ML19246B681

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Forwards IE Circular 79-11, Design/Const Interface Problem. No Action Required
ML19246B681
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  
Issue date: 06/27/1979
From: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: John Miller
GEORGIA POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 7907180311
Download: ML19246B681 (2)


Text

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'c UNITED STATES f'h

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NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION 2

g4.klf'ahf f REGION 18 3

101 M AR H T T A sT, N W, SUIT E 3100 AT L ANT A. GE ORGI A 30303 f

6 3 JUN 2 71979 In Reply Refer To:

RII:JPO 50-424, 50-425 Georgia Power Company Attn:

J. H. Miller, Jr.

Executive Vice Iresident 270 Peachtree Street, N.

W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Gentlenen:

The enclosed Circular 79-11, is forwarded to you for information.

No writter response to this Circular is required.

If you require additional iaforcation regarding this subject, please contact this office.

Sincerely, s

Janes P. O'Reilly Director Enclorures:

1.

IE tituu?ar No. 79-11 2.

List of IE Circulars Issued in the Last 12 Months

$39 268 7907180 3'I

. Georgia Power Company cc w/ enc 1:

K. M. Gillespie Construction Project Manager Post Off2ce Box 282 30830 Vaynesboro, Georgia E. D. Grover QA Site Supervisor Post Office Box 282 30830 Waynesboro, Georgia 339 269

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555 June 27, 1979 IE Circular No. 79-11 DESIGN / CONSTRUCTION INTERFACE PROBLEM Description of Circumstances:

(NSSS),

Apparent inadequate communication between nuclear steam supply system architect / engineer (A/E) and constructors have resulted in several cases where reactor vessels or the supports have been misoriented.

The misorienta-tion proble=s appear to occur at sites where dual reactor units are beinc constructed and one primary system layout is a mirror image c f the other.

2 reactor In 1975 TVA reported a misorientation problem with the Sequoyah Unit Westinghouse was the NSSS supplier and TVA provided their own A/E vessel.

se rv i c e.

In 1977 the Southern Calif ornia Edison Company reported a reactor vessel miserientation at San Onof re Unit 2.

Combustion Engineering was the NSSS supplier and Bechtel provided the A/E service.

1979 the Texas Utilities Generating Cocpany reported a reactor vessel In support system misorientation at Comanche Peak Unit 2.

Westinghouse supplied the NSSS, Gibbs and Hill was the plant engineer and Brown and Root was the constructor.

Even though there appears to be minimal safety implications associated with the particular misorientation problems mentioned, repetition of the same type interface relatien-of errors suggest s breakdowns in the design / construction ship s that could in turn lead to more significant sa fety problems.

Corrective preventive action is reco= mended for the f ollowing reasons:

If the interface control system between the NSSS/AE/ Construction is marginal or ineffective as evidenced by the misorientation of reactor uessels and their supports, it is possible that other safety related eq ui pmen t may also be misoriented and/or mislocated.

In some cases the be as obvious as a misoriented reactor vessel errora may not This type of error can and has resulted in hardware modifications and could cause functional and/or structural changes that affect design and operating para =eters.

In translating NSSS design in f orma t ion into site construction documents, the A/E may make changes to facilitate construction of the balance of plant.

These translations may also introduce errors which may not be 7906200176 339 27nu

June 27, 1979 IE Circular No. 79-11 Page 2 of 2 recognized as errors by the A/E's review system.

The organt.. tion be made aware of responsible for function and/or structural design must changes af fecting design and operating parameters so that proper evalua-tion is performed.

It is recognized that there are effective field construction inspection systems, deficiency reporting systems and as-built check systems to uncover and correct for deviations f rom design. However, these are reactive type systems that address the problems after the errors occur and that rely on astection of errors and design deviations in the construction phase.

The detection of certain other errors and design deviations may only be recogniz-able at the design level.

The NRC's concern is that in some instances sufficient checks at the design level are not being performed to preclude design errors discovered at the con-struction site and that the designer may not be aware of other design related changes that affect design and operating parameters. The 10 CFR 50, Appendix B requirement that addresses this concern is contained in Criteria III which states in paro:

" Measures shall be established for the identification and control of design interf aces and for coordination among participating design organizations. These measures shall include the establishment of procedures among participating design organizations for the review, approval, release, distribution, and revision of documents involving design interfaces."

Preventive action at the design level is necessary to minimize the possibility of the appropriate parties not being aware of A/E and constru-tion related design changes and to prevent errors from occurring.

An appropriate preventive action would be to have the NSSS review A/E drawings that show the location, orientation, clearance, etc., for equipment that the NSSS has functional and/or structural design responsibility.

All holders of construction permits should be aware of the potential problems caused by inadequate com=unication between the design organization and the construction organization and should take appropriate action to assure t h en -

selves that adequate interface controls are established and implemented.

No written response to this circular is required.

If you require additiona:

in f o rma t ion regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

)

Enclosure IE Circular No. 79-11 Page 1 of 2 June 27, 1979 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Date Issued To Circular Subject of Issue No.

78-12 HPCI Turbine Control 6/30/78 All Holders of BWR OLs or cps Valve Lift Rod Bending for plants with HPCI Terry Turbine 78-13 Inoperability of Multiple 7/10/78 All Holders of Reactor OLs and cps S e rv ic e 1,'a t e r Pump s ex c e pt for plants located in: AL, AK, CA, FL, GA, IA, MS, SC 78-14 HPCI Turbine Revercing 7/12/78 All Holders of BWR OLs or cps for Chamber Hold Down Bolting plants with a HPCI Terry Turbine excepting Duane Arnold and Monticelle 78-15 Checkvalves Fail to 7/20/78 All Holders of Reactor OLs or cps Close In Vertical Position 78-16 Limitorque Valve 7/26/78 All Holders of Reacter OLs or Actuaters cps 78-17 Inadequate Guard Training /

10/13/78 All Holders of and applicants Qualification and Falsified for..wactor OLs Training Records 11/6/78 All Holders cf 78-18 UL Fire Test Reacter OLs er cps 78-19 Manual Dverride (bypass) 12/28/78 All Holdt of cps of Safety Actuation Signals 339 272

IE Circular No. 79-11 Enclosure June 27, 1979 Page 2 of 3 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Circular Subject Date of Issued to No.

Issue 79-01 Administration of 1/12/79 All Holders of Unauthorized Byproduct Licensees except Material to Humans Teletherapy Medical Licensees and each Radiopharmaceutical Suppliers 79-02 Failure of 120 Volt Vital 2/16/79 All Holders of AC Power Supplies Reactor OLs and cps 79-03 Inadequate Jaard Training-2/23/79 All Holders of Qualificatico and Falsified and applicants Training Records for Special Nuclear Material Licenses in Safeguards Group I 79-04 Loose Locking Nut on 3/16/79 All Holders of Limitorque Valve Reactor OLs or cps Operators 79-05 Moisture Leakage In 3/20/79 All Holders of Stranded Wire Conductors Reactor OLs or cps 79-06 Failure to Use Syringe 4/19/79 All Holders of and Battle Shields in Medical Licensees Nuclear Medicine except teletherap.

licensees 79-07 Unexpected Speed Increase 5/2/79 All Holders of of Reactor Recirculation BWR OL's or CP's MC Set Resulted in Reactor Power Increase 79-08 Attempted Extortion - Low 5/18/79 All Fuel Facilities Enriched Uranium Licensed by NRC 79-09 Occurrences of Split or 6/22/79 All Materials Punctured Regulator Diaphragms Priority I, Fuel In Certain Self Contained Cycle and Operating Breathing Apparatus Resctor Licensees

})h

e Enclosure IE Circtlar No. 79-11 Page 3 of 3 June 27, 1979 LISTINC OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IS LAST TVELVE MOSD{S Date of Issued to Circular Subject Issued No.

79-10 Pipefittings Manufactured 6/26/79 All Power Reactor Licensees with a from Unacceptable Material CP and/or OL 339 274