ML19249A695
| ML19249A695 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1979 |
| From: | Bixel D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908240165 | |
| Download: ML19249A695 (14) | |
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ca.c.. 2i2 w.u u.c s.g.n 4..no.. s.c =.on. u.cn.s.n o20s. 4,.. coa. sit 7ss.e s so V L' tj August 7, 1979 Director,!iuclear Reacter Regulatica Att Mr Dennis L Zie ann, Chief Operating Reacters Branch :io 2 US :Tue. ear Regulatory Cc==ission
'a'ashington, DC 2G555
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Censu=ers ?cver Cc=pany was requested by :130 letter dated 'uly 20, 1979 to provide additional infer =ation supplenenting cur May h,1979 respense to the subject Bulletin. The requested additional informatica is for.rarded as an attach =ent tc this letter.
Se additional questions related to ite: 3= Jeers 2 and T of the subje++ " etin were =cs: readily answered by a ec=plete re tision of sur previcus respcases to these items. Se cha.nges frc= the original responses are indicated by ver.ical lines i., the cargin.
'; avid A 31xel (Signed)
David A Bixel Nuclear Licensing Ad=inist:9 *.c r C '.'
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Your response is inec=plete in + hat it does not address whether ycur review included precedures for conta'-- -* 4sciation.
In addition you state that certain lines (in isolation Categcry I) do not require isciation. Ecvever, Ite: 30 2 cf !Z3 79-03 explicitly requires that an nonessential lines be isclated. Further, the respense dces not state explicity that centainment isolation is initiated prier to or cencurrent with all autecatic initiations of safety injecticn. Confir: that you have reviewed contain=ent isolation initiation design and precedures to assre that all aute=atic initiations of safe;y injection vin result in isolation of these lines not required for safety features or ecoling capability including these designed to transfer pctentially radicactive gases and liquids cut of the primary containment.
2.
Prepare and i=plement an changes necessary to initiate centain=ent isolation of an lines discussed above and describe hev they ec ply with the require-
=ents of the Bulletin.
In addition, previde a schedule for implementatica cf the necessar/ changes.
Rescense (Totally Fevised Reseense Included)
The Big Rock Peint Plant design provides centai=ent isolatica (excluding e=er -
gen,:y core ecoling, post incident spray and makeup syste=s).
"he iscistion occurs upon reactor vessel lov vater level er contai=ent building high pressure. The low reacter water level set point used for this purpose is the same as that used to initiate emergency core cooling.
Centai=ent isolation is previded through the reacter protecticn syste and occes simultaneously with the icv reacter water level signal used for emergency core cooling. Big Rock Point's only " safety injectien" systems are low-pressure syste=s.
Safety injection through the pri=ar/ or redundant core spray systers, therefore, dces not ocer until a low-pressure interlock in each system is also reached and reactor pressure decays to a point lever than the core spray injection pressre. Thus, contai=ent isolation vill ocer prior to all initiations of the emergency core ecoling systems.
Isciation capability is also provided manually via a centrol censole Operated hand switch.
he isclation valves vill re=ain cle: sed and cannet be opened as long as either the low reactor water level or contai=ent building high-pressre signals re=ain in effect. If both signals are absent and the manual hand svitch has not been placed in the " isolate" position, pneuma +1cally operated valves veuld return to the open pcsition; the main stes= isclation valve, which is d-c =cter operated, requires operater action to open. If isciation is =anually initiated via the hand switch, the valves re=ain in a closed pcsition. Ccatainment isclation capability is periodically tested in accordance with t'.e plant Technical Specifi-catiens to ass =e centinued cperability. Lines centaining isciatica valves are divided into fer categcries. See Draving M-539 (attached).
( r'"E :
'"he attached revisicn of Oraving :1-539 centains -"~ "anges frc:, hat transmitted by Consumers Pcver Cc pany letter dated May h,1979. )
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Type A - Lines which are or =ay be Open to the interior of the containment shell have tvc valves in series, at least One of which closes aut0=atically to prevent outvard flev. Except for check valves, teth valves can te closed by =anual initiatica fr:= either the centrol rec = or another place that vould be tenable after an accident (Ite=s 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 6, T, 3, 13, IL, l
15 and 17 en Drawing M-539).
Type 3 - Lines vnich are cpen to the reacter or any portion of the reacter recircu-lating icop are treated in the =anner described in "A" above, with the added require =ent that the two valves are en opposite sides Of the con-tain=ent shell (Ite=a 9, 10, 11, 12 and 16 on Drawing M-539).
l Type D - Lines that are normally closed have only a single valve. A lock, inter-Icek or operating precedures and/or checklists protect this valve frc=
being cpened during reactor operation or conditions other than cold l
shutdown (Ite: 30 en Drawing M-539).
Type I - Certain line i enter and leave the contain=ent building acut any openings to the contain=ent interior; others leave and return withcut any openings to the atmosphere (instrunent taps, etc). Such lines do not require inclation valves, provided the lines are not in danger of, being broken as a result of reactor syste rupture. These lines are routinely checked to insure leak tightness and are described as follows:
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Drawing M-539 Iselation Ite:
Issential Carability Reasen 13,19, NO Yes Piping closed to centain=ent 21,22, interier - piping vall forms 27,23 contain=ent beundary.
L 29 20 Yes Yes Piping closed tc at=csphere.
Vacuu: relief senser tap.
23,2h Yes No ICOs 1:ng-ter: cccling piping.
L 25 26 No.
Yes Shell side of e=ergency cen-denser for=s contain=ent boundary.
Nor= ally open lines which carry fluids cut Of the containment building are closei l
aute=atically cn the isolation signal, and/or pcver failure, or upon =anual trip frc= the 00ntr:1 console hand switch.
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Ncr: ally cpen lines whi:h carr/ fluids irt: the centain=ent building are each equipped with a check valve to prevent backflow upon loss of inward prepellant force. In additi:n, cperating pers:nnel can secure these lines by =anually operated gate valves or by air-cperated centrol valves. The latter c1:se en air or pcVer failure, with exception of the supply line to the control r:d drive hydraulic syste=.
Centrol valves in this line fail open to insure cen-tinuous water supply and backup isolation is provided by integral spring seated valves en the centrol rod drive pu=ps.
The tvc 2L-inch ventilation openings (supply and exhaust) are closed within six secondars after any scra= signal. Manual open:.ng of these valves is per=1tted (by interlocks) Only after the reacter protection syste= can be reset a=d high radiation levels (> 10 =R/hr) are not present within the contain=ent building Centain=ent is:1stien is addressed in Off-Ner=al Precedure CNP 2 31.
Reviev cf this precedure indicates that steps are addressed to insre iso]aticq of all lites whose isolation does not deg ade needed safety features or c cling capa-bility. However, one procedural step, CNP 2 31.3(f), which was verded as follevs, "If sera = caused by hi-eaclesre pressure or icv reacter vater ley,el, check all autc=atic isolation valves closed and elese cenaute=atic isolation valves not necessar/ to cent:01 scra= incident" has been changed to include the l
f 110ving state ent:
" Place hand Svitch S-5 in the 'ISCLA*I' pcsition tc pre
- I clude valve opening upcn less of trip signal." This action vill prevent the pneu=atically cperated valves (Items h, 5, lh and 16) fr = autc=atically opening
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if the sensors (lev reactor water level and high centain=ent building pressure) return to ner=al dring the scrs= in:ident.
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"he procecural change which we feel is necessary has been i=ple=ented.
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Your respense is ince=plete. Describe the types of vessel level indi:ation for both autc=ati: and =anual initiatien of safety syste=s.
In additien, describe Other instr =entation which the operator =ign have to deter =ine changes in reacter ecolant inventory; eg, radicactivity levels, high 200-tain=ent and equipment area te=peratures, centain=ent su=p pu=p operation, etc.
Restense 1.
Auto Initiation: Emerzenev Cere Ccclin Switches (Net Indicaters) 13 RIC9 A-D Pri=ary core sprays initiatien en low reacter level.
LS RIC9 E-H Eackup core spray initiation en reactor 10v level.
1" 3130-3133 Reacter depressurizing syste= initiaticn en low reactor level.
Manual Initiation nii:sters
- I 3360-3383 Rea::cr level carrev range just abcve top of fuel, unec=pensated.
P 1A-05 Reacter pressure indicater - vide range iigital readeut.
~he in.3tr=entation for =anual initiati:n f e=ergency :ere ::: ling ;istei abcve is in the =ain :entrol rec = and is qualified f:r the 10CA envir:n=ent.
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The f:11:ving instru=entati:n (although not preven to be LCCA qualified, ex-cept as =arked *) =a/ give inf:r:ati:n te help deter =dne changes in reacter c0clant invent:ry prior to, during and after an incident.
Main Centrol Rec = Indicators A.
2 iru= level indicators +30" to -30" frc= dru= C/L (RI 19 A, RI 19 3).
3.
1 stea= dru: level indicator +h0" to hC" frc= dru: C/L (LI IA-19).
C.
1 dru= level ree:rder +25" to -25" frc= dr e C/L (LR ID-:.2).
D.
1 dru= pressure reecrder 0-2000 psig (PR 1A-09).
E.
1 iru= pressure indicator 0-2000 psig (PI IA h9).
F.
1 reactor water level indicater 16' to 30' above bottc= cf vessel, une =pensated (LI 1A-89).
G.
k iru= level indicators -30" to +30" frc= dru= C/L, unec=;ensated (LI 3385-3387).
H.
Reactor recire pu=p inlet seal pressures (LA70 A & 3).
I.
37 pass valve pressure deviation alar =s +5 psi above centroller settings er 25 psi above reacter pressure at full pcver.
J.
Reacter vessel te=ps recorder - using stes= tables, cperator could.
approximate vessel pressure.
- K.
Operations recorder - k recorder pens showing reactor high pressure hap reached sers= point of 1385 psig h recorder pens sheving rea:ter water level at less than 2' 9" abcva core.
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Station a:nunciaters - reactor pressure at 1360 psig.
- reactor pressure at 13S5 psig.
- reactor vater le 31 at 2' 9" above core.
- dru= level at h" of dru= center line.
- dru= level at -8" of dru= center line.
M.
Running ti=e =eturs for: Containment clean su=p Pu=ps 1 & 2.
Contcin=ent dirty su=p Pu=ps 1 & 2.
Radvaste su=p pu=p cutside 00 tainment.
Turbine building su=p Pumps 1 & 2 outside contain=ent.
- l. Area radiatica =ctitor alar =s - control rec = indd cators and alar.s.
Also rec:rded f:r trends. Twenty-cne area =end ters throughout plant.
C.
Stack gas =0nitor - gross activity and Xenon 138.
Indication of pcssible pri=ary syste= leakage.
- F.
Increasing water level in centain=ent (LI 3hCO) vide range level indication.
84 High water level in. centain=ent at four discrete levels indicated by a lignt for each level (L3 3562 - 3565).
R.
Ocntainment high-pressure alar = and indicator (PI 367).
S.
Centain=ent vacuu: indicators and alar =s (?!5 187, PIS 173).
T.
Eigh dev peint and high te=perature alar = and recorder for 5 1ccati:ns in contain=ent.
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_ Indicators and Alar-: in 0:ntain e-- "' d'-a fer Primarf Syster Pres 3re, Level. Terreratures and Enclosure Environment A.
k dru: level indicators +30" to -30" frc= drum C/L (L5 RE 06A, 3 and L3 FI 20A, 3).
3.
k reactor pressure indicators 100 to 1700 psig (PI 07 A-D).
C.
2 stea= drus level indicators unc0=pensated (LI-I -59 and LI-IA-77).
D.
2 stea= drum pressr e indicators 0 to 2000 psig (PT-IA-07).
E.
1 reactor water level - 3 ally indicator 16' to 30' above botte= of the vessel unce=pensated.
F.
I reactor water te=p indicator to clean-up system.
O.
1 (0-2000 psig) reacter pressure gauge (PI L23).
3.
1 constant air ncnitor - grcss radiation air cetivity in contain=ent building - re=cte recorder outside containment.
I.
1 constant air =cnitor - =cniters exhaust duct frc= recirculation pu=p rocs - =cniters gross radiation activity and iodine fres stea,= leaks in primar/ system (ncst primary system piping is located in the re:irculaticn pu=p rocm).
J.
Pipevay hi te=p alarm at 1ccal panel ! 125 F - could indicate stesq leak in primary syste=.
K.
Pipevay stes= leak alar: - detects high dev point in pipevay in encicsure.
Possible indication of stea: leak. Requires checking dev point recorder on local panel.
L.
Multipoint selector for air te=peratures indication at 20 points in venti-(
latica syste= in contain=ent.
4-Indication in Auxiliar/ Buildina of Possible P-irarf Syster Troubles A.
Radvaste receiver tank high level alar =s ec==cn alar = for collections both.nside and cutside of contain=ent.
3.
Centain=ent clean and dirty su=p high level alar =s (LS 352k and LS 3540).
^UE.17: "S P2LA'"ED 'N ! TEM 5 0F IE BULLET *7 7c-08 1.
Your responses to Ite=s 5a and 5b do net address operating procedres er training instructions. A=end your respense to address this =atter.
2.
Your response to Ite=s 5a and 5b is ince=plete. Ycur reviev Of Operating procedures and training instructicns shculd assure that operaters are provided additional informati:n and instructions to (1) not override auto-
=atic actions of engineered features unless continued operatica of engineered safety features vill result in unsafe plant ecnditions and (2) to not rely upcn vessel level indication alene for =anual actions but to also exa=ine other plant para =eter indications in evaluating plant :enditions. A=end your respense a::criingly.
3 Provide a schedule f:r any actions On Ites 5 that have act yet been ::=pleted.
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?estense The cperations group and plant =anage=ent vill be provide 3 special sessi:ns dealing with safety-related syste=s operati:n at the Big Rock Point "lant.
Special e=-
phasis vill be placed en the ite=s covered by this Bulletin. These sessiccs vill be ec=pleted prior to plant start-up.
"te classrec= presentation outline attached will be used f r these sessions.
A review has been =ade of the e=ergency procedures relating to engineered safe-guards syste=s.
The procedures are considered adequate for cperator and =anage=ent guidance unde e=ergency conditions. These nrecedures are reviewed by walk-th-cush de=cnstrations by all licensed persennel at least e tery *ve yes.rs.
The training sessions to be perfor=ed for all operations and plant =anage=ent personnel in respense to this ite= vill be ce=pleted prier te start-up frc= the current cu*, age.
OtJEST!= ? ?Z1A"'ED "'O I"'ZM 6 0F IE BUL1I"'I:i 70-08 1.
It is not clear fr = your respense that safety-related valve positioni'dg require =ents vare reviewed to ensure proper operation of engineered safety features. Please supple =ent your respense to provide a ce~._ it=ent to conduct tnis review and a schedule for c:=pletion.
2.
Your respense did not clearly indicate that all accessible safety-related valves had been inspected to verify proper position. !icr was a schedule f:r perf =ing the position verificatice for all safety-related valves provided. Please supplement your response to provide this infer =ation.
?estensa 1.
The = aster checklist used for plant start-up requires that valve checklists be performed before start-up frc= cold shutdevn. These checklists are signed by the Operator who ce=pleted the=.
"'he checklists are then reviewed by the 0:ntr:1 Operater who signs for his review. A second level review of each check sheet is perfor=ed and signed by a Shift Superviser.
~he Operati:ns Superviser's i=ple=entation of these require =ents is censidered adequate te ensure proper pccition of safety-related valves prier to start-up.
2.
'he valve checklist includes all valves, automatic and =anual, including safet/~rt: lated valves. These valves are all v.sually and =anually checked to assure they are in the proper position f:r pcver operati:n. The valve checklists are perf:r=ed before each start-up frc= ccid shutdevn unless the syste= involved has re=ained in service during the shutd:vn period. Big Fock Point was shut down when 2 Bulletin Tc-06 vas issued and has re=ained shut icvn since. Valve :hecklists vill be perfor=ed verifying the proper position of all safety-related valves prior to start-up frc= this cutage.
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Your respense had no discussi:n regarding hev you assre against inadvertent transfer when rese ting engineered safety featres. Amend your response to provide this infor:ation.
Restense (Totally Revised Restense Included)
(a) High Radiation (b) Isolate Syste:
C =c dity Intaricek en Sir al 1.
Ventilation Air Yes Yes Supply Valve (1) 2.
Ventilation Air Yes Yes Exhaust Valve (1) 3 Clean Su=p Water 3o Yes Pu=p Discharge Valves (2) k.
Dirty S ep Water 3e Yes Fu=p Discharge Valves (2)
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No Yes Valves (3)
Resins 6.
Reacter and Water No Yes
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.a Drain (2)
Continued Operability of these featres is verified by test at least annually in ace rdan:e with Technical Specifications requirements. A precedural change insti-tuted in Cff-Nor=al Pr cedre 2 31 to place the isolate switch to the manual lesre position (see Response 2) upon receipt cf an isolation scra= will prevent inadver-tent transfer shculd the isolatien sig.a's clear. The Operater has available to hi: redundant instr =entation indicating containment building pressure and water level which can be used to verify c:nditions inside containment prior to =anual rec;ening of the abcve valves.
(NCTI: Reset of t.he reacter protection syste: =ust be acec=plished before the ventilation supply and exhaust valves can be reopened. )
Cons =ers ?:ver C:=pany letter dated July 12, 1979 provided additicnal inf:r:ati:n related to this ites. Se July 12 letter incorrectly stated that failre of a radiati:n detector asscciated with tne high radiati:n interl:ck listed ateve v;ull result in reopening Of the ventilation valves. Centrary :: this sta esent, failre of a detect:r due to adverse enviren=enta' -~"' * ' ~ s ve ul d ne t cause a 01: sed valve to rec;en and veuld be likely t cause 01:s"~
- a vnive vui:h was Open at the time of the failre.
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~4e understand frc= ye r respense ths cperability is verified for redundant safety-related syste=3 prior to re=cval of any safety-related syste= fr =
service. Since y:u =ay be relying On prior Operability verification within the current *echnical Specification srveillance interval, cperability should be frther verified by at less; a visual check of the s/ste= status to the extent practicable, prier :: re=oving the redundant equipment fr:: service.
Please supple =ent yor response to provide a e: =itment that you will revise your =aintenance and test procedures to adopt this pcsiti:n.
2.
It is not clear frc= your respcnse that all involved reacter operational persennel in the enec=i=g shift are explicitly notified ab ut the status :f systems re=cved frc= cr ret =ned to service. Please indicate hev this int:r=ation is transferred at shift tenever.
Res;cnse 1.
Maintenance and test precedures will be revised pri:r to plant start-up,to include the requirement that when reliance is placed on prior operability verificaticn of the safety syste= vithin the = cat recent surveillance inter-val, cperability vill be verified by at least a visual check cf the syste=
status to the extent practicable, prier to re=cving the redundant equip =ent fr== service.
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2.
At change of shift. the ene:=ing licensed cperaters review the legs, stat.ns board and outstanding tagging orders. A verbal description of what has transpired is given to the ence=ing cperater by the cutgeing cperator. The Once=ing Operater then signs the 1:gbeck as having reviewed the logs before the shift change is c =pleta.
Auxilia:/ Operators exchange syste= info:::stica verbally en change of shift.
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.0 Respense to II Bulletin Ne 79-Cc 2.0 Ft.'PSCSE:
Review and understand actions taken at
~'"I-2 Pcver Flant and the possible i= pact en 3RFP procedures, check sheets, and persennel actions during emergency er cff normal actions at 3FSP.
3.0 SCOPE
"'his procedure vill cover questiens, state =ents and ec==ents described in TRC II Eulletin No 79-06.
L.O R: : u.EHCE 'CC'CC"S :
Plant Vclu=e 3A and 33 II Bulletin 79-05 II Bulletin 79-05A
.I Sulletin 79-C8
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6.0 PROCIJt., E:
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6.1 Review of II Bulletin Jo 79-05,79-05A thrcugh itemicing of chrono 1-cgy of events fer first sixteen hours of OC-2 accident.
(See Attach =ent "A.")
6.2 Recc==endar,1cns for 3RFP in respect to the SC-2 incident.
s.
Operatiens persennel should =ake no atte=pt tc everride auto-
=atic action of engineered safety features un' entinued cperation of such safety f eatures could result unsafe plant conditions (eg, vessel er contain=ent integrity).
b.
Cperaticcs personnel shculd not get "iccked in" en a single parameter to the extent that backup pars =eters er instru=entatien is ignored. A total overview cf plant conditiens is required during e=ergency operations to take the proper e=ergency actions,
=ake the correct decisiens.
c.
Special care must be exercised when perfor=ing syste=s check sheets, surveillance tests, etc, that when ec=pleted, the syste=
or equip =ent can be declared operable. Reviev cf ec=pleted check sheets and/cr tests =ust be acec=plished as per facility precedures.
d.
If safety-related syste=s are required to functicn at specific set peints (such as cere spray, E'S, reacter high-pressure scrs=,
etc), the cperator should always be prepared to =anually initiate the required actic: if it has not autc=atically eccurred. 7alid aute=atic "scrs=" signals shculd 2.lvays be folleved by a
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'y initiated "scrs=" by the operater.
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ACACICCC FOR "T4 #5 i
e.
Euring power cperaticn if tests, examinations, or inspectiens are necessary en safety-related systems, a precedure is used backup systens are tested prier to the test, exs=inatien, or inspec ' n and all valves, equip =ent, senscrs are returned to their prcper pcsitien trier to the ites being declared cperable.
f.
Review the station procedures and set points so that inadvertent releases of solid, liquid, er gasecus radicactive vastes are prchibited.
g.
Review the plant procedures so that the folleving is adhered to:
1.
Verification by test cr inspecticn of the operability of redundant Jafety-related systems prier tc the re=cval of any safet/-related systes frc= serrice.
2.
Verification by tests and/or examinatiens of the cperability of safety-relate; syste=s when they are returned to sertice folleving tests, =aintenance, or exa=inatiens rrier te teing declared "cperable."
3 F.xplicit notificatien of involved reactor cperating per-scnnel via status beard,1cgbecks, and/cr special operating nescrandum whenever a safety-related syste= is reseved frc=
or returned to service, h.
A thorou6h review by all involved plant personnel of the prenpt reporting requirements to the :GC, using Administrative Procedu'res and Tech Specs for the reviev.
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