ML19246B798
| ML19246B798 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1979 |
| From: | Dettenmeier R, Maura F, Streeter J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19246B779 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-358-79-06, 50-358-79-6, NUDOCS 7907180627 | |
| Download: ML19246B798 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000358/1979006
Text
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-358/79-06
Docket No. 50-358
License No. CPPR-88
Licensee:
Cincinnati Gas and
Electric Company
139 East 4th Street
Cincinnati, OH
Facility Name:
Wm. H.
Zimmer Nuclear Power Station
Inspection At:
Wm. H.
Zimmer Site, Moscow, Ohio
Inspection Conducted:
February 27-28, March 1-2,
19-23, and
April 9-11, 1979
ex
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Inspectors:
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Dettenceier
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B. M. k. Wong (,pril 9-11)
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Approved By:
J. F. Stroter, Chin
!M
Nuclear St.rport Seckion 1
Inspection Surnary
Inspection on February 27-28, Fbrch 1-2,
19-23, and April 9-11, 1979
(Report No. 50-358/79-06)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of Preoperational
Test Program; previous unresolved items and actions on previous inspec-
tion findings; preoperational test results; system turnover for pre-
operational testing; control rod blade inspection; licensee events.
The inspection involved 160 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC
inspectors.
Results:
Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or
deviations were identified in four areas.
Three items of noncon-
pliance (two infractions - failure to fol'.ow procedures - Paragraphs
7, 8.b, 8.c, 9.c.; inadequate procedure - Paragraph 10.f.; and one
deficiency - inadequate records - Paragr.ph 10.e) were identified in
two areas.
344
096
7907180697
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- J.
Schott, Station Superintendent
P. King, Assistant Station Superintendent
S. Martin, Test Coordinator
R. Link, Operations Supervisor
R. Price, Training Supervisor
D. Anderson, Turnover Coordinator
- J. Wald, Station Quality Engineer
- B.
Culver, Proj ect Manager
- W. Schwiers, Principal Quality Assurance and Standards Engineer
- R. Wood, QA&S Engineer
- H.
Gear, Construction Supervisor
- T. Bloom, GE Resident Site Manager
M. May, GE Site Operations Manager
- L. Aiello, GE Qi ality Assurance Engineer
V. Pence, GE Un't Manager, Driveline Components
J. Occoner, Reactor Centrols, Inc.
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee ecployees including
members of the administrative, technical, operating and QA&S staff;
employees of the General Electric Company, employees of EDS
Nuclear, and employees of Reactor Controls, Incorporated.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview of
79.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview o;
.d
April 11, 1979.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview of
14,
1979.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous _ Inspection Findings
(Closed) Noncompliance (358/79-01-01).
Failure to follow safety
tagging (switching order) procedure. The inspector found u.e*
the
licensee is conducting safety tagging refresher training for T1
operations personnel and systets engineers as stated in thei
letter, Borgmann to Heishman, dated February 28, 1979.
(Closed) Noncompliance (358/79-01-04).
Failure to develop appro-
priate procedure to implement to QA&S responsibility assigned in
SU.ACP.03.
The inspector found that the QA&S Principal Engineer
has issued a letter to the Station Superintendent requesting
QA&S be informed 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> in advance of a flush of a safety re-
lated system so that appropriate audits can be conductea on the
valve lineup.
A QA&S engineer has been assigned responsibility
to perform the audits. According to EPD personnel the responsibi-
lity to inform QA&S has been delegated to the system engineer in
charge of the flush.
This action is in accordance with the response
given in the letter, Borgmann to Heishman, dated February 28, 1979.
344 097
-2-
(Open) Unresolved Item (358/78-05-02).
Three core support plate
pins " repaired" prior to taking bend measurements.
During a
meeting between the licensee, General Electric Company personne1,
and the inspectors, the problem of what could happen if the three
pins failed in time, due to the unknown level of cold working
each pin experienced, and how to monitor for such failure was
discussed. No conclusions were reached.
The inspector stated
that the licensee's written response to the NRC on this subject
to close c . the outstanding 50.55(e) report should address the
fellowing items:
a.
State why the licensee feels the pins will not fail in time
(should not be replaced) and give the basis for such position.
b.
Assume the pins will fail and state what possible effects,
if any, it could have on plant operation, refueling, mainte-
nance on control rod blades, etc.
Among the possible effects,
consider possible rotation of the fuel support piece so that
the coolant flow paths do not align with the path in the
control rod guide tube.
c.
Discuss what methods are available, if any, to monitor for
the possible failure of the pins.
Include among the methods
visual examination during each refueling outage.
List the
methods the licensee will co=mit to follow.
d.
Commit to develop prior to power operation the acceptance
criteria, for each of the monitoring programs co=mitted to
in Item
c.,
and the required corrective action whenever one
of the limits is exceeded.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (358/79-Cl-02).
Operator training on
the performance of valve check lists and switching orders. The
inspector found that the licensee is revising Station Administrative
Directive (SAD) OS. SAD.02, Revision 1, " Station Operations" to
include under Paragraph 5.1.7 the specific criteria to be followed
by plant operators during the performance of checklists.
Operators
become familiar with changes to SAD's through the use of the All
Read Folder which they are required to read once/ month and sign
off.
In addition, the lice.see stated all Shift Supervisors are
required to discuss tha changes with his crew.
Regarding operator performance of switching orders, the licensee
has written an Operations Memo on the subject which requires the
operator to place the control switch in the close or open position,
whichever is called for in the order, to verify the valve position.
3.
Other Areas Inspected
(Closed) 10 CFR 50.55(e) Event No. M-11, Control Rod Interferences.
The inspectors found that the licensee had modified 80 of the
control rods by grinding a chamfer in the upper corner of the
-3-
h)h
-
control rod velocity limiter.
The licensee completed this modification
on site in accordance with the General Electric Field Disposition
Instruction No. 94/6300, Revision 0 to elminate the potential
interferences between the control rod and the fuel channel.
A
review of the control rod inspection records for the 80 control
rods modified revealed that:
51 contcol rods were modified on all four corners.
10 control rods were modified on three corners.
11 control rods were modified on two corners.
8 control rods were modifi<.o on one corner.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4
Preoperational Test Program
The inspector reviewed the revision to the Star *op Administrative
Control Procedi es (ACF's) and Startup Proj e
Procedures as of
March 2, 1979 to ensure the changes do not :onflict with FSAR
commitments.
The inspector stated that ACP No. 18, " Work Requests"
is considered unacceptable and must be rewritten as a Station
Administrative Directive in line with the comments given to the
licensee by the Project Inspector.
At of April 4,
1979, of the 114 preoperational tests required to
be completed prior to fuel loading the licensee has completed
writing 108 and has approved for use 77 test procedures.
Twenty-two
systems or partial systems have been turned over for preopera-
tional testing, 17 preops are in progress and four tests have
been completed.
No test results have been approved by the SRB
yet.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Preoperational Test Results
The inspectors reviewed the results of the testing performed as
of March 20, 1979, on the 24/48 VDC and 125 VDC systems.
During
the review it was noted that:
Stratification of the electrolyte in the 24/48 VDC lead-calcium
a.
battery cells is creating an operational problem for the
licensee during recharge following a discharge test in that
it took approximately two months before the specific gravity
of the sample obtained at the top of the cells reached an
accentable reading ( l.205).
While most lead-calcium cells
have an electrolyte withdrawal tube which permits sampling
at a point one-third down from the top of the plates and,
according to the vendor, gives a more acccrate indication of
the state of charge, the Model DC-9 being used for the 24/48
VDC system is not equipped with such a tube.
-4-
344
099
The inspector stated that while the test results meet the
acceptance criteria, the length of time it took to obtain
acceptable specific gravity readings appears to be unde-
sirable during plant operation.
Some method to obtain a
more representative sample of the electrolyte should be
considered.
b.
Two cells on the IB 125 VDC battery failed to meet the
acceptance criteria (cell #84 specific gravity of 1.201, and
cell #88 voltage of 2.06 volts).
The licensee plans to
individually recharge these two cells prior to the next test
which is the 80% of one-hour rating discharge test.
The
inspectors stated that if these two cells fail to meet the
acceptance criteria following the next discharge test, they
should be replaced.
This is an unresolved item (358/79-
06-01) pending the results of the next discharge test.
c.
Specific gravity readings were informally corrected by the
licensee fo* changes in the electrolyte level without affecting
the results of the tests.
The licensee has agreed to require
such corrections as part of his test procedure.
No items of noncompliance cr deviations were identified.
6.
Review of System Turnover for Preoperational Testing
The inspectors reviewed the system turnover process for system
release for preoperational testing to ensure compliance with the
Startup Manual procedures. The review revealed that:
a.
The Master Punchlist, which consolidates the lists of items
remaining to be completed, although continuously updated by
the turnover group, appeared to be missing an approximately
month old item for the low pressure core spray release pack-
age identified by onc of the licensee's construction con-
tractors. Members of the licensee's staff indicated that a
problem existed in the adequacy of the continuous updating
of the Macter Punchlist and that this inadequacy was impacting
on the performance of the preoperational testing.
The
licensee indicated that the system for compilation of the
Master Punchlist was only recently enacted and that the
numerous sources of input to the system created problems in
assurring a complete punchlist.
The licensee has initiated
a program .o compile punchlist items on computer printout
listings as well as to define responsibilities among the
licensee's staff. This is an unresolved item (358/79-06-02)
pending further review of the system turnover for preoperational
testing by the inspectors.
344
100
-5-
.
b.
When revisions are made to drawings on systems which inter-
connect or interface with the scoped system for release for
preoperational testing, and especially in the case of electrical
drawings where the connecting drawings are part of the
release boundary, the system engineers stated that they felt
they were not given enough information in the revision
notification to determine how the revision would effect or
impact upon the preoperational test or results.
It was
indicated by the licensee that although additional research
might be involved on the part of the system engineer, all
information for determining the impact of revisions to
interconnecting or interfacing drawings to the preoperational
test or its results is available somewhere on site.
It was
also indicated by the licensee that the turnover group will
prepare a brief summary of her the revisions to drawings of
interconnecting or interfacing systems will effect the
scoped system for release.
This problem with interconnecting and interf acing systems
originates from the fact that there is a difference in the
number cf drawings used in preparing the preoperational test
and the number of drawings used when scoping the boundaries
of the system for release for preoperational testing.
Although the drawings contained in the release package are
frozen to the point that no new revisions of the drawings
will be released without authorization from the system
engineer, the system engineer has no control of the release
of revisions of drawings which were used in preparation of
the preoperational test procedure which are not also inclu-
ded in the release package for turnover for preoperational
testing.
The inspectors indicated that these differences in
capability to control revisions to drawings which could
effect the preoperational test could lead to portions of
systems or interconnecting portions between systems not
being preoperationally tested.
This is an unresolved iten
(358/79-06-03)
pending further review of the preoperational
test program by the inspectors.
c.
There seems to be some confusion among the licensee's ctaff
members as to a method for dealing with revisions to drawings
for systems which have been preoperationally tested but not
turned over for operation.
The licensee indicated that
procedures are already developed to handle revisions as well
as how the revisions affect the validity of the preoperational
test results. The licensee indicated that he will review
these procedures with the staff personnel.
d.
The licensee has procedures for control and tagging of
areas, components, panels and systems which have been turned
over for preoperational testing. These procedures
-6-
.
do not address situations where components or panels are
shared by one system which is turned over and by another
which is not.
During the plant tour, it was found that the
" Division I LPCS/RHR-A Relay Board" did not have any of its
internal components tagged as being turned over even though
the LPCS system had been turned over.
The licensee indicated
that tagging the panel or all of the LPCS relay components
within the panel or any other similar situation was a matter
of judgement since construction was still allowed on the
RHR-A portion of the panel.
It was also noted during the plant tour that most of the
electrical control and relay panels such as the "HPCS Relay
Board" which was tagged as turned over had their doors
completely removed even though there was no work being
conducted within the panels in most cases.
The inspectors
questioned the ability to control further work by construc-
tion in such areas as well as in shared syste= panels.
The
licensee indicated that the procedures for " System Release
for Turnover" SU.RPR.01 and " Construction Work Authorization
for Equipment Turned Over for Preoperational Testing",
SU.PRP.04 controlled construction work on and around turned
over systems, components and areas.
The licensee indicated
that QA6S also audits the proper completion of the authori-
zation forms involved.
Field audits to verify conformance
to the above mentioned procedures to verify actual initiation
of authorization forms are not done.
The licensee indicated
that he would review the above procedures with regard rn the
inspectors comments.
This is an unresolved item (358/
79-06-04) pending resolution by the licensee and further
review by the inspectors.
In discussions with the system engineers, turnover groups
e.
and operations personnel it was indicated that there was
some confusion as to the disposition of the " Construction
Work Authorization" f orm PRP-04-1 and the " Return of System /
Equipment to Construction" startup form 6.5 while construc-
tion work was in progress under this authorization.
The
operations personnel indicated that some of the above men-
tioned forms were available in the control room although
there was no way to know if they reflected all work going on
under all such authorizations since there was no designated
disposition while work was in progress nor a sequential
numbering system established for filing or traceability. The
licensee indicated that operations personnel have a definite
need for notification of such authorization and would resolve
the questions concerning the authorization forms. This is an
unresolved item (358/79-06-05)
pending resolution by the
licensee and further review by the inspectors.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
-7-
344
102
7.
Plant Tour
The inspectors conducted tours of various areas of the plant to
observe activities in progress, general housekeeping and clean-
liness, and equipment caution safety and or green preoperational
testing tagging. The tours revealed that:
a.
The enclosed area of the spare and IB 125VDC battery chargers,
which have been turned over for preoperational testing, was
cluttered with debris.
Brooms, general trash, metal grating,
hard hats and a welding oven (PL-5) surrounded the IB battery
charger within the wooden barricade.
b.
The spare 125VDC battery charger had one of its side panels
missing.
Pieces of insulation and concrete chips and heavy
dust deposits had settled onto the internals of the spare
charger.
It was noted by the licensee's staff that the
panel had been missing at least since the chargers had been
turned over for preoperational testing in October 1978.
Startup !bnual procedure SU. ACP.16 " Equipment and Building Cleanliness"
requires in Section 5.2 that all safety related equipment shall
be maintained free of excessive oil, water or other material
which could prevent the equipment from performing its intended
safety function. The licensee has failed to follow the Startup
Manual procedure SU.ACP.16.
This failure to follow procedures is
contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion
V, and is considered to be an example of an item of noncompliance
(358/79-06-06A)
of the infraction level.
8.
Overpressurization of Low Pressure Core Spray and Condensate
Systems Piping
The inspector reviewed the event of January 19, 1979, during
which high pressure core spray (HPCS) water entered the conden-
sate (CD) and low pressure core spray (LPCS) systems because
valves lE22-F003 and F031 had been left open causing a rupture of
the steam jet air ejector condenser l A.
The review consisted of
interviews with testing and operating personnel and a review of
the licensee's final report on his investigation of the event.
The review showed that:
a.
Procedure OP.HP.01-4, Revision 0 was used to lineup, fill
and vent the HPCS system,
b.
At the completion of the fill and vent operation the operator
never completed Step 5.1.5 which required him to close
valves IE22-F003 and F-31.
With these two valves open the
CD and HPCS systems became crosstied thru the cycled condensate
(CY) system.
The operator claims he informed the Shift
fO5
_ g_
.
.
Supervisor that he had left the two valves open while the
latter does not recall being told.
This failure to follow
procedures is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion
V and is considered to be an example of an item of noncompliance
(358/79-06-06B) of the infraction level.
c.
For some unknown reason, valve IE21-F025 which had been
safety tagged closed under Switching Order No. 781317, dated
November 16, 1978, was it. the open position.
This completed
the cross connection of the LPCS and HPCS systems.
Violation
of Switching Order No. 781317 is contrary to 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V and is considered an example of an
item of noncompliance (358-79-06-060) of the infraction
level. The switching order was cleared on January 24, 1979.
The corrective action whicn the licensee is currently taking
regarding a previous noncompliance with the safety tagging
procedure (358-79-01-01) is also applicable to this event,
therefore the inspector stated no response to this item of
noncompliance is required.
d.
Paragraph 13.0 of Safety Tagging Procedure EC. SAD.02, Revision
00 allows for the operation of equipment for test purposes
without the removal of the safety tags.
It is possible that
valve IE21-F025 was operated for test purposes thru tags and
subsequently left open by error.
The inspectors have objected
to Paragraph 13.0 of the Safety Tagging Procedure.
On March 21, 1979, the licensee issued operating memo 79-2,
Revision 9, which specifically requires that "Do Not Operate"
tags must be removed before energizing electrical equipment
or opening valves.
An exception is made in the case of
electrical testing conducted by EOTD in which case only the
E0TD caster tag will be left in place.
c.
On December 12, 1977, a General Electric system engineer
reco= mended that a check valve be installed on line IHP18A3
downstream of valve lE22-F031 because a similar overpres-
surization of a small section (up to valve ICY 013) of low
pressure piping had occurred.
The recom=endation was re-
jected because the licensee thought that two valves (IE22-F003
and F031) plus adminstrative controls were sufficient to
prevent recurrence.
The licensee stated the check valve
will be installed.
All other ECCS systems have check valves
in the line from the CY system.
The inspector stated his concern regarding repeatable occur-
rences where a lack of com=unication or understanding between
parties have resulted in damage to equipment.
It is our
intention to closely monitor the licensee's performance
during the preoperational test program to determine the
-9-
.
.
the adequacy of plant staffing and training as fuel load
date approaches.
9.
Flooding of LPCS/RHR-A Pump Room Event
The inspectors reviewed the event which occurred on March 17,
1979, involving the LPCS/RHR-A pump room.
The inspectors ir.t e r-
viewed construction and operations personnel involved in the
event and revieved the operations and shift engineering logs.
The review revealed that:
a.
On March 17, 1979, flushing was being conducted on the fuel
pool cooling and cleanup system. The licensee normally
flushes to the suppression pool.
The suppression pool was
unavailable due to mcdifications.
This flush was to the
clean-up phase separator tank which was lined up to the
reactor building equipment drain tank for overflow.
b.
At lunchtime the engineer in charge of the flush told the
pipe fitters working under him to close the valves to secure
flushing and break for lunch.
The valves were not closed to
stop the flush.
Water overflowed from the reactor building
equipment drain tank and into the corner room which contained
the RHR-A, LPCS and jockey pumps and its associated instruments
and valves for the LPCS system as well as the RHR-A system.
The configuration of the corner room is such that it will
act as a pool up to approximately five feet.
When water was
discovered flowing out of this corner room into the annular
area at the base of the wetwell the uncontrolled flush was
terminated by closure of the valves from the condensate
storage tank supply. The sump pumps in the RHR-A and LPCS
pump room had been out of service due to maintenance.
system has been turned over for preoperational testing.
The licensee indicated that all instrumentation involved in
the flood of the RHR-A/LPCS pump room would be dried, cleaned
inspected and recalibrated.
Restoration of the instrumen-
tation had already begun while the inspectors were on site.
The licensee also indicated that the method of using available
storage tanks for deposition of flushing waters would not be
continued due to the problems experienced.
The licensee did
not, however, indicate what methods vould be used during the
time that the suppression paol was not available.
This event, as well as others experienced by the licensee in
recent months are considered to be examples of poor communications
experienced during operation of systems for testing and
flushing.
The inspectors indicated to the licensee that a
need for developing better communications existed.
This is
considered to be an unresolved
344
105
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item (358/79-06-07)
pending resolution by the licensee
and further review by the inspectors.
c.
During the flushing on the 17th of March, 1979, the floor
drains were also filled and backedup in the reactor building
at the 503 level. This backup resulted in a water washdown
of the HPCS motor and pump.
It was indicated by the operating
staff that the HPCS pump motor and the RHR-C pump motor,
both in the same corner room, had been washed down in sicilar
events several times in the past few months.
HPCS has been
turned over for preoperational testing.
Startup Manual
ProceJures SU.ACP.16 " Equipment and Building Cleanliness"
tequires in Section 5.2 that all safety related equipment
shall be maintained free of excessive oil, water or other
material which could prevent the equipment from performing
its intended safety functions.
The licensee has failed to
follow Startup Manual Procedure SU.ACP.16 in the cases of
the flooding of the LPCS/RHR-A pump room and the wash down
of the HPCS pump motor.
This failure to follow procedures
is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B,
Criterion V. These two failures to follow promedures are
considered examples of items of noncompliance (358/79-06-06D)
of the infraction level.
10.
Control Rod Blades Inspection
The inspectors reviewed the results of the control rod blade
inspections perf ormed by the licensee during the conths of July
thru October 1978.
Our review revealed that:
a.
Of the 137 control rod blades originally inspected using
0.280 inch and 0.320 inch envelope gauges, 86 failed to pass
the .280 inch envelope gauge and of those 86, four also
failed the .320 inch gauge.
b.
In accordance with the Inspection Procedure 22A4387, a
clamp, which applied approximately 40 pounds of pressu.e
against the blade sheath, was placed approximately one to
two inches from the area in question (it should be noted
that the procedure dces not state where to place the clamp).
Thickness measurements were taken with a micrometer and of
the 86 control rod blades 11 still exceeded .280 inches in
thickness. According to Reactor Controls, Inc. (RCI) records
the 11 blades in question were:
C. R. Blade Serial No.
Blade No.
High Spot
A400
1
0.286
A420
4
0.283
A435
2
0.289
- 11 -
.
A440
2
0.281
A443
2
0.282
A453
1
0.281
A461
3
0.285
A484
3
0.285
A501
O.2u2
'
A510
2
0.290
A515
4
0.282
c.
Of the 11 cont
rod blades four (A400, A435, A443 and
'
A461) also fa
the 0.320 inch gauge and were rejected per
Field Deviation .isposition Request (FDDR) No. EN-1-288.
Blade A484 was rejected solely on the basis of a 0.285 inch
reading. The exact location of the high area was not re-
corded.
In addition, control rod blade A437 was rej ected on
the same FDDR due to numerous nicks in the sealing area,
d.
The Inspection Procedure 22A4387 P.4 was modified and the
changes recorded by FDDR No. KN-1-286.
On the FDDR the
exact size and location of the high area was determined for
the remaining six control rod blades (A420, A440, A453,
A501, A510 and A515).
The size of the inspection area was
reduced and the 40 pound clamp was placed directly over the
high point area while deep throat micrometer readings were
taken around the clamped area.
e.
As a result of FDDR No. KN-1-286 the six blades in question
were accepted on the basis that the thickness of the high
point area was reduced to less than 0.280 on five of the
blades with the 40 pound clamp cver the area.
For the sixth
blade (A-510) the thickness remained at 0 290, but the blade
was accepted on the basis that half of the high point area
was located outside the reduced area of interest and a
statement that it " met the intent" of 22A4387.
A review of RCI's records showed that no records were kept
of the work done as a result of FDDR No. KN-1-286.
No raw
data exists to verify the conclusions presented by the FDDR.
Failute to maintain sufficient records is contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVII and Paragraph 17.1.17 of the
FSAR and is considered to be an item of noncompliance
(358/79-06-08) of the deficiency level.
On April 10, 1979, the six blades in question were reinspec-
ted by the licensee, RCI, and the General Electric Company.
The reinspection was witnessed by NRC inspectors. Accurate,
detailed rec 3rds of the reinspection were kept this time
344
107
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.
.
and as a result no response is required from the licensee on
the above item of noncompliance,
f.
During the review of Inspection Procedure 22A4387 and FDDR
No. KN-1-286, which supposedly clarified the inspection
procedure, it was noted that both failed to specify what
direct readings were desired, where such readings were to be
taken, how the clamp was to be used, etc. and as a result,
both the Inspection Procedure and the FDDR are considered to
be inadequate.
This inadequacy is contrary to 10 CFR 50
Appendix B, Criterion V and Paragraph 17.1.5 of the FSAR and
is considered to be an example of an item of noncompliance
(358/79-06-09) of the infraction level.
A meeting was held on April 10, 1979, between the General
Electric control rod design engineer, the licensee and the
NRC inspectors at which time the blade acceptance criteria
(.280"), the use of the 40 pound clamp and the results of
thin control rod qualification tests, etc. were discussed.
The prototype tests were performed by the General Electric
Company using 0.080" and 0.120" wall fuel channels for the
purpose of determining the degree of misalignment, channel
deformation, water gap reduction, etc. at which the opera-
tional performance of the control blade would be af fected.
The test results showed that considerable misalignment
(between 10 to 14 times the allowable during core internals
installation); or reduction of the water gap, due to mis-
alignment and channel deformation, by a factor of approxi-
mately 1.5 to 2.0 would be required before operational dif-
ficulties were first experienced. Wear of the control rod
sheath and fuel channels was measured on tests conducted for
the designed 20 year life cycle.
Based on the results of
these tests and of the reinspection performed on April 10,
1979, the control rod blades presently supplied to the
Zimmer Station are considered to be satisfactory.
During the discussion with the General Electric company
personnel it was stated that for BWR's 5 it is recommended
that the fuel channels be rotated during each refueling
outage.
Since this is new information and since it was not
clear how and when the channels are to be rotated the inspector
requested that the licensee obtain written clarification of
General Electric's position regarding the desirability or
need for channel rotation. This is an unresolved item
(358/79-06-10) pending further review of this matter by the
licensee and the inspector.
'
'344
108
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,
11.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is
required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items,
items of noncompliance, or deviations.
Unresolved items dis-
closed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 5.b,
6.a, 6.b, 6.d, 6.e, 9.b, and 10.
12.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in
Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 23, and
April 11, 1979.
The inspectors summarized the purpose and the
scope of the inspection and the findings.
In response to certain
of the items discussed by the inspector, the licensee representatives:
Acknowledged the statements by the iaspector with respect to the
items of noncompliance (Paragraph 7, 8, 9 and 10).
Stated the SAD covering " Work Requests" would be completed by
March 31, 1979 (Paragraph 4).
Objected to the inspector's position regarding the three core
support plate pins (Paragraph 2).
hkk
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