ML19247B256
| ML19247B256 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Skagit |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1979 |
| From: | Martin J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19247B252 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908080241 | |
| Download: ML19247B256 (29) | |
Text
.g Prepared Testimony of James A. Martin, Jr.
on behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Evacuation Planning In the Matter of Puget Sound Power and Light Company (Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2)
Q.
Please ; tate your name and address.
A.
My name is James A. Martin, Jr.
My business address is:
Accident Analysis Branch Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Q.
Have you prepared a statement of your professional qualifications?
A.
Yes.
A copy is attached as Exhibit 1.
Q.
Are you responsible for the review of emergency planning for the Skagit facility?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Have you been responsible for the review of emergency plans other than the plans for Skagit?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Would you identify these.
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I have been responsible for the review of the preliminary plans for coping with emergencies for construction permits on Greene County, New England, Shearon Harris, and Yellow Creek.
I have also been responsi-ble for the review of the emergency plans for operating licenses on Hatch, Salem, Summer, and Zimmer among others.
Q.
Are you familiar with the Commission's requirements for emergency plans at the construction permit stage of review and at the operating license stage of review?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What are the requirements for emergency plans as you understand them?
A.
The Commission's present requirements for emergency plans are set forth in the 10 CFR Section 50.34 in the section entitled " Contents of applica-tions; technical information."1 10 CFR S50.34(a)(10) requires that the applicant include in its prelimi-nary safety analysis report (PSAR) at the construction permit stage:
"A discussion of the applicant's preliminary plans for coping with emergencies.
Appendix E sets forth items which shall be included in these plans."
1/
As the result of the Three Mile :sland accident, emergency planning requirements are being reevaluated by several NRC task forces.
Their recommendations vill be the subjer.t of a future rulemaking proceeding.
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. 10 CFR 950.34(t)(6) requires that the applicant include in its final safety-analysis report (FSAR) at the operating license stage:
"The following informatior, concerning facility operation:
(v)
Plans for coping with emergencies which shall include the items specified in Appendix E."
Q.
Is there a difference between the requirements at the PSAR stage and those at the FSAR stage?
A.
Yes.
The requirements at the PSAR stage are quite different from those at the FSAR stage.
At the FSAR stage the applicant must provide a ccm-plete emergency plan.
Because construction takes many years to complete and because no emergency plan would be needed until after operation cciamences, at the PSAR stage only preliminary plans are required.
In my review I determine whether the preliminary emergency plans are com-patible with the facility design, site layout and site location.
The items which the applicant must describe in the PSAR are specifically set forth in the introductory paragraph and paragraphs A through G of Section II of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
A copy of Appendix E is attached as Exhibit 2.
Q.
Would you describe, in your own words, how you applied the statement in the first paragraph of Part II of Appendix E that reads "The Pre-mininary Safety Analysis Report shall contain sufficient information to assure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans with facility design features, site layout, and site location with respect to such considerations as access routes, surrounding population distributions, and land use."
Q)l
. A.
The principal application of this statement involves the review of calculated doses from postulated detign basis accidents and site infor-mation presented in Chapter Two of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.
For the worst case LOCA, time-dose-distance plots are requested of applicants in Chapter 13.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants - LWR Edition." An example of such plots provided by the applicant are attached as Exhibit 3.
These plots are based upon the same accidental release of radioactive materials postulated to assess conformance to siting dose criteria, the character and magnitude of which are depend-ent upon facility design features.
They also reflect site location through the meteorological dispersion characteristics used to estimate potential exposures.* The principal purpose of these plots is to pro-vide a basis for scoping the geographical area surrounding a plant for which protective action considerations might be considered warranted.**
Site layout enters this review predominantly through the specifications of exclusion area and the exclusion be,andary distance feature so that the reviewer can clearly distinguish between onsite and offsite areas.
It should be noted that an effective zero height of rel(ase was con-servatively assumed for these plots, whereas the proposed site resides s.'me 300 ft above the river valley.
Calculated doses would be reduced r.oraiderably if the height of release was accredited.
I note that I have participated in a joint NRC/USEPA Task Fcrce on Emergency Planning Cuidance for Stats ant local agencies, which recom-mends a generic plume exposure plannin, distance of 10 milas for speci-fic planning elements.
Neither the Commission, nor the Staff has yet adopted these Task Force recommendations set forth in NUREG-0396 (EPA 520/1-78-016).
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. Road network and population distribution information are used to esti-mate evacuation times that might be expected.
The primary objective of these estimates is to icentify areas where greater attention to planning could provide substantial benefits in mitigating exposures.
From the emergency planning standpoint, land use is predominant.j related to the population distribution and road network of the area.
The upshot of these analyses can be stated very simply:
I would want more definitive plans laid for the public in those areas for which U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency plume exposure protective actior, guides (PAG's) of 5 rem whole body and 25 rem thyroid could be reached within about 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after the initiation of the noted accident.
Perusal of the applicant's time-dose-distance curves shows that for this accident such doses would result only within the low population zone (LPZ).
Q.
Did you restrict your review of emergency p;anning to the LPZ for Skagit?
A.
No.
I felt that if ar. evacuation was initiated at $kagit, it would be more logical to plan to evacuate the nearly valley area rather tnan just an area withir. the LPZ.
Therefore, I considered the feasioility of evacuation of areas within five miles of the site.
I also considered the ten mile area in order tc gain a better perspective of the situation.
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i Q.
Would you briefly describe your analyses and the informa. tion you used.
A.
I calculated egress capacities of roads exiting the areas within five and ten miles of the site and compared these to the total populations within these areas.
I also estimated times that might be required to actually accomplish evacuations of these areas, or portions thereof, using a n.cdel developed by Dr. R. W. Houston, Chief, Accident Analysis Branch, USNRC.
These analyses and results are described in E <hibit 4 of this testimony.
Q.
Would you briefly summarize your results.
A.
First, it is quite obvious that egress road capacities are bundant relative to the total population in these areas.
For example, the projected populations within five and ten miles for the year 2012 are 5,692 and 23,935, respectively.
By comparison, the egress road capaci-ties are at least 45,000 and 75,000 persons per hour, respectively.
Second, using Dr. Houston's model, which is based, in part, on informa-tion from evacuations of historical record, it could take between two and six hours to evacuate portions of the areas within five miles, and up to ten hours to evacuate areas within ten miles.
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Q.
Are you saying that it would take that long?
A.
No. Merely that it could, based on one model.
Implementation of advanced planning should reduce these times considerably.
By apply-ing Dr. Houston's model we have one quantitative measure of the worth of advanced planning.
It should be obvious that if everyone in these areas were warned simultaneously and left immediately the road capa-cities are such that at speeds as low as five miles per hour everyone could be out of the 10 mile area within about two hours.
We see this phenomenon very often at major football stadiums where perhaps 100,000 persons are notified simultaneously that the game is over and it's time to leave.
Two hours later the parking lots are virtually empty and many people are home.
The spread in warning times appears to be the key element in a successful emergency response by the public.
At any rate, based on these analyses, the four hour time difference between, ser, six hours using Dr. Houston's model, and the two hour minimum estimate, is an estimate of the time that coul_ be saved by implementa-tion of a plan.
Q.
You state that a key element in reducing evacuation times is reducing the time that it takes to warn the potential evacuees.
Do the prelimi-nary plans for the Skagit site take this into account?
A.
Yes.
Preliminary plans provide for the immediate notification by the applicant of the Skagit : aunty Sheriff if a significant release has C
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cr may occur (pp. 13.3-8 and 13.3-9 of the Skagit PSAR).
The Sherif f's dispatcher would notify the Mount Vernon Fire Department, which has the responsibility under the Skagit County Emergency Plan to notify the public.
The Fire Department's methods of notifying the public include fixed or mobile sirens, mobile public address systems, radio, TV and telephone.
The USEPA cites these means as those used successfully in over 500 evacuations that occurred in the U.S. between 1960 and 1974.
This averages out to about one evacuation every ten days.
(See EPA-520/
6-74-002, Evacuation Pisks - An Evaluation).
I see no impediment to the use of such means in the Skagit environs or development of plans for their use and, consequently. the warning system planned for the Skagit area should be effective.
Q.
Would you relate your estimates of evacuation times to the doses cal-culated for the worst case accident postulated for siting purposes.
A.
As shown in Exhibit 3, calculated off-site doses for this accident would be such that protective actions would be indicated, at least within the LPZ.
For this case, areas within and well outsite the LPZ could be evacuated before siting guideline doses in Part 100 could be reached, and even well before USEPA Protective Action Guide doses (PAGs) would be reached.
Q.
Are you familiar with SCANP Contention E:
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"The site is unsuitable for the development of an evacuation plan since the physical limitations of the site make any evacuation plan ineffective."
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you agree with it?
A.
No.
As I've indicated above, I have considered key elements of evacua-tion planning, such as road capacity and projected population, I have concluded that timely evacuation within five and ten miles of the site is feasible.
Further, even at this stage of the review, some eight years before a plant would operate at the Skagit site, the key elements of an evacuation plan have been identified.
Q.
Are you familiar with SCANP - PSAR Contention 2:
"The emergency evacuation plan is not adequate."
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you agree with this contention?
A.
I must answer in three parts.
First, to my knowledge an evacuation plan for this area does not yet exist, although certain key planning
,7-4 'i 'l elements have been identified.
From this standpoint, it's not adequate.
Second, as I've stated above, development of an evacuation plan is feasible.
Third, there is no requirement for an evacuation plan at this stage of review.
Thus, although I do not disagree with this contention, in my opinion the contention is nicot because no evacua-tion plan is required at the CP review stage.
Q.
Do you have anything further to add?
A.
Yes.
Although I've discussed evacuation parameters in this testimony I wish to state that in my opinion evacuation is by no means the best, let alone the only, protective action that should be considered.
Shelter in homes and offices would be an effective protective action that should not be ignored by emergency planners.
Sheltering is quite easy to accomplish as compared to a large scale evacuation.
People listening to radio and TV in homes and offices could be directed more expeditiously by cognizant agencies.
They woul! be provided a good deal of protection from inhaling pollutants in the air, especially for puff releases.
These are just some of the advantages of shelter.
Evacuation is the most notorious protective action, but its not the only one and, in many instances, may not be required or even desired.
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EXHIBIT 1 (Page 1 of 2)
James A. Martin, Jr.
Accident Analysis Branch Divisicn of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissien PROFESSIONAL CUALIFICATIONS My job title is Senice Reactor Engineer, presently in the Accident Analysis Branch, Emergency Planning Section of the Division of Site Safety and.
Envircnmental Analysis..NRC. During the past four years at NRC, I have been rescensible for reviews of applications (Safety Analysis Reports) for construgticn permits and operating licenses fcr nuclear pcwer plants
- in the areas cf industrial security and emergency planning. Ecr the past two years I have concentrated en emergency planning reviews.
In accition to these review matters, I have participated as a lecturer at NRC-s:cnscrec (and other) courses en emergency planning for State and local emergency planning and rescense perscnnel.
I am a member of an NRC/ EPA Task Force presently preparing additional emergency planning guidance for State and local agencies.
Previous to my experience at NRC I was employed fcr three years as a Health Physicist (job title) in the Office of Radiaticn pr: grams of the U.S. Envirencental Protectice Agency, Washingten, D. C.
In this position I was resacnsible for the development and a;clication cf mcdels and ccm-puter codes used for the assessment of individual and.pcpulatica doses due to the release of radioactive materials to the envircnment via atmos-pheric and aquatic pathways.
I also participated in field studies (meni-toring) at nuclear power plants and in the early develccment of USE?A staff guidance en emergency planning and emergency respcnse for State and local agencies.
In the previcus ten years I was ecolcyed by Meieculon Research Corporaticn, Cambridge, Massachusetts and IBM Corporation, Owego, New York, where I perfor ed tests en electrcnic systams and ccm;cnents in nuclear wea:cn and space radiation environments and simulators thereof. Previcus to this I werke on the Brookhaven Naticnal Laboratory neutrcn cr0ss-secticn ccmcilation (the Barn Bcck), was an instructor in radar and crypt 0 graphy at the U.S. Army Signal Schcol, Ft. Monmouth N.J.,
and develcped react:r startu: instrumentation for nuclear pcwered submarines.
I earned a 3.S. in Physics in 1952 frcm the University cf Scranton, Scran-ton, PA and an M.S. in Physics in 1957 frcm Temple University, Philadelphia, PA.
I have also earned acditional graduate credits in Physics and Nuclear Engineering at Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA lf
EXHIBIT T
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(Page 2 of 2) 2 I am a member of the Health Physics Society and the National Physics Honor Society, and an a past member of the American Nuclear $cciety, the Institute for Electrical and Electrcnic Engireers ac.c the American Society for Testing and Materials.
I am the aut'1or or co-autner of over thirty publicaticns (Health Physics Journal, IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, International Journal of Radiation En gi n eerin g,
International Atcmic Energy Agency) in the areas of radiation transcort, dosimetry and radiation effects.
I've been married once for twenty years new, end I have seven children.
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EXHIBIT 2 Arrrwort F,--Eassacanct 1%aMs roa Psootre.
- 5. Wrtsten identtMcation. by po.!t:on er
~
Tson ano UrrtJzarton Facn.sTtra funcuen of oth4r ernployees of the I:cenace van specal que 'Scations fcr cop?ng s1th J. Intredactio*
emngency concluons whics tnar er *e. Other Each app!!wst fer a construc* ton permit ts perscGs wita spu:aa paMesuons who are not employees of the licensac and sho may required by 150.3%ian to inctuce in its pre.
be called upon fer assistance shin also be umanary safety analyus report a discussica of preliminar" p!=ca for coping with etter, gdenuced. Ce GM!al qua:!Scanons of the genC!ss. Lach applacint f 0r an operat:ng 11 enspicWs and pmons shan be descrtM C. Means for deter. Intng the msg % nude cense la required by 153 34ib) to include in of the release of radioscure materials. in.
its nal sa'ety analyses report placa fcr ccp.
ciuding critetta fcr determining the need a
Ing with emergencte.
ger not12 cation and participation of local Thl.s appendiz estabitsnes t=!nimu=2 re.
quiremeots for emergency p11:s. nese plan.s and Sate agocin and W War RegWatm Qmmisbon and other federal 3dencies. and shall be desertbed in the prei;rninary.afety testins repcr. a.cd subm.t:cd.ts a psrt cf criter:a fer de te r=1nin g when pt:tecure men.sures snould be c0na:dered wahin and the Cnal safety ins.lysts repert Pracedur,g outsMe the site boundary u mtut hma used in the detal:ec irnplementatten of emer, and safety and prevent da:nage to prcper y; gen:7 p;ana need =ct be cercrited in the pre.
U*
11runary of Stal :2f ety m317 is repCr*.
ments reacted Mth. !ccal. State, and Fed.
l 11. T*tJ P'e:fmtsary Safety Analysts Reporf eral oc"cisas and agene:es for the ear:7 wars.
O'. other protectived ### P"Du*
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- I *A ' P " "" "
no Preu=gr.ary Safety Analysis Earet measures should suca shan contMn su 'ic;ent 1=. fern 2 stun to a.saure
' the cornpatibity of pr: posed emergency m asuru' ** **tl "'eaa#
numbM. m'*.
- ' Cl # E
- U'#
E' t*CII n me W ry M plans wita faculty design festures, site lay.
out and alte tocauen with respect to st cn ChW N.en a cJ the pnncipal d.
N'D "U";
considerauons 4.s access routes. sur-ouna.ing
~
populat1CD distributiot.s. And land use.
1
- oro="o*
" cc
.ts a nu=amum, c. feaoeng it,t=a shta gencies. 2. -e procedures.?.!"i "'* '=".-
t ut,e 1 emer g
A. 'Ne orgkc1:stien fer c0ptsq with etter.
I" E"* E ""
=P"251 Sa".c="cc= :" cost =< =ta=r-genc:. and ce meus for =otec2ecn. :n E
'7 the event cf an ernergency. cf persoca aa.
E er e c
".rst a:4 and pe sonnel de.
algned ta the eczergency crgsntz.2 con:
contamination faciuties. tre!uding:
D. Contacts and arrantements :cade or to
- 1. Equipmat at *e s1*e f penennet e-be made with local. State. 2nd Federal gov.
e mesiterte g:
ernmental agenc:es with rT!pon.s:bluty :cr b
- 2. Faculties and ruppUes at the site for coping with emergencies. tacturng iden'.1
- decontaminat!ca of personnel
cation cf tuo prtnetpal agencies:
- 3. Fac:lt.es and medical supptet at the C Measures to be taken in the event cf
,g g,
gg g
an acetdent within and outside the site n.,,, g.ng, bounds.y to protect healtn and estety :na
( Arr u p o M th emM a g prevent damige to pr:perty and the es.
phys:c:an and otser medical persence! qual.
g ec*ed respec.se in the event of an etner.
eed to hand %m cumc'n-a.n d p
._ gency. :t c:!aite agencies:
A Arrangemeu fu myrwa of m.
- r D. Features of t:e fact!!ty to be provided jured or ccntaminated :ndividuos to treat.
w-for onsite emergency orst aid a.cd decen.
ment faculuu outa:de the :lte ::oundary:
q ta.minacon, and ter emer:ency trsnspcrta.
O. Arrangementa for treatment of ;cd!=
tion of Lndividual.s to ofaite tre atment vidr Ma at traatment factilt.es outs.de the
C # "E elte boundary:
F Prorts!ons to be made for emergency IL Provtstens for train 1=g of emptovees of treatment of :ndividuals u o$ site faciuties; the Ucensee who e.re assigned spec:.Sc au.
- 7. De training program fcr ecaployeM and thority and responsib4.uty in the event of as for rstber persons, not employe*ss cf the !!.
emergency and of other per%otts w hose censee. whose services may be reqt.ared in aanstance may be needed in the event of a coping with an emergency; rad'ation emergency; O. Features of the facil:ty to be aro.
vided to tasure the es; ability for p[ ant
.@ns M tnUng, by peMc M.is,
- I '"d * #3 '""I'UCT d'ans *.o seaurs that evscua;1on ard the capabtuty for fac:2.1ty
- 8 D '" Of Ih*.IC883 "N M*u"# "U3 reentry in crder to :nittgste the consequecees duun', sed pronstens IOr par.
s of an acctdent of..f apptcpriate. to conunce Cipal Ca La the drilla by other per:cns Operation whces a.ss: stance may be neeced in tae event EU. 7:50 Final Safety.tna!ysts Report of a radisuon emergency:
The Final Safety Analysis Repert stall cen.
I **
- D *' * **U U
- O tain plans for coping with emergenctes. T e details of these plans and the detatis of n u their 'mplementauon ceed not be tee:uded.
but the plans submitted must include a de.
The C:ctmiss:on has t.svelcred a scripuon of the etaments set out in secuan document entitled " Guide To the Prep 3 -
IV to an extent su:::ctent to demonstr2te yation of Energenc7 P!s.ns fcr Produc-that the plans ;rovide reis: cable assurance t!;n and Uti!!:.ation Fac:11 ties to he!D that ap7topr:ste measures can and wiu be ppg 1 t2 eSt3h i3U Ed'Nu1E' Elan 3 r"'
taken trn the event of an eme gency to pro.
teet pubite hesith and aatety and pr:: vent ed Mant to } 50.M 2nd t?ns AP-darnage to property.
DCUdIX* IOC CCPt0E With e:neTgen le3.
IV. Centent of Ement=ncy Pians ne emer;ency plans shall contain, but not neceuanty be 11 mated to. the todowt:4 elements:
A. De orpntInt!on fer c00tng w1th r3*
dtation ernergenc*es. in wntch E MICc au.
- De Quade La ars1Isble far fasN:t!1 sW the therities. respec.atetilties, and duties en de.
Commissicn.s Puoile Document EDH&
Sned and assigned. and the mesna of 304 1T17 H Street NW. and coptes may De sien Scauon. In the event cf an emergency. cf:
talnad by accresatog a Request to tus (1) Persone sasigned to the acensee s emer.
t h'e6t*=e of N udear dcastor brui.arion or tb restor of N udear '. tat ef uls Liet y and 9fe-gency orts m uon. and (2) approor* s te 8uarJ1. Js approprut e. U.S. Nyctear Regulatory tit ate, and Federsi aunc:es wtta respon.
L'*m men. w asnirigton. D.L. ;0155.
albtuttes for coping with emergencies:
1 September 1,1973
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EXHIBIT 3 Page 1 of 2 101 25 REM S
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100 2,
3, 5,
107 DILTANCE, MILES PUGET SOUND POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SKAGIT NUCLE AR POWER PROJECT PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT k?
LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT THYROID DOSE
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EXHIBIT 3 Page 2 of 2 101
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5 3
5 REM N
2 1 REM
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5, 101 DISTANCE, MILES PUGET SOUND POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SKAGIT NUCLE AR POWER PROJECT PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT WHOLE BODY DOSE W)')
145 FIGUR E 13.3-1
EXHIBIT 4 ItFORMATION AND PARAMETERS RELATED TO THE FEASIBILITY OF EVACUATION IN THE VICItilTY OF THE SKAGIT SITE JAMES A. MARTIN, JR.
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS BRAf1CH OFFICE OF REACTOR REGULATION U.S. NHCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BASIC INFORMATION The basic information needed to assess the feasibility of evacuation of an area is:
(i) availability of means for providing warnings, (ii) egress routes available and (iii) population distribution.
Puget Sound Power and Light Company (Puget) has provided information regarding all three aspects in Chapters 2 and 13 of its Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report (PSAR).
Means of warning the public, and responsibilities therefore have been assigned.
The applicant would be responsibile for the irrmediate warning of off-site agencies in the event of a serious accident.
Under the Skagit County Emergency Plan, the Mount Vernon Fire Department has the responsibility for warning the public.
Sirens, public address sytems, mobile units, radio, television and telephones are available for providing warning.
These means have been used successfully in evacuations of historical record (EPA 520/ 6-74-002, Evacuation Risks - An Aanlysis, J. Hans and T. Sell, USEPA, Washington, D.C.
20460.)
This concept of operations is described in Chapter 13.3 of the PSAR.
Egress routes from the area surrounding the Skagit site are displayed in Figure 2.2-2 of the PSAR.
Population distributions in the area are shown in Figure 2.1 of the PSAR.
ROAD TRAFFIC CAPACITIES IN RELATION TO POPULATIONS Capacities of roads in the area are abundant relative to the total population.
This can be illustrated very simply using the National Safety Council rule of thumb for safe driving.
The rule is:
for safe l5 (j (j N
driving maintain a separation distance between vehicles of one vehicle length for each ten miles per hour of travel speed.
The functional relationship between road capacity (vehicles per hour per lane of traffic) and vehicle speed is shown in Figure 1, attached, for two cases:
separation distances of one-half and one vehicle lengths per each ten miles per hour of vehicle speed. An average vehicle length of sixteen (16) feet was assumed for the calculations; vehicle lengths should decrease somewnat over the next decade, so the assumption of sixteen feet should lead to conservatively low estimates of road traffic capacities.
The two curves in Figure 1 should conservatively bound road traffic capacities that can be achieved.
From this figure, a vehicle flow rate of 2500 vehicles per hour per lane can be accommodated at average speeds as low as twenty miles per hour.
Assuming three persons per vehicle, 7,500 persons per hour per lane can be safely accommodated.
This can be contrasted with the observation by Hans and Sell that "In observations during evacuations, 1100 to 4080 cars per lane per hour were observed.
The average of dCtual observations was approximately 2600 cars per lane per hour.... average vehicle occupancy observed during a large evacuation was four persons...
... vehicle speeds observed ranged from 25 to 45 mph...".
Thus, from several standpoints the assumption of 7500 persons per hour per lane for road traffic capacities is reasonable.
A comparison of egress road traffic capacities and total populations within five and ten miles of the Skagit site is displayed in Tables 1 and 2, attached.
In these tables, egress routes, total capacities of roads (assuming use of either one lane or both lanes of two lane roads),
and total populations are enumerated.
kh lob The results can be summarized succinctly:
Considering the evacuation of the total populati ~ projected for the year 2010 AD:
about 5700 persons within '
-es would evacuate over roads which could safely accommodate 45,000 to 90,000 persons per hour; about 24,000 persons within ten miles would evacuate over roads which could safely accommodate 75,000 to 150,000 persons per hour.
Thus, roads are abundant relative to the total population.
It is tempting to divide, say, 5,700 persons by 45,000 persons per hour, which results in 0.13 hour1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />, and conclude that 5,700 persons could evacuate the five mile area in 0.13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.
This is patently false and is not being claimed here. All that is claimed is that egress routes are abundant relative to total populations.
Such a statement is useful for establishing a perspective on the matter.
ESTIMATES OF EVACUATION TIMES There is no widely accepted recipe available for estimating times that might be required for a given number of persons to evacuate a given area.
- However, because of the frequency at which people in the United States have had to evacuate areas there exists an abundance of information in the subject area.
Within the range of distances between about 0.5 and 10 miles, and populations up to about 10,000 persons, there is an evacuation about once per week to ten days in the United States, on the average.
In the report by Hans and Sell, they have provided a graph which summarizes the results of their analyses, a copy of which is attached hereto as Figure 2.
As shown, it appears that the higher the population density, the faster an evacuation can be acccmplished.
The population densities within five and ten miles of the Skagit site are both about 75 persons per square mile.
From the graph, evacuation times for a general evacuation of these areas would be about k ') ')
kb 8.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> each, based on historical record.
A major objective of an evacuation plan should be to reduce times required for people to evacuate an area, over the time that might be required in the absence of a plan.
The evidence from the analysis of the historical record is not optimistic, however.
As reported by Hans and Sell.
"A statistical comparison was made of the events used in Figure (2,here) to determine if the use of a plan for an evacuation reduced the time required to evacuate the affected area.
Rased on the information collected, no significant difference between the evacuations utilizing a plan and those in which no plan was used could be determined."
This result should be rcther unsettling to planners Hans and Sell provide some clues regarding their data, however, which point to the key planning elements that should be in place to reduce times required for evacuation, or other protective action responses.
They note that:
"The data indicates that more time is required for evacuation as population density decreases."
"The evacuation times.
include the warning times as well as the times required to move.
. out of the affected area.
Warning times may lengthen as the population density decreases because of increasing distances between persons and more individual contacts may have to be made.
More time is required to prepare farms for a ' shut down' than for residential dwellings."
In short, spreads in warning times are major contributors to delays in accomplishing an evacuation of an area.
4 '/ h>
l47 Hans and Sell also observe that " Road networks generally decrease as the population density decreases; therefore, more time may be required for evacuation because of limited choice and direction of roads."
From the discussion on road capacities in the foregoing, it is unlikely that road networks are limiting in low population areas.
This observation buttresses the conclusion regarding warning times.
The relationships between plume widths and possible travel speeds of plume fronts and people are illustrative as benchmarks.
Several of these relationships are illustrated in Figure 3, attached.
In this graph, half-widths of plumes are shown as a function of meteorological stability class and d: stance from a source point.
Half-widths for Pasquil stability classes B, D, and F are shown.
Generally, D stability occurs when wind speeds exceed about 5 miles per hour, or under heavy cloud cover; B and F are day and night time stability classes, respectively, when wind speeds are less than five miles per hour and skies are clear.
D is the dominant or average stability class.
There are other stability classes, but their inclusion would not serve any useful purpose for this discussion.
Perusal of Figure 3 will lead to the conclusion that effective protective action can be accomplished in short order, where it is feasible to vacate an area at all.
For example, for a wind speed of two miles per hour, and for the case of Class F stability, a person initially at two miles downwind from a po'. luting source could walk crosswind at two miles per hour and be out of an imoact area in about six minutes - i.e. well before a plume front could extend to two miles.
For the same case, by driving downwind at 10 miles per hour one could outrun a plume front.
This is a benchmark example because the meteorology assumed by the NRC for siting does analyses is znr
)
. essentially the class F stability, low wind speed case.
As a further example, consider a person initially at a distance of five miles, with Class D stability and a 10 mile per hour wind.
Plume front travel time to five miles would be one-half hour.
Starting at any time before one-half hour (elapsed time) and travalling downwind at 10 MPH would allow one to outrace the plume front.
Walking crosswind at 2 MPH immediately ugon release of a pollutant, would take a person out of an impact area in about 23 minutes, i.e. about seven minutes before plume front impact.
These examples all assume early warning and clear instructions being imported to the person in the examples.
Thus, these are highly idealized examples.
But they serve to illustrate what is possible, if not practical, to accomplish given early warning and clear instruccians.
Dr. R. W. Houston has developed an evacuation model based, in part, on the data and information reported by Hans and Sell (see testimony of R. W.
Houston, matter of Northern States Power, Tyrone Energy Park, Unit 1, Eau Clair, Wisconsin, October 7, 1976, Docket No. 50-484).
In essence, Dr. Houston's model reduces to the deterministic relation:
No.23 0
O
/L.5 E = 1.05A t
Where tg = estimate of evacuation time, in hours, No = population initially in Area A, A = area in square miles, and L = nuo2er of roads leaving the area.
A graph illustrating this relation is displayed in Figure 4, attached.
I applied this equation for sixteen 45 degree sector-segments 'two adjacent 22.5* sector-segments at a time) using population and road network data for ct ) G AQ']
/
. the Skagit site.
These results are displayed in Figure 5.
Such a display is helpful in highlighting areas where planning could be most beneficiai.
The data disnlayed also could be used to obtain one measure of the worth of advanced planning, i.e. the amount of time that could be saved in accomplishing an evacuation by the implementation of plans.
Recognizing that persons walking at a speed of two miles per hour (a liesurely stroll) could be out of the five mile area in 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, and out of the 10 ile area in 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, the data in Figure 4, implies that two or four hours or more could be " saved" in these areas by implementation of a better plan.
Recognizing further that at a speed of 10 miles per hour a person could be out of the ten mile area in one hour, then as much as nine hours could be " saved" for this area.
The keys to either of these potential savings are patent:
provision of early warning and clear instructions by cognizant authorities, and prompt response thereto by the public.
Of these, the former are under the control of the authorities.
SPMARY nilD C0tiCLUSI0 tis It is relatively easy to summarize the substance of the foregoing:
evacuations occur of ten in the U.S. in areas much like that of the vicinity of the Skagit site.
The dominant conclusion reached is that early warning, and clear instruction by authorities and prompt response thereto by the public would be the key elements in a successful response.
Thus, not only is evacuation of areas in the vicinity of the Skagit site feasible, the key elements have been identified some five to ten years before the plant would begin operation, leaving ample time for development of a plan.
o
EXHIBIT 4 (Table 1)
TABLE 1 EGRESS CAPACITIES OF ROADS IN VICINITY OF SKAGIT SITE
-FIVE MILE PERIMETER-ROAD ENUMERATION
- Rt. 20 East and parallel road 2
N, then East - back road 1
Rt. 20 West and various feeders 2
N and either N or West (Rt. 9 and various feeders) 1 Total 6 roads ROAD CAPACITIES Using one lane per road 6x7500 = 45,000 person per hour Using two lanes per road 12x7500 = 90,000 persons per hour POPULATION
- Population within five miles = 5692
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i
EXHIBIT 4 (Table 2)
TABLE 2 EGRE55 CAPACITIE3 0F ROADS IN VICINITY OF SKAGIT SITE
-TEN MILE PERIMETER-ROAD ENUMERATION
- Rt. 20 East and parallel road 2
N, then East (back road) 1 Rt. 9 N l
Feeders to Rts. 5 and 11 N, NNW and W 3
Rt. 20 W l
Rt. 538 and feeders to W and Rt. 5 S 1
Rt. 9 S 1
Total 10 roads ROAD CAPACITIES Using one lane per road 10x7500=75,000 persons per hour Using two lanes per road 20x7500=150,000 persons per hour POPULATION
- Population within ten mi' es = 23,935
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