ML19242C047
| ML19242C047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 05/30/1979 |
| From: | Johnson W, Spangler R, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19242C039 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-79-09, 50-313-79-9, 50-368-79-09, 50-368-79-9, NUDOCS 7908090691 | |
| Download: ML19242C047 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1979009
Text
.
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report Nos. 50-313/79-09
50-368/79-09
Docket No.
50-313
License No. DPR-51
50-368
Licenace:
Arkansas Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 551
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203
Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANC), Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas
Inspection Conducted: April 14 through bby 11, 1979
Inspectors:
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W. D. Johnson, Resident Reactor Inspector
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R. G. Spangler, Ifenctd'r Inspector
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M. W. Dickerson, kcactor Inspector
Date
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E. II. Johnson, Reactor Inspector
Date
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,G. II. Verduzco, Reacto'Unspecto r
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Reviewed By:
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T. Y. Westerman, Chief, Reactor Proj ects Section
Dale
.
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790809069;
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Inspection Summary
,, , _ _
Inspection conducted during period of April 14 through Fby 11, 1979 (Report
No. 50-313/79-09)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of previously identified
inspection items, refueling aceP ; ties, surveillance (ref ueling), naintenance
(ref ueling), and licensee actic as taken in response to IE Bulletin 79-05A.
The
inspection involved 192 inspec.or-hours on-site by six (6) NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were
identified.
Inspection conducted during period of April 14 through Fby 11, 1979 (Report
No. 50-368/79-09)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of licensee actions taken in
response to IE Bulletin 79-06B.
The inspection involved 107 inspector-hours
on-site by six (6) NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the area inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified.
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59G194
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DETAILS
1.
Peracns Contacted
Arkansas Power & Light Company Employees
J. P. O'Hanlon, ANO Plant Manager
G. H. Miller, Engineering & Technical fupport Manager
L. Alexander, QC Engineer
B. A. Baker, Operations Superintendent
T. N. Cogburn, Nuclear Engineer
E. C. Ewing, Production Startup Supervisor
D. R. Hamblin, QC Engineer
T. Holcomb, Scheduler
P. Jones, bbintenance Supervisor
B. A. Terwilliger, Operations and Maintenance Fbnager
J. Robertson, ANO-1 Operations Supervisor
S. Petzel, Licensing Engineer
F. Foster, Plant Administrative Fbnager
R. Elder, I&C Supervisor
J. McWilliams, Planning & scheduling Supervisor
J. Vandergrift, Training Supervisor
T. Green, Training Coordinator
L. Trimble, Licensing Manager
F. Boswell, Safety and Fire Prevention Coordinator
C. Shively, Plant Performance Engineer
2.
Plant Status
Unit 1
.
The plant was shutdown for refueling during this inspection peri,d.
Unit 2
The plant was shutdown for maintenance following testing at the 20% power
plateau.
3.
Followup on Previously Identified Item
(Closed) Open Item (368/313/79-07-03) - Specific duties of Shif t Supervisor
during a fire emergency.
The inspector discussed this item with the licensee.
The licensee feels the
present wording defining the Shift Supervisor's duties during a fire
emergency is satisfactory.
The licensee has questioned the Shift Supervisors
to verify that they understand their duties and responsibilities under these
conditions.
This item is closed.
590195
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4.
Refueling Activities (Unit 1)
r
The inspector reviewed activities concerning the refueling of Unit 1.
This review consisted of:
Review of prefueling activities
.
Fuel handling crew requirements
.
Core monitoring during refueling
.
Containment integrity
.
Fuel accountability
Observation of fuel movements
.
The reviews and observations were conducted to verify that refueling
activities were conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications, NRC
requirements and approved plant procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance (Refueling) (Unit 1)
The inspector reviewed the procedures and results of the following survail-
lance activity conducted during the refueling outage.
Diesel Generator Inspection ("A" Diesel Generator)
A review of Procedure 1405.02, Rev. 1, 1/27/78, and the results of the
inspection covered by this procedure was made by the inspector to verify that
the activities were in accordance with Technical Specifications and approved
plant procedures.
6.
Major Maintenance Activities (Refueling) (Unit 1)
The inspector reviewed the follcwing maintenance activity during the refueling
outage.
Emergency Cooling
This maintenance activity consisted of installation of two (2) safety grade
cooling units to cool electrical equipment during post-accident conditions.
The inspector reviewed the Design Change Request sDCR 589), the purchase
orders and material receiving reports concetulug the work activities. The
inspector also observed latter portions of the work in progress.
The documentation on seismic and environmental qualification is not c.omplete.
Also, at the time of this inspection the final acceptance test of the
installed equipment had not been performed.
This item will remain open
pending qualification review and satisfactory acceptance testing.
(313/79-09-01)
59G196
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7.
Continued Review of Licensee Actions Taken in Response to
IE Bulletin 79-05A (Unit 1)
A.
On-site Inspection of Engtgeered Safety Features (ESP)
(1) Valve / Breaker / Switch Alignment Procedures
The inspectors completed the review of valve / breaker / switch
alignment procedures for all ESF systems against current
P6ID's and single-line drawings to verify adequacy of
alignment procedures.
(Reference paragraph 13 of inspection
repott 79-07).
The systems and the results of this review are as follows:
Service Water System
The inspector compared the valve / breaker lineup specified in
Attachments A, B, C and D to Operating Procedure 1104.29 to
drawing M210 for the Service Water System and found:
(a) Per M-210 SW-44, RE3810 Isolation Valve, should be SW-93; and
SW-45, RE3810 Isolation ValV6, should be SW-89 on Attachment
D to 1104.29, page 1/5.
(open item 313/79-09-02)
(b) That the addition of the valves f astalled under DCR 589, Vital
Switchgear Room Coolers, in Attachment B and C valve lineup
sheecs of 1104.29 had not yet been completed.
(0 pen Item
313/79-09-03)
Diesel Generator Starting Air System
No problems identified.
Penetratian Room Ventilation
No problems identified.
(2) Administrative Controls After Testing / Maintenance
The inspector reviewed the licensee's administrative controls to
verify that they assure proper return to service of ESF components
following test and maintenance activities.
This review was
tentered on the following procedures:
1004.14, Rev.
1, PC 1,
Initiation and Processing of Job Orders
1004.19, Rev. 4, Hold, Caution and QC Tagging Procedure
1005.04, Rev. 3, Control and Use of Bypasses and Jumpers
(a) The licensee's response to item 10 of IEB 79-05.1 reported
that the job order form was being revised to specify all
pre-maintenance and post-maintenance requirements and to
include verification that they are met to assure redundant
component operability prior to maintenance and to assure
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affected component operability after maintenance or testing.
This revision is considered neces'sary to strengthen the job
order procedure and it will be reiiewed by the inspector
prior to unit startup.
(Open Item 313/79-09-04)
(b)
1004.19
This procedure has the apparent. weakness of not specifying
the desired valve / breaker / switch position upon removing hold
tags.
The hold card request sheet has a signature space
labeled " Tags Removed: System Returned to Normal," without
stating what " normal" alignment is.
After discussions with
licensee representatives, the inspector stated that this
procedure may be acceptable as is when used in conjunction
with a properly revised and strengthened 1004.14.
(c)
1005.04
This procedure appears to require proper control of bypasses
and jumpers.
The inspector has indicated to the licensee
that it would be acceptable, in order to simplify the
administration of 1005.04, to eliminate logging require-
ments for jumpers and bypasses whose installation and
removal are controlled by specific docunented steps of
surveillance test procedure.
an appro,
<
(3)
Review of ESF Surveillance Tests
The purpose of this inspection effort was to review the surveil-
lance test procedures for the ESF systems to ensure that the
procedure restored the system to operability following the test
and that appropriate testing was performed to meet Technical Speci-
fication requirements.
The following test procedures were reviewed:
1104.01 Supp. 1
- Core Flood Tank Operability
1104.02 Supp. 1
- High Pressure Inj ection (llPI) Valve
Operability
Supp. 2-4 - HPI Pump Operability
1104.04 Supp. 1-2
- Low Pressure Injection Pump and Valve Operability
1104.04 Supp. 2
- NaOH Addition Tank Valves
Supp. 3-4
- Reactor Building (RB) Spray Pump
Supp. 4
- RB Spray Valves
Supp. 6
- RB Spray Nozzles
1104.33 Supp. 1-5 - Reactor Building Cooling
1104.36 Supp. 1
- Diesel Generator (DG) Operability
Supp. 2
- DG Air Start Compressors Operability
Supp. 3
- DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump
Supp. 4
1104.43 Supp. J-2
- Penetration Room Ventilation Filter Trains
1106.06 Supp. 1
- Electric Energency Feedwater lump (EFS)
Supp. 2
- Steam Driven EFW Pump
Supp. 3
- EFW Valve Operability
Supp. 4
- EFW Flow Path Verification
1304.08 Supp. 1-6 - Integrated ES Test
{[g('fg[3
1405.02
- Annual DG Inspection
.
-7-
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted in this area
of the inspection.
However, the inspector had several questions
and observation.s regarding certain procedures which were
discussed with the licensee during the inspection.
These items
are considered open.
The inspector noted that there is no flow indication for the
Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system and that the operation to shift
EFW to its safety grade water supply (service water) must be done
manually.
The licensee is pursuing several modifications to the
EFW system.
(open Item 313/79-09-05)
During review of the low pressure injection (LPI) system procedure
the inspector noted that the acceptance :r.teria for pump Ap is
130-143 psid. The FSAR states that the rat 9d pump Ap at rated
capacity is 151 psid.
The Technical Specifications require the
pump to perform within + 10 percent of initial values.
The above
acceptance criteria were established by the licensee for the ASME
Section XI testing program.
The inspector questioned whether or
not these values were within the criteria of the Technical Specifi-
cations noting that the physical placement of pressure detectors
in the system can cause readings to vary from design values. A
licensee representative indicated that these criteria would be
compared to the results of preoperational testing to determine if
the appropriate acceptance criteria have been specified.
(open
Item 313/79-09-06)
The inspector aise noted that valves CV1401 and 1402 in the low
pressure injection system are not cycled during the performance of
surveillance testing on the LPI system valves.
The valves form the
boundary between the high pressure and low pressure side of the
system and are excluded frca the ASME Section XI testing while
the plant is at normal operating pressure to preclude the possibility
of overpressurizing the low pressure portion of the system.
A
Technical Specification Change is needed to reficct this exclusion
from testing.
(open Item 313/79-09-07)
Supplement 1 to Procedure 1104.36, Diesel Generator Operability,
test contains a procedural step that requires placing the diesel
generator control switch in the maintenance position.
Although
subsequent test steps require that this switch be returned to the
remote position, the inspector expressed concern that the restor-
ation steps of the procedure do not include provisions to verify
the diesel generator alignment for standby operation using control
room indications.
(0 pen Item 313/79-09-08)
During review of Procedure 1106.06, Emergency Feedwater (EFW)
Operation, the inspector noted that step 6.2.2.2 requires the
operator to verify the steam supply pressure to the EFW turbine.
N C i, 9 .9
-8-
llowever, no pressure valve is specified in order for the operator
to determine that the pump is operating normally. A licensee
representative indicated that such a value will be provided in
the procedure.
The inspector further noted that valves CV2813 and
CV2814 are not cycled during the performance of the routine valve
operability test.
These valves will be added to the procedure.
(open Item 313/79-09-09)
The inspector reviewed Procedure 1304.08, Integrated ES Test, and
noted that the service water valve alignment specified in the
preliminary steps of the procedure was in error.
Establishing
such an alignment would secure cooling water to the operating
decay heat removal pump bearing cooler.
It was further noted that
the restoration steps of the procedure did not include several
manual valves that were aligned in the preliminary steps of the
procedure.
Although the alignment of these valves would be checked
prior to startup during the performance of valve lineups, these
valves should be included in the surveillance procedure. A
licensee representative indicated that the procedure would be
changed to reflect these concerns.
(open Item 313/79-09-10)
(4)
Review of ESF Surveillance Test Results
The purpose of this inspection effort was to review the results
of the latest surveillance test on all ESF components to determine
that the acceptance criteria for these tests were met.
The surveillance tests reviewed were the latest tests conducted by
the licensee for each of the procedures reviewed above.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
The inspector
noted the following discrepancy which was discussed with the licensee
during the exit interview.
This item is considered to be an open
item.
(313/79-09-11)
During the performance of the filter train monthly test on the
penetration room ventilation systcm on >brch 24, 1979, it was
noted by the operator tnat the door to the upper north electrical
penetration room would not properly shut due to a security monitor
on the door.
The inspector expressed his concern that this could
affect the capability to properly seal this room.
A licensee repre-
sentative indicated that prompt action would be taken on this
matter.
(5) Administrative Controls after Outage
The inspector reviewed the licensee's administrative controls to
verify that ESF systems are returned to operability at the
conclusion of extended outages.
This review was centered on
the following procedures:
59021 0
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1102.01, Rev. 5, PC 6 - Plant Preheatup and Precritical
Checklist
1102.02, Rev. 6, PC 1 - Plant Startup
Two apparent discrepancies were identified. The Hydrogen Purge
System is not specified by these procedures to be aligned prior
to startup, although licensee representatives informed the
inspector that the alignment of this system is normally checked
prior to startup after an extended outage.
(0 pen Item 313/79-09-
12)
The startup procedure does not specify the desired hand switch
position for the High Pressure Injection Pumps. Although the
mispositioning of these switches would not make the system
inoperable, their desired position should be specified.
(0 pen
Item 313/79-09-13)
(6)
Independent Verification
The inspector determined that the licensee does not use "indep-
endent verification of valve / breaker / switch alignments when
performing those alignments following extended outages and
after maintenance or test activities.
B.
On-site Assessment of Operating Procedures
(1) Partial Actuation of Safety Injection to Aid in Pressurizer
Level Control
Anticipated operational occurrences that have a characteristic
of falling pressurizer level occur whenever s. ,ondary heat
removal exceeds primary heat generation for a short period of
time following the initiating event.
Some examples of these
include reactor trip, dropped control rod, feedwater control
malfunctions, and secondary safety relief valve or turbine
control valve malfunction.
The pressurizer level instrument
tap span is 320 inches at ANO Unit 1 with approximately 100
inches of additional level both above and below this span.
Normal level is 180 inches.
Early in the operation of Unit 1
(during 1974), at least one reactor trip occurred during which
indicated pressurizer level was lost.
following this event showed that the level fell approximately
8. inches to 10 inches below the low level tap.
The pressurizer
level charts reviewed by the inspector support this analysis
provided one assumes a smooth trend of level from the time it
went of f scale low until it reappeared (approximately 40 seconds)..
AP&L and B&W concluded that the main cause for this problem
was primary temperature stabilizing at a lower point than
design due to excessive feedwater flow and secondary relief
valve settings on the low end of the acceptable band.
Adj us tments
590ZC1
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were made within the Integrated Control System (ICS) and to the
safety relief valves to improve the transient response of pressurizer
level.
Less of pressurizer level has not been experienced since this
event.
Prior to the above adjustments and as an interim measure,
procedures were modified to require manual initiation of HPSI
to maintain RCS water inventory.
After the above adjustments
were nade, procedures were again modified to include pre-
cautionary steps instructing the operator to start the standby
makeup pump but to inj ect only through CV 1220, the normal makeup
return valve.
As the result of discussions with several senior
reactor operators, the inspector understands that operators
typically, during these types of transients, take manual control
of the pressurizer level system and start the standby HPI pump.
It appears that the system, if left to itself, would stabilize
without the loss of pressurizer level indication; however,
operator intervention terminates level drop and returns level to
normal much more quickly than could otherwise be expected.
(2) Procedures for Feeding Dry Steam Generators
No procedures currently exist for feeding a dry steam generator
from the emergency feedwater system.
It would appear that there
are two poss'ible areas of concern:
(1) tube intergity; and (2)
excessive primary cooldown.
The EFW system sprays into the OTSG
directly onto the tube bundle in the slightly superheated
steaming region.
The plant staff feels that the EFW is therefore,
rapidly brought to saturated conditions minimizing thermal
shock to the OTSG tubes and thus do not regard tube integrity
as a concern.
The Operations Supervisor is considering adding
a caution statement to the appropriate proceduces to warn
operators of the possibility of inducing too rapid a cooldown
on the primary with the sudden injection of EFW.
(3)
Control Panel Tagging
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's control panel tagging
practices to determine whether potential exists for obsecuring
status indicators such as valve or switch position, meter
indicators or alarms.
Current practices appear to minimize
the potential for obscuring status indicators, but the licensee
has been asked to add an appropriate caution statement to
Procedure 1004.19.
(open Item 313/79-09-14)
8.
Review of Licensee Actions in Response to IEB 79-06B (Unit 2)
A.
On-site Inspection of Engineered Safety Features (ESP)
(1) Valve / Breaker / Switch Alignment Procedures
The inspectors reviewed valve / breaker / switch alignment procedures
for all ESF systems against current P&ID's and single line diagrams
to verify the adequacy of alignment procedures.
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The inspectors reviewed the following:
Operating Procedures
P&ID Number
System
' ~ ~
-
2106.06
M-2204 Sh. 4/4
Emergency Feedwater
2104.01; 2104.39;
M-2232
Safety Inj ection System
2104.40
2104.05
M-2236
2304.70
M-2206
Steam Gen. Secondary System
2104.36
M-2717 Sh 1, 2
Emerg. DG Systems
2104.43
M-2264
Containment Penetration
Room HV
2104.29
M-2210 Sh. 1,2,3
2104.44
M-2261
Hydrogen Analysis System
As a result of this review and discussions between the inspectors
and licensee personnel, the following items are to be implemented:
Add a sign-off step for Procedure 2304.70, Containment
.
Isolation and Miscellaneous Valve Stroke Test and Position
Verification, to Procedure 2102.02, Plant Startup, within
Section 8,
Cross reference the Category E Valve list in 2102.02 to the
.
valve list attachments of the operating procedures such
that valve positions are shown as -locked on both.
Add valves 2SW-73 and 2CV1406-2 to the attachment to 2104.29.
.
Add valves 2HPA-37 and 2HPA-38 to category E valve list
.
(locked open)
Add locked open designation to 2HPA-37 and add 2HPA-38
.
(locked open) to the valve list for OP 2104.44
These items are collectively designated open item 368/79-09-01.
(2) Administrative Controls Af ter Testing /FL2intenance
The licensee's administrative controls for assuring proper
return to service of ESF components following test and main-
tenance activities are the same for Units 1 and 2.
For details,
refer to paragraph 7.A(2) of this inspection report.
(3)
Review of ESF Surveillance Tests
The purpose of this inspection effort was to review the surveil-
lance and maintenance procedures for the ESF systems to verify
that the procedures restored the systems to operability following
maintenance or testing.
The surveillance testing supplements
of the following procedures were reviewed:
MCZC3
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2104.01, R2
Safety Inspection Tank Operations
2104.03, R1, PC3 Chemical Addition
2104.05, R3
Containment Spray System
2104.29, R0, PC3 Service Water
2104.33, R2, PCl Containment Atmospheric Control
2104.36, R1
Emergency Diesel Generator Operations
2104.39, 21
High Pressure Safety Injection System Operations
2104.40, R0, PC5 Low Pressure Safety Injection System Operations
2104.43, R0
Penetration Room Vent.ilation
2104.44, R1, PC2 Containment Hydrogen Purge & Recombiner Operations
2106.06, R1, PC9 Emergency Feedwater Pump Operations
In addition, Procedures 2304.67, LPSI Pump Maintenance, and
2304.67, Containment Spray Pump Maintenance, were reviewed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified and all
of the above procedures contained the necessary steps to restore
the systems to operability.
(4)
Review of ESF Surveillance Test Results
The inspector reviewed the results of the latest surveillance
test performed for all ESF components to verify that the
acceptance criteria for these tests were met.
The surveillance
procedures involved in this review were the test supplements for
the above operating procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, but the
February 1979 test data for 2104.05, Supplement 3, could not be
located. This item is unresolved. (368/79-09-02)
(5) Administrative Controls After Outage
The inspector reviewed the licensee's administrative controls to
verify that they assure the ESF systems are returned to operability
at the conclusion of extended outages. The procedures involved
were:
.
2102.01, Rev. 1, PC 2 Preheatup and Precritical Checklists
2102.02, Rev. 1, PC 11 Plant Startup
2102.03, Rev. O, PC 5 Optional Plant Startup
The inspector noted that 2102.02 and 2102.03 are inconsistent
in the positioning of the hand switch for the third high
pressure injection pump.
2102.03 leaves this switch in
" normal af ter stop" while 2102.02 leaves it in " pull to lock."
A licensee representative agreed to verify the desired switch
condition and make the appropriate procedure change.
(0 pen
Item 368/79-09-03)
5902C4
.
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(6)
Independent Verification
. , _ _
The inspector determined that the licensee does not use
" independent verification of valve / breaker / switch alignments
when performing those alignments following extended outages and
after maintenance or test activities.
B.
On-aite Assessment of Operating Procedures
(1) Partial Actuation of Safety Injection
Since Unit 2 has reached no higher power levels than 207., the
inspector was unable to determine if this Unit will require
partial actuation of safety injection to assist in pressurizer
level control during transients induced by routine operational
events.
(2) Procedures for Feeding Dry Steam Generators
The licensee does not have procedures for feeding dry steam
generators.
(3) Control Panel Tagging
Refer to paragraph 7.B(3) of this report.
9.
Additional Questions and Answers Investigated by Region IV Inspectors
A.
What is the normal status of the ECCS pump room doors for Units 1
and 2?
Is this status specified by Procedure? How are we to be
sure that the pump room doors will be sealed during the recirculation
phase of LOCA cooling?
The ECCS pump room doors for both Units 1 and 2 are normally
.
open and are presently required to be closed by procedure
only in the event of flooding.
The Assistant Operations Super-
visor.,has agreed to add steps in the followup action of the
LOCA emergency procedures for Units 1 and 2 to require that
the pump room doors be secured with the initiation of the
recirculation phase of LOCA cooling.
(0 pen Item 313/79-09-15;
368/79-09-04)
B.
Do Units 1 and 2 have procedures for the failure of a primary PORV
or safety valve to close?
Emergency Procedure 1202.29, Pressurizer Problems, requires
.
that the PORV be isolated in the event that it fails to
operate or is leaking. The emergency procedures for a small
LOCA are used in the event that the PORV or a safety valve
fails open.
5902. 5
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C.
Can the Unit 1 pressurizer reference leg flash? If so, has it
happened here?
The temperature of the Unit 1 reference leg is on the order
.
of 150 F and though it could possibly flash, it is difficult
to envision that system pressures would ever decrease to the
saturation pressure for this temperature.
As far as is known,
this event has never occurred at ANO, Unit 1.
D.
Are the pressurizer pressure and level instruments safety-related?
Are they powered f rom redundant vital buses?
Pressurizer pressure is not sensed.
RCS pressure is sensed and,
.
as it inputs to the RPS, these instruments are safety-related
and meet the design criteria requiring independent and
redundant vital power supplies.
Pressurizer level instrumen-
tation is not used in any analyzed accident as a limiting or
mitigating design feature.
In this sense, it can be said to
be non-safety related; although the loss of pressurizer level
indication is not an insignificant event.
There are two level
instruments at ANO, both powered from one vital bus through the
ICS cabinet and a third level instrument powered from a non-
vital instrument bus.
These instruments are considered 'Q
Parts' since they are part of the primary pressure boundary and
they appear to be identical to other instruments that are post
LOCA qualified.
E.
What are the ef fects of ICS power failures on the EFW system?
The ICS cabinet is normally powered from a vital AC source
.
through a transfer network that will, on a loss of this normal
source, switch to an alternate non-vital source, if available.
It appears that a total loss of power to ICS would start the
steam driven emergency feedwater pump but would leave the
emergency feedwater block valves closed, thus requiring
operator action to feed the OTSG's if that should become
necessary. The inspectors have reviewed the consequences of
some failures within the ICS cabinet.
The results of this
review can be summarized by saying that the system design was
not intended to meet class 1E standards and these failures
lead to varying degrees of degradation within the automatic
circuitry.
E.
Has an analysis been done for the loss of off-site power which con-
sideres a single failure of the steam driven emergency feedwater pump?
No analysis of an accident involving the single failure of the
.
steam driven EFW pu=p coincident with a loss of off-site power
has been performed since operator action is required to mitigate
the consequences of this accident.
At ANO, Unit 1, the backup
electric driven EFW pump is powered from non-vital bus A1.
Emergency Procedure 1202.05, Degraded Power, requires that
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all Al bus breakers be opened and defeated by the operator,
except for the electric emergency fe6dwater pump load and that
the Al to A3 tie breaker be closed by the operator.
This
allows a diesel generatcr (DG) set to supply the electric EFU
pump.
The licensee indicates that a load study was performed
to verify that the DC set is capable of supporting the running
ESF loads and the running load of the electric EFW pump.
The
licensee's analysis of DG response to starting and tripping the
electric ERI pump is not yet completed.
(0 pen Item 313/79-09-16)
G.
Has an analysis been done for a loss of feedwater from full power
which considers single failures involving the EFW pump?
No analysis of this type of event has been performed since
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operator action is required to mitigate the consequences of
this event.
That is, the operator would be required to start
the backup electric EFW pump to deliver emergency feedwater to
the OTSG's.
H.
Can the primary safety valves and the FORV pass water by design?
These valves were not designed by B&W to pass water.
The
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licensee indicates that B&W believes that these valves would pass
water and continue to function as designed; however, no documen-
tation to support this opinion is available.
I.
Is the power operated relief valve isolation valve capable of shutting
against design steam flow and/or water flow?
The Operations Supervisor indicated in the one case where this
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isolation valve was required to close against steam flow, the
valve stroked to the seat but tripped on over-torque without
scaling.
The torque switch was defeated and the valve was then
fully seated.
No information exists regarding the ability of
this valve to close against water flow.
10.
Unresolved Item
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
ascertain whether they are acceptable, items of noncompliance or deviations.
The unresolved item identified during this inspection is described in para-
graph 8. A(4) .
11.
Exit Meetirts
Exit meetings were conducted at the end of various segments of this
inspection with Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon (Plant Manager) and other members of
the AP&L staff.
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