of your questions 2
to the best of my knowledge considering that it was an unusual...I 3
didn't really feel the full blunt of what happened till after about 4
three weeks and it was significant.
I worked very hard during the 5
start...I was here during the start of Unit 1.
And you work 16, 18 6
hours a day and you can see something go down the drain in a few minutes.
It has been an experience for me.
There are a lot of things 7
g that I don't recall and a lot things that I recall now from asking and I
g what didn't we'do or what did we say on my last interview.
10 FOSTER:
g Would you like to make any comments as to what you advise others to maybe look for or to improve or make suggestion on design?
13 SHOVLIN:
Its apparent, you know, this was a situation that no one ever cranked into their overall posture of training or ever happening.
15!
I think, you know, certainly we're in order for more instrumentation in some very critical areas.
i 18 FOSTER:
What would be those areas?
19 20,.
SH0VLIN:
I think you should know what your level is in your pressurizer.
21 You can't go...
22 23 FOSTER:
The pressurizer or the reactor coolant system.
24 25j i
895 138 i
l i
t 91 l
1.
SH0VLIN:
Both.
What if in the hot leg or wherever...I thick it 2
should be... you knsv, wS,.~n you have to go and start in a crisis or 3
emergency, you have to go back to start calculating something.
I 4
think you should be more simplified than that, it should be more S
cbvious.
You know, you tcke your pressure and temperature and try to 6
correlate it to leveb that's what...,30 I thinr. thare are areas that 7
we're going to improve end I think as a result of this, I feel its e 8
real severe...it is in the light of a lot of people but I think we're going to be better off.
Certainly more conscio u of where we have to g
improve of our committment, how we do business, how we communicata 10 3
with the NRC, the State, and I'm sure...I know for a fact thr.t you're going to do business differently as well as we are.
13 FOSTER:
Would yoJ> care to elaborate on that?
15iy SHOVLIN:
- Well, think its just like every other area.
You have a level of expertise in your organization. I'm sure you're going to devote some of that level of expertise on site...as well as we probably would improve on some areas.
I think the state itself has found out their shortcomings. How they work and prepare to handle a sit'1ation like that.
Now they know when we conduct our drills that: their involve-ment was just a surfaca, they never really kept totally in
...I think 22 now there's certainly t,a a participant so l'n: sura there is...but 23 overall I do feel the people that I work with is staying with outside 24 I think they conducted themselves I think...considering tne situation...in 25l l
an outstanding fashion.
l 895 139 I
O
~
92 f
1 FOSTER:
Dan, based on your experiences is there;arything that can be 2.
done in simulation training to prepare people better for a real event?
3 SHOVLIN:
Well, I think you're getting geared up for that now, I think 4
d <n n y ur simulator...B&W this is going to part of their training 1
5 6
pr gram but you know, extend that far beyond just what's happened.
I'm Jure there are other areas that you can c.me up with and say, as a
[
result of what would happen, what other areas can we look into and improve and I think there are going to be other areas that they're g
ng m m e up n.
ust hope G at you know we don't e d end 10 ourself to the point where its virtually impossible to ever operate in a reasonable.nanner because you can get yourself sometime so restrictive that its imp;ssible to function.
14 i
FOSTER:
Looking back on your decision to set up the...your, repair 15j group in the control room, would you do that the same way?
17 i
SH0VLIN:
Oh, yes, yes, because I was there I seen what was going on.
Ok, you were a part of it...and you there is no other way I'd ever...quite 19!
i frankly I did it as as not even thinking...I should have directed 20 myself down into Unit 1...I va n't even concerned about Unit 1 at the 21
)
time.
I think what I done I taought was the right proper way and I 22 use the people that were at hand.
They were not the emergency repair 23 party with their people that I had were there that had to take a 24 particular action.
i 25!
895 140 i
i i
93 1
FOSTER:
What about the impact of the number of people in the Control g
Room?
3 4
SHOVLIN:
You mean the...no, because we maintained ourselves off to 5
the side and I don't think in any way and I in no way became involved 6
in their...we stayed out of their way and...in fact, I more or less 7
insured that the area around the console right directly in front of g
the...was being maintained by the people' that should be there and not the...
g 10 FOSTER:
If you set up your group in the Control Room how would you control the health physics access or how would you control the people entering into the contaminated area?
14l l
SHOVLIN:
Eventually HP they brought their people right back to the 15{
16;!
same location that my repair party was.
a 17l t
F0 STER:
Do you feel like you had good HP coverage for your people?
18l 19l SHOVLIN:
But see, when I look back we really it was a minimum of 20 activity that we were invo?ved in.
If you look back there's two specific jobs that were of any consequence and our makeup tank and the 22; bleed tank.
Over and beyond that I...unless there was little things 23 l
like turning on or checking fan was off, there was no significant 2 41 real...and Pentioned about laying down the plastic I do recall that, 2Si but I don't 895 141 i
94 1!
FOSTER:
Compared to the tapes there was minimum amount of work to do 2
why else would your people be in the Control Room.
3 ;
SHOVLIN:
The thing is though there's still the odd. ohm was still 4
5 there, it was apparent, ok.
So we still didn't know we didn't know...in 6
fact, we didn't know just till a few days ago where we're at as far as 7
plant conditions, what we're going to do what we're going to be able g
So you...certainly you're going to be in standby situation, to do.
- ou don't let everybody just go home and do your thing.
So I still g
feel that I made the right decision there.
10 11 FOSTER:
Thank you, Dan.
We will conclude this interview at 12:10 P'**
13 14j
(
sl 895 142 16l t
17!
181 19f i
20 21 22 zg e
24 l 25'i l
- }}