ML19249A991
| ML19249A991 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1979 |
| From: | Boltz D, Brown N, Zechman R METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908280674 | |
| Download: ML19249A991 (58) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
In the Matter of:
2; IE TMI INVE5TIGATION INTERVIEW 3{
of Met Ed Training Staff-4 Richard Zechman i
Training Supervisor Si Nelson Brown 6l Nuclear and Technical Training 7!
Denny Boltz Nuclear and Technical Training 81 Marshall Beers Trailer #203 c,
Group Supervisor NRC Investigation Site Nuclear and Technical Training TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10i Midcietown, Pennsylvania 11l May 6, 1979 12l (0 ate or Interview) 13!
July 2, 1979 4
(Oate Transcript Typed) 14; 177 and 178 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
16i 17' 18!
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20t 21:
NRC PERSONNEL.
22f Bob Marsh 23:
Don Kirkpatrick i
24 25i 790r22667'7' o:,
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MARSH:
The date is May 8, 1979, time is 5:17 p.m.
We are located at Three i
2 Mile Island in Trailer 203, and I am Bob Marsh.
I am an investigator with 3
the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission assigned to Region III, Chicago, 4{
The purpose of today's meeting is to conduct an interview of Sj representatives from the Met Ed Trairing Staff, and at this time I would 6
like each of the individuals in the room going from my left around the 7
table to identify themselves, spell their last name, and indicate their position so we can start.
g 9f ZECHMAN:
10f My name is Rich -d Zechman and the Training Supervisor of the Met Ed Company.
3 I
12l BROWN:
My name is Nelson Brown, I am administrator of Nuclear and Technical Training.
14!
15:
BOLTZ:
My name is De'iny Boltz, Administrator of Nuclear and Technical 16 3 Training.
I 17l 18i KIRKPATRICK:
I am 00.1 Kirkpatrick, I am a nuclear engineer with USNRC, IE Headquarters.
21; BEERS:
I am Marshall Beers, Group Supervisor of Nuclear and Technical 22l l
Training.
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lj MARSH:
Fine, thank you, before we start Mr. Boltz, may I get you to sit up i
2' on the end of the table on this side, and we will turn that end mike this 3
direction if we may, and that may give us a little better pickup.
I think 4l that will give us a little better pickup on the tape.
Okay, Oca, I think 5
y u've got a few words you want to say regarding the scope.
Before we do 6i that I just want to put one other thing on the record.
Prior to starting 7
the tape we had a few words regarding this two page memo, which I have provided each individual in the room.
Pause for a second far the airplane.
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This two page memo lays down the purpose for this investigation, a 'ittle l
10j bit about its scope and the authority under which is being conducted.
At the conclusion of this two page memo are three questions which I would like j
each individual to respond to.
I'll read the questions and then if you 12, I
would, give me your last name and your response to the questions so we also 131 145 have it on the tape.
Question No. 1 reads, "Do you understand the above, making reference to the two page memo?"
15i 16i ZECHMAN:
Yes.
17l 18!
BROWN:
Yes.
19f 20!
BOLTZ:
Yes.
21l 22!
BEERS:
Yes.
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!lj MARSH:
The second question reads, "Do we have your permission to tape this i
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interview?"
i 31 l
ZECHMAN:
Yes.
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6l BROWN:
Yes.
I 7
i OLTZ:
Yes.
8l 9I i
BEERS:
Yes.
10!
1 11 MARSH:
And the third question reads, "Do you want a copy of the tape?"
12:
13l ZECHMAN:
Yes.
14!
15 BROWN:
No.
16i 17l BOLTZ:
No.
IS!
19i BEERS:
No.
20:
t 21f MARSH:
Fine, at the conclusion of this interview I will then duplicate a 223 copy of the tape, and you can have it today before you leave.
There is a 23) fourth question, which is not called out specifically at the end of that i
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two page letter, but is covered in the body of it.
This addresses your 251
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rights to have, if you so choose, a representative from the company or your 2
union present right now.
Could I get a response of your desires on that.
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3!
I ZECHMAN:
No.
q 5
BROWN:
No.
6i 7l gf BOLTZ:
No.
SI BEERS:
No.
10; i
11; MARSH:
Okay, thank you.
One other point on that, it at any time during i
12!
l the course of this interview, you feel that you do want to have someone 13 present, do not hesitate to raise your hand and make the statement, we'll 14' take a break and we'll get someone here.
Likewise, if you want to take a break, you get tired or that, just call out and we'll break the tape, and give you a few minutes for a break.
Don Kirkpatrick, at this point I am going to turn it over to you for your statement.
And I think I will termi-nate this air conditioner and see if we cut down on this background noise.
19i 20' KIRKPATRICK:
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We have already discussed the overall training program with j
you gentlemen and since there is a great deal of documentation that we have 22; i
ready access to that gives this training program in detail, I see no point 23!
j in taping it here at this time.
Instead, what this session is intended to 24i do is to answer specific questions regarding the training that is relative 25e i
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to the incidents that occurred during the events on March 28.
In addition 2
to that, I have some questions regarding the emergency response training i
3 that I will address after this.
The first question regards auxiliary 4(
feedwater operation.
Does the emergency training for loss of feedwater 5
address the verification of auxiliary feedwater flows?
6{
BROWN:
7 Are we supposed to answer now, or are we suppose to wait 'til you 8
have gone through your scope, or are done with the scope?
i 9!
XIRXPATRICX:
I am done, so go ahead.
0 11j l
BROWN:
Yea.
There is the procedural guidance for the verification of 12!
emergency feedwater.
It is covered, and says that on the loss of feedwater, normal feedwater, that the emergency feedwater pumps will start.
That is, 19 one steam-driven emergency feedwater pump, and two motor-driven emergency feedwater pumps, and the emergency control valves, nomenclature EF standing for Emergency Feedwater, ll A and B, will automatically control the steam 17!
generator level.
In the loss of both main feedwater pumps, they will control at 30 inches.
This is addressed in the emergency procedure.
191 Additionally this is documented, we document it by traiaing on that in 20; emergency procedure review, plus we teach it in-house, we talk about operat-ing characteristics, and it is reviewed at the simulator, when we go over loss of feedwater.
23 24!
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BOLTZ:
It is also covered in our in-house ICS course as well, ICS meaning 2
Integrated Control System.
31 KIRKPATRICK: What made the auxiliary feedwater flow indication exist in 4
the control room.
5!
l 6i 7j BOLTZ:
There is no flow indication for emergency feedwater in the control room.
The procedures on loss of feedwater, which is what these fellows 8
i were going through, ask you to verify the pumps are operating correctly.
g What the operator is supposed to look at is the RPMs of the turbine-driven 10 feed pump, and the discharge structure.
There is no flow indication there.
11!
He has to wait until he gets down to 30 inches on the steam generator 12!
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levels, to see that the levels are held up by the initiation of emergency feedwater flow.
So, in fact, until they hit 30 inches steaming down follow-14' ing a trip, there will be no emergency feedwater flow. Yea, the pumps will 15:
be on reset.
16; 17; KIRKPATRICK:
Are the operators train'3d to look for steam generator level 184 rise or indication?
19:
20?
B_0LTZ:
They are trained to lock at the steam valve.
Okay, the level 21!
decrease in the steam generators, which appears following the trip.
They 22 are trained to verify that it does level out 30 inches on a startup range 23!
level entrance.
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KIRKPATRICK:
I see.
2 3i BEERS:
On a normal reactor or turbine trip, it would take about three 4
minutes for the steam generators to steam down to the 30 inch level.
I 5l believe in this incident here the time to steam down to 30 inch was approxi-i 6j mat'lly one third that time, as near as we can determine from heresay when 7
we talked to other people.
81 i
KIRKPATRICK:
The next question pertains to the electromatic release valve gj per tion.
As you know, we believe the relief valve came open during the 10 event and stayed open for a long time afterwards.
Are the operators trained to verify closure of the electromatic release valve following events which can be expected to result in its operation.
13l 14I BROWN:
Yes, they are, and with this loss of main feedwater and then not 15, having auxiliary emergency feedwater immediately there, the pressure would
,6 1
have stayed up for some time period, and it would have--they wouldn't have l
looked at it right away.
And once it, the pressure, would decrease belca 18l the point at which this electromatic relief valve was suppose to reclose, 19J which is 2205, then everything they really had to look at that's concrete 20!
on that night and really concrete, is the indication on the console, which 21l is only an indication of the demand signal to the actuator, not the actual 22l valve position.
And that's what they would have to look at for that.
For 231 additional information they would have to look at to verify it wou~
be 2 42
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closed would be discharge line temperature.
If they waited for, to try and 25i i
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l 11 see it on the alarm printer, the alarm printer is relatively slow, and 2
following a reactor trip or turbine trip, the computer tends to get backed i
3j up and alarms that would happen in the first five minutes tend not to get 4j printed out for 20 or 30 as a rule of thumb, sometimes longer, sometime 5l less.
And they could request that information, but that takes time and the j
61 first couole minutes of an accident you really don't have time to go play q
with the computer and request information.
At this rate, the operator can 1
8 k at the RC drain tank level pressure and temperature but unfortunately gj in Unit 2 that is not easily accessible.
It's on a back panel on!' of sight f the normal controls.
10 11l KIRKPATRICK:
You mention the fact that the operator can look at the tempera-12!
I ture for electromatic relief valve operation.
I understand that one of the 13[
l reasons for the reactor coolant drain tank or one of the purposes of the 14:
9' 15 relief valve during normal operations.
Now, if the electromatic relief j
valva were leaking, would the temperatures that you would expect to get be 1/:
similar to what you might expect following the relief valve opening.
18!
19!
BOLTZ:
I wotid say, yes, that's true.
From my understanding, the electro-matic relief valve was leaking at the time, prior to the incident, because 21l the fellows had to makeup somewhere over a thousand gallons each shift to hold the makeup tank level within the operating band, so that at the start 23j of the incident here, they would have had higher than what you would call 24!
25l normal relief valve discharge temperatures.
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BEERS:
Under these conditions, it is difficult to determine what is a high 2
temperature on the downstream side of the electromatic relief.
Even if the code reliefs were leaking, it would be possible that you woulo get some r
,4j transition of feed back up the pipe that the electromatic relief valve 5l discharges into, and make that pipe also appear hot.
l 61 7l pRKPATRICK:
Okay, thank you.
You also mentioned the reactor coolant l
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<1 rain tank pressurize.
Does the operator training include actions that g
nave to be ta(en if there is a pressure increase in the reactor cot lant drain taelK.
10 11 BROWN:
Under normal conditions, yes.
Additional things go into the RC g
drain tank, the relief valve discharge, valve packing lead offs go into there, and for an example, and these valve packing technically could also cause level and pressure in this tank to increase and with those conditions 15; it's relatively slow and the operator does hac time to respond, which could be turning on additional coolers for that tank, turning on sooner, could be lowering levels slightly, still keeping the sparging line covered, and putting in cold demineralized water to help bring the pressure and temperature back down, but those are relatively long time operation.
21:
80LTZ:
They do have a response to alarm procedure for drain tank pressure,
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high alarm, which is received in the control room as well as hign and los 23!
I level.
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BEERS:
You might indicate where that alarm is, so i
2!
BOLTZ:
Again, it is out of sight from the console.
It is back where the 3
4j level and pressura indicators are for the drain tank.
Sf 6l KIRKPATRICK:
If the operator did observe abnormal indicaticn:. of pressure 7
and level in the drain tank, would he be able to distinguish what source it came from, based on his training.
8 9f 10{
80LTZ:
Based on his training he would be able to, but no: necessarily i
instantaneously.
It's...you've got so many sources of water. at high tempera-11l l
ture that can come in to this tank, that it could take some time to actually 12!
, l get down to the actual source by process of elimination.
A3!
14i KIRKPATRICK:
Thank you.
During the incident, the reactor coolant pressure decreased rapidly to the saturation level and apparently stayed there for a i
good while.
Does operator training address the significance of the satura-17l tion pressure?
181 19 SOLTZ:
I would say, yes, it does in the basic thermodynamics that we teach 20!
the A0s, and what we pick up in our CR0 training program, under heat transfer 21l characteristics.
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23
,KIRKPATRICK:
Should the operator.. assuming he had knowledge that satura-24!
tioil pressure existed, would that mean to him that the possibility of 25!
steaming voiding in the primary system other than the pressurizer.
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11 BOLTZ:
Yes.
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I am sure that the way it is put out by the training depart-2 ment, that it would have meant that.
A good example of the way this is 31 covered, we have a variable low pressure trip for the reactor, based on the 4
actual value of the coolant outlook temperature from the vessel.
As the Si cutput temperature increases, the low pressere trip, set point is automa-I 6
tically increased, and it is put out to everybody the reasons behind all 7f the reactor trips including this one here, and they can all tell y]u it's DNBR consideration, i minimum value af 1.3.
8 H
MARSH:
DNBR?
10f 11l
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BOLTZ:
Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio, DNBR.
I 13!
KTRKPATRICK:
Would you expect, based on operator's training in emergency 15l procedures, that they would indaed check for this condition, assuming that the prcssure was lower than they expected.
16; 17l SROWN:
With the conditions that happened from heresay that I can put together, I would say not immediately.
Primarily, the electromatic was 19' epen.
They knew it was open because the pressure was up, and then they 20t didn't have any feedwater in there so the whole system got very hot as 21:
well.
When they did establish the emergency feedwater, the emergency feedwater comes in at something less than 90 degrees or thereabouts, 90 to 23l 100 degrees, which is very cold ccmpared to the reactor coolant system, 24i which with a lot of heat removal capability, which is going to cause the 25; t
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system to shrink and depressurize.
Additionally, because of the rapid 2l depressurization where they had the steam generators very hot, because they i
3 didn't have that feedwater, emergency feedwater, the actuation of the high 4
pressure injection, the safeguards actuation system, also puts cold water 5
into the system.
So coming from the boiling water storage tank, that is 6
again about 90 degrees, a lot o' heat removal, so those two methods of heat removal plus the pressurizer spray valve sticking open, that's where your 8!
electromatic relief valve stick.ng open would tause that pressure to go g
down rather far and stay down 'or a little while 'til they could recover from that.
g So I think that would help--a little bit of Monday morning quarterback, I guess--but that woulJ help to explain why you wouldn't take i
action immediately, because you did have a aumber of sources in there that 12l were causing a large amount Jf heat removal.
i 14!
80LTZ:
I would like to.acd one point to that.
In the incidert that occurred 15; here on March 28 the temperatures and pressures that we're talking about that would concurrent with each other, this is the first time in my knowledge 17 that a B&W plant has had a reactor trip and " ' elevated core outlet terrpera-18J tures like we've 5'ened through the complete loss of cooling water on the secondary side.
So, if you' re saying, would he have verified for a steam l
bubble in the core with this pressure, normally he would not because normally 21!
,r he would not be experiencing these cooling temperatures that he saw.
W-22l would not have to worry about a steam bubble.
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KIRKPATRICK: Would you expect to find a set of steam tables in the control l
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room.
I 31 1
BOLTZ:
We have no requirement to have steam tables in the control room, 4
5l and I haven't gotter, upstairs to verify whether there are some there or not i
6j since we talked about this previously.
Myself, as a Unit 1 shift foreman 7
previously, we had tables in the shift foreman's desk, but not readily av ilable to an operator at. the console, and there was no requirement to 8
have them there.
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10!
KIRKPATRICK:
I believe he has no instrument to tell him that he's..
11:
i 12' BOLTZ:
Below saturation pressure?
131 14!
KIRKPATRICK:
Right.
16!
BOLTZ:
That's true.
17) 18l BROWN:
As far as relationship of hot leg, or core exit temperatures and 19:
saturation temperature, the only place that it is addressed where they 20; could have somewhat access to it, limited access, is in the station blackout 21l procedure when the discussion goes into natural circulation coolant, but 22!
the situations at hand, they were not in a statior.
'ackout, they didn't 22, lose all the power so they wouldn't have been keyed to look in there, and 24j there was enough other things going on that personally I don't feel they 25l l
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w uld have thought about looking in there to see, you know, where they were 2j in relationship to those temperatures.
3l KIRKPATRICK:
What are the operators trained to do in case of low reactor 4
5!
pressure, lower than normal reactor pressures?
l 6i BOLTZ:
What they are trained to do, and you'll find procedures, what I am 7l referring to, is pressurizer system failure, 2202-1.5 where they cover g
cases of a leaking electromatic relief valve, one which is stuck open, 9j pressurizer spray valve which is stuck open, and they are taught that ways i
101 11;!
of bringing pressure back, it would be like isolating letdown, throwing the l
pressurizer heaters to manual to get them to full output early rather than 12!
i waiting for the pressure to decrease to the automatic setpoint, and possibly 13; increasing pressurizer level.
14!
15 BEERS:
All right, in the normal reactor trip procedure, they give various actions of turning on an extra make-up pump, opening a high pressure injec-17' tion valve to try and bring the level up and the secondary part of that 18i would bring the pressure back up.
19' 20[
KIRKPATRICK:
All right.
Now, if you had the high pressurizer level, what 21:
l would his procedure require him to do.
22l 231 i
BOLTZ:
We have administrative requirements and tech spec requirements on 2a!
maximum pressurizer level.
Technical specifications say that pressurizer 25l nrO
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15 lj levels shall not go above 385 inches, okay, while the reactor is critical.
2 Obviously we weren't critical in this incident.
We had just shut down, but i
3j this is a loss of coolant consideration for the peak containment pressure 4
following a LOCA, for the maximum RCS inventory that would flash to steam.
5l 5, we had that limit there.
In addition, the plant operating procedures, l
6 we have the B&W limits precautions, a statement that says, "Thou shall not 7
g solid at any time in the pressurizer, except for hydrostatic testing."
8 And the consideration is over pressurization of the reactor coolant system, and the possibility of exceeding the safety limit of 2750 pounds in the g
Coolant system by going solid and going against the discharge in the make-up pumps.
I 12!
KIRKPATRICK:
What did that discharge do?
13l l
14' BOLTZ:
It depends on the flow out of the pump.
Deadhead on the pumps is 15, going to be somewhere around 2900 pounds.
17!
KIRKPATRICK:
Well, now, if the operator had any indication of high pressur-izer level and at the same time he had an indication of low pressurizer 19!
pressure, based on his training and experience, what would you expect that 20i he...which action would he take?
21' 20LTZ:
Based on the training and the materials, and the operating philoso-231 phies, that is presented to Met Ed, to the training department by B&W, he 24) would have reacted to the high pressurizer level, again trying to avoid 25!
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lj going solid and overpressurization of the system, the action not going 2{
against low pressure. Like I say, they were shut down.
Normally when you 3
are shutdown, you don't have to worry about DN8R considerations or anything like that.
The core is shut down ahead of time, so normal procedures, if 4;
Sj y u want to call a trip normal, he would respond directly to the high 6
pressurizer level, like I say, a normally coolant temperature or lower.
7' KIRKPATRICK:
All right.
The initial pressurizer level rice appears to be g
caused by relief valve venting and lowering the pressurizer pressure below the saturation pressure in the core.
Now it seems that flashing in the core may have raised the pressure from the main part of the primary system above the pressurizer pressure, thereby forcing water up into the pressurizer i
from the partially voided system.
Has the possibility of this ever occurred?
131 Of this set of conditions that I described, ever occurrir.g and brought to the attention of the operators?
15 16!
BOLTZ:
Never.
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18i BROWN:
The only thing that is ever discussed and it was discussed in the 19?
reactor trip procedure, is that following a reactor t" p if you co not 20i i
maintain your pressurizer level, you can get a pressur zer steam bubble i
21!
into the hot leg which is one of the main reasons why they told them, 22l
" Start one make-up pump, start the second make up pump,"--well, you already 23l have one running- " start the second make-up pump," which is one of your 2 41 first actions, and when you start you end uo having three make up pumps 25; n f. f;
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running following a reactor trip to maintain pressurizer level, so that you 2
d n't get that pressurizer steam bubble down into the hot leg.
That's so l
3 in case voiding occurs in that leg, it will be swepted out by the pump.
4 5(
KIRKPATRICK:
That's right?
I si BROWN:
I am not sure I understand that question.
7 l
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BEERS:
You want to maintain the pressurizer level, some level in the g
pressurizer so that this can never occur--to get voids in the hot legs.
10f I
11; KIRKPATRICK:
You say that the procedure...
i 13 BEERS:
Not a voids, but the steam bubble getting into the hot legs.
The 141 reason it can happen, is because you are going from your normal average temperature of 582 down to an average temperature of 555 following a reactor 17ll trip and the amount of shrink in the system, you have to start additional make-up pump and get more water in there to compensate for that shrink 1
18; because of the change in density.
So that's what we key them to--it is 19!
very important to get another make-up pump on early to keep the pressurizer 20:
level, so that that doesn't happen.
21!
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KIRKPATRICK:
The question I ask, I misunderstood your answer, I was referring 23!
to the primary coolant pump.
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BOLTZ:
The big consideration on the minimum pressurizer level, and the 2
actions given in the reactor trip emergency procedure, is that the reactor 3l is shut down, and you have to have a means of positive identification of 4f coolant system water inventory to make sure the core is covered.
It never c!
addresses the steam bubble formation in that core.
When you are shut down, i
it assumes you have cooling.
The core is shut down, there is heat generated, 6
but you've got positive identification that the core is covered if you have pressurizer level indication.
81 9I KIRKPATRICK:
But in general the possibility of voiding in the primary system, has that been addresseu in TMI or B&W training?
12l l
BEERS:
Void coefficients were addressed to some degree in Unit 1, but it 13{
was never much ef a consideration.
It was never a consideration under 14i these conditions.
15i 16i 80LTZ:
The only procedure that I know of on either unit that addresses boiling in the hot legs, the core exit, is the, for Unit 2, station blackout 18i with loss of both diesel generators, where you're cooling the plant down by 19!
natural circulation, no cooling pumps running, and your doing it with the 20; steam-driven emergency feed pump.
In this procedure, they give a table 21!
which states saturation temperature for a given reactor coolant system 22' pressure and a maximum Tg, they allow you to control in the cooling 2.:
system, and I quote "To prevent hot leg boiling," and primary shrinkage 24 assuming an initial T f 582.
It has two parts in this thing.
It says out 25!
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rlj you can go down so far with no make-up pumps running and maintain your 2
minimum pressurizer level inventory, ensuring that you know the core is i
3; covered, and it also says - this is your saturation temperature for this l
4 given pressure, okay? Don't take T any higher than within 30 degrees hot below this T-set.
It is the only procedure I know of that addresses hot 5
6!
leg boiling.
Again it. is for a cooldown, on a steam-driven pump, during 7j blackout conditions, and no 8
MARSH:
Can you reference the document you are citing from?
g4 10i I
BOLTZ:
Yea, the procedure number is 2202-2.5, Revision 6, dated 9/22/78; 11:
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the table is on page 6.
13l l
KIRKPATRICX:
Thank you.
The B&W analysis of loss of feedwater transient, 14!
Davis-Besey, indicates that this first voiding would occur in the primary 15 system in the case of the loss of offsite power transient.
Has this possi-bility ever been discussed with the operators?
18!
BROWN:
No.
We do review all of the licensee event reports that come from 19!
the computer printout from the NRC.
I forget the division it is coming 20!
l from.
And I have a copy in front of me of the December 9, 1977 LER output 21;
[
on PWR events that were processed by this publication of communications for 22!
the NRC during November for power reactors.
And this particular information 23l is on page 39.
This computer sheet was handed out to the operators to 24l review.
It was not picked out.
I personally review these to go over them 25; nt'
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20 1
in training when it is my turn to go over then.
And the information that 2
was in here was not enough to say that was something important to go over.
3 There was not any information published by the NRC in the current events or 4
operating history information, which comes out with the detailed information, Si n r was there anything prefaced on this by B&W, prior to March 28.
The i
6l information that has three columns in it or four columns, it has a cause I
7 code, cause subcode, facility component, component subcode, system discoverer g
or manufacturer, that's one column, the next column is docket number /LER gj number, which is licersee event report / control number-Then the next co hmn is event date, report date, report type, and the last section is 10 reactor status, event description, cause description, with percent power.
i All right, this particular event where Davis-Besey had boiling in their core as well, which last week we got the information from Davis-Besey, 14[1 by phone call.
They sent us a copy of their licensee event report, which is 50 pages long.
It has in here under the first section:
cause code, other non-applicable, Davis-Besey 1, implementation and controls, other instrumentation system required for safety, operational vent, Consolidated Controls Corporation, then under the docket it gives the Davis-Besey docket i
18!
number, the LER number and the event report date was 9/24/77, report date was 10/7/77, and it was a two-week report.
The reactor status event descrip-20l tion says routine shutdown operations, they were initially at 9 percent power.
Half trip of steam and feedwater rupture control system caused rise 22 in reactor coolant system temperature and pressure.
Caused pressurizer 23[
power relief valve to open, and valve failed to close causing reduction in 24l RCS pressure, LCOs, limiting corditions for operation, were exceeded for 5 25!
l 79)
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21 1{
tech specs, and they give the numbers of them.
Now, they are under standard t
2j tech specs as is Unit 2, and personally I didn't take the time to look up f
3 all those references.
If there was something that was a little more impor-4 tant, I figured it would be referenced.
And then the cause description at Sj the bottom it says - after condition from SFRCS--I am not sure what that 6
definition stands for--safety features, reactor coolar.t system I guess, I 7
am not sure--channel 2 which caused valve, and they give a feedwater valve 8
number FWSP7A, to quote "Cause of this half trip has not been positively gf determined although extensive investigation has revealed lcose connections i
10j at terminal boards (possible cause)".
The information there was not signi-ficant--why do I want to go over with an operator that they had an LER on a icose terminal board that caused a half actuation, although the 50 page report on the second page of the summary, then says, and I quote, "The 13!
depressurization of the primary system resulted in steam formation in the 141 primary system, but the evaluation has shown there was no appreciable 15:
boiling in the core."
And that is the first time in any report that I have ever seen where B&W, or any place else, other than a boiling water reactor, discussed boiling in the core.
18i 19!
KIRKPATRICX:
I thank you.
Are you normally provided with this type of 20!
information by B&W?
21; 22l l
ZECHMAN:
Normally we are.
Normally if information of that.,if that 23l information was very important, normally we receive two places:
- 1) through 24!
communications of the engineering departments between B&W and Met Ed; and 25!
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- 2) immediately it appears on the simulator trainer during recall or some-2 thing of this sort; and 3) if it is important, we also find it on operator licensing exa...s.
If its a major problem, it becomes a favorite exam question, 3
i 4l and casually an operator will be passed on his oral.
And we have not seen 5f any, I don't think any questions that anybody related to us indicated any 6
discussions of this sort either from B&W, NRC or NRC licensing exam.
i 7j BROWN:
Also, if it is something that is important, that could be generic 8
in all of the B&W plants, the B&W has a user's meeting and they also hase a 9l user's memo system where if something important comes out between meetings 10[
lll that they identify to all the operating plants, " Hey, this is something you I
ought to look at."
And there was nothing in there either, to our knowledge.
12',
Nothing came out of that that got down to the training department to train the operators.
14!
15i BOLTZ:
In addition all the piants have tech specs.
I know this for a fact, all the plants do, which requires immediate notification of the NRC 17' on any item which is found not to be reviewed by the safety analysis, any 18i transient the plant has gone through that is not being considered in the 19; safety analysis or any problem which may look to be a generic problem in 20 all similar facilities.
And like I say and like Skip says, this thing at 21!
Davis-Besey was never treated that way, even though it is turning out to be 22l i
that one.
23f 24j 25!
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23 flj KIRKPATRICK:
Do you think it would be helpful if NRC promptly disseminated f
this information to other licensees?
2 l
31 4!
BOLTZ:
Yes I do, but I am not sure even the NRC understood the gravity of f'
5 what happened at Davis-Besey, because it never came to us in NRC examinations 6j or any kind of communications with NRC.
7 BROWN:
8 The communications division at NRC, I don't know how large it is, gj like I said, this is a computer sheet that I have read off earlier that was i
10j n page 39.
Some of these reports, they go in to the components and causes, I
plus they also go into things that are classified as operator error, which could be a maintenance man or janitor or a licensed operator.
Sometimes it says, just plain operator error, and they don' t--or personnel error--and 3
I they don't real'.y identify whether it was an operator or maintenance man or 14; 15,'
what.
But we get these reports monthly in a computerized form, and they run somewhere in the orde" of close to 60 pages every month computerized j
with three events per page, that's how many were processed due to communi-1/;
cation.
Now for that to get put out in even more detail, they would have to see..they would pick off just this one here with this loose terminal board that I quoted before, and use additional summary statements that would require somebody to fully review every licensee event report, for in-21!
comfrunication, to see here if it is a generic item or if it is of major importance item.
And that to me, when they are processing that many reports 23!
esery year, and you run them to standard tech specs with Unit 2 as far as 24j l
the number of things would have to be reported, under standard tech specs, 25; I
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I I
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24 1!
I called a couple of plants that were under standard tech specs before, and i
2 they were running about a 100 to 110, give or take a few, licensee event i
3!
reports per year and there are 70 reactors and some reactors run 30 some 4
run 110, some might go 150 events per year.
That's quite a lot of number Si f events, and this computer printout gives you the prompt notification, 6
which is the two week written followup, it gives the 30 day written followup, 7
plus any revisions that may corr.e in wHch may be six months, nine months, r even 1 nger un a revision or a followup report is generated to give 8
all the specific details.
It is optimistic to say, yea, the NRC or somebody g
ught to jump on it, but that volume of information, and this one I have 10 i
quoted before, this LER from "3vis-Besey, which was 5.: pages in length.
A 11!
hundred of those a month times 50 pages, the guy's going to go crazy reading that.
13!
14' 15:l MARSH:
Do you feel some type of prioritizir ; would be in order for that.
Some type of a code or more definitive code or more information in the code as to the importance of the event, the LER.
17!
18i BROWN:
The identification numbers do prioritize it--whethte, where it was 19!
on, whether it is a safety cystem or not, but some of the accidents cn the 20j
- afety system that are reported are like this, the one I quoted where tnere 21!
was a loose terminal board is what started the whole thing off.
That is 22l not in itself, isn't anything to be overly excited about.
T8at happens at 23l l
different times everywhere, a little electrical connector decides to work 24i 25l:
itself loose.
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25 1:
KIRKPATRICK:
...do you feel that maybe that prioritization that they have i
2{
now should be refined even further.
3' BROWN:
The volume is what really indicates that the initial cause doesn't 4;
5l 1
k like much, but the final results of what really would dictate in the 6
summary.
And that may not be available for six months until all the inves-i 7
tigation, analyses, and everything are done.
One of the things that, I f rget which one it is right now, one of the standard tech specs says that 8
if certain parameters are exceeded, they've got to go through a whole re-g analysis of 5 or 6 different events, to be verified that everything is
,0f still okay with that in mind, and 'til those things are done it can take quite a while.
I 13l BEERS:
Perhaps there needs to be some method of going back and looking at some of these reports--the final report.
You have to have an initial report and a final report on these events.
Perhaps on this Davis-Besey 17l; incident, when the initiai report was put in, maybe they didn't realize the gravity of it at that time, and then it never was picked up again on the final report.
I don't know whether there was any method in the communica-19!
tions civision of NRC to pick up this type of thing.
21!
BROWN:
The coding systems for identifying an LER is in itself defined in a 22l Reg Guide, and for example this one that I read off there its identification 23l l
number was 77-016/0lT-0.
That meant it was 1977, it was the 16th report, 24i l
it was a 01--means it was a prompt report--defined under the conditions of 25:
i 68i OLz
i l
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26 I
lj a required prompt report, if my memory serves me correct.
There is ten 2
items there, the T signifies that it was 10 over 14 day written report and i
3}
the zero means that that's the revision that it was.
That's an awful lot 4
f numbers to remember when you a.e trying to sort through these and say, 5
n w gee, where did this come from and what was it? This coding system 6
after the 77-016 which is the year and the event number, to break down the 7l code it goes anywhere from zero 1 through 99 that uses P, T, L, W and X and then you can have any number of revisions on the bottom of it.
It gets to g
be quite lengthy as you are trying to break it down, and it still doesn't g
really, it goes into a lot more for licensee event reports on environmental 0
incident and for overexposures and that type of thing.
,1l 1
12!
KIRKPATRICK:
I would like to get on with a different subject ncw.
I noted during the incident that the operators were very quick to bypass the ECCS 14!
after it was initiated, even though they may not have found it necessary to reduce flow until sometime later.
Are the operators trained to do this?
17 MARSH:
Before you begin to anever I am going to break for a second and 18(
reverse this tape.
Time being 6:02 and I am reading 710 on the meter.
19!
20!
MARSH:
The time is still 6:03 and we have resumed.
Don, you just read the 21l question, still on your mind to go ahead and answer it.
23 BOLTZ:
Yes. The reason the operators, they are in fact trained to bypass 24i l
SFAS actuation following depressurization of the coolant system to do a 25i k
is
l i
27 r
!lj number of things.
Unit 2 has automatic opening of the sodium hycroxide 2
tank outlet valves into the high pressure injection system which injects 3
caustic into reactor coolant system.
It's happened in the past and the i
4j nly way to get these valves to reclose following opening up, which follows 5
the actuation of the safety features actuation system, SFAS, is to bypass 6
the actuation to allow closure by the operator.
And he would be doing this 7f even though he would not need to, at the time, throttle back on high pressure injection ficw.
I might add that if the pressurizer level is high following g
gl SFAS actuatici, the procedures tell him to maintain 220 inches in the pressurizer.
If it is higher than that, he's going to have to bypass the 10 actuation tu throttle the high pressure injection valves.
12 BEERS:
We feel this is a design problem in that this same hydroxide is injected into the reactor coolant system at this time it is really the design, it is really for LOCA considerations and not necessarily at the 15!
time of a reactor coolant, or a reactor trip.
17 KIRKPATRICK:
Another question along this same line, can you tell me what 18f the pump, make-up pump limitations, flow limitations are.
19:
20l l
BOLTZ:
Yes, the make-up flow limitations on TMI 1 and TMI 2, that's 550 21' gallons per minute per pump and we have high pressure injection flow alarms 22;,
i to each of the four high pressure injection legs.
Individually they come 23!
l on at 275 gallons a minute increasing.
24!
25!
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28 lj KIRKPATRICK:
As the pressure decreases significantly below the low pressure 2
trip setpoint that initiates
, what would happen to the flow.
l 3!
i BOLTZ:
4l Coolant. :ystem pressure decreases following initiation of high 5
pressure injection.
If you start out with, what, say, 250 gallons a minute 6
through each of the four high pressure injection valves, as the coolant 7
system pressure decreases the high pressure injection flow will increase, 8l and it is required operator actions by the emergency procedures to bypass the actuation sigrial and throttle down on the 'high pressure injection flows g
t prevent run out of the make-up pumps.
10 11l 12l KIRKPATRICK:
Okay, thank you.
One of the things that happened during the i.
event was apparen*.ly--the core was, as the core was voiding, a nuclear instrumentation snowed an increase.
Does the training program include the 14!
behavior of nuclear instrumentation during the density changes in the core,... changes of density of the coolant in the core.
171 I
BOLTZ:
Yes, the training that the operators get does address this.
There 18:
are several areas where it is stressed not only for nuclear instrumentation 19i purposes but for reactivity changes in the core.
What we are addressing is 20!
leakage neutrons from the core.
It has never been specifically addressed 21!
that if you get a steam bubble in the core you would see an increase in l
nuclear instrumentation.
We have never addressed a steam bubble in the 23!
core.
But, yes, they would be aware of the effects on nuc instrumentation.
24!
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29 I
1 ZECHMAN:
We hit two areas with respect to those detectors in this light.
2:
One is the density changes of water in the event of neutron leakage which i
3 the detector see, and two, the movement of control rods in the areas of the 4{
detectors and their effects on the instrumentation.
5 6
BOLTZ:
I might add that one of the things which is commonly done by a l
7l control room operator on the console is, when we are doing a heat balance g
check on the out-of-core detectors and of course I am talking power range gj detectors, if they are out of specification, meaning they are out away from 10 the heat balance by more than 1.0 percent full power, one of the things F
yy that we can do is to slightly adjust the reactor coolant system T higher or lower to get the indicated reactor power from the out-of-core detectors 3l back within 1 percent of the heat valves and this done very calmly.
I am F
g not saying we adjust T by two or three degrees or anything like that but 9'"
"U' "9
15 within specifications and the fellows know this, and they know that what they're doing is affecting the core density and the leakage neutrons that the out-of-core detectors are seeing.
181 19t 20;;
Are changes in the pump behavior which are caused by reduced KIRKPATRICK:
I water quality addressed during training.
21l 22l l
BOLTZ:
Yes, you must be talking cavitation of pumps.
23l 24j 25:
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30 i
1!
KIRKPATRICK:
Right.
2i l
3l BOLTZ:
MPSH, cavitation, things like that, pump run out.
Yes, basic 4{
fundamentals under fluid flow and things, are covered all the way down 5
starting in the AOC program that the fellows are initiated in.
Auxiliary 6
Operators, its the lowest, what do you want to call it, rank of auxiliary operator in the plant.
7 I
8l KIRKPATRICK:
And as the operator observed some of the alarms that were 9l 10i ccurring during this event such as increased pump speed and increased vibration, what would his training require him to do.
11(
12!
I BOLTZ:
We have procedures which cover abnormal operation on reactor coolant 131 f
pumps and motors.
Do I have those procedures here?
I should.
Reactor 14i coolant pump operation procedure 2103-1.4, and reactor coolant pump and motor malfunctions, I don't have, let's see, the procedure, here it is, 2203-1.4 address abnormal conditions, which require securing a reactor 171 coolant pump and they include high vibration, high amperage, Icw RC flow, 181 those conditions under the manual action required, they say reduce power, 19l trip reactor and secure the affected RCP, so under high vibration conditions, 20!
which we're sure that they had, they did have decreasing reactor coolant 21; system flow indicatio, which I have seen through some conversations with operators that were there, and I know they had low motor current.
I did 23 mean high motor current rate originally.
So here's one procedure specifically 24!
j which says you must trip the reactor coolant pump.
This was covered in 25i l
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31 11 operator training, both in CR0 training and requal training for the licensed 2
perators.
l 3l MARSH:
4 Regarding both this procedure and the one you cited from earlier 5
and the others that you referenced, is this correct that these are the 6
current versions of those particular procedures and the ones that were in effect on March 28?
7 8
BOLTZ:
The 2203-1.4 procedure, abnormal procedure, reactor coolant pump i
i and motor emergencies, is--that I'm holding here--is revision 3 dated 10j 5/4/78.
The pages that were changed on this revision on this revision are ll; I
pages 2, 3, and 3.1, the conditions requiring tripping the coolant pump 12!
I under the low amps, the high vibration and the low coolant system flow are 131 on page number 8.
14' 15; MARSH:
So that indeed then is the most current version and it does reflect 16; information that was in effect on March 28, those portions that you cited.
r 17!
18!
BOLTZ:
Yes, that's true, and page 8 here is revision 0 dated 5/17/77.
20i ZECHMAN:
And you are using a control..you got a control copy in front of 21!
you?
22l 23!
BOLTZ:
This is a control copy for the training department.
24!
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32
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KIRKPATRICK:
Does the training emphasize or inclede discussion of any of 2
the hazards that the operator might, because of the primary system, if he l
3l did not trip the pump in case of high vibration.
4}
t BOLTZ:
If you did not trip a pump due to high v'Dration.
Yes, the operator 5
61 knoss and it is addressed during CR0(?) training programs that he could run 7li into seal failure problems of the pump itself.
Cavitation could cause dropping the
't
ler, and the steam formation right there, and one of the 8
g big things that we pushed in our training program is the idea of a seal failure.
10 You want to try to avoid it under all circumstances, because it Ig puts the unit into a loss of coolant situation.
I might add from my own personal viewpoints, is--that paper said, you know, you can give your own 13;j recommendations--that if the coolant pumps had been left on line instead of being secured like they were, if they would have cavitated those pumps very l
much longer, they would have gotten seal failure, which would have put them 15, into a loss of coolant situation which is unisolable.
And I feel at this 161 17l time we would be recirculating the Reactor Building sump inventory through the low pressure injection lines and the dose rates in the Auxiliary Building would be tremendous, and any leakage out of those pumps right now is going 19!
to give one heck of a gas release, so we would have offsite teams tracking 20[
a plume yet today.
21!
2h KIRKPATRICK:
One of the things that occurred during the event was that the 23!
outlet temperatures went offscale and comparison with the pressure at the 24l time indicates that these were in a superheat range.
Did the operator 25i training ever address significance of such a thing and the fact that, ah..
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33 l
1 BROWN:
We discussed the regions of heat transfer, as to whether it's 2
conduction, nucleate boiling, film boiling, bulk boiling, or superheat.
As l
31 far as the temperatures were-really referred to the pressure-yes, and no.
i l
We deal our discussions primarily with the steam generators.
We' re talking 4
Sj about those different mechanisms of heat transfer and getting the good 6
quality of steam out of the steam generator, and don't really address it in p
the reactor coolant system because--Well, the only thing we talked about is 8
that the reactor is operating in the nucleate boiling region, and the fact g,
the nucleate boiling region can be broken down into two parts:
the subcooled nd the saturated, and that the regular operators in the subcooled nucleate 10 boiling region, where in the nucleate boiling region small bubbles are i
formed, small voids are formed, but they move into the coolant and collapse
,3 {,
quickly and in the subcooled nucleate boilding region those bubbles of heat
[
transfer are at a minimum, even though you are in a good region of heat transfer.
But as far as talking about those temperatures that be T set, those range of those instruments that they would be looking at on the console only go up to 620 degrees, and I don't know exactly what the pressure was at the time that you were referencing it, 1300 degrees. Yeah, you are definitely over set T.
But, there's a few numbers that are in their mind, like for example, they know that for a pressure of 1010 that the set T is 2 01 around 545.
21l 22l KIRKPATRICK:
That's because that's the steam generator.
24:
25l 1
"I (i
U
I 34 i
i lf BROWN:
And that's to do with the steam generator and we talked about that 2f for a reactor trip, and the steam bypass valves are to maintain that steam I
31 header pressure at 1010, so that we have a cooling mechanism to go to
(
4!
maintain the steam generator 545, while the reactor coolant system will lag 5
a little bit and be around 555, which will limit the amount of shrink l
6l following a reactor trip.
And that is gone over quite extensively.
Whether 7
they can carry it over or not during that transient situation, I don't 8
I'm sure the-personnally I would sit there and say, "Oh, gee, look know.
g' at that temperature, that's T set."
You know, there's 14,000 alarms going ff and you're trying to figure out where to go, I'm not sure if I could 10j put that together myself.
Maybe I could, and I'm cuttin' myself down, but I
that's something I'm not sure I would go with, but yes, heat transfer, superheat and certain T set's are gone over, even in the pressurizer opera-tion.
They have to record every shift of the pressurizer temperature, and 15l they know that for 2155 T set is 650 or thereabouts, close to it, and i
that's the indication that they are looking for to show that they have saturated conditions in the pressurizer.
i 181 BOLTZ:
One tning I would like to add to that is during the CR0 training and in fact during the requalification training, when an RPS force is given 20i we do address the effects of departure from nucleate boiling on cladding 21!
22!-
temperatures.
There is a graph that we put out that show's what happens when the core does depart from nucleate boiling, going back and forth to 23
[
the film boiling region and the film collapsing and cycling the temperatures 24) of the cladding up and down.
But, it is never discussed, that I know of, 25i o
t b
i 35 ll in terms of reactor coolant system pressure and an actual steam bubble gj being formed in the core, uncovering the core.
Just the effects on heat i
3 transfer and the effects on elevated cladding temperatures, is all that has 4
been addressed.
5 6j BROWN:
The only time that any B&W lecture or anything else we ever talked 7l about goes into the safety features emergency core coolir.g system, is on g
the maximum hypothetical accident, the worse LOCA, is that the assumptions g
are that the only system that works is your low pressure injection system, and if the core does get uncovered then the recovering is no problem.
10 11!
i BOLTZ:
That's right.
We also have right li; our tech specs, the final
,2 1
I acceptance criteria of 2200 degrees it is right now, for peak cladding 13!
temperature following a loss of coolant accident.
14' i
15:
BROWN:
The analysis was done to show that it was cafe at 2300, but the 16,i 17l final acceptance criteria for the emergency core coolant system limited that to 2200.
18!
19' BOLTZ:
But again, I do want to stress that the final acceptance criteria as it was presented to us by the B&W people and as we present it to the 21!
operators is stressed on cladding temperature and its effects on heat 22f transfer and cladding damage, not on coolant system response.
We are 23 talking accident conditions when we talk final acceptance criteria, and we 24; I
are talking loss of coolant, which dictates coolant system pressurizer 25!
i n ~ Is l
36 lj level really being low and possibly out of sight because there is a hole in 2
the coolant system.
l 3i 4
KIRKPATRICK:
Pall right, thank you.
That's all the questions I have 5
regarding the primary system behavior.
Do you have any more comments that 6
y u would like to give at this time before I get into the emergency plan 7l questions?
I 8
BROWN:
There's something I would like to have in here.
And that is that g
10!
the wh le event that started this thing was due to the loss of main feedwater.
And what caused this whole thing, I feel it could have been avoided with Iy some good designing.
The main feedwater pumps did trip on low section pressure as designed.
They were cleaning out same--trying to clean up the
]
condensate polishing demineralizers--and a line clogged which got water back into an air line which caused the outlet valves on the condensate polishers to go closed.
Therefore, there was significant reduction in the 17l water suction to the main feedwater pumps, causing them to trip.
There is a bypass valve on these condensate polishers, but it's manual and that 18t doesn' t do anybody a damn bit of good.
And that to me is--that started the whole thing, and we were talking about some of the locations of, where is the indication at? Where's the control at?
In the control room, is the 21; availability for the operator to see it? There's a lot of design things 22j ther? that, as far as I know, were identified on problem reports to tre 23 ctor, Burns ard Roe, the engineer contractor and startup testing, co r.
24l which I believe was done by UE&C, United Ergineers and Constructioners and 25!
i
/
4 t
i, i o
a
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37 t GPU.
This was by the operators.
Some of the things were taken care of; 1
2f other things weren't.
3 KIRKPATRICK:
I discussed this area with you before.
You listed a series 5
f differences between Unit I and Unit 2 that you believe would have led d
to... had they existed on Unit 2, as they do on Unit 1, may have mitigated ei this problem.
8 BROWN:
One of the lists i
9{
10 KIRKPATRICK:
Make notes 11l l
12!
BROWN:
I'll try, I don't know if I can remember all or not.
One of the things i_ the electromatic relief valve.
In Unit 2, there is a status 141 light on the console that was added after they had lost a power supply one 15 time; and the orny thing that this light does in Unit 2 is give you an 17dication of what kind of command signal is being sent to the solenoid i
17j i
valve for this electromatic relief valve.
In Unit 1, it's a limit switch 18!
on the valve that will tell you whether that valve is open or closed.
19; Additionally, in Unit 1 all the operator has to do is, standing there at 20!
the console, controlling the primary system, is turn around and he has 21l l
indication of RC drain tank pressure and temperature, and he can see whether 22!
the heat exchanger is on trying to get th + 'mperature back down.
In Unit 23 2 he can't do that.
Those are two things ight there that I can think of, 24 plus this bypass valve, which I just mentio,.ed.
25!
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38 i
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BEERS:
Right.
Why don't you go ahead and explain how the bypass valve 2
w rks in Unit I?
l 31 4j BROWN:
Well, in Unit 1 if you get a high differential pressure across the 5l p lishers in Unit 1, which is called Powdex in Unit 1, this bypass valve 6
g es open so that you can pump straight from the hot well to the condensate 7
penp, to the condensate booster pump, right to the feedwater pumps, without cleaning up the water.
They sacrifice water quality, as far as chemistry 8
is concerned, to ensure that you do have water in the main feed pumps, and g
in Unit 1, the main faed pumps don't trip because they have that bypass 10 around their polishers.
I 12!
BOLTZ:
I might add that Unit 1 has the same feedwater pumps that Unit 2 1,, !
does.
Unit 1 does not have low pressure trips on those feed pumps.
15.
KIRKPATRICK:
You men +,ioned the existence of the block valves on Unit 2.
16; Feedwater block valves.
Auxiliary feedwater block valves.
17!
1Si 80LTZ:
In Unit 1, it comes off the discharge of the pump, it goes through 19i the control valves, which are called EFV30A aad 8, straignt into the steam 20; generator through the Aux Feed nozzles.
In Unit 2, it comes out off the 21l 22l discharge of the pump and it,oes through the control valves which are l
l EFVilA and B, and then it goes into a header motor operated where this one 23 valve was closed, this EFV12A and B.
They were closed, and then througn 24l two normally closed valves and their numbers are EFV32A and B, and 33A and 25j 1 O}
f)I h
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39 f
lj 8, and they are a bypass around this block valve that in event this 12 l
2l valve doesn't work they can go th qugh those.
And in Unit 1, they don't 3
have that, so there is no problem about worrying if it is locked open, or i
4j if it was tested properly, or if the limit switches were okay.
It's just a eli straight shot off the control valve and you either have it or you don't.
I 6i KIRKPATRICK:
7 Do you know why the procedure for surveillance testing requires closing those 12 valves, valves, if they are not needed on Unit 1.
g 9f BOLTZ:
You mean on Unit 2.
10!
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I KIRKPATRICK:
Yeah.
The Unit 2 procedure requires closure of these valves.
12l Since they don't exist on Unit 1 presumably they are not needed there.
,3i 1
145 BOLTZ:
I don't know why they do.
In fact, not all of the surveillance procedures that we have on the Unit 2 emergency feedwater eystem, which 16:
ends up with the emergency feedwater pumps runairy on recirculation--not I
all the surveillance procedures require those valves to be closed,'only 18' It happens to be the one that was performed a few days before the one.
19!
incident.
20; l
21!
l BEERS:
There are two possibilities of why they must be closed on Unit 2 22!
l ans notJon Unit 1.
The first possibility is that Unit 2 is on standard 19 tech spect and requires many more operability checks, all of these emergency i
24i feed systems, than is required by Unit 1.
Secondly, pe aps the flow 25)
,, n -
9
l 40 li c ntrol valves, the EMVilA and B in Unit 2 leaked through, and to preclude 2
water being injected into the generator, the block valve was in in line with the control valves.
3 l
4!
S' BOLTZ:
The way Unit 1 gets around that is they close the discharge valve 6
en the emergency feed pumps, which is downstream of the discharge check
[
valve and Unit 2 has the same set up.
In fact, motor operated discharge es, Unit l's are manual which have to be closed locally by the operator, va 8 i but the low flow recirculation valve for pump protection is before the pump g
10l a ge e
a e,
ust as in Unit 1.
So they could have operated the i
same way.
11; i
12l l
BROWN:
There is one other difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2, is that 131 scme of the discussion with the operators, they were having a lot of problems with their make-up pumps, getting the.n on and letting them stay on, and the interlocks require a four second time delay for the Unit 2 make-up pumps to M
start, 'cause when you hit the the control switch you have to hold it until it goes tPrough it: logic to get the oil pumps on before we'll say okay i
18!
pumps star".
In Unit 1, it doesn't have that time delay.
You hit the 19i control switch, the oil pumps are already on, and it goes right away.
20!
That's one other difference between Unit 1 and Unit 2 on thos-21; 22l l
BOLTZ:
One other thing we mentioned the other day is for unit differences, 23!
and it becomes quite important in the March 28 incident, and that is the 24i desigt. feature in Unit 1 on the way we empty the RB sump.
We have two 25 e
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41
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1 containment isolation valves that we have to open, it's gravity flow into 2
the Auxiliary Building sump in Unit 1.
There's a low level interlock, 3j which automatically closes one of the valves to maintain a water seal, so 4
that there is no gas release from the containment to the Auxiliary Building 5
should the line go dry with the sump.
There are no automatic sump pumps or 1
valves or anything like this, like Unit 2 has.
And maybe if they would 6l 7
have had the same thing, all this water in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building just wouldn't be there today.
g 9l i
KIRKPATRICK:
All right.
10; i
11; BOLTZ:
I might add one thing, is these two containment isolation valves on 12; I
the Unit 1 R8 sump, and I am sure this is true of all the Units, only close 13l on a four pound safety feature actuation, not a low RC pre 3sure deal.
14,!
15l KIRKPATRICK:
Okay. I'll go to the eme; cy plan questions.
Do you have an established training program for individuals who are assigned duties and responsibilities by the TMI emergency plan.
18!
19' ZECHMAN:
Yes, sir.
We have a procedure titled " Station Health Physics 20; Procedure" 1670.9, Volume 1, " Emergency Plans and Procedures, Emergency 21l
)
Training and Emergency Exercise," which I have available for you here 22l l
today.
23l I
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tlj KIRKPATRICK:
All right, this does briefly describe the nature of the g{
training, briefs of the...well for the various categories of personnel who 3f w old be involved in an emergency, is that right.
4l ZECHMAN:
Yes sir, it does.
5 Si f
KIRKPATRICK:
All right, thank you.
Does the training outline...let's see I
does this training program...is this training program, excuse me, outlined 8
in the form of schedules and lesson plans?
g 10l l
ZECHMAN:
The training program outlines--the procedure, I should say, outlines the training required for each of the assignments to the onsita emergency personnel.
It identifies in the procedure that lesson plans 13l will be available for each program.
In other words, the lesson plans are 14; not included in the procedure but the procedure states what shall be taught.
16 KIRKPATRICK:
All right.
18!
MARSH:
Have these lesson plans been developea?
19l 20 ZECHMAN:
Yes, sir.
I 22; j
MARSH:
And they are available.
23!
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43 I.
ZECHMAN:
And they are available.
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31 KIRKPATRICK:
Is it training, classroom, or hands-on in nature, or both?
4t g
ZECHMAN:
It is a combination of both because along with the training we 6
f 11 wup with a drill, the actual drill participation by the participants.
7 XIRKPATRICK:
All right.
During-you're at the end of the training sessions, 8;
g are there tests or other checks of individual's proficiency.
10!
f ZECHMAN:
In certain areas there is, yes sir.
Depends on the job assigned, for example, we don't for training offsite fire ccapanies or civil defense 12:
people as part of this program, we don't give them tests.
131 14:
KIRKPATRICK:
But for, let's see, well, for personnel in these categories like emergency directors, accident assessment personnel, raciological monitoring teams, fire brigade team, onsite fire brigade team, repair party team, first aid rescue team, operations persannel and division support 18 personnel.
Would they have the proficiency tests?
20' BROWN:
Some of them would.
21l f
22l t
BEERS:
Part of them do, and part of them don't.
23l 24!
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44 i
t lf BROWN:
All right.
The accident assessment group that would be doing the 2f calculations, yes, they are instructed, they go over all the offsite doses i
3l and calculations have to be gone into that, and there is a quiz that goes 4j along with that.
Th.e operations personnel must pass a test on certain 5l emergency procedures that are outlined in this 1670.9.
There is a hands on 6l type of training for the fire brigade, everybody has to go then physically 7f wrap the hose in their hand and put a fire out or an extinguisher or both, g
and the first aid training is a Red Cross or multimedia course and, yes, there is a quiz with that.
Some of the training there is, some there g
isn't.
10f l
11l KIRKPATRICK:
All right.
i 13l I might point out that like the precedures states, unless the plans are outlined, will be revised by the instructor for each program, and will incitde periodic examinations or assignments.
17l KIRKPATRICK:
All right.
19!
MARSH:
You mentioned contingency planning with offsite local fire depart-ments, this type of thing.
Who bears the responsibility for that, under 21i
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whose..which one of you would be in charge of that or would bear reponsi-22l bility for that portion, or do all of you get involved?
23!
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BROWN:
Yes, the training is conducted and it normally falls under the 2
realm of radiation protection supervisor, Dick Dubial, and supervisor of 3
maintenance, Dan Shovlin, and safety supervisor--which I believe in charge 4l of that now, is Earl Gee.
And they work together with getting these people in here.
Earl Gee, for example, he works a lot with the fire companies to 5
6 get them in, either him or Jim Wheelan, from Met Ed Safety Department.
i 7j We'll work with the fire companies so that they know which gate to come in, g
where the special hookups--that's for anything different from what's on their truck--is located and as far as who was in charge this past year, I g
10 I
ll; ij The procedure can be very specific.
For example a training program facility is the responsibility of the supervisor of Radiation Protec-14l tion and Chemistry.
The training program for the Bureau of Rautological i
15l:
Health is the Supervisor, Radiation Protection, or his designee.
The training program for the State Police is the Supervisor of Radiation Protec-tion and Chemistry.
The training program for the local fire companies is 17; l
the TMI representative and his designee, as Mr. Brown just explained.
19i MARSH:
Do you people monitor the performance of these people to see that 20; this training had been carried out?
21i 22[
We receive final documentation.
23l l
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46 1!
KIRKPATRICK:
Okay, has this been exercised.
Have they been doing this 2f lately?
31 Yes, sir.
41 5[
KIRKPATRICK:
Do the offsite people participate in any of your drills?
6 7{
Have they responded or has this been exercised, so that, uh,...
l 81 30 LTZ_:
The way it works is we set up a training program and invited the g
local Companies to respond.
lli i
KIRKPATRICK:
Have they responded?
12!
131 80LTZ:
Some have, some have not.
To be specific, I would have to go back to the records and tell you exactly who has this year and who has not.
I don't have it with me.
16' 17l BROWN:
Some of the..most of them I think had.
I am not sure f we have 18i.
~'
an attendance by name of who from these offsite organizations participated.
19!
And every year in the radiation emergency drill, they are notified to 20' activate their own subsection of the plan and follow it through with the 21(
And this is sort of a little thing afterwards:
about a 22!
I week and a half after this March 28 incident here, I heard a big thing on 23t l
the news from the, I think it was Lancaster County Civil Defense, that 24!
says, "We now have an emergency plan."
What in the hell were they doing 25 since 1974 when we were running these drills?
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KIRKPATRICK:
One of the questions that I have down here is, "Briefly 2
describe the emergency drill program."
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4:
Sir, that is spelled out it. detail in the procedure 1670.9 that Sj I am turning over to you today.
6l 7j KIRKPATRICK:
All right, thank you.
As of 3/28 has the 1978 training gf iteration for emergency planning been completed?
9l 10 The training was provided for each of the organizations that are menticned in the training procedure.
There are a few who send, for example, the repair party.
The repair party, two graduate people (?) have been trained with the responsibility to go to their peop~,e in their departments, and train them.
In certain a"eas, that has not been completed as of this date.
Operations training h.
Seen completed.
16 KIRKPATRICK:
All right, thank you.
If a drill identifies any area or an 17; area requiring followup, in other words improvement, how is the area high-18.
lighted, evaluated or corrected?
20i All right, as a result of the drill critique, individual action 21; I
items are listed on Enclosure 4 of this procedure.
With action to be 22!
j taken, then has the be...the action has to be resolved with resolution 23!
attached and signature and date signed.
24!
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KIRKPATRICK:
Okay, and to your knowledge, on March 28, were there any 2
outstanding items that had been identified during previous drills that have 3j not been resolved.
l 4l 5l During previous drills or the last drill?
5 7l KIRKPATRICK: Well l
8l During the last drill, there are still outstanding items that 9
have not been resolved.
10 4
lll KIRKPATRICK:
All right.
Would you be able to describe them right now or 12 13 No sir, they are available.
t 15:
r gn, au us n ng ems from M is cred ous to Gat 16 have been completed, is that right?
17 18!
Again, I would have to look at, into all those items ard tell you, 19,.
you know.
I do not have them with me to identify that, and it has been 21lj over a year since that time so it is available to you at any time.
22l l
KIRKPATRICK:
All right, thank you.
That's all the questions that I have.
23j l
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49 If MARSH:
I've got one or two more.
With the offsite contingency training, 2
that's a broad title for it, I assume the hospitals are also included?
31 4j Yes sir.
We have run a yearly emergency drill with the hospital.
Si i
6l MARSH:
In some instances, your employees here, within different categories 7
work on a swing shift type of basis, witn them rotating shift to shift to 8
shift, with a set period at the end of that rotation assigned for training.
I gj Do you people monitor the use of that time?
In other words, if I've got a week at the end that's supposed to be training, you are just dealing with
,0I supervisors to be sure that ultimately the training is accomplished, am I I
understanding you right?
12(
13l BROWN:
This is rignt.
For licensed operators and people in operations the 14!
auxiliary A, B and C operators, on some of their weeks, which is called a l
training week, there is some classroom training.
Other than that, there is some system training, which they can do on their own under the direction of 17;!
the Foreman, who says, "Okay, you go trace this system out and go answer these questions." The licensed operators do attend the requalification program.
The maintenance people such as electrical, mechanical, instrument, 20!
radchem techs, people that are on shift work of that nature, we at this 21!
time do not do any training for them.
If there is any training they can 22' i
sit in on, it's fire fighting, first aid.
All right, they come to that, 23}
l but we don't provide a weekly training schedule for those people.
24l l
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50 i
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BEERS:
We do provide sonie training for these type of people that you 6
2{
addressing, but what Mr. Marsh is asking, do we track to ensure that they I
3l are trained.
Am I correct?
4!
Sj MARSH:
The specific one I am looking at that, although time is set aside, I
6i what prevents this time from being used by the supervisor as just another p
work week.
And although it may be labeled as training, it is not dedicated the same.
I am looking for a hand as to whether we can measure that or 8
not.
g 10 We can.
Let me be a little specific.
Our department represented here today has the responsibility for the training, and operations training, general employee training, radiation emergency drill training.
The line departments, line management, is responsible for their training programs, 14,.
maintenance responsible for their training programs, radiation protection, that department is responsible for their training programs, and so forth.
So we are getting in another area that we are not responsible for.
18!
MARSH:
Right, but at the end of that training they then respond to you?
20' That's right.
I 22l MARSH:
Do you have track records on that?
23l 24i i
25i
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51 1!
Yes sir, at the end of that training they supply to us the final 2,
documentation of their training that took place within their area.
I 3l l
MARSH:
That answers my question.
Okay, one other area I would like to put 4
Sj n this tape, and this is from a layman's point of view recognizing that I
6[
the tape may be listened to by other investigative teams with limited 7{
technical knowledge.
If I were a newly hired potential licensed operator, Ig if I understand you right earlier, I would start as a Aux operator C and I start undergoing my training.
Could you briefly describe what my course of g
training would be? How would I progress to the point where I became a 10 licensed operator? Kind of put the whole training program of an operator into perspective, recognizing that it's detailed in the documents, bLt just 13l; for the sake of expediency here I would like you to repeat what's in it.
14' ZECHMAN:
Zechman - Okay, I can describe that program.
The training program for CR0 today begins really at the Aux operator level.
I'll give you a feel for this.
We have three classifications of Auxiliary operators, 17:
Auxiliary C, above him is Auxiliary S, above him is Auxiliary A operator.
18:
In order to get to be a control room operator, you have to be at the Auxiliary 19i A level, and be the most senior qualified individual to bid in for CR0 201 l
position when it is available.
Now, to give you the kind of training that 21; one goes through just to get to the A level:
an Aux C, a person who meets the job specifications for an Auxiliary C operator will be identified as an 23l Auxiliary C operator and come in to a one year training program, the begin-2 41 ning of which is approximately six to eight weeks of classroom training, 8 25 i
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52 1!
hours a day, 5 days a week on secondary systems.
This is followed by a i
gj comprehensive written exam.
Now, I point out that weekly exams are given 3l during the progression of that program, a comprehension exam at the end of i
f classroom portion.
This individual, then, for the remaining part of one 5
year is to be assigned to a shift under the direction of a shift foreman l
6l and other auxiliary operators on shift, and proceeds on-the-job training 7{
with those people.
At the end of one year, he is then given an oral and 8
fin 1 written examination on everything he has had for thati period of one year.
Successfully passirg that program, he then automatically, what we 10l em e, au m c motor progressions, moves up to the auxiliary B level.
Should he fail two exams for the Aux C program, in other words he failed the original one, and then we give him a re exam with the union i
present.
If he fails that he returns to the job he previously held.
If we 13j had hired him from the street, he would be out of a job.
If he came in 141 from a utility group or with any other group within the company, he would go back to that position.
Now assuming he successfully finishes the Auxiliary 16; C training prcgram of one year and qualifies as I said he moves up automa-17!
tically to the Auxiliary B level-again, he goes into a classroom training program six to eight weeks, and now is indoctrinated on the primary systems.
- p Same criteria applies, he takes weekly exams and on final written exam at 20!
the end of the classroom portion, then is assigned again to a shift under t
21; the direction of a shift foreman and an auxiliary operator crew, and goes 22!
onto an on-the-job training situation.
Again, at the end of one year he is 23l l
then given an oral and written examination on everything he has had to 24i date, and it's comprehensive.
It includes both secondary and primary.
And 25i t
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! might point out that the oral exam is given by his shift cupervisor to i
2; assure that, the operation department, that they are satisfied with this i
3:
gentleman they have positioned.
Now once he completes that training p.ogram, i
4j he is automatically promoted to Auxiliary A operator position, as a fully i
Sj qualified Auxiliary A operator.
Now, as I said, if a control room operator 6
position does open up, the Auxiliary A operators are allowed to bid through 7
the union process for that position.
After interviews, the most senior qualified Auxiliary A operator would get that bid.
He immediately then g
gj goes ira.o a nine month, what we call Category 4, control room operator training program.
Perhaps, Marsh, this is your area, you would like to 10 describe that program.
l 12l I
MAP.SH:
Well, Brown, you did so well on the last intervicw that I'll let 13!
you do it again.
14!
i 151 KIRKPATRICK:
Brown, before you start I am going to interrupt you just a second, and put a new tape on if I may.
Okay, the time is 6:47 meter 171 1
reading 1377.
I am going to terminate this tape.
18!
19!
MARS ll:
We are continuing now with the second cassette in a discussicn with lst-Ed training cersonnel, and, Mr. Brown you were about to continue with i
21!
l the training procedures of the newly hired individuals destined to become 22l l
an operator, who'd be going through.
23l 1
24i 25!
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54 I
1l BROWN:
Okay.
The training program for a control room operator, hereafter 2
referred to as CRO, is nine months in duration.
He is going to be on i
3t probation for this job for 90 days.
So the program describes evolutions 4j r the shift foreman to look at.
How well does he handle himself in the 5l control room? Remembering that the control room is a room without any wind ws, you don't know what time of day or what the weather is outside, 6
ccmpletely confined, and it takes a special kind of a person to work in there.
So they want to look to see how they react in there, how well they 8
learn the basics of the layout of the console, and how they've worked with g
I other people on their shift.
The program itself has a listing of all the 10l 11::
procedures in there; the administrative procedures, going over such things 12l as document control, switching and tagging, radiation protection plan, and emergency.
All the emergency and abnormal procedures are listed in there, 131 and the normal operating procedt:res are listed.
The program starts out with a review of the secondary plant with systems like circ water, river water, and some of the closed cooling systems, much like they had when they were an auxiliary C operator.
The difference being, now that they're going 17 to be looking at the specific interlocks of that system, the functions of 18:
that system again in more detail, and the places where that component may 19!
be controlled from-whether it is out on the plant or in the control room 20; and what indications they have in the control room for that system.
And 21!
the first portion also goes into the administrative procedures.
During the 22' whole course, during the 9 months, they have to get signed off on this 22; procedure list.
They have to talk with the--they either have to perform 20 it, simulate it, or describe the events in that procedure to the satisfac-25:
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55 i
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tion of their shift foreman, the shift supervisor, or another senior reactor 2!
operator--if they understand what's in that procedure.
Now the program for i
3; the 9 months is broken down into six segments and they cover it in--we call
[
it half of the cycle.
After they go through half of this cycle, to the 5
sixth segment, they get a written test on that information.
The whole 6i program is cumulative in nature.
What they were responsible for on day 1 7
they are responsible for the end of the 9 month program.
At the end of the first complete cycle, they then have to take another written examination 8
and a comprehensive walkthrough, which will last somewhere between 4 and 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> on the material that they had studied.
They then continue going i
through the cycles into the primary systems, chemical addition, safeguards actuation, reactor theory, control rod drive, intergrated control system, reactor coolant pumps, reactor coolant system construction components in there.
And each time they're taking a written, two writtens and an oral 14!
examination, a walkthrs agh, on every one of these cycles ar'd, again, its cumulative.
So by the time they get to the end of their 9 month program they will have taken a minimum of 12 written examinations, and have 6 oral examinations.
In addition, they also get a class depending on their experi-18!
ence and availability of those people, whether its one on one, or whether 19 its one with five or six, one instructor to five or six people, they will 20:
l have a class on the integrated control system, where we go into everything 21:
except the size of the resistors and stuff.
They' re very detailed, very j
exact, and a one week course on reactor theory as well.
They also have to, 23i for satisfactory completion or preparing for a license, have tc go to the 24) simulator and they have to pass a startup certification.
So, once they 25i f
Il
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56 l
t lf finish the 9 month program with the training department, taking the 12 2!
written and 6 oral examinations, in order to get the opportLnity to get i
3l examined by the NRC, they also have to take a mock written exam following 4j in the guidalines of the NRC exam, of the seven categories, and they have 5l to get an additional oral examination by a senior reactor operator other 6
than someone in the training department.
So they will have 2 to 3 different 7
people or more giving them examinations so that they can benefit from g
having the same question asked by different people in different ways.
It's quite extensive.
We also go into the non-nuclear instrumentation and the g
nuclear instrumentation in great detail.
111 i
ZECHMAN:
We might point out that I have turned over, this is Dick Zechman 12'
}
speaking, turn over to Donald Kirkpatrick a complate package of the category 4 training program.
And you might also point out that when they do receive 14; the right to, for us to allow them to go for an NRC exam, the NRC then 15:
administers both a written exam, which lasts anywhere from 6 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, 16' l
followed by an oral exam, which lasts anywhere from 4 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> before 17;;
i they certify them as an SR0 or CRO,.
18j 19i BROWN:
There is one thing I'd iike to bring out, this is irown again, is 20l r
that during the oral examinations, the emergency procedur<s, they have to 21!
simulate them in a timely fashion corresponding to whateter emergency 22!
procedure it is, at the console by saying "I'm gonna look at this switch,"
23 and pointing to it, "I'm going to lock at this gauge," and pointing to it, 241 and goes throug? ;tep by step, and be interrupted, and say, and answer the 25!
question "Why?," during the evamination.
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57 11 KIRKPATRICK:
This is Kirkpatrick, I have a package that was given to me by 2j Mr. Zechman and it will be available as part of the investigation team 1
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d cumentations.
i 4l 5l BROWN:
One other thing I would like to address since we've described this I
6 program in detail and that is the fact that, as I understand it, the personnel 7
who were actually on shift the day of the incident had had previous extensive I
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experience and training, including, I believe in each individual's case, g
they've completed the naval nuclear power program.
And because of this, 10f the/ did not receive all tne training you've described here.
Could we briefly, since we have addressed this area, can you describe the training I
these four individuals had?
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13l ZECHMAN:
The individuals went through with the NRC titles a code licensing training program and it is described, the program is described in the FSAR for Unit 2, Chapter 13, training programs for supervisory CR0's and SR0 l
personnel and I'm turning it over to you at this time.
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18 KIRKPATRICK:
Thank you.
20:
ZECHMAN:
I might point out tnat that document I turned to you is only a 21t 22j portion, that covers the major training programs of the in-depth and the number of minor training programs by minor I will even include something 2 31 like first aid, although that only has a small number of hours associated 24; l
with it.
The training that each person has received is available from us 25:
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58 1,
and also is summarized on a computer printout and the number of hours for 2
each training program for each individual.
And that is available to you at i
3i any time.
4j 5-KIRKPATRICK:
All right.
I'm still gathering that kind of documentation 6
and I believe that--well, we will include for those specific individuals, 7
we'll include this, these records as part of the investigation team records.
8l MARSH:
Well, I appreciate very much your time in coming in to speak to us g
10:
and since we've been asking you questions, before we terminate, I would like to offer eacn of you an opportunity, this is Marsh speaking, to put 11!
into the record, as I discussed while I was changing tapes, your thoughts i
on the incident and what we're benefitting from it.
Any comments or reccm-131 mendations will be solicited, if anyone has anything.
I know we've discussed 14 and commented during the course of the investigation, this has been going 15; on as things have been coming up we covered stuff on a tape, but I didn't want to cut you short and terminate before we give you an opportunity if 17; there is anything you want to bring up or discuss.
Okay, if we're in 18!
shape, then I'm gonna terminate the tape at 6:58 reading app: oximately 105 19' on the meter, the second cassette.
Once again, say thank you for your 20!
time.
I recognize that you are busy people also, I appreciate your time in 21!
coming in.
I cut the tape then at 6:59.
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