ML19247B180
| ML19247B180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/19/1979 |
| From: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18079A764 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908080137 | |
| Download: ML19247B180 (6) | |
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6/19/79 UtlITED STATES OF AMERICA 11UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOil I
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AtlD LICEtlSIf!G BOARD 2
3 In the Matter of
)
Docket tio. 50-272
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4 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC &
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Proposed Issuance of Amendment GAS COMPAllY
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to Facility Operating License 5
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fio. CPR-70
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~
f (2alem tiuclear Generating
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Station, Unit l10. 1)
)
7 8
HRC STAFF RESP 0!iSE, Ill PART, TO BOARD QUESTI0tlS 9
10 Q.
Please state your name and address.
11 A.
My name is Gary Zech cnd my address is the Nuclear Regulatory 12 Comnission, Washinoton, D. C.
20555.
13 14 My name is De. Jack Donohew and my address is the same as 15 Mr. Zech's.
16 Q.
Please state the purpose of your testimony, 17 A.
The purpose of our testimony is to respond to the Board's 18 Questions fio.1 and 3 to the extent that they do not relate to 19 Class 9 accidents found in the Order of April 18, 1979.
It is 20 the Staff's understanding that question No. 2 wa: withdrawn by 21 tha Baard. The remaining two questions are as foll;ws:
1.
To what extent did the accident at Three Mile Island 22 23 affect the spent fuel pool at that site?
3.
If an accidenc such as the one at Three Mile Island occurred 24 7 90808amgg y
_2_
I at Salem, to what extent would the accident affect the spent fuel 2
pool? To what extent would it have mattered how much spent fuel
- 3. was present at the pool at Salem?
4 Our testimony is not intended to discuss the reasons for the 5
Three Mile Island-2 (TMI-2) accident or to determine whether a 6
similar accident could occur at Salem Unit No. l.
Although-7 there are several task forces now studying the accident at TMI-2, 8
including a Special Inquiry, the Staff believes it has sufficient g
information now to respond to the Board's questions.
10 Q.
Messrs. Zech and Donohew, have you read the Board's questions?
jj A.
Yes.
12 Q.
Will you please respond to question No. 1.
13 A.
The TMI-2 accident had no direct effect on the spent fuel poc1 at that site. There was no fuel stored in the pool at the time of 34 the accident since T'4I-2 was in its first cycle, however, it is the 15 Staff's opinion that even if there had been fuel stored in the pool, 16 there would have been no effect.
17 18 Q.
To respond to Question No. 3, please describe briefly what 19 would happen if an accident simila-to the one at TMI-2 occurred 20 at Salem Unit 1 and to what extent the accident would affect the 21 spent fuel 9001 at Salem Unit 1.
p2 A.
(Mr. 7ecn) To do that, I will first need to describe to 23 some extent, what happened at TMI-2 so that the potential effects 24 of a similar accident at Salem Unit No. I can be addressed.
500
~' ~, 1
1 Based on infornation contained in staff Report On The Seneric 2
Assessment Of Feedwater Transients In Pressurized Wa'.er Reactors 3
Designed By The Babcock & Wilcox Comoany, NUREG-0';60,- May 1S79, 4
after the reactor scram at TMI-2, which was caused by a loss of 5
feedwater to the steam generators and a turbine trip, a series of 6
events occurred which resulted in damage to fuel assemblies in 7
the reactor core. A relief valve en the reactor coolant system 8
pressurizer opened during the initial pressure transient and failed 9
to reseat, resulting in an overflow of reactor coolant system 10 water from the reactor coolant drain tank to the reactor building j)
(containment) sump. The reactcr building sump pumos started 12 automatically due to the rising water level and discharged water 13 into tanks located in the auxiliary building.
These tanks 14 becaine full and overflowed into the auxiliary building.
Be ause this 15 water Hs contaminated from the damaged fuel in the core, the 16 resu' ting radiation levels in the auxiliary building were high.
17 Q.
(Mr. Zech) Could the aucomatic transfer of contaminated water 18 from the ractor building containment sump to the auxiliary 19 building occur at Salem Unit No. l?
20 A.
No. As indicated in the Salem Final Safety Analysis Report (Chtpter 5),
21 the containment isolation valves in the transfer line[ from the 22 Salem Unit No. I containment sump are autcmatically shut on a 23 safeguards signi:1 which starts the safety injection pumps.
These 24 valves at TMI-2 remained open during the initial stages of the 500 m
i.
1 ac,cident because they were designed to close only on high 2
containment pressure (4 psig), not on the safeguards signal.
This 3
pressure in containment did not each those levels until about 4
20 minutes into the accident during which time contaminated water 5
was transferced to the auxiliary bui]di_ng liquid rad waste storage 6
tanks as discussed earlier.
Therefore, it would not be expected 7
that the automatic transfer of the.ontaminated..;er in the 8
contaminated water of the containment sump would occur at salem 9
Unit No.1 as it did occur at TMI-2.
10 Q.
If, for some reason, the containment isolation valves did not work 11 properly, what effect would this have on the spent fuel pool at 12 Salem Unit I?
13 4.
If the inadverdent transfer of contaminated water to the auxiliary 14 building occurred t Salem Unit No.1, the direct effect on the spent 15 fuel pool would not seriously affect the operation of spent fuel 16 pool (SFP) support system or the cool itself.
The pool is located 17 in a separate fuel storaae building, nowever, as at TMI-2, certain
]g support systems such as the SFP cooling system are located in the
,9 auxiliary building.
Radiation levels that might be expected based 20 on Ti11-2 levels in the area of the liquid waste storage tanks and 2) the SFP cooling system would not be expected to preclude accessibility.
22 1
Dr. Donohew and Mr. Zech, have you examined the design of the 23 auxiliary building for Salem?
24 f.
Yes.
Suu 42/
ee 4 e.
O
1 Q.
Based on your examir.ation, do you believe that an accident 2
similar to what happeneu at TMI-2 could seriously affect operations 3
concerned with the SFP ct Salem Unit I?
4 A.
No. We have reviewed Figures 1.2-2 through 1.2-8 of the Salem 5
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and evaluated the accessibility 6
of the spent fuel pool cooling and purification equipment during an accident 7
at Salem Unit 1 similar to that which occurred at Three Mile Island 8
Unit 2.
Access to this equipment is in ar'as which are not expected 9
to be contaminated during such an accident. The equipment is 10 shielded from areas which may become contaminated by water pumped 11 to the auxilia:
'milding from the conta..iment and from other 12 equipment in the auxiliary building which was used during the 13 Three Mile Island accident and which contained highly radioactive 14 water or gases from the primary coolant system. Therefore, we 15 conclude that an accident similar to that which happened at Three 16 Mile Island should not seriously affect operations concerned with the SFP cooling and purification system.
37 The SFP itself is in the Fuel Handling Building which is a
)g separate building from the Auxiliary Building.
Operations in tne
)g Fuel Handling Building should not be seriously affected by an 21 accident similar to what happened at Three Mile Island.
22 Q.
Tc respond to Board Question 3, please tell the Board if 23 any of your conclusions would change if the proposed amendment to 24 increase the spent fuel capacity is allowed?
,cn
- d 3JO
- .I A.
As we had discussed above, even if the transfer of radioactive 2
water were to occur into the auxiliary bcilding the radiation levels 3
that woulc result would not be expected to preclude access to the 4
auxiliary building for the purposes of maintaining or insuring the 5
proper operation of the spent fuel pool cooling system and purification 6
system.
Furthermore, as indicated in the Staff Safety Evaluation 7
in Section 2.2, spent fuel cooling, and the Environmental Impact 8
Appraisal (EIA) Section 5.3, we have concluded that both the 9
additional heat load and the radioactivity in the spent fuel pool 10 as a result of the expansion are not considered to be significant.
11 Therefore, the amount of spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool 12 at Salem is not considered to be important to the consequences 13 of the hypothetical accident discussed above.
14 Q.
Please summarize your responses to the Boari's questions.
15 A.
In summary, if an accident such as the one at TMI-2 occurred 16 at Salem Unit No. I, the effects on the spent fuel pool and support 17 systems would be expected to be negligible.
18 19 20 21 22 23 5 Lirj 33o 24
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