05000250/LER-1979-022-01, /01T-0 on 790626:loss of 3B 4160 V Bus Would Not Result in Automatic Transfer of Shared D Motor Ctr to Alternative Supply from 4A 4160 V Bus.Operating Procedures Are Being Revised to Correct Situation

/01T-0 on 790626:loss of 3B 4160 V Bus Would Not Result in Automatic Transfer of Shared D Motor Ctr to Alternative Supply from 4A 4160 V Bus.Operating Procedures Are Being Revised to Correct Situation

ML19224D837
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	06/26/1979
From:	Schoppman M FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19224D834	List: 05000250/LER-1979-022, Forwards LER 79-022/01T-0 05000250/LER-1979-022-01, /01T-0 on 790626:loss of 3B 4160 V Bus Would Not Result in Automatic Transfer of Shared D Motor Ctr to Alternative Supply from 4A 4160 V Bus.Operating Procedures Are Being Revised to Correct Situation
References
LER-79-022-01T, LER-79-22-1T, NUDOCS 7907170101
Download: ML19224D837 (2)

LER-1979-022, /01T-0 on 790626:loss of 3B 4160 V Bus Would Not Result in Automatic Transfer of Shared D Motor Ctr to Alternative Supply from 4A 4160 V Bus.Operating Procedures Are Being Revised to Correct Situation

Event date:
Report date:
2501979022R01 - NRC Website

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D notor control center to its alternate supply from the 4A 4160 V bus.

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REPORTA3LE CCCURRENCE 250-79-22 y

, LICE'ISEE EVENT REPORT PACE T'n'0 Additional Event Description and Probable Consequences:

Subsequent to the discovery of the design defect, a re-review of the safety evaluation was corapleted. Based on this review we conclude that while opentor action to provide power to both the second fan cooler and second filter unit is preferred, it is not required to naintain post LOCA pressures below containnent design and to naintain offsite doses well below 10 CFR 100 guidelines.

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