ML19242D911
| ML19242D911 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1979 |
| From: | Ross M METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908280852 | |
| Download: ML19242D911 (51) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
l NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION l
l 1!
In the Matter of:
i 2!
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3!
of '-
Michael J. Ross l
Supervisor of Operations 41 Si i
6l 7l 8l Trailer #203 9l NRC Investigation Site l
l TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plan':
1 01 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
May 19. 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13!
Julv 9, 1979 (Date Transcript Typeo) 14l l
226 15l (Tape Numcer(s))
16!
17 18.
19!
20!
21!
NRC PERSONNEL:
22j Tim riartin L
Dordin R. Hunter 23l William H. Foster 24 25 7W2M5?
'g uus mms
l l
l 1!
FOSTER:
The following interview is being conducted of Michael J. Ross.
I 2
Mr. Ross is Supervisor of Operations at Three Mile Island, Unit I.
The 3l present time is 1:05 p.m.
Today's date is May 19, 1979.
The place of the 4{
interview is Trailer 203 located immediately outside the South Gate of the 5
TMI site.
Individuals present for the interview are Tim Martin and Dorwin 6i R. Hunter.
Both Mr. Martin and Mr. Hunter are inspection specialists with 7l the offices of Inspection and Enforcement's Performance Appraisal Branch.
g My name is William H. Foster.
I am a senior inspector auditor with NRC's g
Office of Inspector and Auditor and I will be monitoring the interview.
10l:
Mr. Ross was previously interviewed as part of this investigation on April 7p 25, 1979.
At that time Mr. Ross signed the Advisement Document.
Mr. Ross 12 let me ask you again would you like a copy of the tape of this interview?
13
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ROSS:
Yes, I would.
15; FOSTER:
Fine.
At this point, I ill turn the interview over to Mr. Hunter
,6; 1
17;!
and Mr. Martin.
i 18!
HUNTER:
Okay.
Mike I'd like to cover a couple of general areas just to 19!
get started and get ourselves thinking back on the 28th of March again.
l this year.
We had in some interviews we picked up some information concern-21l i
ing the core... tank valves and it appears that early in the morning the 22!
core flood tank valves were closed.
The breakers had been.
which.
the 23l l
breakers are normally open and locked.
Early in the morning the breakers 241 had been.. the locks removed and the breakers closed and the core flood 25;
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tank valve was closed.
Were you are you aware of that condition existing i
2j either when you came to the plant that morning or during the day, do you 3j recall the core flood tank valves being reopened?
4!
5 ROSS:
No, I don't.
I remember discussions to let core flood tank valve...
I 6l or let the core flood tanks go in on top of the core later in the day.
7 That was somewhere around noon, I guess.
I don't recall shutting the 8
valves or the reason for doing that.
What time were they shut?
91 HUNTER:
Okay.
Mike, it was relatively early in the morning.
It would 10l 11l h ve been after 4:00 when the..., apparently when the pressure initially had come down.
12, The next question Mike is when you came on shift you actually came over from Unit I upon request from Bill Zewe?
141 a
correct 15 16' 17l HUNTER:
Do you recall looking at the core flood tank valves at that time as part of your catching up on information?
181 19i ROSS:
No, I really didn't.
There was an awful lot to be done at the time.
21l l
HUNTER:
Okay.
22l 23 ROSS: I did not specifically look at them.
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1 HUNTER:
All right.
Let us pick up another general item as we go along.
t 2f In the afternoon at approximately,..
after 12, 1300, there was a pressure i
31 spike in the containment.
Were you present and recall that particular 4
event?
i 5
6i ROSS:
Yes.
l 7
HUNTER:
Now can you give us your location at that time and what you recall g;
gf seeing or hearing or discussing at that time?
10' ROSS:
Yes.
11l I was near the console at that time and if we are talking I
about the same time was around 2:00, sometime in that area.
And at that time we got a an ES signal and some of the components restarted, decay 13 y
heat, what have you.
We got building isolation again and we took care of I
that and we looked back and the control room operator said "Jeese the spray 15; 16;l pumps are running" and we looked back at the charts at that time.
We saw a 17l fairly large spike on the chart and the exact pressure at this time I don't know,...it was around 30 pounds.
My thought at the time and Miller was out there with us and he questioned he said, "jeese you know I thought I heard something, too."
We are moving down the road there 100 miles an hour i
21l and we looked at it and we said "Jeese the spike was so short it must have i
been an instrument."
That was our reasoning at the time.
We reached over 22' and we said you can shut the spray pumps off now because the pressure came 23 right back to 0,.. almost very, very rapid return and we shut the spray 24!,
pumps off.
I now know the spray pumps were on about five minutes when 25; v i i. r, on.
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looking back because I did look back on that particular one.
I personaly 2
didn't associate it at the moment with any kind of explosion in the building.
I 3l I associ:sted it with an instrument problem perhaps and I think so did 4j Miller at the time because we just went on to something else.
It wasn't 5f until the next day that we thought about anything like that and started 6l looking back.
7 HUNTER:
Mike, apparently during this specific period of time, Bill Zewe 8
gj was directing Fred Scheimann to open the EMOV block valve and at that 10 instant Bill was watching the containmen+- pressure because that was the ll; controlling limit for opening the EMOV, watching building pressure, trying t
keep it below 4 pounds and let the cooling systems work.
When he saw 12 the building pressure spike, did he turn to you or how did you,..
did he 13 j
indicate to you that you had the spike or did you just pick it up?
15; i
j ROSS:
Well, the way we picked it up, we got ES actuation which isolated r
17;[
the building again.
At the time we did not have it.
i 181 HUNTER:
Right.
Okay.
19!
20!
l ROSS:
So everything, actually we knew we had something go up in pressure.
21j i
2.2l HUNTER:
Did you and Bill talk at that time about that?
I 24l 25l i
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5 If ROSS:
Pretty much the same type o' discussion that Gary and I had at the 2j time, Gary Miller.
We kind of wrote it off.
We said yeah, we had a spike, l
3 but it disappeared awful rapidly, probably was an instrument.
We just kind i
4 of went on.
You know, like I said we were going down the road 100 miles an 5'
hour.
Si 7l HUNTER:
By passing by the particular event of building sprays and the l
g spikes, was that something that you definitely would not expect in this plant or had never given any thought?
g I
10l j
ROSS:
Well, I had never seen this particular condition in a plant.
I don't think anybody has.
13)
HUNTER:
Did you, as you are in fact let's say, I want to ask you particu-g larly if during the use of the EMOV block valve specifically to control pressure earlier in the day around noon, then it was decided to depressurize, was there any discussion as far as any gases in the containment at that time or were your thoughts that you were venting steamed and no hydrogen or 18j was hydrogen ever mentioned?
19!
20; 21,l ROSS:
No.
The hydrogen really wasn't.
Our main line of thought at that time was to establish some sort of cooling.
That is what we were really concentrating on.
Our goal was to get some k;nd of cooling to the core, 23; preferably some kind of forced cooling.
Hydrogen?,Wwe never really thought 24 too much about to tell you the truth.
We thought when we open that valve 25!
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we are going to lower the pressure, perhaps let the core flood tanks come 2!
in and guarantee ourselves the core was covered here.
We were concerned I
3 the ccre wasn't covered.
You really don't have a lot of instrumentation to 4
look at.
WC knew we were injecting.
We knew that the cold legs were cold 5
and we knew the hot legs were hot, but there is no level instrument that 61 says hey, the core is covered.
So our concern at that time was one to get 7
down to get some kind of forced circulation on that particular core, perhaps 8
let the core flood tanks go in and verifying that it was covered.
That i
kind of was our thinking.
A hydrogen thought really never came to us, I g
101 don't think, until the next day or even a day later maybe before we really ig thought about it.
12l HUNTER:
Mike, was the intent to get the core flood tanks and additionally get decay heat on or was the thought to get the core flood tanks on and on the way to getting decay heat on?
I am trying to get a feel for..
was the 15:
original intent really to go to decay heat if you could, or actually..
g core floods were in the plan getting to decay heat? Or was the thought I
actually just to go down and get the core flood tanks on and 1ike then go 18I to decay heat in that order?
20j ROSS:
Well our thoughts in our discussions was one which would do both.
We had planned long term to end up on decay heat.
That's where we werc 22!
i headed and we thought on the way down we wanted to make sure we gave the 23L l
core a good shot of water and make sure it was in fact covered.
There was 241 some concern in our mind that maybe high pressure injection was not going 25; y
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1l through the core.
I feel it did go through the core based on the tempera-l 2
ture indications I have now seen and when we started the pump, but at that i
3 time we weren't sure it was all going to the core.
4!
5 HUNTER:
Mike, the difference in the flow path for core flood and high 6i pressure injection, is that a different flow path?
7 ROSS:
Yes, sir High pressure injection taps into the reactor coolant 8
pump discharge piping.
Core flood enters through a separate nozzle that is g
shared with the decay heat removal into the core directly.
10 11!
HUNTER:
Mike, Hunter speaking.
The core floods and the decay heat removal are..
would be your low pressure type injection system?
141 ROSS:
Yes, sir.
That is correct.
15, 16!
l HUNTER:
Another area that I would like, well, I'd like to start through 17j the events, and I hope that I am in order now so that as we go through, we 18!
will try to move from time 0 working our way through that first day and then I've keyed a couple issues that we could talk about.
Okay?
20l i
21('
ROSS:
Okay.
22 23 HUNTER:
In the morning when you came over there.
the comment previously 24 was that the EMOV indication on the control board which.
on the control 25i nr BUD J.
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board you have indication and you indicated that the valve itself indicated 2l shut and that you had looked at that at the time.
Would you go through the 3j indications again for me on what what you actually saw?
4!
Sj ROSS:
Well, what you have on the console, you have a light and a brilliant 6
light indicates it has a signal that will open the valve.
Okay, that light 7
was in fact in the "off" position.
That was the indication we saw.
So to l
gl us, even though that it is not an actual position indication it is a signal indication if you want to look at it from that standpoint.
To me it indi-g cated shut.
10 11!
HUNTER:
You indicated that the reactor coolant drain tank is on the control room board upright, but the indications and alarms are behind the control board around the corner from the operato.s and that they can't see that particular instrument, tanks, pumps and alarms.
It is my understanding 15'
- 16l, that if they get an alarm on that board that it will flash and sound.
They will hear the sound, but they would have an ennunciator that they couldn' t 17,:
clear or that they had an ennuciator that wasn't clear.
The way they know 18i that that board is in enunciation, then is that they would have to go around and see that that alarm was the one that they they weren't able l
to... that that was giving an alarm they would have to clear.
21t i
22!
ROSS:
That's correct.
And that same type of thing is also common in the 23l l
heating and ventilating panels which are around the back also.
24l 25!
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HUNIEP:
Okay.
Thank you Mike.
On your way into Unit 2 control room, what i
2; was your... did your path to enter the control room coming across from I
3j Unit 1 to Unit 2, did you pass that... through as behind that... behind the 4j control board or did you come through across the turbine floor or in another Sj direction?
I 6i ROSS:
7 I came from Unit 1 through the corridor and up the stairs ~ into the control room and I entered the eastmost door.
I came directly across..
I 8
g never passed....
Even if you did come in the other door you would have to
-t deliber tely kind of come around behind the panel to see that, but I didn't 10 ig take that path.
12!
HUNTER:
And that during that time frame you did not in fact go back and look at it?
14r l
15r i
ROSS:
Yes, sir.
I never did look at it.
16-l 17!
I HUNTER:
Okay.
There were some readings taken on the reactor coolant drain 18l tank, on the power operated and the relief valve discharge temperatures by 19!
a number of people, Ken Bryan was one, and he took readings that were in 20{
the range of 2000 and the readings that he took on the computer indicated 21l 22lj that they were fairly close, a few degrees apart, but nothing gross or nothing exceptional.
Do you recall a look here, or having those readings 23l reported to you or do you recall discussing that?
24l 25!
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!lj ROSS:
No.
I really don't.
Bill had said that about the time I got there 2l they had just closed the valve.
That Ken had looked at some readings and l
3f decided they ought to close the valve or close the block valve for the 4f valve really, and but he said it never indicated.
at that time he said 5
that it to me that it never to him indicated open, but evidently it was in 6i fact, open.
I 7
HUNTER:
8l Okay let me now try to clear up the jog job your memory a little gj bit.
Ken Bryan ended up going back to Unit 1.
10j i
11l ROSS:
Sometime later he did 12l HUNTER:
13 And Brian Mehler came in also, and Brian enaed up staying on Unit 2 and Ken ended up going on Unit 1.
i 15i 16l ROSS:
Right.
f 17l HUNTER:
Brian was also involved by the way in those temperatures, I want to make sure I don't want to --
l 20!
ROSS:
One time there was three guys.
Mehler was there, Bryan was there 21l; and as far as shift supervisors, Zewe was there.
They were all there at 22; one time.
23I 24j!
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f 11 If HUNTER:
Okay.
2:
3 ROSS:
At that time we I kind of decided that we kind of left Unit I hanging 4!
with a problem going so we ought tu have someone go back up.
So we sent 5
Brian back up in that he had the shift up there prior to this starting and l
6i he was most current on information.
71, HUNTER:
8 Did the readings... does readings on the power operated relief g
valve and the safety valve discharges in the range of 200 to 230 even as high as maybe 250? Was that unusual if you have a leaking valve?
10 11!
ROSS:
No, I don't think they're unusual if you have a leaking valve.
I I
think readings on the order of 2200 would indicate a leaking valve.
13!
14!
I HUNTER:
But not a valve that was discharging for instance.?
15' 16i ROSS:
That is correct.
17!
18; HUNTER:
The valve was apparently looked at that temperature and even 19t though they were above 200 in some cases.
By looking at the computer data, l
they finally ended up with, well Brian Mehler ended up, picking the tempera-21; tures off at a specific time.
I don't have any reason.:hy it changed right 22' f
now, but it was like 260 above the relief valve so he.
somebody said, 231 l
close the power failure relief valve, block valve and it was closed and it 241 l
turned out that was in fact the problem.
In the previous tape and I want 25i i
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to clarify something.
At the time the power operated relief valve, block 2f valve cas closed, okay, which occurs at 2.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in that range, do you i
3l recall the pressure transient or the events that occurred or the things 4j that you do recall seeing when the valve was closed?
5 Gl ROSS:
Yeah I basically just got there when that particular thing happened.
7 I was still trying to digest what was going on around me.
A pretty frigh-g tening sight walking into something like this.
I am sure you can understand.
g Right after it wat closed, Zewe turned around and said, "Geeze, that was it, the reactor 'uilding pressure is going down."
So he figured he had o
10 11,l f und where it was going at that time.
12l HUNTER:
Okay, do you recall looking at the reactor coolant pressure at 13 that time yourself or was.
.?
15f ROSS:
Yeah, it was when I first got there it was like ch, well, I don't know 1,300 or 1,400 pounds maybe in that area.
It was not high.
It was 17;!
not extremely low.
It was lower than we would like to see it, of course.
18t 19i HUNTER:
Okay.
And in your previous statement we had gone through you did 40 l
not note the steam generator primaries you were actually concentrating to 21(
the left side of the control board and you had discussions concerning 221 k
getting a reactor coolant pump started.
Can you characterize those discus-23 sions, the reason for getting the pump back on?
24j 25!
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ROSS:
Well, again I was looking for forced cooling any way we could get it 2
at the time.
And I think throughout the next couple hours we have...
3 admittedly this is kind of vague but.
We attempted to start various 4j reactor coolant pumps throughout the next period of time and throughout the Si day.we had worked on a reactor coolant pump interlocks the whole day.
We l
6i did get a pump started.
I now know it started.
There was some discussion 7
whether or not it was actually running at the time.
It was one of the B loop pumps.
The time, 7:00 or 7:15.
I don't know, but of course it ran at g
gj 100 amps.
10 HUNTER:
Okay, and we, infact, 1 coking at the pressure curve that for wide j
range pressure we, in fact, can in fact, key on to the point where the pump 19 started, and realize now that it was the 2B pump I think.
13!
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ROSS:
2B loop pump, that's it.
16:
HUNTER:
But you had at that time to start the A pumps first?
17l 18!
ROSS:
We were trying all along to start the pumps.
20; 21l HUNTER:
There is a point though on the pressure curve where you indicated that you were increasing and the chronology that you were increasing pressure 22l and still bleeding through the EMOV.
Was that the EMOV block valve?
From 23l here to here pressure is increasing, and the attempt was apparently to 24 increase pressure?
25i
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i ROSS:
The intent was to increase pressure as high as we could get.
We lj 2j were still trying to get a reactor coolant pump, trying to suction of the 3j pump.
That was what we were trying to do at the time.
4l i
5l HUNTER:
And let us go back and talk about the EMOV block valve a moment.
6 During this time a couple of things we need to touch on, was was the EMOV 7
bl ck valve the mechanism that you are using to open and close or to open 8
to maintain pressure and/or to bleed the reactor coolant system and high gj pressure injection flow to the reactor building? Were you actually going 10 through using tt:e EMOV for that purpose?
11l ROSS:
I believe it was shut.
i 13!
HUNTER:
Blocked like?
15 ROSS:
Yeah I think believe it was shut during the initial pressurization.
g Then we opened and then we had some control problem and that prompted us to go to electrcmatic relief control wnich is very coarse as you see there, 18f very coarse.
20!
l HUNTER:
All right let me ask you, the electromatic relief control and you 21; are saying electromatic.
Were you then using not the block.
the MOV l
block valve is a motor operated ialve that pull open, pull closed is not a 23l throttled.
It is just opc..ed and closed.
24j 25l B
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ROSS:
Yes, that is correct.
l 2
3 HUtiTER:
Now looking at the electromatic relief valve the EMOV, the R82 i
4i valve, did you use that during the day? Or was it still failed?
Si l
ROSS:
We actually opened and closed that during the day and used that 61 I
7 valve to my knowledge.
Now I could be wrong on that, but I'm almost positive g
that this whole period here that we were using.
9 HUNTER:
It was actually working?
10l t
11!
ROSS:
Lei me think on that a minute.
l 131 HUNTER:
I'm trying to 15.
ROSS:
I know what you are trying.
I am trying to remember it too, to tell you the truth.
17l i
18[
HUNTER:
Well, I guess the question comes back, was the RB2, the electro-matic relief valve actually failed in the open position and did it stay in 20j the open, or did it actuall become operable at some time?
21l t
22 ROSS:
And I'm not sure Dorwin to tell you the truth.
My recollection is 23!
I that we cycled that valve.
24 25!
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16 If HUNTER:
Do you know who was actually performing that activity?
2!
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ROSS:
Yeah.
3 l
4!
5l HUNTER:
As far cycling the valve on the panel was it like a Ed Fredrick i
Gi was on the panel?
Fred Scheimann was on the panel?
Bill Zewe, of course, 7
probably was close to the panel.
I 8!,
ROSS:
Close to the panel.
Bill didn't actually do any of the valve cycling, g
10l I d n't believe.
It would either have been Fred or Ed to my knowledge and i
77l tney would know which one they opened.
l 12!
MARTIN:
Could that be Don Olson?
13l 14:
15:
16 17,'
MARTIN:
Denny Olson?
l 18!
ROSS:
After 7:30 or so it could have been.
Yes, sir.
19!
20l MARTIN:
Maybe 1 can help jog your memory.
You were controlling pressure 22j in a fairly tight band initially at this pressure and it appears that near 23l the end of it we opened up the band.
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ROSS:
Right.
l 2!
MARTIN:
There was sonie overt decision made because of a possible concern 3
4 maybe that will help you.
1 5'
ROSS:
6 We were concerned that we were going to fail the valve we were using 7
and then have a real problem.
We would have no control.
8l MARTIN:
Which valve were you using?
g 10j!
i ROSS:
11!
I am saying that it is the electromatic relief valve.
12!
MARTIN:
Okay.
13i i
14 15l:
ROSS:
What do they say?
I never thought about it.
16:
HUNTER:
No.
We have had different 17j l
18i ROSS:
Admittedly I was looking, you know, to put in the proper perspective 19!
from a distance and I could not tell knowing where the controls are.
They 20!
are both within inches and I never really verified when a guy goes to 21 operate which one it was.
I assumed it was electromatic.
I never questioned 22 it to tell you the truth.
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MARTIN:
Tim Partin again.
To your knowledge was the pressurizer vent 2:
valve ever used?
3l ROSS:
The pressurizer vent valve was used.
4; MARTIN:
Do you know when in the sequence of events it was used?
Si 7
ROSS:
It was used early, but what time, I can't.
It was used, yes.
8 91 i
HUNTER:
Another question.
Hunter speaking Mike.
Was the spray valve used 10; to your knowledge for any purpose either during the day or without reactor coolant pumps realizing that the spray valve would maybe not have proviaed specific control as it did with the reactor coolant pump on, but was that 13i 14[.
tried at any time just to provide a flow path?
15i ROSS:
Yes, that was tried.
We discussed.. and timing is awful hard...
16, We discussed possibly getting a flow path somehow through that valve maybe 17 trying to get some circulation.
We were looking for any kind of thermal 18i circulation that we could get at the time.
20j 21:l Would you describe, Mike, the flow path of the spray valve, the HUNTER:
flow path that you were looking for?
23l i
ROSS:
This flow path is from the discharge of the reactor coolant pump to 24j the top of the pressurizer.
That's some of the discussions we had if we 25!
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get any kind of circulation at all in the loop it would help to break up l
2!
any voids we had and I don't remember what time that was on my part.
I 3f thought it was later in the day, and then earlier, and that's what we were 4j looking for anything we could get, get any kind of a path.
5!
6l HUNTER:
By opening the spray valve then what would the actual flow path i
7l be?
I 8l ROSS:
Discharge to the pump or even backwards.
It didn't make any difference g;
10t Discharge of the reactor coolant rump to the top of the pressurize".
to us.
11!
HUNTER:
And then out the powcr operated relief valve or the block valve?
g 13l Flow path through that?
14i 13; R0ss:
Okay, then we touched base already..
This is Hunter speaking again.
Initially, after the pressure at approximately 9:30 to 10.00, the 6
I pressure was in fact increased to a band of around 2,000 to 2,100 pounds.
17l I
The pressure band was, in fact, fairly tight.
The fellows were maintaining 18i like 2,000, 2,100 and then later on the pressure band was expanc'ed to say cycling the valve whichever valve it was.
Okay?
At this time with the 20j pressure, the cycling of the valve was very apparent.
Does the cycling of 21;;
the valve indicate that high pressure injection flow was in fact substantial i
22!
during this period of time?
24 25l
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20 1.
ROSS:
Well, I would like to think it does.
Yes.
2l i
3l HUNTER:
Do you recall high pressure injection flow during this particular 4
peri d of tine?
i SI 6
ROSS:
Yes.
High pressure injection flow was never purposcly secured at 7ll all throughout this day for more than..
there was a discussion point of a gl couple of minutes where it may have been off, but throughout the rest of gj the day, Miller would not allow it to be secured.
i 10!
HUNTER:
Mike can you go back to the earlier morning and characterizo the thoughts about high pressure injection in the time franie of when you came into the control room approximately, 7:00, 6:30 you came to Unit 1 and at 13
]
6:30 they called you.
So around 6:45 or so in that range.
You were in the control rocm and you were getting the status.
What was the posture at that time in relating to high pressure injection?
17' ROSS:
Well after I come in as I previously stated, I was not real sure what high pressure injection was, but I did see some things on a source
,9 f J.
range that bothered me.
Things that bothered me was that counts were a lot j
higher than they should have been.
And I asked Zewe about emergency bora-21j tion and he said, " yeah, he was," and I asked him was he injecting and he i
22l l
said, " yeah, he was," and I looked up they were in fact injecting.
Now 23!
I there was movement on the panel at the same time.
I can't guarantee that 24) they didn't just start, but I think they started boration pnnpu at tr,e same 25:
time.
J m m I
t
{
21 1
HUNTER:
You indicated 2:
I ROSS:
Boration 3l 4:
5 HUNTER:
Right.
Okay.
Hunter.
Ucu indicated earlier they looked like 1
6j about 200 gallons per leg at the time.
7 ROSS.
8l Right and then shortly thereafter tney cut back some.
9li 10f HUNTER:
All right 200 gallons per leg and that would be for four legs is 4
11l that true?
12!
ROSS:
Right.
13i 14!
15 16' ROSS:
Yes, sir.
18!
HUNTER:
Okay.
What was the positive force throttling back? Would whould they throttle back to a specific number or a general amount of high pressure 20' injection?
i 22l RCSS:
Well, there is no specific number.
Okay, at that time we didn't 23l know how much high pressure injection we needed.
The intent, the point 24!
there was to keep from taking the plant up all the way through the code 25 c.
7 o t_,
cm iO s
i
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22 I
f l!
safety valves, so, they would have some high pressure injection all the i
2!
time.
Later on we did discuss, I don't know if we've told you exactly how I
3l the discussions were held, but most of our discussions were held in the i
4j shift supervisor's office and closed rooms so we didn't have any noise.
We 5
discussed whether or not we wanted to pump water through the code safeties.
I 6l At that time we decided it wouldn't really benefit us and we weren't real, 7l real sure how the code safeties would respond to water through them or how gj they would remain after we put water through them.
So, at that point we g'
decided we wouldn't purposely, at this time, put water through them.
B&W 10f w s advised and by that time they were onsite.
lli HUNTER:
Mike? At that time did you fellows establish a minimum amount of high pressure i.,jection that you would accept at all times? Gary's decision..
13 gf hare a note that the decision was based on some fact.
Do you recall what a was?
15 16:
NOSS:
Yeah, he..
our guidelines is a point... there was... we were trying to keep some high pressure injection going all the time and we gave him a 18!
number of around 400 gallons with a minimum of 4 to 6 and where that number came from we don't know.
Later on in the day, we did get a numbers from 20!
B&W says keep the 400 gallons on.
We did not have that number that early 21l in the morning.
22lI 23j l
HUNTER:
But are... is it your understanding that they maintair.ed in this 24I 25li range of 100 gailons per minute per leg or if it they have one pump on, the pump will put out 500 gallons a minute.
t o r.
2[L j UcJ
i l
l 23 If ROSS:
That's that's correct.
7l l
3l HUNTER:
But if what would your impression be for injection if they had one 4
pump on?
5 6l RUSS.
Well, we initially started out injectin9 all high pressure injection legs.
Later cn in the day we discussed whether or not we were shor. circling 7
g some of the high pressure injection.
Our concern being that maybe we were gj going back through the letdown line, maybe we had a leak in a letdown line, y u know..
unknown.
We wanted to ensure that the injection was going 10 through the core.
At that time we started to inject just two legs at a I
higher flow rate.
That is what I remember.
12j 13 HUNTER:
Thanks, but the with the total flow would it be equal to that 14t which you are injecting previous to that one?
15; 16:
ROSS:
Yes, sir.
17!
s 18[
HUNTER:
Okay.
There is a comment that.
changing the subject a little 19!
bit at this time... that still.
sometimes the time sequence..
I think 20j i
your comment earlier Mike was that when you came in and during this time 21!
period basically you really weren't steaming much out cf tne A steam gener-22!
I ator.
In other words you really seren't having to feed the generator.
You 23j really weren't steaming.
Decay heat wasn't being released througn that 24 path.
If I recall your.
25r t
VOJ L V i
(
24 1!
ROSS:
Yeah, I thought it was.
2!
i 3l HUNTER:
But, okay that was your feeling?
I 4!,
5l ROSS:
Yeah.
I 6i i
7 HUNTER:
During this time also, you comment that you had lost the auxiliary g
boilers and lost vacuum.
Can you recall in the time frame... apparently gj they had lost the auxiliary boilers and lost the vacuum on Unit 2, once, 10f maybe twice.
Can you.. do you recall that particular sequence of how many 11l times you had problems with vacuums, for instance?
I 12!
ROSS:
Well, we had problems with boilers on and off.
Okay, early in the 13y morning we didn't have boilers at all and some time before noon, we actually broke vacuum or much before noon probably 10:00.
I don't know.
We broke 15 a
vacuum on Unit 2.
We actually secured seals and what have you.
There 10:
was no way of maintaining a vacuum because we could not get sealant steam ver from Unit 1.
At that time our removal path would have been steaming 18:
the A generator directly to the atmosphere.
There was some concern about that and we did take some samples and some monitoring up there.
And later l
on we were ordered to close that particular path off for fear that maybe we 21!
were putting something out although we knew the A generator was intact by 22j then and we kr.ew that whatever we were putting out of the atmospheric dump on the A side was in fact clean steam, and not contaminated or radioactive.
3 24 We knew that from the samples up there and frcm flyovers up there.
25;
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25 I
i 1!
HUNTER:
Do you recall then when you regained the vacuum back?
i 2!
3l ROSS:
Well, Gary left for the Governor's Office and one of the last things he told me prior to leaving was not to open the atmospheric relief valve 4j 5'
any more.
Which I did and so with not being able to open it we pursued 6i rapidly getting a vacuums.
So sometime in that area we reestablished the 7j vacuum from Unit l's auxiliary boilers.
Then we went back steam in the g
condenser shortly thereafter with the A generator, ker. ping the B generator gj bottled up.
10 HUNTER:
Okay.
We would like to get your comment in an area that B&W was... in the person I believe Rodgers who was in actually, there early in the morning and was a member of your group in the shift supervisor's office...
14l.
You indicated that you were, in fact, receiving advice or including him in the decisions.
Do you recall the advice path that was the advice that you were taking through Lee Rodgers or do you recall who Lee was actually in 16;.
contact with or was he in contact with anyone?
17!
18!
l ROSS:
Lee did talk personally I think maybe once, but normally he was not 19!
at the black phone talking to S&W.
I am not sure who he had talking to B&W either John Flint or Greig Shadell one of the two guys that probably communicate with S&W.
He was trying to get the phone and he did establish 22l l
phone communication with them sometime that morning.
Time unknown.
23l 241 i
25!
?
c-
?
t
l.
26 1!
HUNTER:
There was a decision and again a group decision to go from a high i
6 2
pressure to a low pressure condition as we discussed.
That you indicated i
3l was a difficult decision and B&W was involved, they had all kinds of people 4j helping it.
Can you characterize that decision and give us an idea of the 5
things that you fellows were concerned about and what made it difficult?
l 6l 7
ROSS:
Well, it was e,ificult in our mind that, one, we were purposely 8
g ing to let an awful lot of steam to be produced in boiling,...
We, you gl know, we had to do some boiling at the time.
Maybe that is good ano maybe that is bad.
It is particular where you are sitting I guess.
We knew we 10 11!
were going to dump a lot of something to the reactor building.
The reason i
12f we felt at least I felt that that was the path to go at the time, was based 13l n a couple of things.
One, we were running out of water in BWST and we hadn't gained an inch.
I mean we hadn't gained any headway in where we were y ng g
ur q a eing ne estaMish some mode of cooling a 15 g
reliable mode of cooling to the core.
Two, we, at least I wasn't sure that we purposely or we in fact had the core covered and all high pressure
(
injection was going through the core.
I was not totally convinced.
I 18(
didn't have anything to tell me.
Hey, high pressure injection is in fact 191 going through the core.
So based on that, we discus.ed going down with the 21;!
goal being one, to let the core flood tanks come in ;ad verify that yeah, 22j the reactor was in fact covered, two, give it a drink of water.
That is a l
little coarse I know, but give it a drink of water if it wasn't getting it, 23j l
and maybe go on decay heat removal which is a forced mode of cooling.
That 24l is what we were trying to do at that time.
2 51,
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27 1!
HUNTER:
The decision being difficult.
Was there.
was it a heated discus-2 sion?
3i 4l ROSS:
No.
I --
5 HUNTER:
6 Very well, I don't....I'm not looking for any arguments or anything,
,7 I understand, was it very completely batted around, everybody involved?
l 8!
kOSS:
Yes it was batted around, in fact there were NRC people in the room g
ur ng s dscussion.
10 11l I
FUNTER:
Do you recall the fellows who were there at that particular time.
i 13l ROSS:
They just kinda of drifted in and out throug-the day.
You know the 14 faces, but I think Jim Higgins was there and...,
I don't know all the fellows, I do know our normal team, I'm pretty sure Jim was there or running 16,:
around at that time.
17l t
18!
HUNTER:
Alright, Mike.
In this time frame was there discussions.
the pressure was high, it was solid, the system was somewhat.. indicated j
solid, at least you were having to control pressure, meaning that you 21l probably had an adequate amount inventory back in the coolant system, you 22l l
had charged an enormous amount of water back in there.
Was there discussions 23i during this time for starting the reactor coolant pumo? Do you recall any 24j discussions like that, or was it considered I guess is what I'm trying to 25j say?
~-
L;;
L-
a 28 1,
ROSS:
Yes it was considered, and there were negotiations going on as to 2,
what pump to start... all day we talked about pumps and at interlocks and 3l things.
Then we talked to B&W about what pump would be best to start and
!{
we finally did get one.
l 5!
l 6
HUNTER:
There is two ways to have forced cooling right?
Latter on in the i
7 evening, of course the pump lost away then to.
What about in this time 1
81 frama when you also had pressure.
there is a significant difference...
I g-and I think with it there's no problem.
the difference is in this case 10j y u are having to control primary system pressure and temperature with the igj r.cwer operated relief valve.
It makes it apparent that you in fact have no natural connection astablished for the steam generator because you could not use the steam generator to control the saturation temperature and pressure.
At this time it became obvious that the A generator in fact was doing its job to some degree.
5 16i I
ROSS:
It became obvious slightly before that time, we saw indications that 17l we were in fact getting some temperature change across the loops.
19 HUNTER:
Ok,I,..
{,o ahead just a second.
Let me pursue this one step further, I think.. don't want to leave you either, but what I'm interested 21j
[
in is that your indication was that you had in fact started the pump, 22' bumped the pump, and then there seemed to be a continuing effort to get the pumps on, out in here you were sitting at a condition that you might have 24l been able to start a pump, but what was the problem with the pumps, was it 25!
- T D
k h k) j
[ _.
m t
29 the interlocks or did somebody indicate that you really had rather go to core flood and decay heat rather than trying start the reactor coolant pumps.
4i Sli ROSS:
I think our at least my feelings were and I never pursued, it...
we l
had pursued it with B&W to get pumps ready to run but at that point we 61 h
l still had no indication that we had any water on the loops.
T hadn't 71 c
l changed, T had not done anything.
I'm saying that there was no real 8'
indication to us that its loops were filled and I don't think that they 9l
[
were full at that time.
10 lli HUNTER:
An then are you saying that the overall discussion at that time 12 l
would have been to act start a pump or go to decay heat rather than start a 13l l
pump?
14!
15; l
ROSS:
Yes, at that particular time I would say the reason, at least I 16 l
fel t, you know, there was a lot of people involved and a lot of people 17!
thinking different things, six to eight people involved.. what I thought 18l triggered me that the next step was a reactor coolant pump was the fact l~o ;
j that they all had seen temperature change in the loop, now I know it had 20!
water in that loop at least some kind of circulation in that loop, at least pumping, I could make it start pumping and that happen somewhere down the 22lI stream after we lowered the pressure and we did in fact see a temperature 23l change.
24i 25!
^~
,t,;
} }
r I
30 1!
FOSTER:
Let's take a break and change the tape, the time is 1:49 pm.
2' 3
FOSTER:
This is Foster were going to continue with the interview of Mr. Ross, 4l the time is 1:57 p.m.
i 5l l
Gl HUNTER:
Okay, Mike we had discussed the decision to depressurize and go on 7
core flood and decay heat as a forced, as a core flood to put water into g
the core to assure that the core had water and the decay heat to provide a gj forced cooling mechanism.
Okay.
During the time period that we had depres-10f surized to a 1cwer pressure and we were sitting at 500 lbs in the afternoon i
11l and you were apparently alternating the water through two legs and then l
through the other two legs in an attempt to vary the core flow, the flowpath 12{
13j through the core from the high pressure injection system.
Was there any y
other reasons that you are aware of that you were actually alternating the legs?
15 16:
ROSS:
One time we got indication that yeah, we were in fact lowering the g
temperature on T and raising the temperature on T.
The thoughts then it h
c would do the same thing with the other loop.
That was later in the after-noon.
That would be the only reason to change our mode of what we were 40 21l doing.
We did in fact keep high pressure injection going throughout all times even though we alternated legs.
The idea of being we were removing 22j 23j the steam, we were putting water in the core and our hopes being that yeah, 24; it was in fact going through the core.
I still feel it did go through the l
core based on the temperatures of the loops and the reactor when we started 25!
.--J
f 31 1,
the pumps up.
Till this day I still figure most of the flow or a good 2
percentage of the injection flow did in fact go through the core.
I based 3
that on the fact of wqat the T temperature was when we started to pump.
c 4
5l HUNTER:
Okay.
Later in the afternoon Mike, you had set on core flood you I
6i were not able to get down decay heat apparently.
Would you,..
can you 7
clarify your meetings, discussion and the reason that you fellows, decided g
then you would have to depressurize rather than go on decay heat?
9I ROSS:
10 We were discussing repressurization based on the fact that now we g
did see some temperature change and the goal all day was to get a forced i
mechanism flow and those discussions were never finished before Mr. Herbein call us and told us to take it solid.
That helped that decision a lot, 13 i]
made it easier and we started to take her solid.
f 15:
16:
talked to you specifically since you were his operations representative.
17!
Can you char:.cterize what Gary,... the order or the discussion that Gary 18(
gave to you concerning going back to the solid?
20!
ROSS:
Gary told me quite simply take it solid.
He said Jack wanted it 21l j
I' solid and he wanted it now.
Please to do it.
So I did it.
22
?
23 HUNTER:
At this time you indicated two makeup pumps, taximum high pressure
+
24{
injection and taking the system back solid.
Again my understanding through-25!
/ (i 7 Lj d )
L' r
=
5
lj out the afternoon is that the high pressure injection system had... the 2!
high pressue injection flow had been maintained.
Do you fellows at that 3
time feel like you were cooling the core or were you still attempting to 41 get down to the decay heat removal system?
Si l
61 ROSS:
Well, I think then as I saw the temperature, I felt that we were in 7
fact cooling the core.
I think our discussion was cut short by Jack's 8j order to take the plant solid, really is what happened there.
I believe gl that our goal wculd have been the same as his in the end, to go back based i
10 n that and take her solid and start a pump, based on the fact that it 11j lo ked like we had something going through the loops now.
12:
HUNTER:
13 Did you in fact, were you in fact, able to get down to a pressure 14 where you might consider going on decay heat?
l 15; ROSS:
16l No I,.. we had discussed making a mad dash and trying to open v lves but we felt that it wt. really irresponsible maybe to do that, the 17 p ssibility of lifting a relief valve or doing something other and put us 18 in a worst condition.
g Decay heat pressure has to be less than 400 lbs, you know were talking like a 340, 350 lbs, we never really got below 4r0 lbs I don't think.
22l l
HUNTER:
Mike, we, through the interviews we,.
it was revealed that 23[
[
someone went down and opened up, closed a electrical breaker, the electrical 24!
breaker on.
Carl Defley went down and closed the electrical breaker on the
- (,
o,-
b
.2 u J i
.j I
33 i
1!
decay heat suction I think, DH108 valve or whatever the number it is, were i
2{
you.. do you recall him being directed to do that?
3 ROSS:
We had directed people to make sure that if we got down to decay i
S heat we did in fact have everything powered and everything ready to go.
So 6l it could have been out of a result of that.
Their thoughts being, you 7j know, you get down there in decay heat and you are ready to go and now a l
gj
- Tlve won' t open because the breaker is open so..
I 9l HUNTER:
I'm going to get you some.
the interviews revealed that Carl 10 11 went down there 9:00 in the morning, it was early, and that ne in fact ended up contaminated, not because he walked in water, but he indicated I
that he was in a 1R field and closed the breaker and he left, he wasn't 13l there ten minutes, he indicated he only received like 60 mR on his pencil 13l reading dosimeter.
The thoughts were that early in the morning to go on decay heat or align so it would be
...?
17,l ROSS:
Orr thoughts were to make sure the decay heat would work, I believe 181 that early in the morning I don't remember it at 9:00, but the thoughts were thac the.
we are going to need this system lets make sure its ready.
21;l That was a least our thinking along those lines.
i 22 HUNTER:
Okay.
Lets talk about,... Ken you have any comments you'll like 23 to cover, I'll like to go to letdown flow, I'd like to go to the letdown 24!
flow system, if you have any question you'd like to cet involved with 25j i
first?
t' l-
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a I
34 i
ilj MARTIN:
Tim Martin might?
I understa"d that you weren't in the Control i
2!
Room till about 6:30, 6:45, but...
m r
4 ROSS:
-I'm not sure of the exact time.
Sj 6
MARTIN:
You might be aware of some discussions or explanations of things 7
that occurred prior to that time, specifically I'm interested in what was g
done after tripping the last reactor cooling pump in the loop at approxi-gj mately 100 minutes into the event?
I'm trying to find out why pressure 10 dropped very drastically at that point.
Do you have any ideas?
11l 1
ROSS:
Not at all, couldn't even begin to come up with a postulation.
12 13 MARTIN:
After you arrived, a pump was started, I believe in the B-loop, it 14; i
15; was run for approximately 19 minutes and curing this period we went to the site emergency and we had all sorts of radiation alarms.
I think we did a 16l lot of things but at the end of that time we tripped that reactor coolant pump.
What actions were taken?
Do you remember any specific actions that g
19:
were taken when the reactor coolant pump was tripped around 7:13, 7:14 in
" "9 20:
21l ROSS:
Specific actions?
None to specific we had quite a discussion worrying about whether the pump actually ran.
First of all the discussion, some people said the pump didn't run, and we were pretty well convinced that it 24i i
pumped steam, I think.
At that point, we decided to keep injection going 25
,ot vuJ i
(
35 l
i 1!
and increase pressure and try to cool through the high pressure injection l;;
mode.
It was kind of our goal line, I really don't know what your looking 3l for... I don't remember anything specifically.
4l Sj MARTIN:
During the next three hours pressure shows the general downward i
6 trend until the decision was made to repressurize and go on the EMOVs.
Do 7l y u remember any activities that occcured during that period of time, from 8
the time the reactor coolant pump was tripped, until you decided to pressur-gj ize and operate off the some vent mechanism?
10l fg ROSS:
There was a lot of things about generator level, during that time we were trying to get some sort of actually circulation, I think we had changed generator levels a couple of times, we've gone to 95%.
We pretty much 13 y
tried everything on the secondary side to get something going for us.
On the primary side I con't remember anything specific other than letdown.
16; MARTIN:
Another period of time which is of interest to us is after the 1,/ :
i reactor building spray pumps started.
There is a period of a very general 18l increase in pressure until the decision was made to take the plant and 1
19!
start a reactor coolant pumo.
Can you give me an explanation of what was 20!
I occurring during that period of time?
21l 22f I
ROSS:
No, I really can't.
We had talked about core flood tank pressur::s 23j l
during that time.
We had talked about even the possibility of increasing 24j
- hose pressures slightly.
Then we decided that maybe that wasn't the best, 25I i
,O d
e..>
f I
36 i
i i
1!
the total best thing and that you could possibly get nitrogen into the 2:
system.
We had discussed with C&W whether or not we ought to increase core l
3 flood tank pressure all day; but you did triqqar something there.
I do I
4 remember something.
We had +aiked about increased nitrogen pressure back Sj some point in between there, and I don't know exactly why right now, to I
6i tell you the truth sitting here, but we had talked about it and talked with i
7 B&W.
8 MARTIN:
Was this for the purpose of possibly causing more core flood tank 7
10j injection?
l 11 ROSS:
Yeah.
12!
Some of the thoughts were to insure that we kept good, we h d to keep water going in.
We knew the core, at least we felt the core 13 was totally covered.
So then we felt we couldn't be in too bad of shape as r as uncovering of core.
We sd ll fe u se had to cool h, but keep it 15 Covered While we were cooling it.
i 17l i
MARTIN:
Follcwing the decision to depressurize, at around noon, you droppea 18; 19f down and pressure finally bottcms out, on this chart slightly under 500.
We believe this is a little high.
It probably is ar: und 450.
21!
j ROSS:
It probably is.
22, 23 MARTIN:
An hour later, pressure has been fairly stable, we're told that 24; the EMOV, the electromatic relief valve, was opened.
Do you know why it 25j f
I r
j l
i I
[
37 1l would be opened at that point? Are we now trying to get down on.o ecay 2i heat; is that the attempt here?
3 4
ROSS:
Well, the way we got all the way down, was by opening a release path 5
on out.
61 7
MARTIN:
We've been sitting now for at least thirty minutes though with l
g pressure fairly stable.
The fact that the EMOV could be opened if it had g
to be shut at that point.
So we've made another overt decision.
Are we 10i trying to do something different, are we trying to make this quick run down 11j to decay heat?
Is that the potential--is that what we are doing?
12!
13 I'm not sure exactly what that is, Tim.
We always had the goal at ROSS:
gi one time to get on decay heat.
That didn't change.
I'm not aware of any ng ere.
e may have pened vent on a pressurizer to try to 15 g
depressurize, but I'm not sure of that.
I don't have any recollection of that.
17l I
18{
MARTIN:
Let me not deceive you.
As you recognize, reactor pressure is a g;
gauge device.
This happens to also correspond to the increased pressure in the primary system or in the reactor building.
If you measure that spike, it exactly corresponds to what the reactor building did in the opposite 22l direction.
So this is simply the gauge reflection of that device.
But we 23l also have reports that the EMOV was operated at that point.
24j 25i o
[',,
d t
~
38 1
ROSS:
I don't have any recollection.
I'm sorry.
I wouldn't know what 2l that would be.
I 31 1
4l MARTIN:
What widely used T instrumentation do you have available to you h
5l normally in that control room?
Gi 7
ROSS:
Wide range T --really none.
When you say wide range T ' '
h h
8 g
MARTIN:
Is there not a multipoint recorder on the back panel that goes all 10j the way up to 800, and did anyone ever try to use that to see where T h
11l went when, in fact, the local recorder went off-scale?
12; ROSS:
13 I don't have any recollection of every looking at that.
We did have Ivan Porter in.
I rtported looking at alternate instrument modes.
I don't g
15; remember him looling at that either.
16 MARTIN:
At any time during this event, did anyone examine a steam tables?
I 181 ROSS:
Yes.
Steam tables are placed on the table--at times hard to recog-g nize--but they laid on the CRO's desk on and off, and what time we put them out I don't know.
We did get steam tables.
22ll MARTIN:
23l At any time did the information from the steam tables become part of the decisions that were being made?
2g 25i h
39 i
l lli ROSS:
Yeah.
But I don't think that happened until some time later.
Once I
g!
we pressurized up and we looked at some other things, we actually used them l
31 to determine what we were going to do with the parts pressurizer level
)
4j later on in the night.
I don't recollect we looked at temperatures vs.
I SI pressures.
That was discussed and we knew tha+ we'd have to have an awful l
6' lot of pressure to fill everything back up based on what temperatures we I
felt we had at that time.
They were discussed.
Lee Rogers had looked at 7
them and he kicked them around.
I can't put a finger ma k on the time.
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9l I
MARTIN:
Do you know maybe a reason why the control room ventilation would 10 not shift automatically to a recirc mode on high radiation level, high in particulate?
g 13l i
ROSS:
High particulate?
No, I don't know of any reason why not.
154 u
n ac, s au m cally?
16; 17l 18r
- --~ROSS:I'd have to look.
My recollection is that once you do get on it, it will, in fact, do it totally automatic on Unit 2.
19!
20!
MARTIN:
We believe that the system had to be put in manual.
Did anyone 21i I
verify when people were forced into respirators, that the system, did in 22l fact, trigger into a recirc mode, and if it did, how did the high activity come to exist in that control room?
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ROSS:
That I'm not sure of, and yeah, as soon as we had to go into masks, l
2!
the ventilation system was checked.
One of the shift foreman was sent to i
31 check that.
I'm not sure right now who that was, but someone was sent.
We i
4; were told that she was in full recirc.
The only thing we could figure is 5
possibly just due to some air exchange--maybe pumping something in from the l
Gl turbine building.
We then later dropped the turbine building ventilation I
7 to help with that problem.
We thought maybe the turbine building we gi sucking air in, and we had a zero outside wind speed, so air we were putting g
out was virtually on top of us.
We felt maybe we were sucking it right 10l back in our turbine building ventilation and getting some exchange possibly.
l 11!
Iy MARTIN:
At approximately 2:30, Mr. Miller, Mr. Herbein, Mr. Kunder went to the Governor's Office and who was in charge at that time?
13 14!
e gan is the superintendent He shou W have been in charge.
He 15 was in Charge at that time.
I 17!
MARTIN:
Who was in charge of cperations in the plant?
18l 19i ROSS:
I still ought to be there.
I was still there.
21l MARTIN:
Okay.
Did you receive any communication, approximately 4:00, 22f I
while these gentlemen were still gone from Mr. Hitz, who was in Unit 1 23!
control room at the time, relative to an NRC concern that the T, RTDs, the 24f h
in-core thermacouples, could, in fact, be correct that they indicated a 25l super-heat condition
'd that there was need to get the core recovered.
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ROSS:
No.
I recollect nothing on that.
I 2l l
3l MARTIN:
Who would have received that communication over the so-called hot-l 4l line.
If I remember correctly, it's a multi-colored phone, black and 5
white, or something like that?
6i 7
ROSS:
Well, it could have been either a shift foreman, a shift supervisor 8
or one of the control room operators.
They would be the only ones, normally, oj who would answer that particular phone, normally.
~i 10l n
MARTIN:
Do you remember anyone utilizing that phone around 1600 that day?
i 12!
ROSS:
No.
It was used on and off all day.
13 I
14!
HUNTER:
15i You had mentioned earlier that the high pressure injection flow had been dictated by Gary Miller to be maintained.
Your comment earlier, I 16 think, was that later on some word came from B&W or somewhere to maintain g
400 gallons per minute or greater.
Where did you get that information g
I from?
191 20' ROSS:
I'm not sure.
That information kind of showed up.
You know how things were, but we were told that there was,..
at least I heard that said 22l and I don't even knew where it came frem,.
400 gallons was the minimum in 23!
24,l the cooling pump.
25
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42 i
l 1l HUNTER:
Mike, during the daytime, Ivan Porter was in, I think the inter-i 2!
views have shown at this time that Ivan was looking at some RTD data, I
resistance, and showing temperatures in the range of 725, 700.
Also, if my 4
understanding is correct, that John Flynt was thcre and Ivan Porter was 5
looking at some thermocouple data also.
6i 7
ROSS:
John Flynt was there.
I know Ivan was looking at some data--exactly gj what he was looking at for John Flynt, I'm not sure.
1 9
HUNTER:
Okay.
Do you recall in the discussions, think tank discussions, 10f 11l that the thermocouple temperatures were, in fact, brought up in the discus-I sions?
13lj ROSS:
Thermocouple temperatures were brought up to Gary Miller, and I guess n e bottom line 2ey got out of Qat, was dat eiey were not conclu-15 sive.
It showed the core was hot, basically.
I was going to say his range varied, very scattered.
He had like.
He was saying ie had various g
temperatures scattered throughout.
So, well, Gary and he discussed it, and basically I think the bottom line was yeah, the core is hot, or it is at 19!
I least hot.
20i 21l
,j HUNTER:
Okay.
Can you give me a rundown of your understanding of the 42 natural circulation requirements on the B&W once througn generators? What I
are the recuirements to establish natural circulation?
24!
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ROSS:
Well, c far as requirements, we have a setpoint already programmed 2
into our control systems that takes the steam generator levels to 50% in 3
both units in loss of reactor coolant pumps; so our training had indicated 4
that a man should have 50% le nt to go into natural circulation.
As far as Sj whether or not you can get natural circulation with a void in the primary l
Gi system, in honest, I don't think we've ever really sat down and discussed 7
that problem in great detail.
I don't think anybody in the industry has.
8 HUNTER:
Mike, in a number of procedures, there is a minimum temperature g
10f and pressurizatior, curve, and it has a number of points on it.
Part of it i'
11 is the buildup :n transition temperature pressure relationship; also, it 12l has a saturation pump operability curve.
Did you fellows have that out 13 during the daytime during the, in the think tank or were you looking at i
14; that particular MPT curve?
t 15 ROSS:
We 1 ked at it later in the day.
During the early part of the day, 16f the control room operators had it on constantly.
Specific discussions on I
that were later in the day as I remember.
We talked about the possibility 18!
of possibly being outside of that curve later on.
191 20l HUNTER:
Okay, Mike.
I'd like to clarify a couple of things concerning letdown flow.
We discussed this earlier and one of the comments is that 22l l
early in the morning the letdown flow became low and you started having 23{
i problems with it.
One of the things that you commented on is that you had 24!
isolated the letdown flow and had noted the relief valve lifting flow 25l r o; U (1 J V
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1l spikes and also noted water being dumped into the bleed tanks, so that you 2!
apparently were fairly certain that you were getting water down to the 1
3 relief valve at that point.
You indicate isolating letdown flow.
Would 4f that have been a manual operation--do you recall?
5l Gi ROSS:
Well, letdown flow can be isolated automatically on building pressure--
7 the major valves--but the valves that were shut later on during the day 8!
were manual valves like the inlet demineralizers, that type of thing.
i 9i HUNTER:
Okay.
Isolating the letdown flow downstream of the relief valve 10 11 in your system, would appear to be a manual operation..
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12!
ROSS:
It is a manual operation.
13 14!
j FUNTER:
Would I understand that the isolation that occurred at that time O* #*
16:
17 ROSS:
It would have been manual from the control room-pushbutton.
18(
19i HUNTER:
Which valve woula you have then closed?
21i ROSS:
It should be the inlet to the demineralizers.
22 l
23l HUNTER:
Okay.
The inlet to the demineralizers being closed now to replace 24:,
25:f the relief valve on the reactor cooling system, basically with the orifice l
opened or the bypass opened.
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ROSS:
Yes.
I 2l 3l HUNTER:
And you,... and at that time it was letdown flow you recall actually I
4 on zero and was moving off zero?
Si I
6 ROSS:
Yeah.
Letdown flow was one of our problems throughout the day.
We 7l had indication, then we didn't have indication, then we pulsating indication g
after being isolated.
Yeah, we saw some indication throughout the day of it.
gj 10f i
HUNTER:
Alright.
Let me go one step further, Mike.
You indicated that you saw pulsating flow.
Was the pulsating flow then after you reopened the demineralizers, and had a flow path down through the first set of filters 14;;
through a demineralizer, and was the flow path through the makeup filters and into the makeup tank? Would yot recall.. Allow me to continue.
15 16.'
During the day you, in fact, bypassed the system.
Can you clarify what you 1
actually bypassed?
There's a bypass totally around the demineralizers.
17,;
There's a bypass around the filters and do you not have two sets of filters 18i like an inlet to the demineralizers and then also the makeup filters.
Do 19I you recall which of these you bypassed?
21i ROSS:
Well, we tried to establish letdown flow by bypass.
There was some 22l confusion there because all these valves have remote operators on them.
23l There was some question about whether c. not the valves had actually opened.
24'!
Some thought being that the remote, when I say remote operators, a handle 25!
I going through a shicided wall.
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HUNTER:
Excuse me.
Hunter speaking.
Question whether or not the valves i
2j had opened to bypass the filter or the...
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4j ROSS:
Yes.
5!
l 6j HUNTER:
Okay.
Go ahead.
7 ROSS:
We're questioning whether or not the valves actually turned.
That's 8
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kind of the question.
The idea was to try to get some letdown ficw, and 10 yet we thought we had bypassed a lot of things from the early hours.
I yg think we later found that that was not totally true.
12l HUNTER:
Did you find out that you did not, in fact, bypass something you 13 thought you had bypassed?
15; ROSS:
I think that was later on when we found out that when we pulled the 16;
]I handle, it was disconnected.
ISf HUNTER:
Okay.
Did you ever discover which one was disconnected?
19t 20l ROSS:
Yes, we did.
I think that was about Friday, but I don't remember 21!
which one it was.
22l l
23 HUNTER:
Would it be a handle of, again, around, like the makeup filter bypass--that type of thing?
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ROSS:
Yes, it would have been...
I 2!
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HUNTER:
Who can I talk to to find out which, what that particular valve 4
was? Apparently, you had to send somebody in to reconnect the handle 5
and/or to open the valve locally?
61 7
ROSS:
I don't believe we ever sent anybody inside the shield; the radiation g
levels wera very high.
i 9I 10f HUNTER:
It has never been bypassed now, to this time?
l 11:
i ROSS:
Not to my knowledge.
13 HUNTER:
14!
I have been in the control room, Mike, and the letdown flow itself 15:
sti ' isdo*aonthesc1e 15; ROSS:
That's true 7
18t HUNTER:
Ai..! the minimum amount of makeup is being added to Unit 2 to maintain pressurizer level, indicating, the fact is the reactor coolant pump still is about the cnly thing we have going, and the problem with this 22I is because you can' t letdown.
I 23 ROSS:
Yeah, that's correct.
If you go to take the plant into a solid mode 2 41 which we are doing periodically over there, you got to be able to let cown 25i f
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48 1,
what you put in or your pressure goes up; so really we are limited by our 2'
letdown, as far as what we can make up to the system.
As far as who could 3l tell you exactly, from that day....
4l 5
FOSTER:
Mike, I'm trying to remember a name for you here.
61 7
HUNTER:
Okay.
I'd appreciate it.
8 gl ROSS:
Possibly Chwastyk.
10l 11j FOSTER:
Okay.
We have him on to interview shortly, so we'll get him.
l 12!
+
13l HUNTER:
One question, Mike.
You did various valving and various deminera-l lizers bypasses, various filter Lypasses.
You indicated that one of the 14 15 p rticular sets of filters you were not able to bypass, and you, in fact, still have not been able to bypass due to the 6:
17\\
ROSS:
My understanding is something isn't bypassed right now.
We tried to g
bypass everything.
There's one valve you can bypass demineralizer and g,
fi l ter.
To my knowledge, that valve is still shut.
c 0 :,
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22{,
HUNTER:
Okay.
A question then, on the drawings that I have, shows a I
letdown relief valve going to the bleed tank.
I think during tne last c31 interview, I think we fairly well established the fact that that relief valve, when it lifted did fill the bleed tank.
25)
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ROSS:
That's hard pipe to the bleed tank.
2 HUNTER:
That, and again I'm going on the fact that when you did this 3{
4 evolution you saw the bleed tank level change, which is what you expected.
5 We are never 100% sure, but that's my understanding.
6l 7
ROSS:
Its a big tank, but we thought we saw it.
8 HUNTER:
Okay, now the next thing, there are also some more relief valves g
10 n that system, on the discharge side of the demineralizers, and these 11.j indicate that they discharge to the floor side, to the WDL system and not l
12f to the bleed tank; and looking at the ficw path to the makeup tank, even if it's a minimal flow, if a letdown has been lined up on and off--I don't 13 p;
know if it's lined up today--do you recall the relief valves, or do you recall the set funcdons of those relief valves?
15 16i 17l ROSS:
No, I don' t.
18!
HUNTER:
They are in there to protect the demineralizers.
They weren't on the original plant design and now they're in there, a subsequent modifica-c0; tion apparently.
22 ROSS:
I do not recall it.
23 24!
25i
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HUNTER.
You never heard those relief valves being discussed as a source of gj water to the auxiliary building, sump, I should say.
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4j ROSS:
I did not, no.
5 6
HUNTER:
Okay, I just want to make sure.
Are you still having some activity 7
release to the auxiliary building at times?
l 8:
ROSS:
I don't know.
I believe they are seeing some occasionally.
I g
10j haven't been over there in a week.
I've returned home.
I 11!
HUNTER:
Okay.
Alright, Tim, do you ha.e any further questions?
I 13i MARTIN:
No.
15 9
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9# "'
16:
i like to say thank you for your time and your patience; would also indicate 1,/ l that if you have any comments, please feel free to make them.
This tape will, in fact, be listened to by a number of people.
Also, if you think of something later, make sure you get back wi+h us.
We are avail ole.
Something that clicks and you really feel like, yeah, we need that informa-21; tion, feel free to get a hold of us; we request you to get a hold of us, so 22{
l that we can understand this particular event.
23t 24j 251 I
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51 I
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ROSS:
Okay, I'll do that.
2!
3l FOSTER:
Mike, I also thank you.
We are going to conclude this interview 4j at 2:30 p.m.
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