ML19242D889
| ML19242D889 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/10/1979 |
| From: | Herbein J METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908280745 | |
| Download: ML19242D889 (35) | |
Text
1 ld UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION In the Matter of:
2I IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of Jack Herbein, Vice President, Generation, l
Metropolitan Edison 5;
i 61 7
8l Trailer #203 9'
NRC Investigation Sita TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!
i Middletown, Pennsylvania 11.f vav in. lo7o 12!
(Date of Interview) 13!
July 1, 1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 14!
193 15i (Tape Number (s))
16i 17l i
18 19' 20j 21j NRC PERSONNEL:
~22l Bob Marsh Robert D. Martin 23!
Albert F. Gibson l
24 25l
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7 to7 720 7 't3'
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MARSH:
The time is 9:48 a.m. and we're located in trailer 203 at the 2!
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TMI site.
This is Bob Marsh and I am an investigator with the U.S.
31 i
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, assigned to Region III, at Chicago, 41 l
Today, we are together to interview Mr. Jack Herbein, Vice
- k President, GPU..
6i HERBEIN:
Generation, for Metropolitan Edison.
8 9
MARSH:
Generation Section c,f the Metropolitan Edison, correction.
To 10f begin with, I would like each individual in the room to identify themselves i
11l and spell their last name, if you would start.
I 12l 13 MARTIN:
This is Robert D. Martin, Chief Nuclear Support Section No. 1, 14 USNRC Regional Office II in Atlanta, Georgia.
15:
16!
GIBSON:
This is Albert F. Gibson, Chief, Radiation Support Section, t
17l Region II Atlanta, NRC.
18!
19 BEHRLE:
This is William H. Behrle, and I'm a Projects Engineer with 20:
Metropolitan Edison.
21l 22l MARSH:
Mr. Herbein.
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HERBEIN:
Jack Herbein, Vice President, Generation, Metropolitan Edison.
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l MARSH:
Mr. Herbein before we turn the tape on, we discussed briefly the 41' two page memo whict. you have in front of you and just for the record I'd n]
like to review a little bit of what's on those two pages.
As I indicated, 6i it does cover the purpose and scope of this investigation as well as the 7
authority granted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
On the 8
second page, there appear three questions which I'd like to get your 9
verbal response to, to make it a matter of record on the tape.
First 10 question reada, "Do you understand the above making reference to the two 11 page memo?"
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i 13!
HERBEIN:
Yes, I do.
14!
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MARSH:
The second question reads, "Do we have your permission to tape 16!
this interview?"
17l 1Sf HERBEIN:
Yes, you do.
19i 20!
MARSH:
Third question reads, "Do you want a copy of the tape?"
21j 22l HERBEIN:
Yes.
I 2 31 24f MARSH:
Sir, at the end of this interview, I will provide you with a 2z copy of the tape at that time.
Further, as it is transcribed I will get
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you a copy of the transcription also.
There is a fourth question that I 2'
i have not specifically called out, but it is covered in the body of the i
31 memo regarding your rights to have someone from the company present, and t
4;!
this has been presented to each of your employees as we have gone through
]k the interviews.
In instances as we discussed earlier, you did request that Mr. Behrle sit in, is that correct?
7l Ol f
HERBEIN:
That's correct.
9i i
10 MARSH:
Fine, okay, then at that point, Mr. Gibson do you have some 11 questions?
12j I
13 GIBSON:
Mr. Herbein, would you briefly describe your position with 1
14 Metropolitan Edison, and include in that description your prior background 15; in the Nuclear Industry?
16l l
17!
HERBEIN:
As Vice President, Generation, for Metropolitan Edison, I'm 18!
responsible for all the generation that's owned and operated by Met Ed.
19; that consists of nuclear generation, a hydre station, two coal stations 20 and fourteen combustion turbines.
Additionally, Metropolitan Edison 21I owns the sixth...the Conagnaw (?) Generation Station in Western part of 22l Pennsylvania, which is actually operated by Pennsylvania Electric.
My 23f previous background in the nuclear business consists of:
Navy Nuclear 24 training, which I received in 1964 under the Naval Nuclear Propulsion 25{
Program.
It consisted of 6 months of prototype training, and 6 months r
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of theoretical training at Naval Reactor School in Bambridge, Maryland.
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l Following my tour of duty in the Navy, I was employed by Yankee Atomic 3l j
Electric Company from May of 1967 through September of 67, at which time 4'
l I left their employ and came to work for Metropolitan Edison at Saxton 5
Nuclear Reactor in that.. Western Pennsylvania.
I was at Saxton in the 6'I capacity of Supervisor of Operations from 1967 through 1970.
'thile at 7
Saxton, I held a Senior Reactor Operator's license.
I came to Three 8
Mile Island in 1970 as Station Engineer, and was promoted in 1973 to the 9
position of Assistant Superintendent.
I was licensed as Senior Reactor 10 Operator on Unit 1 in 19.. 1974.
In 197.. 1974, I was promoted to 11l position of Station Superintendent, responsible for both Unit 1 and Unit 12I 2.
Then in 1976 I was promoted to position of Manager of Nuclear Operations, 13!
still responsible for the o]eration of both Unit 1 and Unit 2, but i
14; headquartered in..in Read'ng.
1977, I was promoted to the position of 15:
Manager of Generation Operations..at that time responsible for both 16!
nuclear, coal, oil and hydro generation for Metropolitan Edison.
In 171 1977....Can you shut that off for a minute?
18l 19l INVESTIGATOR:
together?
20:
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HERBEIN:
Yeah.
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INVESTIGATOR:
Sure.
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5 li MARSH:
Alright, we're going to take a break here for a moment the time 2
i being 9:55.
I 31 4l MARSH:
Okay, resuming now at 9:55.
Mr. Herbein.
5 l
6 HERBEIN:
As I stated previously, following approximately 6 to 7 months 7
as Manager of Generation Operations, I was promoted in 1977, I believe 8
it was May of 77, to the position of... position of Vice President, 9!
Generation, for Metropolitan Edison, and at that time responsible for l
10l all generation activities for the stations, which Metropolitan Edison 11 owns and operates.
12l l
13i MARSH:
Sir, can you give me your corporate office headquarters? Where 14 are you located now?
15 16; HERBEIN:
I'm located in Reading Corporate Office.
17!
18!
MARSH:
What would the address there be sir?
19i 20l HERBEIN:
2800 Pottsville Pike.
21:
r 22l MARSH:
Fine, thank you.
23 24 GIBSON:
Mr. Herbein, as...as I understand your position now as Vice 25l President, Generation, the Station Superintendent for Three Mile Island would report to you in a line organization.
Is that correct?
)
I
6 1!
HERBEIN:
That's correct.
Approximately the first of March, Gary Miller 2'{
was promoted to Manager, Generation Station, Nuclear, and at that time 31 l
his reporting responsibilities were c. hanged so that he reported directly 41' to me.
6)
GIBSON:
Mr. Herbein, if you would now I would like for you to begin 7
discussing the events chronologically to the best of your memory, from the time that you were notified of the incident that occurred on March 9
28, and just briefly describe who notified you, what information was 10f provided in that notification, and what your actions were following this l
11 notification.
And we'll just let you have the floor, and just discuss 12 as best you can recall what you did on the 28th and 29th and 30th.
13i As..as you perhaps understand, our investigation covers the period of r
14i time from the 28th at 4:00 a.m. until midnight on the 30th.
Part of the
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15 investigation...the part that covers operational aspects...is more t
16 limited to the first 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> following the event that occurred at 4:00.
17)
The radiological aspects and emergency response aspects will..we will 18 investigate up to midnight on the 30th, which would be Friday evening at 19!
midnight.
So with that if you would pick up and just discuss what you 20!
did following initial notification.
t 21 22l HERBEIN:
I received initial notification of the reactor trip at approx-t 23!
imately 0630...well, it was actually between 6:30 and quarter to 7 that 24l Wednesday, the 28th of March.
My understanding based on that telephone 25l call was that we'd experienced a low pressure suction trip of the feed-i
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j pumps such that both feedpumps were lost.
That in turn resulted in 2'
j a...a high pressure reactor trip.
They felt that code release had 31 opened and as a result of that, the rupture discs on the reactor coolant 4l drain tank were blown.
Following this depressurization, the operators had secured reactor coolant pumps in the B loop, and then sometime later 6l they secured them in the A-loop.
They believed that they had taken the i
7 plant solid with high pressure injection.
At the time of our call, I 8
believe I was informed that pressurizer level was sout 370 inches, and 9l that the pressure was around 700 pounds at a...at a 500 temperature.
I 10l was told we were using emergency feed to remove heat and promote natural 11:
circulation and that they had fcend it necessary to shut off feedwater i
12 to the B steam generator because they thought they had a leak.
I've 13l refreshed my..my memory of that initial phone call with some notes that 14 I jotted down following..following the conversation that I had with...with 15 Gary Miller and members of the plant staff.
Following that initial 16!
notification, I attempted to contact Bob Arnold to let him know that the i
17 plant had tripped.
I called his home and his wife answered.
I believe lSi that was.. I believe that was about 7 30.
Just prior to that, about 19 7:15 I'd contacted Blain Fabian, who's Manager of Communications Services 2
with Met Ed, and let him know that there'd been an event at...about 4:00 21 at Three Mile Island.
I told him that the unit was off-line because a
.i 2$j feedwater pump failed in the secondary loop, which in turn caused a 1
23 turbine to trip, and that in turn caused a reactor trip.
24!
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l MARTIN:
I'm going to interrupt you....
2 31 1
HER8EIN:
Yes.
t 4!
MARTIN:
Is it...would it be normal on any major plant trip in your 6i j
system to contact this gentleman?
I believe, did you say, Manager of 7lI Communications Services?
9 HERBEIin Yes.
10' 11l MARTIN:
I...I don't understand his function and therefore I'm guessing 12) at what his function was.
13l f
14f HERBEIN.
Okay, he's primarily Public Relations, and we do receive a t
15:
number of calls when the unit comes off-line, and in order to alert him 15!
directly that this had occurred why, you know, I'd...I'd called him..there's 17f no...there's no written requirement.
It's really a courtesy...
18l 19i MARTIN:
I was trying to understand what the purpose.
20{
f 21l HERBEIN:
Yes.
Yes.
Yeah.
So, just to let him know that the reactor 22 had tripped in case he got inquiries from the press, and so also that he 23l would inform our president, who he communicates with regularly.
So, i
24l following the ' phone calls to Fabian and the attempt to contact Arnold, 25l I..my next communication was about 0840 frcm Bob Arnold, Vice President,
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Generation, GPUSC, we briefly discussed the plant trip.
At that time I 2t j
don't believe there was any additional infor..etion over and above what 3l I'c' previously given you.
He indicated that he thought that Walt Creitz, 4}
tiesident of Met Ed would be calling me shortly.
I did get a call from i
i 5'
l Walt Creitz around 9:30 to quarter of 10.
We discussed, we again discussed 61 the trip briefly.
I don't-recall exactly what was said at that time, but Walt felt that...that I should probably leave Philadelphia and 8) report to Three Mile Is;and.
I received another phone call about 10:00 9
from H. L. Roebada, Vice President of Operations with Met Ed who informed 1
me that..that a helicopter would be available to transport me from 11 Philadelphia to Three Mile Island.
Approximately 11:00, I left Philly 12!
for Three Mile Island.
I arrive at the Observation Center about 11:40 i
13 and went immediately into the office normally occupied by Bill Gross, 14' and we used the ' phone there to talk to Gary Miller in Station Staff and 15:
learn where the plant was with regard to status and the particular trip 16l that had cccurred that morning.
Following discussion with Miller, and I 17l believe now it was about 1:15, I met with members of the press at the 18l Observation Center, and they indicated there was a problem with the 19' secondary side of the plant, that we'd lost feedwater pumps, that the 20l reactor tripped on high pressure.
I indicated that no one was injured i
21!
and that I certainly felt that it was the company's position not to 22l intend to expose anyone in any subsequent plant cleanup efforts.
I 23t indicated that radiation levels at the boundary were being monitored, f
24 and though we picked up small amounts of radiation at the plant boundaries, 25!
site boundary, I indicated I felt they were about a 10th of the general i
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10 1f emergency level.
I also indicated that we didn't see any indications of 2
high levels of radiation in the reactor building until approximately 10 3
minutes to 7, and at that time we declared a site emergency.
Following 4l l
the exchange of information with the press, and I guess this time it was ni
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about 5 minutes of 2, myself, Gary Miller and George Kunder left the 6i Three Mile Island Observation Center to meet with Lt. Governor Scranton, 7
who had requested the meeting from Walter Creitz.
He wanted to be I
8!
' briefed on the situation here at Threa Mile Island, and I felt it was 9f necessary to take someone from the plant staff with me.
I'd asked 10l initially that it be George Kunder.
Miller and I had some discussion 11l about that.
We subsequently agreed that he would..he and Kunder would 12 both go.
About 1400...
13!
14!
GIBSON:
Excuse me, Mr. Herbein...
15:
16!
HERBEIN:
Yes.
17l 18!
GIBSON:
Before we get too much deeper into..perhaps we should go back 191 and ask a few questions on what you've covered so far..
20i 21l HERBEIN:
All right.
l 22' l
23 GIBSON:
And then you can pick up here and carry on again later.
Could 24!
you clarify at what point during the morning you became aware that this 25!
was something more than...than just a normal trip?
You were notified at l
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6:30.
Was there information in that notification to indicate that there 2!
l had been some...more extensive plant damage?
31 4i j
HERBEIN:
There was no indication in my initial phone call that there 5l was plant damage.
Of course, as I indicated, the reactor coolant pumps 6i were shut off and the plant staff thought that we'd...or least I recall 7I they thought they had initiated natural circulation, but at that time 8
there was no...no indication that there was fuel damage.
Now I...during the morning, I guess sometime between...between 8:30 and...and...ll:00, 10f when I left to come back to Three Mile Island, I became aware that there 11 was...that a site emergency had been declared, because of radiation i
12!
alarms that had been received in the Auxiliary Building.
Now I'm not i
13]
exactly..I'm not exactly sure of exactly when that communication took 14 place, out I believe...it must've occurred between 8:30 and 11:00, which 15!
was the time I left from Philadelphia.
I may have talked to the plant 16]
staff in Philadelphia that morning before I left to come back to Three 17I
- Mile, i
18j 19!
GIBSON:
You were telephoned by Mr. Creitz I believe you said around 20' 9:30.
This would not..would this be a normal telphone call if the trip 21l had been a normal trip or would this indicate something mo:e serious?
I 22I I
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HERBEIN:
This 'phcne call would've indicated something more serious, I
24j and Walt's concern with the status of the plant, so it was...it may have 25I been through that ' phone call that I became aware of the significance of the problem, the initial significance of the problem.
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GIBSON:
Could you..you mentioned that you met with the press around 2
1:30 p.m. on Wednesday.
Do you know if Metropolitan Edison had made a 3i press release as of this time? Who notified the press of this event to 4l l
your knowledge?
5!
HERBEIN:
I... I... I don' t really know I... I would assume that it may 71 have been Communications Services from Blain Fabian.
8 l
9 GIBSON:
You mentioned that, in discussions with the press at 1:30, you 10 did discuss an assessment of the environmental conditions and I believe 11 you said t!iat you believed environmental radiation levels were 1/10 of 121 general emergency levels.
I 13!
14 HERBEIN:
And that...and that goes back to the general emergency criterion 15; of 125 mR at the site boundary.
And at that time I didn't believe that 16 we'd seen anything that was..that was greater than a 10th of that 17f value.
18!
19!
GIBSON:
What...what basis did you have for that statement? Had you 20!
been provided results of environmental measurements at that time?
l 2.:
1 22!
HERBEIN:
In discussions with the plant staff, I'd asked them what..what 231 levels the site monitoring teams had been reporting to the emergency 24!
control station.
M I recall they..the... don't recall the exact values, 25; but..but I did make that statement based on what I'd been told.
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GIBSON:
When you arrived at the Observation Center, what role did you 2
play at that point?
Did you assume control of operational events in the 3{
control room, or...or did you assume responsibility for interface with r
4!
j the media, or was...I guess what I'm asking is did you have some specific m
~l functions that you were performing or had that been clarified?
6i 7l HER8EIN:
Vice President, Generation, really isn't included in the 8
foi.nal emergency, formal emergency plans.
As such, there' re no specific assigned responsibilities and duties which I was required to execute, so 10j my concern primarily was with the situation at hand.
There were a l'^ i; number of...of reporters here.
They all felt the immediate need to 12l know, in order to keep the public informed and kept relatively abreast 13) of the events which were transpiring.
I felt the plant was certainly in 14 capable hands and that the emergency plans were being executed according 15{
to their design.
After I had discussions with the plant staff and heard 16' their version of events and their..their implementation of emergency lY plans, I was satisfied that the control was being exercised as it should 18!
be, so my initial response was to talk to them, sort of following what lb they were... sort of follow what they were doing, and then make an effort 20l to communicate that to the media.
I 21l i
22' GIBSON:
Did you bring with you staff from your office or did you come 23; to the site alone?
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HERBEIN:
I came to tile site alone from...from Philadephia, and only 2i later established a staff watch with structure and specific responsi-3 bilities, and of course they evolved as the...as the series of events 4!
unfolded over here at Three Mile Island, but there was no specific plan i
for...for doing that.
6 I
7' MARTIN:
May I ask how the decision was reached to go to the Observation 0
1 Center as opposed to going directly to the site itself?
9 10~
HERBEIN:
Well, again, because the emergency plan procedures specifically 11I assign responsibilities to the Station Superintendent, Station Manager.
12 and I felt he is perfectly capable of with his staff and his group o' 13l carrying out those responsibilities, I didn't feel it was appropiiate to t
14 insert myself into, into the procedures and organization, which was 15l well defined and well established, and to the best of my knowledge, at 16 the time we're coping adequately and effectively with..with the conditions.
I 17l i
18!
MARTIN:
Is...is there direct communications available between the 19' office that you went to in the Observation Center and the control room 20j or is this...just use of commercial telephone?
21l 22l HERBEIN:
Use of commercial telephone lines.
We subsequently established 1
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more direct means of communication using portable radios, additional 2dj phone lines and walkie-talkies.
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l 15 lij MARTIN:
Is this in a first day time frame or the second or third day t
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time frame?
3!
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4 HERBEIN:
That was the first or second day, and I'm not... I did order on c:
3/28/79 additional ' phones be installed in the observation center, and I O
also asked for radio communication and that occurred sometime in the 7
afternoon of the 28th.
I would think somewhere between 2 and 4 o' clock.
3 ol GIBSON:
Were they installed shortly after you ordered them?
t 10' 11f HERBEIN:
Yes, they were.
Don Barry could possioly give more definitive 12!
information as to the exact time they were installed.
13 14j GIBSON:
Why don't you continue with your chronology.
15:
16 HERBEIN:
Well, we wera to the point where Miller and myself and Kunder 17l went to talk to Lt. Governor Scranton, and informed him of plant status l
19!
and an attempt to answer his concerns with regard to the ger.eral public.
191 20i GIBSON:
What provisions were made at that point to enable either you 21 or, in this case I would expect primarily Mr. Miller, to stay in contact 22I with the plant staff or those in charge involving conditions at the 23 plant?
i 24 25!
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HERBEIN:
Well, the plant was I think, due to the depressurization 2'
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effort which was the strategy initiated shortly before we left to talk 3
to Lt. Governor, in a relatively stable state compared to what we believed 4i' we had during the morning.
Miller had established Seelinger in charge of the emergency control station ECS and he'd left Joe Logan in charge 6i of Unit 2, Joe Logan's the Unit 2 Superintendent.
Mike Ross, the Unit 1 7
Operations Supervisor, was also available for assistance and I know that 8
there were other engineers and I believe Lee Rogers from B&W was present, 9
so based on tnat I felt it was appropriate to take any member of the 10!
plant staff with me for response to any detailed questions regarding i
11l plant status that might arise in our session with the Lt. Governor.
i 12!
13 GIBSON:
Was the trip to the Lt. Governor's office initiated by you as a 14 result of a request from the Lt. Governor, or was it by your management 15 by the President of the company?
15' 17 HERBEIN:
No, as I understood it was...as I understood it from my boss ISi Walt Creitz, there was a direct request that someone with knowledge of 19 the incident report to the Lt. Governor and brief him first hand on what 20 was going on, and as I understand it they really weren't interested in 21l talking to Mr. Decamp who just happened to be in Harrisburg at the time.
22 They wanted to talk to somebody from the plant with the first-hand 23 knowledge of events, so I got the word from Walt Creitz, by boss, that I 24l absolutely had to..had to make every effort to be there in a timely 25j fashion and brief the Lt. Governor.
So, following that briefing, then, 1
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I we returned to the Observation Center about 4:30 p.m. and I..at that i
2l1 time again communicated with the...with the plant staff, and learned of 31 the system status and what particular strategy they may have been using 4:
ar. the time.
And I guess it was about 4:30 or 5:00 I communicated the c!
plant status with...with Bob Arnold'and he and I mutually agreed that 61 the strategy of attempting to...to remain at low pressure and use core I
7l flood tanks and possibly decay heat was really not being as successful 8
as we initially hoped that it..that it might be, and by we I mean the 9
plant staff, and so Arnold and I agreed that we ought to pressurize and 10f if necessary take the...take the plant solid, and attempt to start... attempt 11 to start the reactor coolant pump.
We began that effort to the best of 12 my knowledge around 5 or 5:30 p.m. that evening, and after getting power 13l supplies rigged to some of the reactor coolant pump auxiliaries we were 14!
able to successfully start the reactor coolant pump in the A loop around 15!
8:00 p.m.
I then stayed and talked some more with the plant staff, made 16-an effort to work with the observation center watch that we established, 17!
improving their communications, assign tasks, status and so on.
I left 18!
the Observation Center about, I don't know if it was 1:30 or 2 00 in 19!
the..,in the morning.
The next day then, the 29th, I appeared on Thursday 20l morning at WHP studio, Harrisburg at 7:30, then at 10:00, I and Walt 21!
Creitz held a press conference in the Aztec Room of the Hershey Motor 22l Lodge at..it was around...it was around noon that Walt and I also 23 talked to the Public Utility Commissioners, gave them a briefing on the 24l plant conditions.
At about 2:30 p.m., perhaps it was closer to 3:00, I 25j briefed Senator Gary Hart, Senator Schweiker, Congressman Rotel and i
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l others who came up from Washington.
Herman Decamp was present at that 2!
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briefing, to also following that briefing there was another briefing of 3l additional Congressmen and Senators that came up from Washington.
That 4l first briefing that I gave to Senator.iart was taped.
Lt. Governer's c
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office taped that briefing.
Then again on Friday, March the 30th, I 6j held an 11:00 press conference at the Middletown American Legion Hall 7l j
along with Walt Creitz.
8 9
GIBSON:
For the record Mr. Herbein, I know that you are referring to 10 some notes that you brought with you this morning.
Are these notes you 11 prepared yourself based on your rcollection of the events?
12l 13l HERBEIN:
Yes, and I also had some assistance with the...with the prepar-14 ation of these notes by people that report to me trying to key in on..on 15-times, but they were prepared under my direction, and as such I would...would 16 represent them as mine.
17i 18!
GIBSON:
At the conf usion of the interview, I'd like to request a copy 19!
of these notes for tne record.
20:
I 2 11 HERBEIN:
We'll cartainly provide this.
22j l
23 GIBSON:
I noted that you held several press conferences, and I presume 24j that in each there was some discussion of environmentai conditions 25!
around the plant.
Could you generally describe how you were kept informed r
?y.
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of what environmental radiation and contamination levels were as the 2!
j event unfolded?
3l 41 HERBEIN:
Well, as I indicated we had established an Observation Center E
watch at the Observation Center, with communication links to the various 6i monitoring teams and to the Emergency Control Station, and we were able I
7!
l to...to keep a plot of results that were..that were being recorded by 8!
the various monitoring teams.
So, I was through..through this system able to kee? reasonably informed as to the type of radiation levels, and 10 amounts that were being recorded offsite by the monitoring teams.
11l l
12l GIBSON:
You said that you were able to keep a plot.
Was this done in I
13l such a way that there is a record now of the data that you were recording
- 14I, in the Observation Center?
15-16!
HERBEIN:
There are...there are records, but I can't speak to the exact 17l form of them.
Logs, as I understand it, were maintained and the logs 18 did included radiation readings from monitoring teams, and that information 19!
should be...should be available.
20:
21:
GIBSON:
Okay.
Mr. Herbein, would you describe generally the type of 22l technical support that was provided by your Reading office during the 23;l first three days?
I'm particularly interested in any support that you 24 may have either provided directly or arranged for through consultants in 25j areas such as radiation protection spacialist, public relations and
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l information services, medical consultants, administrative areas.
I'm 2!
j sure that you did provide extensive support in several of these areas so 31 i
if you could just generally describe...
4}
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HERBEIN:
Well, the Public Relations I can't...I can't really speak 6i directly to. I'm not aware of what consulting firms we may have used for 7'
assistance there.
With regard..with regard to medical we did use Radiation Management Corporation personnel, we relied fairly extensively 9!
on...on Porter-Gertz for environmental monitoriag.
For general adminis-10 tration, of course, we brought some of the engineering and administrative 11 types out from Reading to lend support.
The operating arm of...of the 121 company, which takes care of transmission and distribution headed up by 13 Vice President H. L. Robada came out to the site and actually helped 14 establish the trailer city and all the support network that was required 15!
there.
And he pretty well headed up along with Walt Creitz all the 16 administrative support that was necessary.
We utilized the Observation 17)
Center post to coordinate all the initial help coming in from a number 18i of agencies including the NRC in the initial days of the...of the incident.
19i A number of utility folks came in from around the country and we used 20 the Observation Center as a.
.as a staging area, as manpower resources 21!
coordinating center, got them TLD, badged and assigned into the plant in 22l the most expeditious and effective means as we could.
2 31 24j GIBSON:
Did...Mr. Herbein did...do you know ano made arrangements for 25j the Utility people to come in? Was this a Met Ed initiated event or did Utilities voluntarily send people?
t 1
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1{1 HERBEIN:
The utilities in some instances voluntarily sent people, and 2f i
in other instances I used Joe Colitz as a aanpower coordinator and he in t
3!
i turn...he in turn asked for some specific people to come in and help us; 1
4l and I don't recall the exact... exact date that we got Joe involved the c
j manpower business.
I don't recall whether that was the 29th, 30th or 31th, but somewhere in the initial phases, why, we used Joe.
7) 0 GIBSON:
Is it fair to state that most of the arrangements for offsite 9
consultants, administrative support, public information services, help 10-from other utilities was arranged by the Met Ed general office staff, 11 either from the site or from the Reading office or..did 12!
l 13{
HERBEIN:
I' m not... I' m not i
14) 15:
GIBSON:
The basis for my comment is, for my perspective, it appears 16l that the plant staff was primarily involved with coping with events in 17l the plant.
18!
191 HERBEIN:
That's true.
The plant staff handled events in the plant, and 20!
offsite events were..were renc. led by the..by the corporate group, by 21:i myself, by the other officers of Met Ed and to some extent there was 22) assistance from...from GPUSC.
23 2dj MARSH:
Excuse me, before the break point, this is Marsh speaking, I'm 25; going to break briefly at 10:33 and we're leaving 700 on the meter to i
j break and turn this tape over.
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{l fARSH:
The time is now 10:35 and we are set to resume.
Mr. Gibson, I l
2 think you have the floor.
31 4!
GIBSON:
Mr. Herbein.
Did you have on your staff at Reading a specialist c:
~j in the area of radiation protection and environmental monitoring?
Gi 7l HERBEIN:
We've got a radiation safety and environmental engineering 8
section, yes.
And we do have a person with a radiological protection background in that... in that group, that's... that's Beverly Good.
I'm 10 not sure exactly when she came out to the plant site, whether it was on 11 the 28th or 29th, but she was here to the best of my knowledge in the 12!
early.,in the early stages of the event and lent support to the...to 13 the plant activities.
t 34!
t 15!
GIBSON:
To what extent, you..you mentioned earlier, Mr. Herbein, 16 that...that the corporate office was not included, or is not included, 17!
in the emergency plan, the emergency response plan, which is true.
But 19!
to what extent had you been involved prior to March 28 in you capacity 19 as Vice President, Generation, in emergency planning activities here at 20 the site.
I noticed, for example, that your name was on letters arranging 21l support from offsite agencies.
I 22' 23 HER8EIN:
That's..that's true, we are required...we are required to 2dl show prior to being granted a facility license that arrangements and 25l agreements have been made with offsite agencies for a response capability.
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Those agreements were made and were submitted to the...the NRC as a part 2.
j of the licensing requirement, and it. was probably those letters in which you saw my...my signature.
4!
i Si GIBSON:
Have you participated in drills conducted previously at Three 6l Mile Island?
7l 8i HERBEIN:
As the annual emergency plan drill is conducted, yes, I was Cf
]
notified of...of an exercise in... in progress as a part of the offsite 1
notification of Met Ed management.
11; l
12 '-
GIBSON:
Following that notification, did you take some active part in i
13l the exercise?
14i 15' HERBEIN:
No, that was not...that was not called for in the plan.
I was 16; notified and...and acknowledged that..that I'd been informed of the 17l Plant status, but no, I did not take an active role in the exercises.
18!
19!
GIBSON:
I noted earlier you mentioned upon to returning to the visitors 20j centar from the Governor's office, after being briefed on the condition l
21(
of the plant, you made a recommendation to the plant staff that they 22l' increase pressure and take the pressurizer solid.
I found that.
23f 24l HERSEIN:
I don't know that I said take the pressurizer solid.
I recom-25!
mended that they increase pressure.
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GIBSON:
Okay.
To what extent were you involved in making operational 2!
l decisions in the plailt, during this period?
31 4j HER8EIN:
I wouldn't say that I was...that I was involved directly.
I 5
f believe that was the, certainly, it was the station staff's responsibility 6i and they were..they were in fact making the decisions.
I was..I was i
I 7
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kept informed and I did ask questions regarding the...regarding the process by which the decisions were...were being made, and I was satisfied QI
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that they.. that they were doing the best they could, and had the best 10f technical input.
11!
12!
MARTIN:
There's a few questions I would like to direct to you and have 13 you focus your attention, just to the 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> between the time of the 14l trip and the time in which the coolant pump returned to...you were able 15:
to establish cool.. coolant pump.
During that period...that beeper was 16i just the... Mr. Behrle's beeper going off in the background...With II regard to your arrival at the Observation Center and the activities you 18i undertook there, you have already discussed the communications that were li established and what additional communications you called for and were 20j installed later in the day.
Did you collect together during that first 21!
day any tec;1nical staff from Reading to come join you at that Observation 2bl Center to provide you with assistance or establish any communication to 1
2${
technical support consultant, B&W, or other personnel that could give 24j you additional advice or technical input during that first 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />?
i 25l
l 25 1:
HERBEIN:
Well, I was aware that a link had been set up directly with 2i i
B&W.
I satisfied myself that that had occurred.
I was also satisfied 31 that...that the NRC had come directly to the site and had people in the 4!
{
control room with....with open ' phone lines.
As I indicated earlier I Si j
did...I did ask for assistance from...from Porter-Gertz.
I was satisfied that the NRC had...had been asked by us to bring ndditional monitoring i
D teams in, and I think Phil Stohr came down from Millstone about 8:00 at 8
i night.
I had also...I think that's...I think that fairly well summerizes 9f the assistance that...that I recal' we requested.
I 10 11 MARTIN:
I think I asked previously and did not recognize that probably 12i asked a complex question previously, and you answered a portion of it, 13 and I just noted that I don't think we covered all the points.
In the 14 trip to the Governor's office that had occurred after the briefing to 15 the press with yourself, Mr. Miller, and Mr. Kunder, I believe I had 16:
asked or at least I had intended ast did you know of any communications 17l equipment that had been established?
Did Mr. Miller or Mr. Kunder carry 1
18!
either a..a beeper or voice communication, or a walkie-talkie or scmething 19 that...by which they could maintain some sort of contact with the cite?
20; l
21l HERBEIN:
Yes they..they did to the best of my I owledge, and I believe 22) one of them had a beeper.
I 23j 24 25!
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MARTIN:
Did you carry any such equipment or?
2!
l 31 HERBEIN:
No.
I did not.
4l 5!
l MARTIN:
Let me go to a few more detailed questions.
In discussions we 6
have had with others...This is Martin speaking again...In discussions we t
7' j
have had with others there has been some alluding to, or discussion 8 !
about, the degree of throttling with low pressure, high pressure injection, 9!
j sir, high pressure injection, during the early phases, especially when 10!
you...the operators were approaching high pressurizer level indications.
ll'!
Were you aware of the extent or had you any knowledge of that kind of 12I detail about actions that had been taken during the course of the...the t
13!
early phases of the event?
14 1
15 HERBEIN:
No, I was not.
As indicated in my...my briefing to the Senators 16 and Congressmen on the
.on the 29th.
We indicated at that briefing 17 that there were probably events on which we had not had the time to 18r become briefed on, and that only after the investigations were sorted 19!
out would we know..would we know the true facts surrounding some of 20' the..some of the allegations, and particularly high pressure on 21; and emergency feedwater valves.
p 22!
23 MARTIN:
The... bringing up the..your briefing to the Congressional 24l group on Thursday the 29th, do you recall if during that period you were 25j aware of tPo cressure spike that had occurred in the containment prior
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14 to, in fact it was just shortly prior to, Mr. Miller leaving the site to 2l come to meet you at the Observation Center to go to the Lt. Governor's 3!
office?
4!
]9 HERBEIN:
I was not...not aware of the pressure spike.
6i 7
MARTIN:
You don't recall mentioning anything about that during the 8!
briefing or the Congressional..?
9l 10 HERBEIN:
No, I don't.
11:
12 MARTIN:
At the time the decision was reached, or you conveyed your 1sl recommendations, I'm not sure how to characteri::e it, but let's say that 14 you conveyed your recommendation to the operating staff to repressurize 15 the primary system using high pressure injecti]n to try to get a reactor 16-coolant pump in operation, was the operating staff in agreement at that lIf time, or did they...did they see a need for it, or did they feel that 18:
plant conditions was sufficiently stable that repressurization was not 19' the alternative that they would recommend?
20:
2 HERBEIN:
No, we talked about it and ultimately we...we agreed that was 22l the approach that they would take.
Now, I don't recall the..the specific l
23 dialogue but, you know, we...we recogni.' that we had some..we had i
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28 I
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some fuel damage at that point and that, you know, we were into a rela-2l i
tively severe transient, so there, you know, there was some discussion 3l over whether or not we should increase system pressure and following 4li that discussion by joint agreement, why, the pressure was increased.
5l 6i j
MARTIN:
In your comments about that, you did mention it was necessary 7l to rig power at certain auxiliaries to the reactor coolant pumps.
Could i
8!
you expand on your knowledge of that that activity?
9; l
10l HERBEIN:
Well as I recall that...there was the need to get power to a 11l DC lift pump.
This is an oil pump and that..that effort did go forsard I
12l and was...was satisfactorily accomplished and that enabled us to start
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13!
reactor coolant pump.
14 t
15' MARTIN:
To your knowledge, at least, that was the only auxiliary that 16l you needed to service?
17l 18!
HERBEIN:
To the best of my knowledge, yeah.
19i 20l MARTIN:
There was a conference call established early in the morning of 21!
the transient.
I think it was at the time of the first call that you 22 received.
There was, let's see, Mr. Miller I think was at home, Mr-23l Rogers, of B&W, and then yourself.
And I think it was, I believe the 24 contact was by Mr. Kunder from the control room.
You have discussed the 25 nature of that phone call, Could you characterize to me ycur impression
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29 l!
l of Mr. Kunder's motivation?
I don't mean his personal motivation, but 2
what you think lead him to generate a...a conference call at that partic-31 ular time? Did that occur af ter the...both sets of reactor coolant 4!
pumps had tripped?
5!
6!
HERBEIN:
To the best of my knowledge, yes, that's when....
(
7 8
MARTIN:
And, this is about 6:30 when...
1 9
10!
HERBEIN:
Yes, yes.
11l i
12 MARTIN:
..when both pumps had tripped?
13!
14l HERBEIN:
Yes.
I think he was...I think he was concerned because they 15:
had experienced a...a decrease in pressure such that he felt it was 16' necessary to protect the pumps from operation below net positive suction 17!
head, and as a result of the pump trip he was..he thought into the i
ISl natural circulation...into the natural circulation mode of cooling.
And 19 as such I believe he felt it would be responsible and prudent on his 20:
par t to notify...to notify plant management, so he...he did that.
21; i
22l MARTIN:
Do you recall during that particular period of time if anyone 23 noted that the reactor system temperature pressures were essentially 2M corresponding to saturation conditions at that time?
Do you recall a 25j discussion of whether or not the RCS was basically under saturated conditions under.
.?
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l HERBEIN:
No, I don't re...I don't recall that.
2i j
3!
i MARTIN:
Do you recall if there was, in subsequent conversations or in 4!
[
conversations with others, either the plant site or personnel offsite "I
]
during the course of the day, a discussion of the possibility of saturated 6;
l conditions in the...in the' reactor coolant system, not necessarily in so 71 l
many words, but in the sense of whether or not one could be 8I i
establishing...let me...let me rephrase...what I'm trying to get at is, 9I that at what point did you become aware of the fact or the recognition 10f that natural circulation had been compromised, and you were not achieving c
11I natural circulation in the primary?
12 I
13f HERBEIN:
I think that's a difficult...that's a difficult question to 14!
answer because I don' t specifically.... don't specifically call just i
15; when I...when I became aware.
I think in my discussions with..with 16:
Arnold after I came back from the...the Governor's office, I think at i
17!
that time I was aware that that..
that we..that we had a problem, and 18i that we weren't getting the natural circulation that we...that we'd 19i hoped for.
20:
21 MMTIN:
There was a decision after the...
22!
i 23)
HERBEIN:
There was...there was during the..during the..during the day i
24 with my..my discussions with the plant staff, I guess some conce.a 25 about..about saturation conditions in the..in the hot legs and as a t
[
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t 31 i
i 11 result of that, the inability to achieve natural circulation that...the 2!
central...the central approach by the plant staff to the...the transient 31 following the shut off of the pumps had been to attempt to achieve i
4!
natural circulation and then they attempted in the morning I'd say Ci
]
between...between 8:00 and 9:00, and I don't recall tne times exactly, 6i to repressurize and..and start reactor coolant pumps.
I believe they 7
l continued pretty much that effort through the morning, and then the key effort during the afternoon was primarily to...to depressurize the
~l plant, attempt to inject core flood tank water on the core and depressurize i
10 possibly to the point of operating the decay heat pumps.
That was...that 11!
was prima:ily the thrust during the afternoon.
They also...they also l
12 felt with the injection of the core flood tanks and with the depressuri-13l' zation that afternoon that they had achieved some measures of natural ld circulation and core cooling.
Again, we came back from the Governor's 15:
office and reassessed the condition.
We felt it was necessary to try 16l again the increased pressure and get forced circulation.
17l l
18!
MARTIN:
The decision on the mode of ooerating, the pump 1A, when it was 19i put into operation, it was decided to jog it at first.
Was that a 20i precautionary type start to protect the pump or was it for the purpose 21l taking some sort of data to see whether or not it was effective?
22l l
23{
HERBEIN:
It may..it may...it may have been some of both, I...
241 4
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1!
MARTIN:
Okay.
Did you...there was no...nothing stands out in you mind 2:
specifically about the...the methcd of the start of the pump or about..any-3l thing about the starting of that pump?
4!
t 5!
l HERBEIN:
Well, I know that the plant staff had talked to... talked to 6l Lynchburg about the pump start, but the thrust...at least my concern..was 7l to get the pump started and initiate forced circulation, 'cause I thought 8
that was...that was...the... the...the important aspect that we wanted 9
to acccmplish.
10f MARTIN:
Let me ask something much more in general and less specific to i
12;'
the 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> time frame.
There had been as you are well aware other transients on..on both Units 1 and 2 of either turbine trips or other
^3l 14 plant trips.
And during the course of analyses of that... those trips, 15 !
post-trip analyses, does your staff or the Reading staff or any portion IEf of it become directly involved in the review of those analyses, either 17!
from an investigation or an engineering review and analysis?
18f 19' HERBEIN:
Well, to the extent that..that our licensing group reports.. pre-2 pares reports for me to the Nuclear Regulatory Ccamission both the d
licensing group and the engineering group would have some involvement, 22{
again, if t.
incident was reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission.
2i Additionally, there's a requirement for the generation review committee 2df to review certain kinds of..of events and this is a requirement of 25!
the...of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications.
To that extent the people i
e i.
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I 33 1l!
get involved with the review of transients and analyses and primarily 2!
l due to a...or through the licensing... the licensing requiremer.ts.
Now 3l r
we..we have on occasion utilized service company personnel to help us 4:
with transient analyses.
Bob Arnold's group has been...has been helpful ci]
in...in transient analyses in the past, and Metropolitan Edison the 6l operating company does rely on ti on the service company expertise in 7
this particular area, and it has again as I've indicated in the...in the 1
8l past.
10f GIBSON:
Based on any experience or information that is gained as a 11 result of these reviews of transients, it would be through your organiza 12 tion or directly from the site organization where any training benefits 13 from prior transients are factored into the operator...cperator training, 14 requalification training, retraining of staff, generally informing the 15; staff of these transients?
i 16 t
17 HERBEIN:
That transient information would..would be handled here 18!
directly at the site and would be incorporated into the.,into the II training.
20!
21; GIBSON.
I'll just take a moment to browse over my notes, and see if I 22 have any other...
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MARTIN:
At this point, I have no further questions of Mr. Herbein.
2'.
31 l
GIBSON:
Yes, and I have no further questions.
4!
C*
MARSH:
Okay, I have just one question sir.
The Emergency Director in 61 this program...in this plant here, as it stands now, would've been Gary 71 Miller, the Station Superintendent, am I right?
I 8l i
9!
HERBEIN:
That's true.
10f i
11l MARSH:
During the course of the event on, let's say the first two days, i
12 did you have cause to override any of his decisions or did you ride i
13l pretty much with what he had come up with?
14!
15!
HERBEIN:
No, I rode with..with the decisions that he had made, and 16 ;.
felt that his...his notification of..of the offsite agencies was in 17!
fact timely, and I...I agreed with the decisicas and the approach 18!
that...that the plant was taking, as I understood it.
19; 2Dr M,ARSH:
Did he seat your counsel in any of those decisions?
As an l
21l example, the shutting off of the ventilation systems, was that discussed 22 in any great detail before a decision was made?
23 24j HERSEIN:
I beliive the ventilction system may have been secured late on 25]
the evening of the 28th.
I believe we did.
,I believe we did discuss i
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j that, and I believed reached agreement that we wouh..that we would 2:
j shut off the ventilation system to see if, in fact, it would decrease 31 j
some of the releases + hat were taking place through the plant vent.
4j r
MARSH:
Okay, I don't have another question for you.
OK we're all done.
6!
3efore we complete, it's been one of our policies to turn the microphone t
7l over to you for any comments that you would like to make before we 8
conclude our interview.
Now we could do that at this time if you have C~i anything you feel you'd like to discuss or put on the record.
i 10j 11 HERBEIN:
No.
I guess in closing I'd say that I...I feel that plant 12 staff did the best they could under a very difficult situation.
I 13 believe that they behaved responsibly, and I believe the Emergency I
14i Director carried out the emergency plans and procedures to the best of 15:
his ability and in accordance with...with the guidelines that they 16j contained.
17l 18!
MARSH:
Fine.
Recognizing that you're a very busy man still, we appreciate 19 your time in coming in and the time being 11:00 a.m. and reading 125 20' that's 1125 on the meter, we'll terminate at this time.
21!
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23l 24l 25l I
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