ML19225D046
| ML19225D046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1979 |
| From: | Gallagher E, Hayes D, Eric Lee NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19225D040 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-329-79-10, 50-330-79-10, NUDOCS 7908030633 | |
| Download: ML19225D046 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000329/1979010
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-329/79-10; 50-330/79-10
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Docket No. 50-329; 50-330
License No. CPPR-81; CPPR-82
Licensee:
Consumers Power Company
1945 West Parnall Road
Jackson, MI
49201
Facility Name: Midland Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: Midland Site, Midland, Michigan
Inspection Conducted: May 14-17, 1979
Inspectors:
E. J. Gallaghe
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hE.W.K. Lee
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Approved By:
D. W. Ilayes, C
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Engineering Support Section 1
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Inspection Summary
Inspection on May 14-17, 1979 (Reports No. 50-329/79-10; 50-330/79-10)
Areas Inspected: Reactor coolant pressure boundary and safety
related piping; pipe welding work activities; containment prestressing
work procedure, work activities and quality records (Units 1 and 2);
status of soils work activities; concrete expansion anchor installation
procedure ("aits 1 and 2).
The inspection invoised a total of 44
inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
Four areas were inspected.
One item of noncompliance was
identified in the areas inspected.
(Infraction - failure to properly
translate FSAR design requirements into specifications and procedures.)
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DETAILS
P-
an- Contact
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Principal Licensee Employees (CPCo)
,
- D.
B. Miller, Site Project Manager
- T. C. Cooke, Project Superintendent
- D. R. Keating, QA Group Supervisor
- D. E. Horn, QA Engineer
- R. G. Wollney, QA Group Supervisor
- B. H. Peck, Construction Supervisor
R. Ostrowski, QA Engineer
Bechtel Power Corporation
- W.
L. Barclay, Project Field QC Engineer
- E.
Smith, Quality Assurance
- 0. H. Holman, Field Superintendent
- R. W. Shope, QC Supervisor
- A.
Ozeroff, QA Engineer
- A.
J. Boos, Field Engineer
NRC Resident Inspector
- R.
J. Cook
kDenotes those present at the exit meeting.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected
Details of functional and program areas inspected are documented in
Sections I and II of this report.
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Section I
Prepared by E. J. Gallagher
Reviewed by D. W. Hayes, Chief
Engineering Support
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Section 1
1.
Review of FSAR Containment Prestressing System Commitments
(Units 1 and 2)
The inspector reviewed FSAR Section 3.8.1.6.3 (Prestressing
System) in order to verify consistency with the site implementing
procedures.
The following apparent conflicts exist between the
FSAR commitments to the NRC and site procedures and specifica-
tions for the prestressing system:
a.
The FSAR states, " Tendon sheating is galvanized, spiral
wrapped, semi-rigid, corrugated tubing conforming to the
material requirements of ASTM A-513, Type 1, Grade 1010-
1020 or ASTM A-53, Type E or S, Grade B.
Contrary to the FSAR statement, Bechtel specification C-2,
Rev. 11, dated November 16, 1978, Section 11.1 requires
" material of shea* Ss shall conform to ASTM A366-66 or 68,
22 gauge cold rol.ed carbon steel."
In addition, the
Inryco Quality Control Manual C2-146 requires sheathing to
be of ASTM A366 material as well.
b.
FSAR Table 3.8-25 indicates the maximum allowable chemical
limits for the tendon cerrosion protective grease to be
2 ppm for chlorides, 4 ppm for nitrates and 2 ppm for sulfides.
Contrary to the above, FSAR Section 3.8.1.6.3.1 permits
the maximum allowable limits for chlorides, nitrates and
sulfides to be 5 ppm.
In addition, Bechtel specification
C-49, Rev. 2, Section 6.2.2 specifies the chemical limita-
tions for protective grease to be 5 ppm for the above
chemicals.
However, contrary to the Bechtel specification,
Inryco Quality Control Manual C2-146 requires the protective
grease to have chemical limits the same as FSAR Table
3.8-25,
i.e. 2, I. and 2 ppm for chlorides, nitrates and
sulfides, respectively.
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Based on the above", measures did not assure the design basis
included in design specifications were translated into the
license application which resulted in inconsistencies between
design documents and the FSAR.
This is considred an item of
noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III.
(329/79-10-01; 330/79-10-01)
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2.
Review of QC Inspector Qualifications for Containment Prestressing
System Work Activities (Units 1 and 2)
The inspection requests to review the personnel qualifications
of the Bechtel QC inspectors who would be inspecting the pre-
stressing system work activities.
The following was determined
after reviewing six personnel qualifications:
a.
It was apparent from the personnel work experience records
that none of the six inspectors had any prior experience
with prestressing systems.
b.
Training of the six inspectors was given by an individual
that likewise had no prior experience on prestressing
systems.
The above deficiency in personnel training and qualifications
was also identified by the licensee quality assurance group as
an item to be resolved prior to performing any further work
activities on the prestressing system.
Th . area will continue
to be reviewed in followup inspections of the prestressing
system.
3.
Review of Quality Records for Containment Prestressing System
(Unit 2)
The inspector reviewed the following quality records relative
to the containment prestressing system.
a.
Material Certification
(1) Tendon Wire - a review of the physical and chemical
test results was performed on tendon wire heat Nos.
9399, 9582, 9521, 9578, 9507 and 9476.
The results
meet the requirements of ASTM A421, " Uncoated Stress-
Relieved Wire for Prestressed Concrete."
(2) Tendon Bearing Flates - beat codes GL, GS, GM, GR and
GN were found to meet the requirements of ASTM A-36,
" Specification for Structural. Steel."
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(3) Tendon Sheathing - the tendon sheathing records were
acceptable according to the requirements of ASTM
A366-66, 22 gauge, cold rolled sheathing.
(4) Tendon Shop Head Anchorage - heat No. 53215 meet the
requirements of ASTM A-322-64, " Hot Rolled Alloy
Steel Bars."
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(5) Tendon Bush'.ngs - heat Nos. 55984, 7836 and 15008
were reviewed and found acceptable to the requirements
of ASTM A-322 using material AISI 4142.
b.
Performance Tect_s
Construction specification C-2, Rev. 11, required the
following quality tects to be performed and submitted
prior to fabrication of the prestressing system. The test
results were not available onsite at this time.
The
licensee indicated that these quality records would be
made available during the next NRC inspection.
(1) Section 10.1 requires certified testing at low
temperatures to substantiate that the anchorage
assembly including bearing plate is capable of trans-
mitting the ultimate load of the tendon to the structure
without brittle failure. The lowest service temperature
for the anchorage is -20 F.
(2) Section 10.3 requires the sheathing filler retaining
caps to be tested to substantiate that the cap will
not fail or leak when test to 150% of required
pumping pressure.
(3) Section 14.6 requires button head rupture tests from
each reel of wire to be submitted a quality control
record.
Since the above three items were not available for review,
this item is considered unresolved pending submittal of
the records.
(329/79-10-02; 330/79-10-02)
4.
Observation of Containment Prestressing System (Unit 2)
During the course of the NRC inspection CPCo and Bechtel issued
a "Stop Work Order" on any further prestressing system work
activities. The reason for the stop work according to QA stop
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work report No. 5 'was that the " status of Inryco furnished
Field Installation Manual which forms the basis for Bechtel
Field Procedure of Installation and Quality Control (PQCI) is
questionable." In order for work to resume, it was stipulated
that it would be necessary to resolve questions regarding
Project Engineering (Bechtel) level of approval for Inryco
furnished Field Installation Manual and establish approved
instruc; ions for installation and inspection including revising
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Bechtel Field Procedure and Quality control instruction.
Due to the above work stoppage, observation of the prestressing
work activities could not be performed. This matter will
continue to be inspected to verify an adequate procedure and
inspection program is in effect for the containment prestressing
system work activities.
5.
Status of Safety Related Soils Work Activities
Safety related soils work is not preceeding until certain
corrective actions are taken in order to resolve a number of
previously identified deficiencies.
Some of the licensee's
corrective actions include:
a.
Identifying all conflicts within the PSAR or between PSAR
and FSAR.
b.
Identify all conflicts between PSAR/FSAR and site procedures.
c.
Re-evaluate the use of Zone 2 random fill material as a
backfill material.
d.
Assure that interpretations to the specifications are resolved.
Establish a single soils engineer responsible for the
e.
soils work activities.
f.
Re-evaluate the capability of the equipment being used to
meet compaction requirements.
g.
Assure proper tests are performed to document acceptability
of in place soils.
h.
Assure each nonconformance report is properly dispositioned.
During this inspection, the NRC inspector observed air bubbles
percolating f rom the ground in the safety related tank farm
area.
A closer inspection indicated that air and water was
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being moved through the previously compacted soil mater:als in
this area.
It was observed that soil materials were being
moved by this condition and leaving voids beneath concrete
foundations for the tank structures.
This condition was brought to the attention of CPCo project
manager on May 16, 1979. On May 17, 1979, the project manager
and superintendent responded by visually observing this condition.
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They concurred with the NRC inspector that the condition was
serious and that denage to the compacted soils may have occurred.
The extent of the movement of materials was not known.
The NRC inspector indicated to the licensee that in order to
substantiate that the materials and compaction of the soils had
not been disturbed, additional soil borings and test pits would
need to be performed. The NRC took photos to document the soil
condition and movement of soil materials.
It was also brought to the NRC's attention that CPCo QA department
had brought this condition to Bechtel QC months earlier, however,
no corrective action had been taken to correct these adverse
conditions.
During the exit meeting the CPCo site superintendent gave a
copy of a letter to the NRC requiring the contractor to relocate
the air line embedded in the fill and turn off the air to the
existing line. This letter also indicated to map the location
of all air seepage areas so that additional soil borings could
be taken in these areas.
6.
Review of Procedure and Observation of Testing Concrete Expansion
Anchors
The inspecter reviewed specification C-305, Rev. 8, " Installation
and Testing of Expansion Tn.. Concrete Anchors" and Quality
Control Instruction (QCI) -1.50, Rev. 4.
In addition, Field
Change Notices C-1835 and C-1846 to specification C-305 were
also reviewed. The following specific observations were made:
a.
As of this inspection, the specification did not require a
means of inspecting or identifying the embeddment length
of the bolt.
CPCo had identified this item in QA request
for evaluation on July 28, 1978. Bechtel then issued SCN
C-305-9002 to require a permanent length identifier to be
stamped on the bolt.
CPCo required Bechtel to develop a
procedure for ultrasonic testing to reinspect the length
of the bolts installed prior to this time.
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b.
Specification ~C-305, Table 4.1, lists certain test torques
for acceptance of concrete expansion anchor installation.
The inspector requested to review the test data which
demonstrates that the torque values specified develop a
tensite capacity equal to or greater than the design load
as required by IE Bulletin 79-02.
This data was not
readily available and will be followed up on subsequent
,
inspection as per the requirements of IE Bu.lecin 79-02.
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c.
Specification C-305, Table 3.2, indicates the allowable
design loads for the Hilti HDI Drop-in anchors (shell type
anchors) and the required tensile test load. The test
load specified is only approximately two times the design
load.
For example, 3/4" anchor in 4000 psi concrete the
allowarie design load is 3.2 kips while the tensile test
load it 6.0 kips.
IE Bulletin 79-02 states that the licensee should verify
that the ultimate load for shell type anchors is five
times the design load.
This was indicated to Mr. W. Bird
via telecon.
This will continue to be reviewed as per IE
Bulletin instructions.
During this inspection, the h7C inspector had a telecon
with the CPCo QA supervisor relative to the requirements
The following is a sumnary of that
discussion:
(1) The licensee is required to identify base plates that
are considered flexible according to the criteria set
forth, i.e.
if the unstiffened distance from the
attachment to the edge of the plate is greater than
two times the thickness of the plate it is considered
flexible and requires evaluation for adequacy.
(2) The licensee must verify that the ultimate load for
wedge type anchors is four times the allowable design
load and the ultimate load for shell type anchors is
five times the design load.
(3) The design requirements for the anchor bolts should
be described for cyclic loading conditions.
(4) Verify that design requirements have been met through
existing QC documentation that (a) cyclic loads were
considered and (b) bolts installed are the specified
design size and type.
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The following is the NRC's understanding of testing requirements:
The essential requirement is that the licensee justify the
adequacy of proposed testing program.
IE Bulletin 79-02 suggests
an acceptable sampling program to test one anchor bolt in each
base plate. Other approaches including a statistical sample to
provide a 95% confidence level that fewer than 5% defective
anchors are installed are equally acceptable.
It is suggested
that any test sampling program chosen should be on an individual
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system basis when a significant failure rate is found, an
increased sample size must be taken or 100% testing may be
required to assure systems capability.
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Section II
Prepared by E. W. K. Lee
Reviewed by D. H. Danielson, Chief
Engineering Support
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Section 2
1.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Foundary Piping - Observation of Work
and Work Activities (Unit 2)
The inspector observed the two installed hot legs and the
installed Reactor Coolant Pump No. 2P51B section.
It was
determined that the pipe runs were installed in accordance with
the drawings.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
2.
Safety Related Piping - Observation of Work and Work Activities
(Unit 2)
The inspector observed weld end preparation of weld No. 83 on
sketch No. 2FCB36-S611-4-4.
It was determined that work activities
were performed in accordance with the applicable procedures and
good construction practices were adhered to.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Safety Related Piping - Observation of Welding Activities
(Units 1 and 2)
The inspector observed the following welding activities:
a.
Unit 1 Main Steam System Weld No. 15 on drawing no. M631,
sheet 1;
b.
Unit 1 Decay Heat Removal Discharge System
'B' Weld No.
110 v:. ucawing No. M610, sheet 6;
c.
Unit 1 Reactor Building Heating Ventilating and Air Condi-
tioning System Weld No. 25 on drawing no. M512, sheet 3;
d.
Unit 2 Decay Heat Removal Discharge System
'A' Weld No. 18
on drawing no. M611, sheet 4.
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It was determined that (1) work was conducted in accordance
with traveler; (2) proper welding materials were useJ; (3)
welding procedure requirements were met; (4) work area was free
of weld rod-stubs and (5) physical appearance was acceptable.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
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Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping - Special Welding
Applications (Unit 2)
The inspector observed the following repair work activities:
Grinding and etching of cladding repair on weld no. WJI-1.
a.
b.
Weld repair of classing on weld no. WJ4-4.
It was determined that (1) work was conducted in accordance
with traveler; (2) proper materials were used and (3) procedure
requirements were met.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Safety Related Piping - Weld Heat Treatment (Units 1 and 2)
While observing welding activities for items stated in Paragraph 3
of this report, the inspector determined that preheat met the
welding procedure requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping _-
Welder Qualification (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector reviewed qualifications records of welders who
performed welds identified in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this report.
It was determined that ASt1E B&PV Code Section IX requirements
were met.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Exit Irterview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted under
Persons Contacted) on May 17, 1979. The inspectors summarized the
scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the
findings as reported.
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