ML19241B157

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IE Insp Rept 50-482/79-08 on 790416-19.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Follow Approved Concrete Curing Procedures & Failure to Establish Proper Document Controls for Blasting Procedure
ML19241B157
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 05/16/1979
From: Beach A, Randy Hall, Rosenberg A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML19241B144 List:
References
50-482-79-08, 50-482-79-8, NUDOCS 7907110747
Download: ML19241B157 (10)


See also: IR 05000482/1979008

Text

U. S. fJUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-

0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION IV

Report No. SIN 50-482/79-08

Docket No. STN 50-482

Category A2

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Licensee:

Xansas Gas and Electric Company

Post Office Box 208

Wichita, Kansas

67201

Facility Name: Wolf Creek, Unit No.1

Inspection at: Wolf Creek Site, Burlington, Kansas

Inspection conducted: April 16-19,1979

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5/10/79

Inspectors:

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A. B. Beach, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Support

Date

Section (Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6 & 7)

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/J. B. Rosenberg, Reactor Inspector, Engineering

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Support Section (Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6 & 7)

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,/[J. R. Schweibinz, Reactor Inspector, Projects

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Section, RIII (Paragraph 4)

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,'J. F. Suermanr., Reactor Inspector, Engineering

Dite '

Support Section, RIII (Paragraph 5)

Reviewed:

4 79

C. R. Oberg, Reactor Inspection, Projects Section

Date /

Approved:

4 /-

A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section

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R. E. Hall, Chief, Engineering Support Sectio,

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7007110747

Inspection Summ:ry:

Inspection on April 16-19,1979 (Report No. STN 50-482/79-08)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannou1ced inspection of activities including

observation of safety related concrete activities; review of radiographic

procedures for welding of the containment liner plate; and the observation

of activities and the review of procedures for blasting.

The inspcction

involved eighty-nine inspector-hours by four NRC inspectors.

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Results: Of the four areas inspected, two apparent items of noncompliance

were found in two areas (infraction - failure to follow approved concrete

curing procedures - paragraph 3.c; and infraction - failure to establish

proper document control for blasting procedure - paragraph 5.a) and an

apparent deviation was identified in a third area (deviation - improper

penetrameter size specification - paragraph 4).

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DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E)

  • J. O. Arterburn, Superintendent, Nuclear Development

M. E. Clark, Manager, Site QA

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  • T. C. Newman, QA Auditor
  • D. W. Prigel, QA r jineer
  • G. k'. Reeves, QA Engineer

,'aniel International Corporation (DIC)

M. Ayres, Civil QA

v.

W. J. Blazek, QC Training Coordinator

T. A. Green, Civil QA Representative

  • A. S. Harper, Engineering Manager
  • W. E. Hitt, Project Manager
  • I. Hussain, Assistant to the Project Manager
  • D. L. Jones, QC Manager
  • C. T. Kinney, Construction Manager
  • L. R. Smith, Regional Manager
  • V. J. Turner, Manager, Project QA

Other Personnel

  • R. D. Brown, Site Representative, SNUPPS
  • G. P. Nutwell, Field Engineering Supervisor, Bechtel Power Coporation
  • W. R. Seiple, Resident Geotechnical Engineer, Dames and Moore
  • denotes those persons in attendance at the exit interview.

The IE inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor

employees during the course of the inspection.

2.

Site Tour

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The IE ir.spectors walked through various areas of the site to

observe construction activities in piogress.

No items of non-

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compliance or deviations were identified.

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3.

Concrete

a.

_ Placement and Testing Activities

The 17 inspectors observed concrete placement activities and

concrece testing activities relating to the following concrete

placements:

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Placement flumber

location

OC-135-W-14

East wrll on the north side of the

Reacter Auxiliary Building

OC-141 -S-01

Floor slab in the south portion of

the Fuel Handling Building

O C-381 -S-01

Roof slab in the west portion of

the Fuel Handling Building

Concrete placemer.', techniques were observed to be in accordance

with Bechtel Specifications 10466-C101 and 191.

Review of field

concrete test records for concrete temperature, air entrainment,

and slump for these placements indicated that results were within

the acceptance tolerances.

Qualification records were also reviewed for the QC testing

personnel involved in these placements.

Qualification records

reviewed indicated that these perconnel were qualified in

accordance with Daniel Procedure AP-VI-01, Revision 3.

In regard to Placement OC-381-S-01, the IE inspectors were in-

formed by licensee and contractor personnel that a flonconformance

Report (flCR) had been written to identify the fact that weather

protection for the placement had been readily available, but it

had not been used when it began to rain, and that there appeared

to be some shrinkage cracking in the concrete.

After receiving

th's information, the f1RC inspectors inspected the placement

area and noted that there was some apparent shrinkage cracking

in certain areas.

This item will be reviewed in subsequent

inspections to evaluate the resolution of the flCR.

This is

considered an unresolved item pending review of the dispositioned

NCR.

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b.

Batch Plant and Aggregate Storage

The IE inspectors examined the batch plant and observed batch

plant activities.

The aggregate and sand storage facitilies

were also inspected. All activites observed were in accordance

with Daniel Procedure WP-IV-105.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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c.

Concrete Curing Activities

An inspection of post-placement activities and a review of the

concrete curing records for Placement OC-611-S-09, which was

made on April 10, 1979, indicated that concrete curing procedures

were being performed in accordance with the requirements of

ACI 308.

The NRC inspecto s also reviewed curing activities with regard to

Placement 0C-141-S-01. The inspectors observed that the top of

the floor slab in the Fuel Handling Building was being provided

with the required ccmplete cover of water, and burlap had been

applied to hold the water onto the surface of the slab. The top

of the slab was being continuously moist cured in accordance with

the requirements; however, the construction joints at the north

and east face of the slab were observed to be dry.

Discussion

with contractor personnel revealed that a sealing compound to

reduce the loss of mixing water from the concrete had not been

applied to the construction joints.

Since the curing require-

ments of Section 2.2 or Section 2.3 of ACI 308 were not being

met for this construction joint surface, this is considered to

be an item of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion

V.

Subsequent to this inspection, a nonconformance report

(ISD 1537C) was written by cor.t.ractor personnel, and a liquid

membrane was applied.

4.

Radiographic Examination of Containment Liner Plate

The following documentation was reviewed by the IE inspector:

a.

SNUPPS PSAR, Section 3.12, Regulatory Guide 1.19, " Nondestructive

Examination of Primary Containment Liner Welds," which states in

part, "All nondestructive examination methods and techniques are

in accordance with Section V of the ASME Boiler and Pressure

Vessel Code, except for radiography which is in accordance with

Appendix X of ASME Section III."

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b.

Appendix X to Section III of the 1971 ediIion of the ASME Boiler

and Pressure Vessel Code, " Nondestructive Examination Methods for

Metal Containment Vessels."

(1) Paragraph X-3325, "Penetrameters," subparagraph X-3325.1,

" Material, Size and Shape," states in part, "The maximum

thickness of the penetramet.er shall be as shcwn in Table

X-3325.1-1."

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(2) Table X-3325.l-1, " Standard Penetrameter Sizes," indicates

that "For a weld thickness between the range of over 1/4"

through 3/8", the thickness of the penetrameter on the

source side shall be 0.0075" and the designation on the

penetrameter shall be No.

7."

(3) Subarticle X-3330, "Tecnnique for Radiographic Examination

of Welded Joints," paragraph X-3332, " Required sensitivity

of Radiographic Technique," states, "Padiography shall be

performed with a technique which will have sufficient

sensitivity to indicate the features in C-3334.5 of a

penetrameter of the thickness specified for the thickness

of the weld being examined, as shown in Table X-3325.1-1."

(4) Subparagraph X-3334.5, " Images Which Shall Appear on

Radiographs," (a) "The images of the identifying numbers

of the penetrameter outline and of the 2T hole are all

essential indexes of image quality on the radiograph and

they shall appear on the radiograph, except that for

penetrameters 5, 7 and 10, the slit shall appear clearly,

and hole need not appear."

c.

Bechtel Specification No.10466-C151(Q), " Furnishing, Fabri-

cating and Delivering Reactor Building Liner Plate."

(1) Paragraph 7.5.1.a requires that liner seam welds be

examined radiographically in accordance with the require-

ments of Article 3 of Section V of the ASME Code.

(2) Paragraph 7.5.7 requires that type 1 or 2 film be used and

that fluoresent screens shall not be used.

d.

Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) Procedure No. 9.TP (74-3750/59),

Revision 2 approved by Bechtel by a letter dated November 22,

1977, titled, " Radiographic Examination Procedure for Welds,

SNUPPS Containment and Liners."

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(1)

Section 3.0, references:

1974 ASME Boiler and Pressure

Vessel Code,Section III, Division I and Section V with

the following Addenda: tione

Referenced Parts:

Section V, Article 3

Section III, flE 5300

(2)

Section 4.5, Type of Film: Only fiim types equivalent to

Class 1 and Class 2 ... will be used for radiography.

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(3)

Section 4.7, Type of Screen: tio fluorescent screens will

be used.

(4)

Section 4.9, Penetrameter: The type, size and shape of

penetrameter shall be in accordance with T-320(e) of

Section V.

(5) Section 8.1.A, "The images of the identifying numbers,

the penetrameter outline, and of the essential hole

as required by Table T-320 are all essential indexes of

image quality, and they shall appear on the radiograph."

e.

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section V, Article 3,

" Radiographic Examination."

(1)

T-320(e) states in part, "Penetrameter thickness shall

be as specified in Table T-320 ...."

(2)

Table T-320, " Thickness, Penetrameter Designations, and

Essential Holes," requires that for a single wall material

thickness of the range of over 1/4" through 3/8" that the

source side penetrameter shall be a size t!o.12.

t'ote : A size flo.12 penetrameter has a thickness of 0.012".

The above documents were evaluated by the IE inspector. The IE inspector

requested the licensee to explain the apparent deviation between:

(1)

the commitment in the PSAR to have radiographic examination procedures

for containment liner welds in accordance with Appendix X to Section III

of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which requires the use of

a 0.0075" thick penetrameter for a weld thickness over 1/4" thruugh 3/8"

(the liner is 1/4" thick); and (2) the requirement of CB&I Procedure

flo. RTP (74-3750/59) to deterraine the thickness of the penetrameter in

accordance with Table T-320 which requires a penetrameter 0.012" thick

for the same material thickness.

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The licensee contacted Bechtel for assistance.

Bechtel Specification

No.10466-C151(Q) references Article 3 of Section V instead of Appendix

X to Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

It should

be noted at this time that the No.12 penetrameter called for in Article

3 of Section V is 60% thicker than the No. 7 penetrameter as called for

in Appendix X to Section III.

Bechtel could not explain why the thicker penetrameter was allowed to

be used in lieu of the commitment in the PSAR.

The IE inspector recognizes that Section III of the ASME Boiler and

Pressure Vessel Code does not require that the containment liner

plate seam welds be radiographed.

However, Regulatory Guide 1.19

does require that these seam welds be spot radiographed.

SNUPPS PSAR Section 3.12 commits to Regulatory Guide 1.19, August 11,

1972, " Nondestructive Examination of Primary Containment Liner Welds."

Regulatory Guide 1.19, paragraph C.1, " Nondestructive Examination of

Liner Seam Welds," subparagraph C.l.a requires that welds be examined

radiographically in accordance with the techniques prescribed in

Section V.

(ASME B&PV Code) Subparagraph 7.a. " Containment Liner

Seam Welds Examined by Radiography," states, "Where a spot in the seam

weld is judged acceptable in accordance with the referenced standards

of NE-5120 of Section III of the ASME B&PV Code, the entire weld test

unit represented by this spot radiograph is considered acceptable."

Subarticle NE-5120, " Examination Requirements of Welded Joints for

Vessels," of Section III of the 1971 Edition of the ASME B&PV Code

states, " Examination in accordance with the requirements of Section

VIII, Division 1 of this Code shall be made of welded joints for

vessels as follows:

(a) Welded joints of Categories A and B as

defined in NB-3351 shall be radiographed in accordance with UW-51."

Subparagraph NB-3351.1 defines Category A welded joints as longitudinal

welded joints within the main shell.

Subparagraph NB-3351.2 defines

Category B welded joints as circumferential welded joints within the

main shel.

UW-51 to Section VIII, Division 1 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code, Table UW-51, " Standard Penetrameter Sizes," requires that a

penetrameter for weld thickness range of over 1/4" through 3/8" be of

a thickness of 0.0075" and designated a No. 7 penetrameter. The liner

plate is 1/4" thick.

The cormitment in the PSAR Section 3.12 .equires that radiographic

examination procedures for containment liner welds will be in accordance

with Appendix X to Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel

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Code.

Appendix X to Section III and Article 2 of Section V are

acceptable methods of meeting the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.19, since their examination requirements are equivalent.

This item is a deviation from a commitment in the PSAR.

5.

Lakes , Dams , and Canals

a.

Proccdures

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Blasting work on the safety related Ultimate Heat Sink (VHS)

is being done by the Clarkson Construction Company as a sub-

contractor to Daniel International, the site contractor.

Dames & Moore is the geotechnical consultant and performs

blast monitoring and contour mapping.

The IE inspector

reviewed Dames & Moore Project Plan and memoranda - Wolf Creek

Generating Station, Unit No.1, Rev. 5, dated May 1978 and

found it met the applicable specification requirements.

The IE inspector reviewed the Clarkson Construction Company

Blasting Procedure, Specification A-3854, dated April 27,

1978, which is a work procedure governing blasting work on

the UHS.

The procedure was not approved as required by

Specification A-3854 and the procedure was not assigned a

control number.

Secondly, the procedure was revised to in-

corporate a change in the method of notifying Dames & Moore

of intended blasts and only reviewed on April 19, 1979,

although blasting on the UHS had begun on December 13, 1978.

Finally, the blasting procedure dated April 19,1979, was

not controlled by a revision number or some other means of

control which indicated it superseded the earlier blasting

procedure.

These items are considered to be in noncompliance

with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI.

b.

Observation of Work Activities

The IE inspector witnessed the preparation and blasting of

a section of the southeast lobe nf the UHS on April 18, 1979.

The hole pattern, hole size and depth, and required stemming

met the requirements of the Clarkson Blasting Plan.

The plan

had received verbal approval from the Dames & Moore engineer

and was not required to be monitored.

The blast consisted of

398 holes arranged in a rectangular, parallel row, non-staggered

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array, which utilized Dupont electric blasting caps (25 - 1,000

millisecond delays), 696 lbs. of ammonium nitrate blasting agent

(Pilshaw Explosive Co.), and 100 lbs. of Dupont ToVEX water gel.

The blasting foreman ran the circuit continuity checks on the

firing circuit and sounded the warning signals prior to the

oi. t as required by the blasting procedure.

No items of noncompliance or deviatior.s were identified.

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c.

Training

The IE inspector reviewed the training qualification records of

several of the Dames & Thore field staff.

Dames & Moore is

committed to the requirements of ANSI Standard N45.2.6-1973 as

stated on page 2 of the Dames & Moore quality Assurance Plan.

The training records of the resident geotechnical engineer

and also those of two field geologists were reviewed.

All

three Dames & Moore personnel had received indoctrination on

the Quality Assurance Plan and had received field training in

the particular requirements of their duties.

None of the

personnel had received the eye examination, but this is con-

sistent with Dames & Moore's im?lementation of ANSI N45.2.6

as applied to the Wolf Creek Project.

None of the records

contained certification as required by paragraph C.3 of Regula-

tory Guide 1.58 and paragraph 2.2.4 of ANSI N45.2.6.

It is not

clear whether Dames & Moore policy takes exception to this

requirement, and hence whether the certification is formally

required.

This matter is unresolved.

6.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required

in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of

noncompliance, or deviations.

One item relating to concrete placement

is identified in paragraph 3, and one item relating to the certification

of Dames & Moore personnel is identified in paragraph 5.

7.

Exit Interview

The IE inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in

paragraph 1) at the conclusion cf the inspection on April 19, 1979.

The IE inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspaction.

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