ML19242D888
| ML19242D888 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1979 |
| From: | Arnold R GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908280739 | |
| Download: ML19242D888 (39) | |
Text
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1,
In the Matter of:
l 2
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of 4
Robert Arnold Vice President Si General Public Utilities I
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SI i
i Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10j Middletown, Pennsylvania 11l May 9, 1979 12l (Date of Interview) i 13{
July 3, 1979 j
(Date Transcript Typeo) 14l 192 1
(Tape Numcer(s))
16:
17, 181 19l 20l 21; i
NRC PERSONNEL:
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Robert Marsh 23 !
Robert Martin Albert Gibson 24l 25 7Wzzo739 1 r; 7
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4 MARSH:
The date is May 9th.
The time is 8:57 p.m.
This is Bob 1{
2j Marsh.
I am an investigator with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
3 Assigned to the Chicago, Illinois, Region III offices.
This evening 4f we are located in trailer 203 at the Three Mile Island site.
And we 5
are here for the purpose of interviewing Mr. Robert Arnold, Vice 6
President with General Public Utilities, GPU.
Before we' start I would 7) like each of these individuals in the room to identify themselves, 8
spell their last names and give their title.
If you would Bob start.
9j MARTIN:
My name is Robert Martin.
I am Chief Nuclear Support Section, 10 Region II NRC Office.
12l GIBSON:
My name is Albert F. Gibson, Chief, Radiation Support Section,
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Region II, Atlanta.
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15; MARSH:
Now Mr. Arnold if you would.
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17 ARNOLD:
Yes.
My rieme is Robert C. Arnold.
And I am Vice President, Generation, GPU Service Corporation.
20 MARSH:
Marsh:
Mr. Arnold if you would just well first before I ask 21:
you to give some background, before we turned the tape on we had discussed just very briefly this two page memo and included in this 23 memo which covers the purpose of the investigation, covers in some 241 detail the scope and authority of the U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 25i l
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1; in th2 accomplishment of this investigation.
And to some extent your 2
rights during this investigation.
At the conclusion of it, are three questions which I would like to make a matter of the record on the 3
tape.
You have read this and I noticed you have signed off on it, but 4
Sj I'd like your responses for the tape.. Question one reads "Do you understand the above?" making reference to the two page memo.
6 i
7 es sie.
8 9
MARSH:
And question two reads "Do we have your permission to tape the 10, interview?"
121 ARNOLC.
Yes sir.
13 14 l
MARSH:
And the third question reads "Do you want a copy of the tape?"
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FRNOLD:
Yes sir, I do.
17' 18j MARSH:
Okay.
In addition to that tape copy of which I'll provide you 19!
l at the termination of the interview I will also provide a copy of the 20i transcript as it becomes available.
There is a fourth question covered 21; in the body which we have been covering with your people as we go 22l along.
It may not se appropriate here, but I'll indicate it anyway.
23 Normally on the tapes at this point I do ask the people ah they do 24 have the right to have a company representative or. a union representative 25l
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And at this point I would request them to respond to that if 2,
they do want representation.
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3' ARNOLD:
I am aware of my right in that regard and I do not desire to 5{
have anyone here.
I 6l MARSH:
Fine.
At that point then to begin with, Mr. Arnold, if you 7
would could you give us a short resume of your background and your g
g' year history with GPU?
10' ARNOLO:
Yes, I am a 1959 graduate from the University of Michigan with a degree in Science Engineering.
I initially served ten years in the Navy prior to, or subsequent to graduation from college the first four years of which was in destroyers and the last six years of which 15(!
were in the Navy Nuclear Power Program, including the one year of 16l nuclear power training.
I was qualified as an engineer officer of the watch in the Navy's Nuclear Power Program and I was qualified as a 17!
reactor control technician, in fact a chief reactor control technician 18i at the A1W prototype where I was a reactor control material officer 19 for about a year, and. was also qualified for engineer officer on 20l nuclear powered ship.
I resigned from the Navy and terminated my 21 active duty with the rank of Lieutenant Commander.
I came with the 22}l Metropolitian Edisnn Company in Reading, Pennsylvania, in September of 23l 1969, where I was an engineer on the staff of the superintendent of 24l I
production.
At that time TMI Unit No. 1 was about a year and a half 25i (bc
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t into its construction.
Unit No. 2 was a few months into construction.
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My initial assignments were various project engineering responsibilities 3
in the Production Department, including some association with TMI 'Jnit 4
No. l's staffing and plans for training of the staff.
In 1971, June 5
f 1971, I was made supervisor of Production which was essentially 6i ssistant department head.
The Production Department was responsible 7
for the operation, maintenance and engineering support of all the Metropolitian Edison Company generating, operated generating stations.
8 In January 1972, I assumed the responsibility of the department head.
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, the department was elevated organizationally to 10 where I reported directly to the President as manager of generation with the same general scope of responsibility but more management f m dom.
In December 1973, I was made a vice president of Metropolitian Edison Company.
And it was in September of 1974 that Three Mile f
Island Unit 1 weni commercial.
do that from June c. 1971 through the 153 date 6f commercial operatin the Station superintendent for Three 16; Mila Isidad repcrted directly to me.
I continued in that assignment 17l until June of 1977, at which time I became V Le President of Generation 18!
of the GPU Service Corporation.
Primary responsiN in that acsign-y 19!
ment was for design and construction of new gene -ating facilities, 7.0!
l major modifications to existing stations, and I had what would probably 21!
most closely described as corporate staff responsibility for policy, 22{
j coordination, of the implementation of maintenance and operations in 23-engineering support for the three operating company's generating 24!
stations.
I have continued in that role in that assignment until the 25!
present.
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Sir, you indicated that you have three generating stations MARSH:
gj urder your control, could you list those?
Talking TMI 1, what other l
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ARNOLD:
I don't believe I said three generating stations.
si MARTIN:
I believe he meant the three utilities under GPU.
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MARSH:
Three utilities then fine.
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10 ARNOLD:
Yes.
The three operating utilities' generating stations.
121 MARSH:
Okay, that's close enough.
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15l ARNOLD:
I had responsibility, as I say, sort of as corporate staff 16{
but not line responsibility for those stations.
In addition, I might mention that within the GPU Service Corporation, we had centralized a number of the more specialized technical efforts to provide support 1.8!
for the existine nuclear stations and the new, as well as of course 19!
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this support for the or9s under construction.
The most notable of that is nuclear fuel.
21; 22 GIBSON:
Where are your corporate offices now, sir?
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!lj ARNOLD:
Ah the corporate offices are 260 Cherry Hill Road, Parsippany.
2 My office is located at 1 Bloom.'ield Avenue, Mountain Lakes, New I
3j Jersey.
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MARTIN:
And can you briefly describe for this record the relationship 6i of Metropolitian Edison, let me reverse the direction, GPU with Metro-7 politian Edison, stressing such matters as either routine technical 8
support type functions or nonroutine assistance other than those that g
you have already mentioned in your general description?
I take it 0
fr m the general commeats you made you provide basically specialized support, engineering sup,' ort, and it seems to be directed specialized support in matters such as fuel, procurement or fuel management.
And i
that would be designing for the TMI facility would be t.1e major modi-fit tions that may be undertaken.
Is there a size or a, is there a size limit or some other benchmark at which GPU Service would become 15ij involved in the engineering aspects?
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ARNOLD:
Let me just talk about it a little bit because its not that 18l l
precise an arrangement in general.
First of ail, I think its important 19L to understand there are four subsidiaries to General Public Utilities.
20l 21!
MARTIN:
May I have a little water?
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23 MARSH:
Well, I'll wait till Bob gets back.
24 25 J
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7 GIBSON:
Thank you.
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31 ARNOLD:
I think first of all its important to realize there are four i
subsidiaries of General Public Utilities.
Three of them, Pennsylvania 5
Electric Company, Metropolitian Edison Company, and Jersey Central 61 Power ana Light, joint owners of the Three Mile Island facility, are 7
operating electric utility companies.
The fourth, GPU Service Corporation, g
was established in May of 1971 as I recall to provide certain centralized gj capabilities for the GPU sy P m.
General Public Utilities, the parent 10 corporation, owned all the common stock of all three operating companies 3
and 's the owner of the GPU Service Corporation.
3PU Sersice Corporation by charter or by bylaw is only available to serve on a non;cofit basis, the operating subsidiaries.
General Public Utilities, per se g
has a very limited number of employees:
basically the officers of the l
company. and the president of General Public Utilities is also tha 15!
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president for the GPU Service Corporation, Herman Decamp.
The cha.rman g
of General Public Utilities is also the chairman of GPU Service Corpora-tion and of each of the three operating subsidiaries and is the chief executive officer of each of those five corporations.
The presidents 19l of the individual operating companies are the chief operating officers 20j l
for their respective company.
And Herman Decamp is the chief operating 21!
officer for GPU Service Corporation and for General Public Utilities.
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So that the line responsibility for the operation of the individual 23 j
operating subsidiaries rests with the operating subsidiaries corporate 24i officers.
GPU Ser/ ice Corporation provides a coordination and integration 25!
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of those issues which are, which need to be dealt with on a common l
2l basis across the system for economy of operation, efficiency of operation,
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3l reliability of the system.
That's consistent with and in fact the 4{
objective of the holding act.
So within the Generation Division, 5
which I head up in the GPU Service Corporation, we do as you indicated 6
provide specialized services to the three operating companies that can 7
best be provided on centralized basis.
So that ah nuclear fuel manage-g ment, procurement of application services, is done on a centralized g
basis within within my division, or the in core fuel management issues.
10!
Within the Service Corporation another division uranium. procurement, is 3
is handled on a centralized basis and they also handle planning g
for subsequent storage, shipment disposal of spent fuel.
All operating and maintenance budgets and capital budgets of the individual operating subsidiary generating stations or generation divisions are reviewed by myself and my members of my staff for me.
Ali authorizations to 151 16; committ funds above a $100,000 are re<iewed an approved by myself as
!g part of the internal processes.
In te rms of whether or not we would 18!.
prov m the engineering services that is not so much a function of the dollar amount as it is the capabilities that we have and whether or not we can do it more efficiently than either being done within the 20' l
individual operating company or contracted out. iIn general work 21l f
22l that's contracted out we do not manage for the service corporation, for the individual operating utility other thar very large jobs for 23 which a substantial engineering and construction management staff may 24l t
be necessary.
They would contract fuel se~ vices directly.
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MARTIN:
For a sense of perspective, could you give me a rough estimate 1
2; of the size of the GPU Service Corporation in terms of staff professional i
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r technical staff.
These really, we only need the rough numbers just 4
for a perspective of the staff size that's available.
5 ARNOLO:
My recollection is that the GPU Service Corporation has about 6l 7
550 employees, 250 of which are in the generation division.
Of that 8
250 the I would estimate 175 to 190 are professional or technical gj specialist.
10j MARTIN:
As you may know Al and I are covering obviously the same incident but we are focusing in somewh5s ditferent time frames, so if I could I would like to ask you to direct your attention initially to g
i the initial day of the incident and most of the questions I'll be 14!
directing towarc you will cover that more limited period of time, froa the time of the start of the incident the turbine trip to the time at 16i which the reactor coolant pump 1A was put into service.
So that is 17(
l the focus at this point.
Could you inform me of the manner and approximate 18!
timing to the best of your recollection of when you first became aware that there were difficulties at the TMI site on March 28?
20t 21; ARNOLD:
Yes.
I'll before preceeding the answer to that let me kind 22!
j of put a qualifier on all my responses at this time and then I won't I 23!
I will refrain from adding a qualifier each time.
I think it would be 2 41 unrealistic for me to think of my recollection of the initial hednesday, 25!
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lj Thursday and Friday, Saturday sequence of events and when I might of 2
talked to whom and what the nature of those conversations were with a l
3l great deal of accuracy.
So I will, I guess acknowledge ahead of time i
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there may well be discrepancies that develop as time goes on and 5
additional people are interviewed.
I do remember with great precision 6l assuming that without atesting to the accuracy of my clock, but the 1
7' clock on my desk when I was notified was 7:59 on Wednesday the 28th, I g'
received a call from George Tropher, who is the manager, Operational g
Quality Assurance for Metropolitian Edison Company.
During which time 10 he inf rmed me that there had been a turbine and reactor trip at Three Mile Island Unit No. 2, that B steam generator appeared to have a primary to secondary leak, that there were increased radiation levels in the reactor compartment and that a site emergency had been declared.
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MARSH:
Where would Mr. Tropher's normal duty station be? Would he be 15 16{
callino from Reading or from the site? Or where would he have been when he called you?
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ARON 0LD:
Mr. Tropher was calling me from Reading' which is his normal 19!
work location.
At least as far as I know he was in Reading.
I assume 20j he was when he called.
Attempts had been made to reach me prior to my 2U arrival at the office just prior to which almost coincided with George's 22{
call but I'd left home already.
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,l lj MARTIN:
Could you tell me if the call to you would have been placed 2
as part of a preplanned no indication of GP Service Company, that is 3
GP Service Company has some specific emergency response responsibility r was it more of an information to a to an executive officer in that 4l 5
regard?
Si ARNOLD:
It's some of each, I think.
The emergency plan does not 7
g identify the specific responsibility on the part of tns Service Corpora-g' tion as far as I know.
However, the notification requirements, if not 10J in the emergency plan then of other administrative procedures relating y
to notification for off-normal events includes notification to the vice president of Generation and GPU Services Corporation.
My interpre-tation of that requirement and I was in position to identify the list of people to be named at one point when we were writing those procedures is that the vice president of Generation would be the most likely 151 person to be in position to respond appropriately with technical I
systems on an off-normal condition.
17l 18 MARTIN:
You are in a sense anticipating my the second question I am 19!
about to ask.
But before I ask that one, in view of the sequencing with you being called, and what you just related as to the administrative 21i procedures which would call for notification of the Vice President of 221 Generation.
Do you believe that you were the first GPU Service Company 23 official notified?
Do you have any reason to bel ~2ve that cerhaps 24{
other staff members had received notification prior to you?
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I would expect that I would be probably the first that they 2{
w uld attempt to contact.
And to my knowledge no one was contract, l
31 contacted prior to myself.
1 4l 5
MARTIN:
Will you then describe to me what initial actions you took in 6
... perhaps in your position and with your responsibilities as Vice President?
7 8
ARNOLD:
Well, the..
I guess the first thing I did was to leave word gj i
10j at the office of Dick Wilson who is my Director of Technical Functions and who has reporting to him four departments, Quality Assurance, i
Systems Engineering, Engineering and Design, and Project Engineering, to come and see me as scon as he arrived that morning.
Very shortly I
after that I talked by telephone with Walt Price who is president of 141 Metropolitian Edison Company, and with ah Jack Herbein, Vice President 15; of Generation of Metropolitian Edison Ccmpany, and I don't recall for 16:
the moment which the sequence was.
I had talked with both of em I 17 think by 8:30.
18!
191 MARTIN:
Was there a mobilization or an establishment of a line of 20i i
communication between Mr. Wilson in his role as superintendent of 21l l
technical functions or members of his staff with the emergency organiza-22l tion as it would have been constituted at the Three Mile Island site 23 for the purpose of providing essentially on-line technical support?
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ARNO D:
There is not any formal establishment of that P.ind of arrange-2 ment.
The people within Wilson's four departments are routinely 31 available to site personnel for assistance in various problems or 6
4j issues.
We do not have the, perhaps what might be considered, the 5
equivalent of a emergency response center or emergency control center 6
at our New Jersey offices for this type of incident.
My purpose in 7
contacting Mr. Wilson was to inform him that the reactor trip had g
occurred and that we should get some of his staff lined up to go to g
the site as expeditiously as could reasonable be achieved.
It was not 10 at that point in my mind a, an emergency anywhere near approching the magnitude or not even of the same nature as what we eventually came to realize we were facing.
13 MARTIN:
Can you tell me if in fact there was a dispatching of technical people from Mr. Wilson's staff to the site and approximately as best 15:
you can remember if it occurred, when it occurred?
16; I
17l ARNOLD:
I don't know what time they left but it's about a three and a 18t half hour tr normally.
And I believe they arrived late afternoon or early evening and the initial group to come out here consisted of five 20; orofessionals.
I think three or four of which are supervisor, super-21!
visory engineer level people.
22lI 23 GIBSON:
Mr. Arnold had GPU Service technical people ever been dispatched 2 41 to the site before in response to a problem such as a trip?
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1 ARNOLD:
We have never dispatched to the site because of a trip per se.
2:
The last previous time I think that we had dispatched them under the 3f certain sense of urgency I guess as opposed to going out to res and to 4f m re routine kind of problems... was... the reactor trip where we Sj had the steam valve discharge failures which had been I guess upwards g
of a year ago?
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gi GIBSON:
During your conversations with Dick Wilson and Mr. Herbein, i
g; did they specifically request support of you in the early morning urs?
10 11 ARNOLD:
12; Well with regard to Dick Wilson, I informed him that I wanted I
a group sent.
And when I talked to Jack Herbein I either told him 131 that, you know, we were sending or that I would be sending a group.
I 14!
15j don't recall if he requested or if I just volunteered.
But it was understood between the two of us that I would be sending a group out i
there to look at, I guess to ensure that I'm not perhaps misleading 176 you, I was not sending them out with the idea that that time that the 18l 19l situation was such that they were needed to place the plant in a safe i
condition.
They were really going out there in order to review the l
plant history and to initiate the investigations that we normally do 21l after all these plant trips prior to returning the plant to power.
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23l GIBSON:
When you say the investigation that you normally do, is do 24I you mean that in a general term for each of the operating divisions or 25l l
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do you mean specifically that GPU Service Corporation provides a...
2 performs an investigation of one level or another for each of the unit I
31 trips, or other off-normal conditions?
l 4l 5l ARNOLD:
GPU Service would... would, I think can inveriably be involved
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61 in reviewing any significant off-normal events at any of the stations, 7
but in terms of an investigation prior to returning the plant to g
power, after a reactor trip it would really depend upon the... I gj guess the degree to which we felt we were we understood the reason for 10 the trip and the extent to which anything other than just the obvious ig causes where we needn't be invnbied.
So we did not usually have g
transients or off normal condtions that would have the service corporation participating in a significant way prior to starting t.p again.
But 13 certainly on anything, and in this case I think it was the lack of un e an ng e
e e ee system in inWadng me 15 trip as well as the secondary indications of the primary / secondary leak that lead me to be concerned about the need for a more than routine kind of look at the plant.
The infor:..tcion we had at that time was... I'm talxing 8:30, with really only the three telephone calls data recall only being supplied in from Tropher and Herbein was 20 not such that either Dick or I were particular alarmed and certainly 21; were not concerned about the safety of the core at that point.
t 23 MARTIN:
Could you describe for me if your contacts with the site 241 I
throughout the remainder of the first day were frequent?
Or was your 25i
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information, let me rephra::e that, were direct?
For exampie perhaps t
2f Herbein or did most of your information about the status of the plant 3
in the course of the first day come from other sources other than f
q direct conversations with Herbein?
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6 ARN0LD:
Almost all my information was indirect.
I guess referring to 7
the reported comnients of Harold Denton, just as you can't manage an g
emergency from Washington, you can't run the plant from Parsippany so gl I followed really a practice that I'd established even when I was in 10:
Reading and responsible for the operation of Three Mile Island, of 7p attempting to permit the plant level staff, the plant staff, to handle i
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plant issues and be sensitive to any signals from them whether direct r,
r subtle.
That additional assistance was needed which I could 13 provide or from which the resources I had control of could provide.
15;!
So I had the conversation with Herbein shortly after 8:00.
I believe the next conversation I had with the, as the plant status was, with 17;!
the plant at about 10:00, as I recall.
10:00 to 10:30 probably.
In that case I did call directly into the curtrol room because I knew 18j Herbein not to be available as he was in transient.
The.
and I had 19!
received a call from B&W asking if I could provide them any assistance 21l in attempting to get in contact with their site manager Lee Rogers, who they thought to be in the control room, but they had been unable to contact him.
So I did call the control room at that time, my I
recollection is that I talked with Lee and Gary Miller.
I did get 24 some plant status from them frca them.
It was not indicative of 25!
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conditions which increased my concerns significantly of, my recollection 2
is that I did feel that we had the possibility based upon the radiation 3
levels in containment which I did't have a precise understanding of,
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but I guess basically, primarily because of the report of the dome 4
5 monitor reading.
Frankly, was so high that it didn't appear to have 1
6l any corelation with anything that would be meaningful, or would be 7
realistic.
And I suspected that we had a moisture problem with a...
8 r some type of failure from steam in containment, because I was aware g
that the ruptured disc had failed, on the compartment drain tank.
I 10 did have some concern through that we may have some fuel damage at that point.
I... my recollection is I was not as concerned as Herbein 11 was, that or I did not think that probability was quite as high as I felt that Herbein had expressed earlier in the day in talking with me.
13 14!
MARSH:
Do you recall the approximate time of that call?
15 16!
I ARNOLD:
My recollection is it was about 10:00 or 10:30.
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MARSH:
Were you aware at that time that it still at a site emergency 191 level or advised that that had been elevated?
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ARNOLD:
I don't recall that I was ever specifically aware that it had 22 been changea from elevated frcm a site emergency to a general emergency.
23l I just don't, don't know-My next conversation that I recall was, was 24l with Tropher which was about 11:45, nearly as I can recall and which 25!
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was my first understanding that we had indications of off-site releases.
2 I had been in conversation I believe with Walter Kreitz sometimes 3
during the morning as well and for, it was my understanding, I recall i
4 why right now, that he was in the process of contacting the Governor's 5
ffice to discuss the incident and I did not think that he was aware 6i that we had any indications of off-site releases, cause I remember 7
telling George Tropher specifically to be sure he gets the information g
to Walter Kreitz so that he informs whoever he speaks with whether its the Governor or representative that... that we do have indications of g
some off-site releases.
That again did not alarm me particularly, in 10}
as much as on Unit 1 when we had the reactor drain pump, the reactor drain tank disc rupture, we had, had on occasion had small puffs of 12}
xenon which were detectable at the site boundary.
Or at least we were 131 aware that they were they were detectable on the plant monitoring system, at least.
So I did not ;et have the degree of alarm perhaps 15:
16;l that was called for.
The next time I talked to anyone, and I suspect somewhere about this time I talked with Herbein and I'm sure that some 17, I
about midmorning I talked with Mr. Decamp who was in Harrisburg that 18l day.
And both or part of Walt and my conversation at the beginning of 19!
the morning was with regards to trying to contact him and that we both 20t would do what we could to be sure that he was aware of it.
Bill 21 l
Coons, Chairman of the company, who was home ill, and I did talk with him a couple or three times during the day to alert him about what I 23 knew about the situation.
And I talked to Herman Decamp probably two 74 l
or three times during the day.
The next contact that I had with the 25i f
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h lf site that I recall grew out of additional concern I believe that Dick g{
Wilson triggered because of information that I th.nk came to him l
31 through his fuels people who had been in contact with some people at i
4j the site talking Gout plant parameters they were plant parameters and 5
I d n't have a specifics on it.
I just recall that about 2:00 or l
61 there abouts, I called into the control room again because of some of 7
the information that Dick had gotten through his circuits.
And I g
believe at that time I talked with George Kunder and Lee Rogers again.
g' They were at that time depressurizing to come down on the core flood 10l We expressed to them a very strong concern that they did not tanks.
have a solid system.
Independent of the pressurizer that they had the steam bubble, the steam bubble in the reactor vessel and the TH legs I
potentially.
I think we really were thinking what a TH legs being 13l 14[
void and the only way that that could happen is that they were having obviously very bulk boiling in the reactor vessel.
16i 17(!
MARSH:
Excuse me Mr. Arnold, you said "we expressed" was there someone i
else from your staff as well?
18J 191 20
-ARNOLD:
Yes, we had, as I recall probably three or four in the room with me on a speaker phone.
And I think Dick Wilson and Bob Keaton 21; who is the manager of Systems Engineering were at least there.
I 22f don't recall.
No, no one else was there.
So we expressed as I say at 23
' hat time out concern that the that they had perhaps uncovered the 24l f
co'e, and that they could not be competent at that time that the core 25; j
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was covered from the information that we had.
Their response as I 2
recall was that they were competent that they had not uncovered the 3
core and they had depressurized now to the point where they were on y
the core flood tanks and they had just received indication that the A 1
p was : olid.
They did agree that they had probably, undoubtedly 5
6 had some steam formation in the TH leg.
But that as I indicated they felt the A loop was now solid and that the B loop would be solid shortly.
And that with the solid loops being restored they would then 8
g' be in position to have natural circulation.
We left that, ended that us s W 1 expressing our concern dat Mey cou M not c nvers nw 10j be, that we, we were still uneasy about whether or not they had had a 111 solid system.
You know I would add that in retrospect obviously they, obvious they had at that time a very large hydrogen bubble and that 13i thought certainly never crossed my mind that they were going through a 141 metal water reaction.
Nor do I believe any of the others in the room 15; with me had the thought of that sort of event.
My subsequent conversation was I believe next with Jack Herbein, somewhere arcund 4:00 - 4:30.
And in the meantime Wilson and some of his people had continued to discuss among themselves and with me what plant parametric values they 19!
thought existed at various times and what the significance of it was.
20!
And in particular they were concerned that we may still not have 21; collapsed the steam bubble completely in the system.
And I don't 22l i
recall if Jack called me or I called him.
He probably called me cause 23f I am not sure I would know how to get in touch with him at about the 24l time that these conversations had reinforced concerns earlier to where 25i
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I felt appropriate to perhaps insist a little more strongly on what 2l they would do.
l 31 1
MARSH:
0.K., the time is 9:45.
We have just tripped off on the first 4
Sj side of the reel, and we are starting the second reel, second side of l
Gi the first casette, meter reading of 728.
Excuse me.
7 ARNOLD:
8 As I was saying, I recommended strongly to Jack that he g
insist that they, that the plant personnel, turn on the charging pumps 0
and take the plant solid and ensure that they have collapsed any steam bubbles in the systems.
At least taken the plant up to as I recall i
something like 2200 or 2300 pounds, and that we attempt to get a pump I
started.
131 141 GIBSON:
Mr. Arnold, about what time do you estimate this conversation 15 :
took place again?
l 17!
ARNOLD:
My recollection is it was about 4:00 to 4:30.
19l GIBSON:
Did 20;
.. did your staff seem to be the only group at the time 21;I who had strong concern about a bubble existing or the core being uncovered?
22l 23 ARNOLD:
Well, I don't know exactly when, what the timing was when 24; talking to B&W, but my recollection is that very shortly after that 25t
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conversation with Herbein I talked again with the people in Lynchburg.
i 2
And I believe they called me and they effectively, as I again as I 31 recall, were making the same recommendation.
They did not feel that 4
the plant staff was... and I shouldn't say plant staff, the people in 5
the control room, were I guess sufficiently in agreement with their 6i Perception of things to proceed in that way.
I related to them the conversation that I had had with Herbein then.
And it could be that 7
g the two calls were reversed in sequence, I can't say for sure, but I g'
don't think so.
We also talked, as I recall, at that time about 10, getting a pump started and I told them that I would like to be a party to the decision on how to start it.
And I think over the next hour and a half or two hours there were a couple of phone calls between j
Lynchburg and our office perhaps at the site in which we agreed that we would there was agreement I should say that the pump would be initially jogged and not brought up to full speed.
And then depending i
15<
on how that looked, we would either jog again or start the pump.
And that was subject to be done at about 8:00, as I recall.
There was 17i also conversations I believe or in the conversations that I earlier 18r had with the plant, probably the 2:00 one, at which we talked about 19}
starting the pump.
And there was a great deal of concern at that time 20l
[
as I recall it as to whether the pump could be run without damage.
21t They described their earlier attempts to run the pumps the lack of of 22 power requirements by the pump indicating that the pump really wasn't 23 pumping any fluid.
And the, and I suspect although I can't really 24!
recollect..
recall with assurance that they felt that with the solid 25i l
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A loop they would... would be reestablishing natural circulation.
f One of the the points that B&W made and what I believe was a conversation 2
3 after the last conversation, I referred to with Herbein at 4:00 or 4(
4:30, was that the 100 amps indicated was during the starting of the 5
pump was less than the motor should draw uncoupled.
So there was some I
6i inconsistency in the reported power demands of the pump when it was 7
tried earlier in the day.
But that's kind of a ragged disjointed 8
ccount of the conversation but I'm afraid it's about the best I can do.
g 10j
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GIBSON:
The decision to go ahead and pressurize certainly followed that time period or at least the action.
As I recall perhaps even immediately after that, I'm trying to remember the exact time frame i
13{
and it's passed my mind.
I think actually the block valve was closed 14!
and the 5:00 to 6:00 kind of time frame.
15; 16 i
ARNOLD:
No, the block valve, as I understand it, for the electromatic 17l6 relieve was closed about 6:22.
18(
19l GIBSON:
It would have been after, what I was trying to get at is that 20!
l there was a period of time between the time in which you expressed you 21; i
iterated your strong concern tc the staff.
I presume to Herbein at 22f that,',oi nt.
And the final decision to..
to go ahead and close the 23 block valve and take the plant on up to full pressure 24l 25f
~.-
cc
i 24 1!
ARNOLD:
Yes.
I think that, and it may well have been that the block l
2:
valve had been opened in the interim in the attempt to depressurize to l
31 get on the cara flood tanks.
In obviously I've looked at some of the 4
sequences of events, information that we put together and hopefully my 5
recollection as to when the conversations took place were not influenced 6
by that, but I believe it was something like the time period from 5:00 7
to 6:30 that they were taking it back to ah full pressure.
81 t
g' GIBSON:
Mr. Arnold, obviously your staff made a very valuable input regarding increasing the reactor coolant system pressure and starting 10l the pump recommending such, had you previously considered the need for having technical staff available to analyze, sit back and analyze plant conditions in an emergency situation and provide advice to the site? And as I can see it's apparent to me that there would be an dvantage in having a technical staff that could step back from the 15 crisis and look in a more calm fashion at what's taking place in the i
control room at in plant parameters and make advice such as your staff 17l l
did, I was wondering had you preplanned that type of activity?
Or if 18(
l to your knowledge Metropolitian Edison had a technical staff that had 19!
that responsibility?
21j ARNOLD:
I think Al that you have to hear the answer to that quLstion in the context of the industry's general perception of these types of 23t incidents.
And at least my characterization of that would be that the 24l type of accidents that we have been concerned about are ones which by 25i f
/09 wc t
25 l
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and large take place in a very short time frame.
And t.1e intent of r
gj our procedures and our training of the plant staff has been to give 3
them the ability to recognize the condition of the plant, the condition i
of the equipment, and operate that equipment in such a way as to Sj terminate off normal conditions.
I don't think any of us really 6l thought of the plant accidents as stretching out over a period of many 7
hours and which would then lend itself to the type of kind off-line g
resource group to provide that type of advice to the operators.
I g
think the the experience of the March 28 and the succeeding days you know certainly give us cause to rethink that.
O 111
]
GIBSON:
Did GPU Service Corporation dispatch any other people other than that first group of five?
That group of five people that were sent from your technical group?
r 15, ARNOLD:
Yes.
On the, Thursday morning and I don, recall now whether, 16i well I guess I do as I think about it, by Wednesday evening, we had I i
17' think had realized that there may well be significant core damage and that was significant in in terms of our view of the world of possi-r 1$
bilities at that time not significant in terms of what we now have 20f experienced, and that this would not be the type of post trip investi-211 gation and assessment in return to power that several hours earlier we 22 had been anticipating.
So that we had decided Wednesday evening that 23l Dick Wilson would go to the site the following day with some more of 24!
his people, to head a relatively formal board of investigation into 25!
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26 1!
the incident.
We in fact drafted a which I don't recall recall if I 2
drafted that night or the next morning which was prepared in smooth i
3i f r Herman Decamp's signature the next, the next day and which Wilson Iq took with him which identified a an investigative board and what the 5
responsibilities of those were.
The whole letter being written with 61 the idea that at that point the incident par-se was terminated.
I believe *here were four more Service Corporation people that went out 8
late Thursday morning and also Tom Kremn: ens who is Manager of Generation g
Engineering for Jersey Central Power and Light went to the site and I'm not aware of what prompted him them to go he was, we were very gj grateful to. help them there.
I also called Bill Lowe of Pickard and Lowe, early Thursday morning and told him that I thought the situation was quite serious and asked him to serve on the investigative board f
and asked him to first go to the site as quickly as he could.
Which he did do.
So then on Thursday we had those five additional people 15 there, mid-afternoon I suppose by the time they got there.
In talking 16, with Herman Decamp on Thursday afternoon and evening, I guess it r'eally more in the evening than afternoon, it was apparent to him that 18{
some of the things that my people who had gone out to the site and who 19I had on Wednesday afternoon and evening and during the day on Thursday i
20l had begun to piece together was not known at that point and all the 21l details to Jack Herbein.
And I did not have a a lot of details but I 22I think by Thursday morning, certainly I was aware that the high pressure, 23 the high pressure injection pumps, had been reduced in their utilization 241 during the early part of the transient to some extent.
I didn't 25i
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27 I
lf really know how much, but that I was aware of and I was also aware 2l that the operators had been principally concerned because of their i
3l inability to control pressurizer level and that we had depressurized 4;
consideraaly.
As a result of that concern, and I think that at that 5
time as I indicated before I was concerned about the degree to which 61 we may have fuel damage.
The... as a result of you know that that 7
perception of where my understanding was versus the vis a vie Herbein's 8
understanding I made arrangements for a charter flight from Morristown g
to the site or to Harrisburg for early Friday morning and I arrived ut here at about 8:00 a.1.
We... ah we in the meantime through 10f I
11j Wilson, really I guess I shouldn't say we, but Wilson had in the i
12{
meantime I believe probably mostly on Thursday evening, then talking with his people in New Jersey and at Mountain Lakes and had directed a f
number of them to come to the site.
I don't know how many of them got l
there on Friday, but I suspect there were anywhere from another 10 to 15t 16; 30 that showed up some time Friday.
And I just don't know by then.
I Before we were very far in the weekend we had probably in the order of 17J I guess it was 60 to 80 of our Service Company people my division out 18; there.
191 i
20l 21;j I would like at this point to pursue with a specific point GIBSON:
l and that is the, at about the time period of 2:00 on that afternoon, 22' it was just about the time frame that the plant pressure had been reduced and the core flood tanks had been observed to have a slow 24:
discharge and or at least a small level charge after they were coupled 25l n
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28 I
t lf to the system, the plant was depressurized, that a decision was made i
2{
for I believe, if I'm correct Miller, Herbein and I believe Kunder to i
3l go to the capitol and at least brief either the Governor or Lieutelant f
,4{
Governor at that point.
Were you aware or could you tell me what 5
knowledge you have of that decision if any?
6 7
ARNOLD:
I'm sure that I was aware that Herbein was going up to the 8
Governor's Office or Lieutenant Governor's Office whichever he was g
originally scheduled for.
I was not aware until sometime after they 10, had gone up t1ere and I would suspect it was 3:00, 3:30 that Gary and George had gone with him.
I was informed of that by Mr. Decamp who of course was up there also.
I knew Jack was going and that was the g
reason that I called directly into the contrcl room at 2:00 when I described that I had called him.
15i I
MARTIN:
Okay.
From your own knowledge not conjecture, but from your 16; j
cwn knowledge do you know the source of the decision to go to the Governor's Office at that point?
i 19j ARNOLD:
Well, I'm not sure what you mean by my own knowledge, the i
Governor did not contact me...
21:
22l l
MARTIN:
What I meant was I heard I was not lo uing to pursue that I 231 heard that it was so-and-so that said that Jack should go to the 24, Governor's Office.
25l l
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29 1
ARNOLD:
Well, I would think that I i
2!
l 31 MARTIN:
Something more certain than....
4 4!
5{
ARNOLD:
I would think that I knew Jack was going either because I i
6f talked with Jack in that time period or I talked to Walt Kreitz and 7
Waiter told me, but I, I'm fairly competent I knew about it with g
enough assurance that I knew that Jack..~as not available.
9 10l That's the degree of assurance though?
MARTIN:
l 11l ARN0LD:
Yes.
12 13 MARTIN:
At this point I want to turn it over to 41.
15l GIBSON:
16:l Mr. Arnold, 7'd like to review for just a moment the types of l
technical capability you have on your staff, and in particular I've 17l made a few notes to myself here to refresh my memory.
do you have 18I radiation protection specialists on your staff?
You or Dick Wilson?
19!
20{
ARNOLD:
We have a large number of people within the organization who 21l l
had gone through the Navy nuclear power training program who had been 22' in the Navy's construction program, from the shipyards standpoint, 24l side of things and consequently had background in radiation protection principles and practices.
Ti.9 '.ily individual that we had who was, 25i t
30 i
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11 who was specializing in that area in a staff position is Don Ruppert.
2{
Don is a radiation protection specialist.
I do not believe he is l
31 certified, but I know that he is has experience equivalent for certification.
4 And he works for Jack Thorpe who is a manager of Environmental Affairs Si and has and has responsibility for within his department for nuclear 6
licensing and for analysis, safety analysis, from the plant systems 7f outward to the environment.
Dick Wilson's group handles the plant's 8
safety analysis and the in plant safety analysis.
I 9'
10 GIBSE:
I see.
Did, I know that later in the next week Jack Thorpe did come to the site I met him here I'm r.ot sure exactly when he 12 arrived, I think it was probably after our period of interest ends on w ch is mMnW de 301 13 14!
ARNOLD:
Jack Thorpe went to Reading on Thursday as a technical resource 15 16l to the Med Ed corporate staff for me.
He returned I believe to New Jersey, Thu,'sday evening with my concurrence, and I don't believe that I asked him to come to the site until early the following week.
18!
191 l
GIBSON:
Do you know if Don Ruppert responded and came to the site?
20!
?
21l ARNOLD:
Yes.
Don Ruppert came out with Dick Wilson on Thursday.
23l GIBSON:
Okay.
How do you spell his name for the record?
RUPPERT?
24i 25i n 1 '-
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ARNOLD:
Yes sir.
2!
i 3f GIBSON:
Can you describe briefly ah the expertise on the GPU Services staff for environmental surveillance?
I'm thinking of environmental 4l 5!
monitoring, sampling, analysis of the environment impact?
I 6i 7
ARNOLD:
From a racic'ogical standpvin ?
8 gj GIBSON:
Yes.
l 10' ARNOLD:
3 We have a limitod capability in that regard I would characterize it we have utilized since before preoperational on Unit 1, TMI Unit 1 the firm of Pickard Lowe in Garytown in particular Keith Woodward, g
Woodaro, who I believe as a well recognized competence in this area.
Has been the chief architect and chief reviewer of our implementation 15; and execution of our environmental radiological monitoring.
Metropolitian Edison Company has on its staff a fellow by the name of Jim Mudge who has a PhD in physiology and has worked in environmental monitoring of 18; various both types, i.e., both radiological and nonradiological for a number of years.
Michael Burling, BURLING, is also on t.he Reading corporate staff and he has a background a background similar to Don i
Ruppert although not as extensive.
22' 23 GIBSON:
These people that you are naming I assume that sometime or 241 other they were all involved in the response to the incident?
Do you 25!
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32 i
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know to what extent they were involved? When they reported to the 2
site if they did?
I 3l i
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ARNOLD:
Well let me first clearify that the offsite releases and the S'
impicmentation of the emergency plan for offsite surveillance of the 6
incidert is predominately executed by the plant staff.
The emergency 7
plan provides for required off ite "tonitoring.
Michael Burling came 8
ut fairly early, I imagine cause i, it s ams at least in retrospect that he was here when I was here.
Initially we requested on Wednesday g
10 the assistance of Radiation Management Corporation who were contract f
and in fact this firm had been set up to assist in these kinds of incidents to help and they arrived on Wednesday.
So these people were involved to varying degrees but the offsite release monitoring for a real time basis was primarily being administered and executed by the 14i emergency plan team augmented by RMC Radiation Management Corporation and I think perhaps I'm getting a little bit outside you know the area of my first-hand knowledge.
But there were probably others.
The..
17(!
I know from my own participation and you know, and subsequent review i
18!
of information that Pickard and Lowe, and RMC people ard 'im Mudge 6
19:
were involvec in the analysis of the data that was gathered together from our environmental monitoring stations.
And that the the pickup 21(
of that information was made on a daily basis and the information is 22 feed into our computer in Reading and was then available through the 23l termals in Reading.
24l 25i
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33
?
1; GIBSON:
Mr. Arnold, I have a list of the company names that we had 2
compiled and it may act be 411 inclusive but if you would scan the 3
list, perhaps it would help your memory, we are trying to establish l
f what type of support GPU Services did provide or arrange for during 4
5{
the early days, ome of thes companies were not involved unitl later, l
61 but looking down that list I note that you have already mentioned
-/
several companies on the list, do you see arif others that to your 8,
knowledge which were arranged by GFU Services?
'l 9i ARNOLD:
101 1 think even the most knowledgeable might have a dif ficult y
time knowing exactly who made arrangements and to what extent various i
companies sent people and we just agreed to it.
13 GIBSON:
Okay.
l 15!
ARNOLD:
But clearly we were in touch with B&W and while they initiated on their own initiative, while they took it upon themselves to initiate a very substantial technical effort on Saturday at some time like 18(,
11:00 to 12:00, I personally talked with John MacMillen vice president in charge of their Lynchburg division that supports Three Mile Island 2q 21l and requested the full support of his technical cabilities and authorized the use of the full supports available, full scope of support available, to him for the incident.
There was a lot of activity prior to that i
going on?
Obviously.
Bechtel as I recall volunteared people and 24 initially and we said yes by all means come.
I was not principally 25i
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34 f
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involved in... in making the contacts.
I was aware of many of them 2
going on.
And I could run through here and I'm sure that I could i
3{
identify 30 or 40 of the 100 or so that are here that I know that you know the Service Company took the initiative to contact, but in many 5,
cases, particularly from the other utilities there was either a telephone 6
call to offer certain kinds of assistance or to tell us we've sent 7
these kinds of people are on their way.
8 GIBSON:
g For the record, GPU Services did make arrangements for a 10 number of off site companies to assist in the recovery?
11' ARNOLD:
Yes.
For example I think by Friday afternoon, although again
}
it might not, be my memory is a little hazy, but by Friday afternoon I think we had a dedicated phone lines from Dick Wilson's office to 15l Westinghouse, B&W, Combustion Engineering, and estinghouse, into 1
their technical staffs.
And he had as I say dedicated phone lines 16!
picked up they had hot line types of arrangement into those technical 17!
I facilities.
18t 19l GIBSON:
Okay, Mr. Arnold one more question, you commented earlier 20!
that the emergency plan is a site emergency plan, to your knowledge of 21, GPU Services does not have the responsibility assigned to this plan, I recognize that to my knowledge they don't either.
But from that I 231 l
would presume that most likely you had not made prior arrangements 241 l
with companies such as the ones on this list for emergency assistance 25j in a case like this.
Is this generally the case?
,c
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?
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35 1,
ARn0LD:
Yes, I think the requirement for offsite support arrangements 2{
are were clearly delineated during the licensing process.
We had 3,
inplace the letters of agreement that were identified as being necessary i
4{
to assure that certain kinds of support were available to plant staff.
5 That's not to imply that we were indifferent to the capabilities of l
6 the service company and the other operating companies had to offer and 7
I think as the events from that day on would have demonstrated both 8;
plant and the company in general felt e,aite free and to call upon I
gj those services and the response was there.
So that the nature of the t
site and general emergency plan was directed to a certain extent to a different view of how emergency conditions would develop.
I L2l GIBSON:
I have no further questions.
13) 141 MARTIN:
I have no further questions.
154 16i l
MARSH:
I have one or two items that I was concerned with.
Sir, when, 17l l
to your recollection, do you recall you first received notification of 18!
the water flow to the Aux Building?
20l l
ARNOLD:
I think that some time during the
.. during the day when I 21:
22;j was probably in a conversation with Herbein I was aware that there had I
ah some water which had not been contained within tanks or sumps to 23 the point that there was water on the floor, veracular.
And that the sumps had been pumped down to take care of that and that they were 25i y,
yx
I i
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36 ilj laying poly s'leets to reduce the airborne contamination as the surfaces 2
dried.
I recall that kind of a comment and I would expect that it was 3
pr bably in a conversation with Herbein that I was made aware of that.
4{
But I'm not, I'm not really sure, to tell you the truth.
I don't i
5l think that at any time the first few days or for that matter now I i
6j really see the water in the auxiliary building other than in tanks or 7l sumps which are intended t( contain radioactive liquids as a substantial problem.
8 9l MARSH:
10 Had you teen aware on the first day of the people in the control room going to respirators?
12; I
ARNOLD:
Not as far as I can recall.
13t i
14 MARSH:
The final item I was interested in was caterested cm was when 15:
did you beccme aware of the the spike?
17;l ARNOLD:
When I was pickeo up at the airport Friday morning at 8:15, by Sandy Lawyer and Ron Williams, incidentally I didn't mention Ron 19i and previous discussions as to people who came out here but obviously he was here as he met me at the airport, Ron is a senior consultant 21t l
who reports directly to me, has a extensive experience, and in riding 22l from the airport to the plant th
/ mentioned that there had 23)
I apparently been a hydrogen explosion.
It was frankly my impression 241 that it had occurred during the previous night that it had occurred 25!
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37 I
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the day of the accident.
They did not have any details on it.
And 6
2{
shortly after arriving at the plant we got pretty well swept up in 3
things o that I never really pursued it.
I'm not even sure when I 4{
recognized that it, I realized that it was a pressure spike that 5l ccurred the day of the accident.
Si GIBSON:
7 Mr. Arnold, I think this may have happened after our period 8
f interest and in which case I might be interested in it.
Did GPU g
Services make arrangements for Mr. Bill Graber and other from the, from Electric Boat Division to come in and assist in management of the health physics program here?
Or was this, these arrangements made by somecne else? And when were they made?
13 ARNOLD:
To the best of my understanding the the arrangements were made between probably either Electric Boat or someone else who was 15, familiar with Electric Boat personnel and Herman Decamp.
I frankly l
don't remember when Herman and I talked about it.
But I do remember 17 that Herman identified that the person by title who eventually turned 18{
out to be Bill Graber, would be available and that we also probably could call upon assistance from others within the government who had this type of background if we needed it.
And my recollection is that
[
I certainly endorsed getting Bill to the site and that we should get 22!
half a dozen or a dozen of people with sup health physics supervisory 23 kind of capability in as soon as he could.
And whether that was 24l Friday or Saturday perhaps even Thursday, I don't know.
I'm sure it 25!
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.6 38 lj was after I'm sure it was Friday or later.
It was probably Friday or i
2{
Saturday.
But my recollection is that those people came as a result I
3l of telephone calls that Herman Decamp was involved with.
4l 5
MARSH:
Okay.
I htve to tais with Bill Graber onsite, perhaps he can 6
clear that t.p.
Is t!.are an3one else onsite who might know when the 7
arrangements wer3 madc?
S i t
ARNOLD:
g I think there is probably several who would know when he 10, I don't know for sure that there's probably probably Dave arrived.
Limroth might have some idea.
I don't even remember who I told that they were coming.
I probably told Jack Herbein and Jack may recall something about it but there were many many organizations with, making g
offers of help and we initiating many contacts on our own and it 14!
15li wasn't always clear at the time even where the, who was the initiator l
of the conversations.
16i 17 MARSH:
Sir, we have about two minutes left on this tape and if need 18!
be I'll put a new cassette on but as we've done with most interviews towards the end I'd like to turn it over to you in case there's any 20t t
i comments you want to make.
Obviously we've trying to draw from these 21!
interviews also any recommendations that we can profit from for the 22 i
future.
23l 24l 25i
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- 7. ' ;t
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39 1
ARNOLD:
Well my own feeling at this point is that its been a very 2
complex event and that the recommendations for fixes that should be l
31 put in place really will come out of the indepth study and analysis 4j that are underway from a variety of organizations including our own.
5l And will be of considerable greater value than, the whatever too of 6i the head comments I could make.
7 MARSH:
8 If no one has anything else then the time being 10:29, meter gj reading 416 which would be 1416, I will then terminate this tape.
I 10 w uld like to say thank you for your time recognizing that you are an exceptionally busy man, and we appreciate you coming in.
I will i
terminate the tape at 10:29.
13 i
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