ML19241C028
| ML19241C028 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1979 |
| From: | Boyd D, Ridgway K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19241C025 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-79-10, NUDOCS 7907260264 | |
| Download: ML19241C028 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000409/1979010
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U.S. .HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION ANI) EhTORCEMENT
FIGION III
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Report No. 50-409/79-10
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Docket No. 50-409
License No. DPR-45
Licensee:
Dairyland Power Cooperative
2615 East Avenue - South
La Crosse, WI 54601
Facility Name:
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor
Inspection At:
La Crosse Site, Genoa, WI
Inspection Conducted:
May 1-4 and 21-24, 1979
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Inspector:
K. R. Ridgway s'
L.tl[ / 'I
. ,', .O, /
Approved By:
D. C. Boyd," Acting Chief
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Reactor Projects Section 3
Inspection Sux.rrv
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Inspec:.on on May_l-4 and 21-24, 1979 (Report No. 50-409/79-10)
Areas Inspected:
S; ecial, unannour.ced inspect on of licensee
activities in response to IE Bulletin 79-08 including their response
to the bulletin and the operability and availability of engineered
safety features (ESF), administrative control of Ear, verification
of ESF status, operating procedures, surveillance tests ar.d operator
training.
The inspection involved 66 inspector-hours onsite by one
NT<C inspecto r .
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified in
any of the areas inspected.
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DETAIL _S
1,
Persons Contacted
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- R.
Shimshak, Plant Superintendent
- J. Parkyn, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor
P. Wiley, Assistant to Operations Supervisor
R. Prince, Radiation Protection Engineer
L. Krajewski, Health and Safety Supervisor
H. Towsley, Quality Assurance Supervisor
S. Rafferty, Reactor Engineer
L. Papworth, Operations Engineer
M. Polsean, " lift Supervisor
N. Hoefert, Mechanical Engineer
L. Kelley, Security and Fire Protection Supervisor
P. Gray, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance
D. Kabachinsky, Operator
G. Whynaucht, Operator
W.
Fuller, Operator
G. Gadow, Operatar
P Crandall, Operator
G. Holmstadt, Operator
D. Stalsberg, Operator
In addition, the inspector observed and held discussions with
other engineers, plant equipment operators, reactor operators,
assistants, and plant attendants,
kDenotes those
at at the exit interviews.
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2.
General
This inspection was cond2cted to review tne response by the
licensee to Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 79-08 " Events
Relevant to Boiling Water Power Reactors Identified During
Three Mile Island Incident" and to verify that the actions
requested in the bulletin with respect to operator training,
NRC telecommunications, and reviews of engineered safety
features (E3i) had been completed.
In addition, the inspection
consisted of an independent examination of ESF systems to
verify that the systems were operable according to technical
specifications by review of procedures, administrative controls,
valve / breaker / switch checkoff lists, piping and instrument
diagrams, and the actual alignments of valves, breakers and
switches.
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The following systems were considered to be Engineered-Safety
Systems in this inspection:
Emergency Core Spray (High and Low Pressure) (ECS)
Alternate Core Spray (Low Pressure) (ACS)
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Shutdown Condenser System (SCS)
Boron Injection System (BIS)
Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)
Containment
The reactor protection actuation circuitry was also r2 viewed
briefly as were portions of the nuclear steam system.
3.
Engir.eered Safety features (ESF) Availability and Operability
The inspection included a review of ESF alignment procedures
against current piping and instrument diagrams to verify that
the procedural alignments do not compromise the availability or
operability of safety related components.
Normal sta rtup
procedures from both cold and hot shutdown conditions require
the completion of valve checklists before the startup can
progress.
This inspection also i,cluded a review of any sur-
veillance, special, and maintenance procedures to establish
that valves, breakers and/or switches in the ESF systems are
returned t, pretest conditions or that a normal prestartup
check sheet verification would be completed before the system
eperabild y is required.
The licensee uses alignment checklists following extended
outages or extensive maintenance i
to assure proper lineup
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of valves and valve s itches.
Ali
slignments can be
verified by indicator lights in the
n
room and in addition
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any open breakers, out of normal positic.2 valves and switches
are ca r: :od in the " lock and tag" procedure which is under the
control
-f the Shift Supervisor.
The checklists along with
operating procedures, surveillance test procedures, special
procedores and maintenance procedures were compared with piping
and instrument line drawings to verify correct positioning of
valves and switches following tests and during normal operations.
The review of system lineups and test procedures did not idertify
any instances of improper lineup control, such that the operability
or a-
lity of ESF systems would be compromised.
A number
of iu
.encies between test procedures and data sheet
checkoft were noted.
In all cases the procedures required the
proper return to service of valves and switches but the data
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sheets of the tests did not provide documentation that-the
systems had been returned to normal. A list of the incon-
sistencies were provided to the licensee for his followup.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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4.
Administrative Control of Engineered Safety Features
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Licensee administrative controls to assure proper return to
service of ESF systems and components following maintenance or
test activities and at the conclusion of extended outages are
and have been subject to continuing review by the NRC inspector.
These areas were cursorily reviewed during this inspection to
determine if any changes had been made that might reduce the
effectiveness of ACP 15.2, Equipment Lock and Tag Control; ACP
17.3, Maintenance Requests; ACP 2.1, Authorities and Responsi-
bilities for LACBWR Operation and Shutdown; ACP 2.3, Shift
Transition (turnover) Shift Conduct; ACP 6.2, Procedure Adherence
and Temporary Changes; and ACP 15.1, Installation and Removal
of Jumpers, Lif ting and Replacement of Leads.
Based on this review, administrative controls are considered
adequate to assure proper return to service.
Discussions with licensee personnel concerning independent
verification of system lineups indicates that the lineup checks
are made by qualified operators (licensed or unlicensed); the
lineups and test data sheets are not reverified, but the sheets
are approved by the Shift Supervisor and reviewed by the Operations
Supervisor to verify completeness and accuracy of data.
Licensee tagging practice and procedures to provide control of
equipment, was reviewed during this inspection. The purpose of
the review was to determine the potential for tags to obscure
position indicators, meters or alarm lights.
It was noted that
tags were either bent or held in place by rubber bands so that
significant indicators would not be obscured.
The inspector also reviewed the recent surveillance tests of
ESF systems to verify completeness and conformance to Technical
Specifications.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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5.
Current Status of. Engineered Safety Features
This inspection included a verification by the inspector of the
current valve, switch and breaker lineup of ESF systems.
At
the time of the inspection, the plant was concluding ap eight
y
week refueling - m intenance outage and startup preparations
were in prc gt ess.
Lineups were verified with checklists for
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normal operatang conditions. The only valves to be found out
of operational alignment ere five in the Decay Heat System as
maintenance work was in progress and the Decay Heat System is
normally in operation during startup.
During the ..igane;' ve ificativa, it was noted that there were
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inctnsistencier in locked "alves bet een procedures, check' sts
and actu
ace L
There were several valves which the
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insnec or . --'edsd should be added to checklists.
One valve
identific' ion was missing because of recent maintenance work.
A l'st
i, e inconsistencies was given to the licensee to
t
bring proceceres, test data sheets and lineup checklists into
agreeme t.
This is considered an open item and will be reviewed
during a subsequent inspection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Staff Training
The inspector reviewed the training actions taken by the licensee
in response to IE Bulletin 79-08, by reviewing records and
interviewing licensed operators.
All operations personnel had
reviewed IE Bulletin 79-05 and the licensee's response to IE
Bulletin 79-08, dated May 2, 1979.
Operations Memo, DPC-75
dated May 16, 1979 concerning manual override of automatic
actions of ESF systems had been issued and reviewed by all
operations personnel.
Operations Memo, DPC-76 dated May 24,
1979 concerning immediate and uninterrupted telecommunications
with NBC in the event of uncontrol' ?d or unexpected reactor
conditions had been issued and reviewed by all personnel.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Operations Review
The inspector observed plant outage conditions, removal of the
peripheral shroud for replacement, control room manning, lock
and tag status of equipment, and valve / breaker / switch alignments
of safety related systems for startup.
Additionally, the
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following records,Jor the month of May 1979 to determine
compliance with Technical Specifications and regulations and to
determine if Night Order and Operational Memos conflicted in
any way with operation of requirements:
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a.
Night Order Instruction Book
b.
Shift Supervisors Log
c.
Outstanding Maintenance Orders
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d.
New Operational Memos
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Management Interviews
Management interviews (as shown in Paragraph 1) were conducted
on May 4, 1979 and at the conclusion of the inspection on
May 24, 1979. The inspector discussed the scope and findings
of the inspection.
The following items were discussed:
a.
The inspector advised the licensee that the independent
review of the ESF systems procedures, lineups and admin-
istrative controls had not identified any condition that
would jeopardize ESF availability or operability.
b.
Notes made by the inspector relating to inconsistencies
and apparent inaccuracies in procedures, test data sheets,
and lineup checksheets were provided to the licensee. The
inspector stated that the resolution of the list would be
reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
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