ML19242D900
| ML19242D900 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1979 |
| From: | Marshall W METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908280795 | |
| Download: ML19242D900 (36) | |
Text
i l
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION i
1!
In the Matter of:
2j IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW i
3l of Walter J. Marshall Operation's Engineer 4
bl l
6' 7l l
81 Trailer #203 9l NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant i
10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
May 17, 1979 121 (Date of Interview) 13!
July 9, 1979 (Date Transcript Typea) lti 209 15!
(Tape Number (s))
16l 17i 181 19I 20-21!
NRC PERSONNEL 22!
Doren R. Hunter Tim Martin 23l William Foster 2!
n9 1 ~9 (i O 4 i
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25!
l 7 TOP 2207%
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i lj FOSTER:
The following interview is being conducted of Mr. Walter J. Marshall.
2 Mr. Marshall is a Operation's Engineer at the Three Mile Island Nuclear l
Power Facility.
The present time is 3:47 p.m.
Today's date is May 17, 31 1979.
4 The place of the interview is Trailer 203 located immediately outside i
the south gate to +he TMI site.
Individuals present for the interview are:
0 ren R. Hunter, Inspection Specialist, Performance Appraisal Branch; Tim 6
Martin, Inspection Specialist, Performance Appraisal Branch; and my name is 7
William Foster.
I'm the Senior Inspector Auditor of OIA from the NRC, and g
I will be doing the monitoring of the interview.
Prior to the interview g
being recorded, Mr. Marshall was provided a document explaining his rights 10 concerning information to be obtained regarding the incident at Three Mile 11:,
Island.
In addition, Mr. Marshall was apprised of the purpose of the investigation, its scope, and the authority by which the Congress authorizes i
13) the NRC to conduct the investigation.
On the second page of the advisement 14!
document, Mr Marshall has answered three questions.
The questions and Mr. Marshall's answers will now be recorded as part of the interview.
16' i
Mr. Marshall, do you understand the document?
17i 18l MARSHALL:
Yes.
19i 20!
FOSTER:
Do we have your permission to tape the interview?
21l 22 MARSHALL.
Yes.
23 24i i
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FOSTER:
1.
Do you want a copy of tape or the transcript?
l 2!
t 3l MARSHALL:
Yes.
l 4j FOSTER:
Mr. Marshall, at this time will you please provide a brief summary q
f y ur academic background, employment history, as they relate to the 6
nuclear field.
8 MARSHALL:
I graduated in May of 1971 from Christian Brothers College in i
Memphis, Tenn., with a Bachelor's of Science Degree in Me hanical Engineering.
10l i
I started employment June 1, 1971 in Newport News Ship Building and worked 11!
I there for 5 1/2 years, at which time I was a mechanical test engineer and 12{
l later a ship test engineer on a cruiser project.
In February of 1977, I 13l came to Three Mile Island as an Aux Engineer.
15:
FOSTER:
Thank you.
At this point, I'll turn the interview over to Mr.
1 61 i
Martin.
17l l
18j MARTIN:
Mr. MarshcIl, we would like to start this interview with a deter-19!
.:.ination of when you arrived onsite, when you became involved in the event, 20:
I and where you were in the plant.
21l t
l 22 MARSHALL:
Okay.
I received a phone call approximately at 5:00 on the 23 moriung of the 28th, telling me that the reactor in the turbine had tripped 24l and that my presence was requested.
I got to the control room, I guess it 1
25!
hva f
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lj was 5:35, twenty minutes to six, at which time I came in the control room 2
and I asked one of the aux operators what had happened, and he said that 3
the polishers had tripped us.
I immediately went downstairs to the conden-4 sata polishing system and started looking around to figure out why the 5
p lishers had tripped us.
At that time when I got there, the polisher l
6 utlet valves were shut and the polisher system had been bypassed.
I started blowir;g down the instrument, air regulators and found them to be 7
full f water; and I blew down some of the service air lines.
They also 8
had water in them, and I proceeded over to the service air compressor /
g receivers and the instrument air compressor / receivers and started blowing 10 I
them down.
I went back up to the control room abou; 6:15, no 15 to six, I 11!
l guess.
No, fifteen to seven.
It took me about an hour down there and at 12l
,3 {,
that time we were just getting ready to go into a site emergency.
When the site emergency was declared, I proceeded to get the tables and the isoplats 14!
l aut, and then I manned the status board.
Shortly after the site emergency 15; was declared, the radiation alarms started or went off in rapid sequence i
and a general emergency was declared.
I would think that that was some 17; l
time around fifteen after seven.
I continued to man the status board, 18f keeping up with information as it came in, what time phone calls were made, and I guess it was around 9 o' clock, Jim Sumes sent me to Unit 1 to escort 20:
NRC inspectors that had arrived onsite over to Unit 2.
I came back to the Unit 2 control room with the NRC inspectors and let's see.
I don't remember exactly what ti.:e that was, but it was probably somewhere around 10 o' clock.
23:
I'm trying to think what was going on then.
I think it was from around 24, I
that time until later in the afternoon, I was involved with the various 25; f
as bu,
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1l phases of the accident as I was instructed by the shift supervisor for the 2j m st part.
About 4:30 that afternoon, myself and Fred Shimond and a health i
3j physics technician entered the auxiliary building to reclose the breakers i
4!
on the building's spray pumps, not the building spray pumps, the reactor 5
building sump pumps.
We could not get to the breakers because of the high radiation area, so we came out of the auxiliary building shortly after we 6l entered it.
Sometime during the day, I was requested by Joe Logan to 7
interview the operators that were involved, who were on duty at the time of g
gj the incident; and some time that evening I started doing it.
I left the slam, I don't remember what dme h was, M I went over to ne %serva-10 I
11;f tion Center to start talking to some of the aux operators, and I guess the rest or the major part of the evening, I guess from about 9 o' clock that I
night till 2 or 3 in the morning, I spent talking to Craig Falks and Ed 13l 14l!
Fredericks and Hugh McGovern and taking a written interview with them.
Sometime around 3 o' clock, I called back to the Island to see if Jim Floyd 15, had arrived yet.
I was told that he had arrived, and at that time, I came back to the Island to try and locate Jim, at which I didn't have any luck
- 17l, in doing.
I fi~nally got a message from him that he had gone home and for me to call him at home.
So I called him at home and talked to him and he 19!
said that after he got a couple hours, a few hours sleep, he was going to l
come back in and for me to go on home and get some rest and come back in 21:
that night.
This was probably 7:30 or 7:00 o' clock Thursday morning.
I 22 lost track of time there after awhile.
23!
24j 25j t
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i MARTIN:
Mr. Marshall, Tim Martin speaking.
I would like to tie down a 1
2 little better the exact time of arrival by using some events that I know I
3f I would also like to focus in on some of the points that you've ccurred.
4j raised.
The first question I have is, when you arrived in the Unit 2 i
control room what was the status of the rector coolant pumps?
5 6l MARSHALL:
I don't know, Tim.
The first thing I did when I came in the i
Control room, Mike Ross, George Kunder, Bill Zewe, Tim Bryan were all in the control room, and the first thing I did was ask the aux operator what g
i tripped us.
He said the condensate polishers, and I went cown to the 10l l
condensate polishing system.
11; 12!
I MARTIN:
Martin, speaking again.
When you arrived at the condensate polishers, 13l l
is this in the vicinity of condensate pumps and booster pumps?
14!
f 15; MARSHALL:
Yes, it is.
16 MARTIN:
Were the condensate pumps running?
18[
19l MARSHALL.
I didn't notice that the condensate pumps were running at that 20:
i time.
21l 22l l
MARTIN:
Were the booster pumps running?
23l 24l l
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7j MARSHALL:
I didn't notice that the booster pumps were running at that ti***
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3l MARTIN:
You did indicate that the polishers had been bypassed or something.
5 6:
MARSHALL:
Ye.s, and I believe that the condensate pumps were running, but I 1
didn't physically go over and verify that the condensate pumps were running.
7 81 i
MARTIN:
Martin, again.
Were there any other auxiliary operator's in the 9
area?
10l l
11!
l MARSHALL:
There was one auxiliary operator with me, he came down with me, 12!
ai.d I believe it was Donny Miller.
I'm not sure if it was Danny or not.
13!
We proceeded to blow down the regulators in the lines and then went over to 14!
the receiver area.
15; 16i MARTIN:
Martin, again.
Were there any other auxiliary operators in the 17!
area?
18l 19!
MARSHALL:
I don't remember.
20j 2 16 MARTIN:
What was the condition of the hot well at this time?
22l l
231 i
MARSHALL:
I didn't check on the hot well level.
24l 25
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I 1l MARTIN:
Martin, again.
How long did it take you to blow down the instru-ment air receiver?
2!
I 31 e
MARSHALL:
4 From the time that I started blowing down the individual regulator 5f stations and the instrument air receivers and service air receivers, I w uld say it was forty-five minutes to an hour.
6 7l MARTIN:
Martin, again.
In your own opinion, could what you had found in 8
the instrument air system have caused the isolation valves on the polishers g
to go shut?
10(
l 11!
MARSHALL:
Yes.
12!
I 13l MARTIN:
Can you describe to us how this might have occurred?
15 MARSHALL:
It seems in the past that we, at least once, we got water in the instrument air system and the polisher outlet valve shut.
It didn't happen on the shift that I was on, but I came in and "clieved the polisher watch 18i that night and I seem to think that the plant tripped because of that, one 19!
time.
I'm trying to think what month that was.
It must have been November, 20' some time in November at which time we determined that. the fluffing air 211 l
valves were leaking by, and over the next week we replaced all the fluffing 22l
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air valves.
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0 MARTIN:
Martin, again.
If the fluffing valves were leaking, does this 1
2j allow water to get back into the instrument air system?
I 3l t
4l MARSHALL:
It can't.
A check valve also has to leak by and another manual valve has to be opened.
5 I
Gl MARTIN:
7 Given that that night they found a resin plug in the transfer line from one of the polishers and were, in fact, attempting to transfer resins, wouldn't the normal lineup have had only the fluffina valve closed and g
I cycling the fluffing valve, and then the demineral water, and that, in 10l i
fact, the fluffing valve would have been the only barrier between the 11!
I instrument air system and the water which existed in the tank.
12!
13 MARSHALL:
True.
That and the check valve.
14k r
15:
MARTIN:
Martin, again.
There is some confusion on the fail-what position 16:
the outlet valves will fail in, given a loss of air or loss of electrical 17 power.
Do you know the position they will fail in?
IS{
19' MARSHALL:
They will fail in the closed position and the loss of electrical 201
(
power.
That happened once when the technician mistakenly opened the control 21 power breaker fluid of the polishers.
On loss of air, they will also fail.
22l Loss of controlled air they will also fail closed.
23l 24 25 ion i
d ou.
4 I
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9 1
MARTIN:
1 Is the air that is utilized to operate the valve, the same air 2
that is utilized for fluffing operations?
I 31 MARSHALL:
No, I don't.
I believe the instrument air is used for operating 4
5 the valves and the service air is used for fluffing.
I 6i 7}
MARTIN:
Martin, again.
How do you then mix the water entering into the 1
... the potential water leaking into the stationary system, how does it get g
over into the instrument air system and cause the valves to go shut?
g 10j l
MARSHALL:
The service air and instrument air systems cross connoct.
11; i
12!
I MARTIN:
Is that cross connect close to the polishers or should we expect 13!
to find other failures in the system?
15, MARSHALL:
It's not.
Physically, it's on the same level as the polishers, 16:
its not in the same immediate vicinity, and I don't, I'd have to lcok a 17l little harder to tell whether you'd have to expect some more failures.
181 19i MARTIN:
Martin, again.
Is it true that we did find water in the receiver 20l l
for the instrument air system?
21l 22 MARSHALL:
I believe so.
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HUNTER:
This is Hunter speaking.
The AL in the control room who told you 2
the plant had tripped, what was his name?
Was that Donnachie?
3l l
4l MARSHALL:
I'ni not sure.
i Si i
HUNTER:
Okay.
When you went downstairs, you knew when you went down 6
7 towards the demine.alizers and found the outlet valves closed, you indicata you started blowing the air lines to control stations down and the service g
air and instrument air.
Based on your previous experience making sure that g
there was water--it didn't surprise you when you found water in it?
10 11l MARSHALL:
Well, it surprised me, because I hadn't seen, I haan't any I
reason to expect water to be in there other then the polisher valves being 131 shut and maybe Donny might have been down there then and suggested that we 14!
had water in the instrument air system.
16:
HUNTER:
If our information is right (Hunter speaking again), they've been 17!
working cn that problem of the resin feed, of the resin plug for 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />.
18j 19:
MARSHALL:
I was not aware of that at that time.
I later heard that they 20!
had been working on it since second shift, not the shift before.
21 22' HUNTER:
Looking at the, you indicated that the outlet valves and the inlet 23 l
valves were closed.
24!
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1l MARSHALL:
I dian't notice that the inlets were closed.
I did notice that 2{
the outlets were shut.
3; HUNTER:
Alright.
The condition of the polisher when you left and you had 4;
5 just blown all the valves down and then left it to the auxiliary operator, 6
r did you place, did you leave it operating.
7 MARSHALL:
Let's see, let me think a minute.
I blew all the regulators g
gj down, and at that time, I believe I went back out front and the outlet 10l v ves were open at that time.
They had come back open.
I 6
11!
HUNTER:
As soon as you had blown the water out of the lines apparently the outlet valves came back open.
3 13!
i 14!
MARSHALL:
I believe I rememcer that.
15:
16i HUNTER:
Okay.
In the morning, things you discussed during scme previous 17l interviews, that George Kunder had indicated that they had requested Dick 18i Dubiel to make the standard preparations apparently to enter the containment.
19!
20f 21,f MARSHALL:
Yes, I believe 22!'
HUNTER:
And, were you involved in that particular request to go into the 23 containment?
24, 25j r
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l 12 lj MARSHALL:
I vaguely remember somebody saying get RWP ready; Marshall and I 2
will g in r something like that.
Nobody approached me and said get ready l
3:
to go in, but I think I remember hearing somebody say.
4!
l 5l HUNTER:
Do you know why anyone would have wanted to go in at that time?
l 6i MARSHALL:
No.
7 l
a; HUNTER:
Not specific.
Nobody specifically mentioned to you...
g 10l 11:!
MARSHALL:
No.
12!
i HUNTER:
Okay.
13; i
14I MARSHALL:
I don't believe.
I don't recall.
15!
16 HUNTER:
Okay.
And that time then working or, the isoplats, the status 17 i
board, Unit 1 as an escort to bring NRC fellows over back to Unit 2, did 18' various jobs..
What do you like to be called?
I hate to use your last 19i name, Mr. Marshall.
20j 21:
MARSHALL:
Bubba.
22!
23)
HUNTER:
What's your various jobs that you were involved in in the control 24l room area?
Do you recall being involved in any of the specific plant 25j
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i 1l activities, such as the sites, like the reactor building sump pump breakers, 2
y u attempted to reach them and close them...that particular activity, do I
3l y u re;all why you were asked to close the reactor sump pump breakers? Who i
4i asked, who set that up, who did you go with and why were you going to close i
them?
S 6!
MARSHALL:
I think the breakers had opened earlier or the bus had been 7
cleared earlier.
And there was some suspicion as to whether it was the 8l gl sump pump breakers that cleared the bus.
Joe Chiwastik wanted us to go up
!g and close the sump pump breakers.
11!
HUNTER:
Okay.
To close the sump pump breakers to, what to, I'm not follow-12!
ing the sequence.
13!.
14!
MARSHALL:
To see if that's what had cleared the bus.
15, 16' Ht;NTER:
And you never got..
17!
l 1Si MARSHALL:
We never got there, and we subsequently started reloading the 19i bus and the other complements that were energized would stay on the bus, so 20!
j later came to the conclusion that the sump pumps were the reason that the 21!
buss had cleared.
22 23 HUNTER:
Okay.
How far did you make it on the way to the, I guess this is 24i on the radwaste panel there 25i
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MARSHALL:
Yeah.
We made it to the 328 elevation of the auxiliary building.
l 2!
l 3l 2" did y u encounter?
4l 5l MARSHALL:
At that time, the health physics guy.
Let's see, I can't even I
6l remember his name, but he had the teletector and he was in front of us, and we came in the door by the elevator and started over to the other side of 7
the building and we got about 10 or 15 feet in and he said, it's too hot in g
here and let's go back.
So we turned around and came back.
I don't remember, g
right off the top, what the level was then.
10 i
i 11l HUNTER:
Did you have a self-reading pocket dosimeter?
12t 13 MARSHALL:
Yes, I did.
14!
15i HUNTER:
And so, did you read it at that time?
16i 17 i
MARSHALL:
No, it was inside the wetsuit.
18:
19i HUNTER:
Did you read it later on?
20!
21l l
MARSHALL:
Yeah.
22l 2 31 i
HUNTER:
Had you received any exposure?
241 l
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MARSHALL:
Yes, I had.
2l HUNTER:
How much?
3 4{
MARSHALL:
I think it was about 60 millirems.
5 61 7l HUNTER:
Sixty millirems?
8, i
j MARSHALL:
If I remember correctly.
g!
10f 11:!
HUNTER:
Any specific jobs that you were involved in, in the plant itself, i
12l other than the polichers, auxiliary feedwater system, reactor coolant pump operation, makeup system operation?
13l 14!
MARSHALL:
No sir.
15:
16i HUNTER:
Or for the shift supervisor.
You indicated you were doing jobs 17!
for the shift supervisor.
18i 19j MARSHALL:
No sir.
20[
21!
HUNTER:
Okay.
Okay, Tim.
22, 23j l
MARTIN:
This is Tim Martin.
To our records, the NRC inspectors were 24l l
escorted to Unit 2 approximately 10:30 in the morning.
At approximately 25j i 0
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16 ilj 10:30, the primary plant was between 2000-2200 lbs., was being controlled 1
2!
through some mechanism.
Would you happen to know what that mechanism was?
3l MARSHALL:
Well, it would be speculation on my part.
4{
5 MARTIN:
Okay.
Sometime after that, approximately 11:30, a decision was 6i 7j made to depressurize the plant.
Do you know the technique used to utilize, to depressurize the plant at that time?
g 91 MARSHALL:
Of I believe the this was just the effort to insure the core was j
covered by dumping the core floods.
1 i
12:
l MARTIN:
That's affirmative.
13) 14 MARSHALL:
I believe the pressurizer vent was open, to depressurize itself.
16' i!
MARTIN:
The vent or the EMOV.
17l 18!
MARSHALL:
The electromatic relief.
19!
20!
i MARTIN:
Okay.
Tic "artin speaking again.
Were you in the Unit 2 control 21l room for most of rest of the afternoon?
22l 23l l
MARSHALL:
Yes.
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lj MARTIN:
Were you in the control room at the time that the reactor building's i
2!,
spray pumps started?
31 i
4j MARSHALL:
Yes sir.
5 MARTIN:
Did you hear anything during that period of tinie?
6i l
71 MARSHALL:
I remember I was standing right near the makeup panel at that 8
time, and I remember Gary Miller asking me what was that.
I didn't notice g
anything, and I started looking around at varicus instruments, primary 10l' plant pressure, the pressurizer level and I didn't see anything unusual.
I 11!
12,[
told Gary that and about right after I got that out of my mouth, I looked l
up and saw that we had the building spray actuation and I did say, "We got 13i
,4 [.
building spray." What was it, a 4 lb. signal. Shortly after that, two or 2
three minutes after that, the building spray pumps, in fact, had started 15; and I don't know if I secured them and then, I believe Glen Wright actually 17j secured them.
We were both standing there next to each other.
This was i
sometime around 2:00, I guess.
ISr 19' MARTIN:
How do you spell Mr. Wright's name?
20) l 21!
MARSHALL:
W-R-I-G-H-T.
22l 23l HUNTER:
This is Hunter speaking.
Let me ask you at that time, I've asked 24i' you about some of your background, Walter.
You've been as an operating 25!
engineer since February 1977.
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18 MARSHALL:
Yes.
11 ei
'I HUNTER:
Did you work Unit 1 and Unit 2?
3.
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4j 5l MARSHALL:
No sir.
I came to Med Ed in 1977, strictly for Unit 2.
l sj HUNTER:
Do you have any operator or license training?
7 8
MARSHALL:
Yes sir.
g 10 HUNTER:
Are you a senior license operator?
12!
I MARSHALL:
Yes sir.
13l 14!
HUNTER:
Okay.
How long have you been senior licensed?
16; i
MARSHALL:
Since June-July 1978.
17) 18!
FOSTER:
Foster.
We are now going to take a short break to change the 19!
tape.
The time is 4:15 p.m.
20:
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FOSTER:
We are now going to continue with the interview with Mr. Marshall.
22l' The time is 4:18 p.m.
23 24j 25!
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i MARTIN:
Bubba, Tim Martin, again.
Since you indicate that you were by the 1!
2{
makeup panel at the approximate time that we had this pressure spike, you I
3l probably also had looked at the makeup flows and letdcwn flows and what 4
pumps were operational.
'lo you happen to remember any of that?
Si MARSHALL:
6 I believe the A makeup pump was running, but I'm not positive, 7l and I don't remember what the CL injection flows were or the letdown flow at that time.
g 9l MARTIN:
As a result of the pressure spike, did we get a ES actuation?
10{
11!
l MARSHALL:
I dor,'t know.
I don't really remember if we got an ES actuation.
12' We dio get the 4 lb and the 30 lb signal in the bui'iing isolation coolant and the spray pump rtarted, but I don't know if we got the ES actuation at 14!
that time.
15 16:
l MARTIN:
Martin speaking again.
If you have a 4 lb signal, doesn't that 17!
r normally..
181 19i MAR $ HALL:
Yes, it does normally, it does start.
I don' t remember it i
happening.
21{
22l l
MARTIN:
Following the pressure spike, examining the wide range pressure 23!
Indication, we see a long period, some five to six hours, of slow pressure 24j l
increase.
It gradually ks its way up and I have very little informaticn 25l l
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1 about what was going on during this period of time.
What decisions were 2
being made; what actions were taking place in this period of time.
Do you 3f have any.
4!
MARSHALL:
This was prior to the spike.
rj 6i MARTIN:
No, right after the spike, and up to the point where the decision 8l was made let's repressurize the plant.
We have five to six hours there gl that just, very little information and obviously not many radical decisions f
10f were being made because of the pressure just hanging up.
i 11:
MARSHALL:
Building pressure?
l 13l MARTIN:
No, this is rea tor quadrant pressure.
15; MARSHALL:
It seems like after we depressurized and dumped the core flood banks, shortly af ter that, we attempted to increase primary plant pressure and collapse the bubbles in the hot legs.
We did it on the A side.
We had indication that we collapsed the bubble on the A side.
We went to the B 19!
side and attempted to do the same thing on the B side, and the bubble reformed in the A side, and we went back and recollapsed the one on the A 21l f
side and then went to the B side again and collapsed the one on the B side.
22!
l That took a considerable length of time if I'm not mistaken.
23l i
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21 i
MARTIN:
Martin speaking again.
Could you describe for us the maneuver 1
2 that was utilized to coilapse these bubbles?
e 3;
MARSHALL:
4 Essenticlly clocked the electromatic relief and pressurized it 5l with HP injection.
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7}
HUNTER:
Hunter speaking.
Bubba, were you working with Mike Ross at that 8i i
9l MARSHALL-No, I wasn't.
10' 11l HUNTER:
Were you working or who were you working with at that time?
f 13{
MARSHALL:
I don't really remember who I was working with at that time.
14:
15 HUNTER:
Were you moving around with your station at that time.
Were you i
moving around the panel, in ot'cr words, with like Bill Zewe or the shift 17!
supervisor.
18i 19l MARSHAlg No.
I think, maybe by that time, I was keeping a log.
Sometime 20 during the event, I started keeping a log of what was going on, and maybe 21:
by then I had gotten into that, but I don't really remember.
23 i
HUNTER:
Sid you start keeping a log aoout 1300 or 1 o' clock?
24!
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L MARSHALL:
I don't really remember what time it was.
11 l
2:
t HUNTER:
Okay.
Looking at the containment spray pumps operating, they were 3
g turned off 5-6 minutes after they started.
Were you involved in the discus-5 slon as far as turning the pumps off, '.he containment spray pumps off?
I 6i MARSHALL:
No.
There wasn't...If I remember correctly, there wasn't a 7
discussion as to turning them off or not.
Joe Chiwasek was there, and 8,
l after we realized that they were running, we left the building pressure and 9!
it was down.
It was just a tremendous spike and then came right back down 10l l
to where it was, and Joe said secure the pumps, and like I say I can't 11l remember if I secured them or if Len Wright secured them.
12!
f 13!
HUNTER:
Hunter speaking.
When you saw the spike, Joe saw it, Len probably saw it...
151 16; j
MARSHALL:
This was after it had occurred.
17; I
18r HJINTER:
Right.
Okay, and it was time to shut the pumps off.
The pressure was probably still decaying or it may be 20:
21l MARSHALL:
It spiked, came down almost...
22' I
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HUNTER:
It had already decayed back to normal?
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MARSHALL:
Yes, it didn't even ink coming back down.
i 2!
3l HUNTER:
Okay.
The question, then, is what was the discussion you fellows 4l had at that time, not today but at that time, as far as what caused that 5
p rticular spike.
6l 7l MARSHALL:
We couldn't come up with any reason at that time that would have 8
given us a building pressure spike, other than maybe an electrical system or an instrument fault.
g I
10 HUNTER:
Did you call somebody to look at that into that aspect of it or 11!
l 12; are you aware that they called anybody?
13}
MARSHALL:
To be honest, I don't remember.
14!
15 HUNTER:
Joe, the shift supervisor, knew that it had occurred and that he had the pumps turned off.
Did you or he tell anybody else about this 17!
particular event, that you are' aware of?
ISj 19l MARSHALL:
I discussed it with Jim Floyd the following night.
20f l
21!
HUNTER:
Now, you indicated that Gary Miller was there and said, "what's 22f that," and you said then you told him the building spray pumps started.
23l l
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24 1.
MARSHALL:
Well initially, I looked at the primary indicacions, thinking 2'
that something had happened to the primary, and I want went over and looked 3
at the condenser hot well and secondary side.
I didn't see anything.
I 4
came back to Gary and he said I don't think it was anything, and then 5'
that's when I noticed that we had the ES actuation.
Gj HUNTER:
7 And your comment to him then was that the sprays are on?
8 MARSHALL:
g No, I had already told him I don't think anything had happened, and I think Joe said well we got building spray.
10 i
11)
I HUNTER:
Okay.
In your discussion around that event, was there an activity that was being performed, that you are aware of, right at the time that spike occurred?
15i MARSHALL:
I think we were cycling the block valve at that time.
17l HUNTER:
Okay.
The power operator relief EM08 block valve?
18!
19t MARSHALL:
Yes.
20 21l HUNTER:
Okay.
Did you, at any time, look at the nuclear instrumentation.
22 23l l
MARSHALL:
At that particular time?
24l 25!
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1l HUNTER:
During the day, really.
2!
i 3l MARSHALL:
During the day, yes.
I did look at the source and intermediate 4
range indication.
I'm trying to think when it was.
5' HUNTER:
If you tell us what you saw, I suspect that we could put a time on 6
i t.
y 8
MARSHALL:
It was a spike from source and intermediate range inoication.
g 10' HUNTER:
They both went up?
l 12l MARSHALL:
They both spiked up.
14!
HUNTER:
Okay.
16:
MARSHALL:
Slightly.
I'm trying to think what we were doing at that time.
17l:
i I think it was earlier in the morning, sometime during the morning, probably 18l around 7 o' clock.
19i 20!
21;l HUNTER:
That's when the reactor coolant pumps were off and you were sitting, i
and 22l 23f l
MARSHALL:
Yes, I believe it was.
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26 1{
HUNTER:
And you saw the the range vent off the intermediate range went up with it, emergency borate.
Were you involved in the emergency question or 2
any f th se to enter that decision, or a discussion as to why the source 3
intermediate range came off; why the source increase?
i Si I
MARSHALL:
I don't believe.
No I wasn' t involved in that.
6i 71 i
i HUNTER:
Were you aware duiing the day that the auxiliary feed pump, the 8!
emergency feed pump, discharge valves, the EF B-12 and A and B were closed?
9i i
10' MARSHALL:
I was not aware of that until after midnight that night when I was conducting interviews with the operators.
12l l
13j HUNTER:
Who indicated to ycu that they were closed?
14:
15' MARSHALL:
Craig Faust.
16 17!
HUNTER:
Did during the interview, no, okay, that's fine.
That's the point 18i where you found out.
19j 20t MARSHALL:
Yes, that's the point.
21i 22ll HUNTER:
Did you notify anybody at that time?
231 24i 25i i r :)
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27 l
Ilj MARSHALL:
Let's see.
I think it was around that time when I talked to 2
Floyd, I think, that I told Jim then.
31 HUNTER:
Okay.
Bubba, have you been in Unit 2 during previous unit trips, 4
5 actually in the control room?
Gi 7{
MARSHALL:
Yes sir.
8l HUNTER:
As the shift supervisor?
q~
i 10 MARSHALL:
Not as the shift supervisor.
l 12:
I HUNTER:
During the trip and then during the recovery?
13l t
14 l
flAR$ HALL:
And subsequent recoveries.
Yes sir.
15!
16!
17l HUNTER:
Okay.
Have you seen the power pressure relief valve open before on a turbine trip with the reactor?
181 19l MARSHALL:
Yes, sir.
20; 21l HUNTER:
I may assume then that you've also, it closed normally in the l
past?
23 2 41 25!
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28 1{
MARSHALL:
Yes sir.
l 2!
HUNTER:
Okay.
And what about the operation of the pressurizer, heaters 3
4j and the spray in manuals do to the leak on the, apparent leak, on this 5
relief valve and the safety valves.
Were you aware of that and had that happened before?
S I
71 MARSHALL:
At the time of the accident, I was under the impression that the g
pressurizer heaters and spray wern't manual because they were trying to g
equalize tne boron.
10[
11!
HUNTER:
Right, and has that happened before that you are aware of?
13 MARSHALL:
That we periodically have to equalize the boron?
14!
15r HUNTER:
Yes, that you have to equalize the boron.
i 17i MARSHALL:
Yes.
18i 19' HUNTER:
The im.aediate operator actions then become spray and the heater 20[
21:l slats were on during that time.
22f MARSHALL:
Right.
23l 24l 1
25:
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29 1{
HUNTER:
Okay.
During a unit trip, in the past apparently you had the 2
engineer in Safeguards following the trip.
Is that fairly normal in Unit l?
3 4j MARSHALL:
I don't have the background on Unit 1.
5[
HUNTER:
I'm sorry, on Unit 2.
6 7'
MARSHALL:
On Unit 2, we've had it at least twice, and without going back g
gj and looking, maybe three times.
I 10 HUNTER:
The operators, when they start the second makeup pump, according 11;,
to the procedures, or a third makeup pump and you get down to 20 inches of l
pressurizer, normally go around the panel then and open up one of the 13l suction valves on the ESP, one of the five valves, during your experience 14!
on the trips in Unit 2 is that normal to see the guy start the pump, check 15; everything, go around, open the five valves, come back and then effect on 16; the makeup panel?
Is that generally the way it occurs?
I ISI MARSHALL:
Yes sir.
19!
20' HUNTER:
Okay.
21, 22l l
MARSHALL:
Generally, the first thing that happens is letdown gets secured 23 and a second makeup pump gets started, very shortly into the incident, into 24!
the trip.
25j fL i
I j
30 1
i HUNTER; They had some problems with the lA makeup pump during the day.
i Craig Faust, the operators had problems, he tried to start it, he didn't 2:
l hold the switchover, the oil pressure didn't build up and he let the switch 31 i
go trip back off.
We understand that.
I think that was fairly clear.
One 4l l
thing that happened was that the pump had been running for 29 seconds or so Si and then it tripped for no reason at all, that we can see.
The operators 6i didn' t trip it.
The fact is, in 2 seconds they put it back on.
They would 7
have restarted very quickly, because they wanted it on, so it might have 8
i been the guy, that the operator might have tripped it, but the interview's 9l don't show that; it doesn't show that the operator tripped it and put it 10 back on.
He noticed it was off and then he restarted it.
Do you have any ll{
j experience from an operations standpoint that the A or the makeup pumps, 12l j
any of them, had tripped before and is there a reason that those things 13l would trip that you are aware of.
14!
15 MARSHALL:
No sir.
I don't think we have a history of tripping makeup 15' l
pumps.
17l ISI HUNTER:
Okay.
We've checked into the maintenance aspects of it, and when l'd i
you look at the maintenance, we're still eviewing it to see if they have a 20' reason that the pumps would actually trip.
Okay.
Did you get involved 21<1 with, one thing that occurred during the trip, was that one of the main 22 turbine stop valves failed to close.
Did you get involved in that activity i
23l at all?
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1 MARSHALL:
No sir, didn' t.
That was another thing that I didn't know until gi I had looked at the sequence of events.
3 4j HUNTER:
Okay.
5 ARSHALL:
That was something I did during the day.
6i 7
HUNTER:
Oh, okay...
8 9l 10f MARSHALL:
During a period of that lost time there, I spent a portion of the time looking for sequence of events.
12!
HUNTER:
What--did you see anything that was significant to you during the 13l I
review of the sequence of events? What was most signi ficant?
14!
15:
MARSHALL:
CDP 1A was the first thing on there that tripped.
16 17l HUNTER:
Is there any reason for CDP 1A to be the first thing to trip that 181 you' re aware of?
19t 20t i
MARSHALL:
No sir.
There isn't.
That being the first thing that tripped 21!
made me wonder whether the polisher outlet valves went shut after that pump 22 tripped or before it tripped.
23' 24 25 (3 3 !}
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32 HUNTER:
Hunter speaking.
That's the A condensate pump was the first item 1.'
2 to trip on the computer at minus I second, I believe.
i 31 1
4l MARSHALL:
Right.
And in fact, the condensate booster pumps on the sequence i
of events didn't trip until 5 minutes after.
-l 6l HUNTER:
Can you explain that, as far as why they ran out in five minutes?
7 I
MARSHALL:
I can't explain that.
It's been my experience with the polishers g
i that when, and if, the outlet valves goes shut that the condensate booster 10l I
pump is the first thing that trips and that it in turn trips the feed pump.
11]
I've never seen a condensate pump trip because of a polisher.
13 HUNTER:
And looking at the sequence of events then, could the condensate 14!
I polisher valve have gone shut later into the event and at that time would 15i have tripped the condensate booster pumps?
17!
MARSHALL:
That's a possibility.
I haven't had an opportunity to look at 18!
the individual polisher flow charts, but I would think that that might be 19l an indication of the valves going shut rather than flow.
20l 21l HUNTER:
Let me ask vou a question.
Looking at the flow path out of the 22l l
condensers, what's the pumps next to the condenser?
23!
i 241 25j f
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33 I
i 1!
MARSHALL:
The condensate pumps.
I 2:
3j HUNTER:
Alright, then they, in fact, discharge through the polishers?
41 MAR $ HALL:
Through the condensate polishers.
S Si HUNTER:
Right and then you have...
7 8
MARSHALL:
And they provide the suction to the booster pumps.
g i
10j HUNTER:
Was one condensate pump on at all times following the trip.
l 12!
I MARSHALL:
Yes sir.
13l i
14!
HUNTER:
So that would tell us that if one condensate pump was on, and you had no feedwater requirements, no heavy feedwater flow, one condensate 16 :,
pump, since you had the system in manual flowing through the polishers, 17l I
would have kept three booster pumps suction pressure high enough to keep 18i the three booster pumps on reset.
20l MARSHALL:
Very possible.
22l t
HUNTER:
Okay.
And then the feed pumps.
What would have tripped... What 23l l
trips the feed pumps.
Low suction pressure?
24i i
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34 I
l!
MAR 5 HALL:
Low suction.
Yes sir.
I 2'
i 3l HUNTER:
With one condensate pump and three boosters.
I 4f MARSHALL:
I'm sure that they would have tripped on low suction one conden-5 sate pump.
6i 7
HUNTER:
Okay.
It would have dropped right back down.
So now we're back 8
down to the point, it appears where maybe one condensate pump tripping g
i would just drop your pressures down to the point where the feed pumps 10' couldn't continue.
11!
I 12; MARSHALL:
That's possible.
Yes sir.
13l 14!
l HUNTER:
Okay.
We have not, in fact, picked up a reason for a condensate 15l pump to trip.
It wasn't in automatic; it wasn't paired off.
Apparently, I thought about a low suction pressure trip, but it doesn't have, a water 171 f
handle wouldn't even have tripped up on the low suction pressure.
18i' 19!
MARSHALL:
If I'm not mistaken, the only thing that trips those is under 20!
current loads, under voitage reflectable trips.
21; I
22f SUNTER:
To reset the, are you, let me ask you a question for my own edifi-23 i
cation.
You are, you have a 4160 volt breakers in Unit 2 for this type of 24 equipment?
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35
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lj MARSHALL:, Yes sir.
I 2!
t 3l HUNTER:
What is it required to reset that 4160 volt breaker?
Just turn the handle?
4 t
Si MARSHALL:
Yes.
Turn it to go back.
6
\\
7l HUNTER:
What if
.=.1 operator physically took the condensate pump and tripped 8
it.
Now you saw that ic was flagged and he went down and he, in fact, i
91 reset it.
He would have cleared the trip on it?
101 11; MARSHALL:
I'm not sure.
12l i
13l HUNTER:
Is that when you get an over-current trip or a trip--can you clear 14!
it with the switch handie, or do you have to ga down locally.
16 MARSHALL;_
I'm not sure if you.. I believe you hate to go down locally and 17I reset the flags.
I'm not sure.
He can remotely reset the breaker but I'm 18f 191]
not sure that you have to physically, I believe, go down and reset the flags.
I'm not positive on that.
20\\
21'i HUNTER:
Okay.
Well we'll look at that.
Okay, Tim.
Any further questions?
22 Okay,'..e're through right now.
We would like to indicate as we go through 23l l
the sequence and if we pick up any other particular points, specifically 24!
being the operations engineer, we may, in fact, want to talk with you 25Y again.
If we do, we'll contact you; try to set up anotner intery.iew.
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36 MARSHALL:
Yes sir.
Okay fine.
Thank you.
1:
i 2t I
FOSTER:
Thank you, Mr. Marshall.
This concludes the interview at 4:40 p.m.
3; 4
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