ML19225C715
| ML19225C715 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1979 |
| From: | Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908020354 | |
| Download: ML19225C715 (4) | |
Text
P. O. Box 525100
,8 Miaci, Florida 33152
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June 18, 1979 JL )M(8 Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enfor ement U. S. Nuclear Re.latory Commission 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Re: RII:JP0 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 IE Bulletin 79-05 A The attached information is submitted as a follow-up to our earlier responses to the subject bulletin. We understand that only bulletin items 2 and 10 remain open following this submittal.
Very truly yours,
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L Robert E. Uhrig Vice President Advanced Sysr.ams & Technology REU:GDW:cf Robert Lowenstein, Esquire cc:
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UPDATED RESPONSES TO IE BULLETIN 79-06A Response 5 24, 1979 response, " normal practice and As indicated in our April established procedures dictate that an operator (as a primary and essential function) monitor and maintain steam generator level (s)
The operator assigned to main-during transients or accidents."
tain steam generator level (s) does not have any other concurrent duties during an accident or transient until after the steam gen-erator level (s) are stabilized.
Response 7 (b. c)
In our response of June 4, 1979 we stated that "tte actual procedure changes will be made after resolution of the differences betweer, the NSSS vendor recommendation, and the bulletin (NRC)The 'inal requirements (regarding operation of HPSI and RCP pumps)."
procedure changes will be based on the final resolution achieved by the NRC a..d NSSS vendor with regard to the bulletin requirements concerning HPSI and RCP pump operation.
Response 8
.n a field verification of the correct positions We normally pert of all safety-related valves necessary to ensure proper operaticn of engineered safety features prior to a start-up following a refueling outage. This field verification will be performed prior to the start-up of Turkey Point Unit 4.
Our procedures require a re-verification by a field inspection of the correct position of all valves on the locked valve list, monthly.
Our procedures require a verfication by a field inspection of the correct position of each safety related valve which has been subject to maintenance or test (including periodic surveillarte tests) prior to returning the system or component to service.
We have verified that our position requirements in our procedures for safety-related valves necessary to ensure proper operation of engineered safety featurcs are correct by revieving the appropriate procedures against the applicable flow diagrams.
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Response 9 Prior to the start-up of Turkey Point Unit 4, a special interim instruction will be implemented to require:
- 1) That controllers for the sump pump discharge valves and the main steam isolation valves will be placed in the shut position prior to resetting phase A containment isolation, and
- 2) That the controllers for the containment purge and instrument airbleed isolation valves will be placed in the shut position prior to resetting containment ventilation isolation.
This instruction will remain in effect until the control logic of these valves can be revised in accordance with our earlier letters.
Response 10 The removal of safety-related equipment from service for maintanance or test is required by procedure to be reviewed and approved by the on duty nuclear watch supervisor or nuclear watch engineer, in addition to a licensed senior reactor cperator.
A log of equipment clearance orders is required by procedure to be maintained in the control room.
In addition any safety-related component that is removed from service must be logged in the equipment out of service log book which is also maintained in the control room.
Our procedures require that the equipment clearance order log book be reviewed periodically by the nuclear watch supervisor and the nuclear watch engineer; and that the equipment out of service log book be reviewed by the oncoming nuclear watch superviser and the nuclear watch engineer each shift.
Response 11 In ou June 4, 1979 submittal, we stated that use of the NRC proposed direct open con unications network, when installed, would address this issue. Now that the new direct open coneunication network (re.? chone) is operational, we will use (F' network to make the initial 442 3;g
report and to maintain an open communication channel with the faRC control center in Washington, D. C. within one hour when the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition of operation. We understand that use of this communication channel satisfies the open communication channel requirements of the bulletin and that no other verbai notification of any other NRC personnel is required.
Plant instructions will be revised to implement these reporting requirements pri7r to the start-up of Turkey Pcint Unit 4.
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r 442 313
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