ML19224D210

Forwards 790328 Chronology of Accident Until Core Cooling Was Restored

ML19224D210
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/04/1979
From:	Ross D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
NUDOCS 7907110087
Download: ML19224D210 (22)

Text

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260 142

.3 13GC p

CHRONOLOGY OF TMI-2 ACCIDENT UNTIL CORE COOLING RESTROED WEDNESDAY MARCH 28, 1979 FIGURE TIME EVENT 1

about 4 AM

' Loss of Condensate Pump

"~

Loss of Feedwater Turbine Trip 1

Start + 5 sec.

POV opens (2255 psi) to relieve pressure in RCS 1

+12 sec.

Reactor trip on high pressure (2355 psi) 1

+15 sec.

RCS pressure decay to 2205 psi (POV should have closed 2

+15 sec.

RCS hot leg temoerature peaxs at 612*F (pressure of 2150 psi, 450 psi over saturation) 10

+30 sec.

All three aux. feedwater pumps start as

(-

designed and running at discharge head -

no flow was injected since discriarge valves closed 1&4

-50 sec.

Pressuri:er level indication begins to rise faster than HPI injection rate would indicate 2

+1 min.

Steam Generators A and B are essentially dry

/

4

+3 min.

ECCS initiation (HPI) at 1600 psi 4

+6 min.

Pressurizer level off scale - HPI flow stopped - ECCS and containment isolation reset - Auto pumoing may have begun to Aux. Bldg.

12

+6 min.

RCS flashes as pressure bottoms out at 1350 psi (Hot leg temperature of 554*F) 4

+6 min.

Pressuri:er level indication is off scale 5

+5 min.

ECCS injection stopoed due to nign pressurizer level incication 10

-5

in.

Aux. feednater flow is initiated by coening ciused valves 260 14s POOR iB!Qgt.&;n-

2 FIGURE TIME EVENT 4&5

+9 min.

ECCS flow (HPI) restarted by operators

+10 min.

S.G. pressure recovered by aux. feedwater

~

'15 min.

RC Drain Tank diaphragm ruptures at 190 psi ue to continued discharge of POV 11 v1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Operator trips RC pumps in Loop T8 11

+1.8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Operator trips RC pumps in Loop A lA

+1.8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> (estimated)

CORE BEGINS HEAT UP TRANSIENT - Hot leg

~

temperature regins to rise to 520 F (off scale) and cold leg temperature drops to 150*F (HPI water) 15

+2.3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (estimated)

POV isolated by operator after S.G.-3 isolated to prevent leakage 19 & '3

+3.2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> RCS pressure increases to 2150 psi and POV opened - RC Drain Tank pressure spike of 5 psi,,

18

'3.8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> RC Drain tank pressure spike of 11 psi (unexplained) - RCS pressure only 1750; Contair. ment pressure increases from 1 to 3 psi 15

+5 hour Peak containment pressure of 4.5 psi 19

+5.5 to 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> RCS pressure increased fron.1250 psi to 2100 psi

)

19

+8 hour Operator opens POV to depressurize RCS to attempt initiation of RHR at 400 psi 19

+S-9 hour RCS pressure decreases to 500-450 psi; CFT discharge 15

+9.9 hour1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> 28 psi containment pressure spike, sprays initiated and stopped after 5000 gal. of NaOH injected (about 2 minutes of operation) 19

+13.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> POV closed to repressurize RCS, collapse voids and start RC pump 19

-13.5-15 hour RCS pressure increased fo:n 550 psi to 2300 pfP 14

-15 hour RC pumo in Loco A started hot leg temperature decreases to 550 F and cold leg temperature increases to 400*F indicating flow

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NRC PRCCECUE.E5 FOR CEC!SI0t TO RECC "4E!!D E'/ACUATIC!;

Who Decides S

1.

Ccebination of consequences and times require imediate initiation of evacuation: Senior t1RC Official en site rec:= ends :: Governor.

2.

Unplanned event with substantial risk takes place or is irmlinent Or situation judged excessively risky but there is time for con-sultation. Senior NRC Official notifies Governor and NRC HQ.

Chairman akes rec:=endation to Governce after consulting with C =issicners if possible.

S 3.

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Chairman

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2. Setiuence lead-11aintain Containment Ilesign Contain-4 hour Precaut [oigry, ing to Core Integrity '(likely) with ment Leak Itate tiel t Containment Cooling Evac 2 mi all around and 5 mi, 90" sector stay inside 10 mi Containment expected to Significant 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Eva.. 5 ml all Ilreach '

release of core (time for con-around and 10 fission products tainment failure) talle, 90*

sector, stay l-inside 15 mi

3. Ilycirogen flame flixture in flanmible Precautionary 9o~

or explosion range 2 ml [? )_ -[

6 L isi S upe r possible inside

't reactor vessel Explosion; m. lor t

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4. I:vacuate or Lose loss of Control Treat Evac 5 mi all L9 Lontrol Room like major release around and 10 C3 mi 90* sector, stay inside 15 miles kM S

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Action C-uidelines Notify evacuation authorities two hours in adva".ce (if possible) a.

to standby for a possible evacuation.

5.

Projected doses of I rem-whole body or 5 rems thyroid stay inside.

Projected doses of 5 rems whole body or 25 recs thyroid mandatory c..

evacuation of all persons.

6 Assumes general warning alreacy the aeme form of evacuation.ay b

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- Sprays and Cec.lers Cperative Time =0 Ficw st ps, core and wa:ar start hat:-up Time =lCO min Cer'e start's to uncover Ti==150 min Core begins to ceit Time =200 min Molten core is in icwer head of ret::Or vessel, pressure is 2500 psia Time =210 min Reac:or vessel fails, containment pressure ;:es :: 25 psia Time =210 min Hydrogen burns, c:nt.in.ent pressure goes to 57 ;sia Steam explosien possibility - miner consecuence CCNTA:NMENT SURVIVES (Failure assumed 130 sia) 4...= = 1 n.. cu r v-1. n re h as e i..a. a..,u.

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Ihis even should net pr: duce major TEleiIes Even: 2

- Sprays and C:olers Failed Beferd ricw Ste;s Time =0 to Time =2l0 min'.

Same as Event 1 - c:ntainmen pressure is 25 psia ilme=e10 min Centainment pressure is <0 psia Time =1 day

.C:ntainment fails due to steam ( cstly) Overpressure -

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In an actual release, the release rate and weather should be evaluated as they are at the time, and the decision based on those values.

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f risky maneuver s

Find out what actually happened and what is functioning.

3 33; g3 Predict what could result - different likelihoods Predict release rate Deter

aine present weather and forecast Assumed constant in table

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EXi'ECTED PLAfil R11FAsE IllsFlitlG EVACUATIO;g liti0

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I VI III ftESP0llSE (llAllGE7)_

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lifCII)ES 2.

1: ore llell 11ainta in Contalinnent lech Spec Con-4 hour Precaut iona ry Integrity (likely) with tainment leak l

Containment Cooling itate Evac 2 mi all around and 5 mi sector; sta inside 10 mi Containment lleached Reactor Safety 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Evac 5 mi all Study Categories around and 10 i

P!!R 4 - See uil sector, s ta e

_APl!endix 1 inside 1S mi 1.

Ilydrogen Ix-tio significant change tio significant tione plosion luside in reactor or prinury change Iteac tor Vessel

_sys teni CoreCrushed(unl1(ely)

Core melt See item 2 &

Appendix 1 N

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"ajor secuences evaluated here are :ied :: the less of for:ed :ircu~

1ation in the RCS.

The less of ficw frc the reseter :colant pump (RCP) is the gene'rali:ed initiating event frc which c:her initiating events such as less of off ite ;0wer can develop.

nr:.:nD vu 1..,.

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u Figure 1.b-1 snews the icss of RCP even: tree.

This :ree snews the varicus c;;iens avati-able given -he less of the RCP, and indicates wnich

binations of events or failures wculd lead to ::re ei t::wn (CM'.

The sequences der.cted with an asterisk are those which wcuid i:e ex-

/

Oected to f0licw the ::re melt::wr, progressicn discussed beicw, leacing

the variety Of at.cspheric radioactive releases and ::nsecuences

iscussac later.

Sc..w : Ore.:eltdowns c:uid be expecue :: be celayed for r:ughly a week because of the availability Of ~CC inje::icn over that period.

This method of c:re c:oling, h:wevgr, is no: expe :ed ::

be adequate to prevent core melt; as such a core mel:dewn is assessed

Occur at roughly a week. A rcugh measure of relative probabilities cf the varicus cute: es is indicated by the nota:icn of L, M, H (1cw, medium,high)'.

The column en the right-hand side of the cage indicates

-he relative pr:babilities of thj! sequences, with "LM" as the highes:

2

r:bability and L M as the icwest.

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-a AFpENDIX i.b MRJOR EVENTS AND TIMING IN EVENT 0.: CORE I'.El.TC0h?(

l.'

Event 1

- Sprays and COclers Operative Time =0 Figw stops, core and water start heat-uc Time =lCO min Cor~e' starts to uncover Time =150 min. Core begins to melt Time =200 min Molten core is in icwer head cf reactor vessel, pressure is 2500 psia

_.ilme=c,l0 min neactor vessel..ls, containment pressure ;ces to

- psia al c::

Time =210 min Fydrogen burns, centainment pressure gces to 57 psia Steam explosien possibility - mince cons.ecuence CONTA!!MEFT SURV!VES (Failure assumed 130 psia)

Time =10 hours Moltea core has melted about 1 meter int: basema:

Time = days Major problem - handle hydrogen, exygen - maintain c:ntain-ment integrity

(

CAUTICN:

- Keep sprays running

~

- Keep water many fee: Over cl:en debris

- WITECUT RECOM3It!ERS Hydrogen c:ntinues :: build up 5ASEMAT SURVIVES Even: 1

Conclusion:

This event should not produce major releases

/

Event 2

- Sprays and Ceciers Failed Bercre riew S ::s Time =0 to Time =210 min.

Same as Even 1 - centainment pressure is 25 psia Time =810 min C:ntainment pressure is 70 psia Time =1 cay Centainment fails due to steam ( cstly) overpressure -

c c.bcut 135 psia u v i-, w v.e. 4 1. :[ S

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Conclusion:

This event leads :: tafor eleases.

260 16:

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The even: tree for c:re melt leading :: various releases is :hown in Figure 1.b.

The following are essential in the event of core melt.

1.

Sprays and c:ciers are required to preven:.ajor releases.

2.

1:ydrogen must be ree: bined or otheraise re=0ved "r:: :ntainment.

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Larce Leak in Auxiliarv Euildine (AB)

The activity level in the reactor coolant is so high that substantial releases can'ccme fr:m small amounts s:illed in the A3 which requires ence through ventilation. A leak of 5 gpm to the AB atmosphere is assumed for the expected level of leakage. A leak of 50 ;;m is taken as a large leak to c:nsider a major leak in pump shaft sealing or seme similar nishap.

Based :n the leakage experienced already only the noble gases and no icdine are assumed :: evolve.

The A3 v2ntila:1cn exhaus: is assumed to ficw through the char cal filters.

Id.

Hydrecen Excicsien in Reactor ?ressure Vessel A de:cnation of the hydrogen oxygen bubble in the rea::Or vessel

uld rupture :he vessel and/or crush the c:re.

Rough analysis indicates tha: the pressure vessel would not ru::ure.

Postula:icn of tne c:re rescense is difficult.

If the core is crushed, it c:uld effectively prevent c:re cooling leading djrectly :: the core melt sequence described earlier.

It is unlikely that ccm:ression would lead to criticality.

e e

4 6

4 f^

Action Alternatives Evacuaticn Stav Inside l

c l'

2 niles l

l2 -

6 2 miles l

5 miles 2 miles all arounc 13 -

5 miles 90* sector 10 miles 3 m11es aii arounc l4 -

10 miles 90* sec30r 15 miles a.

All sector choices governed by wind direction.

If s'hiftine, more than

~

one quadrant may be affected b.

Jbese are initial values; as the release continues measurements ma'v indicate the need for reconsideration: of actie: up to 20 miles, e

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6.

Weather The table is based en F stability and 1 m/sec wind speed, in view of the April 1-3 forecast. At the approach c decisien time for evacur.tien, the apprcpriate met. condition will be.~ac:cred in:c the. dese ecuaticas to dete.mine the evacuaticn time, sec ces, and distances for the evacuacien.

NRC is predicting X/Q for current ceteorclegy as the incident progresses.

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260 166

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a.

Notify evacuatica authorities :,x: hcurs in advance to standby for a possible evacuatien.

5.

Predicted deses of IR whole body cr SR thyrcid in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> -

mandatory evacuctica cf children and pregnant wcman.

c.

Predicted doses of 5R whole bcdy or 25R thyr:id in 3 neurs -

mandatory evacuatien of all persons.

Assumes general warnir.g already that sc. e form of evacua-icn

~

may bec: e necessar.v.

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SHH A/3/79 - 0645 "E0 Procram" l.

"Minners Group" a.

What equipment is so important that we should find cut now all we can about radiaticn exposure and radiation resistance?

b.

What is (are) the barebenes c:mbinatien(s) of instruments (other equipment) to run the plant?

c.

What jury-rigging could we do if we start to lose "barebones" stuff, e.g., put pressure transmitters on samole lines to measure process pressures.

(

2.

"Lainas Group" 1/2 Results sent to Stallo What do we kn0w about environmental cualificaticn of the vital instruments.

3.

"Satterfield Grcup" a.

Calculate the radiction dose rate of vital ecuipment.

j b.

See whether the Navy or the weapons establishment know anything about the radiation resistance of tne kinds of thing (pressure transd4Cr:r7 etc.) we are worrying about.

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_ FLOOD TIMES

@ 250 GPM = 15000 GPH 12' = 74,330 gal 1 " = 619 A. 2 15,000 G/HR = 2.42"/HR.

Starting Point = 2 feet 2 hrs 10 min Steam Gen Press Loop 3 (1 of 2) 4 hrs 50 min Reactor Coolant flow Loop A (2 of 4) 7 hrs 30 min Press Level (3 of 3)

Steam Generator Press Loop B (2 of 2)

Reactor Cool Flow Loop A (2 of 4)

React Cool Flow Loop B (2 of 4)

(Loop A) Steam Gen Lev (Operate Range) (2 of 5)

(5 Total) Steam Gen Lev (Start-up Range)(4 of 5)

(Loop B) Stm Gen Lev Full Rangef l of 5).

(5 Total) St= Gen Lev (Operate){3 of 5)

Stm Gen Level (Startup Range)(5 of 5) 15 hrs 45 min St= Gen LeveM (full Range) $ of 5)

==

St= Gen Press Loco A(2 of 2)

React Coci Press Loop A @ of 2)

Wice Range React Cool Dress Loco A S of 1)

Low Range React Cool Press Wide 0 of 1 )

Loop S Penetrations (Start) 29 hrs, 40 min D.H Valves for shutdown cooling 49 hrs, 40 min Reactor Coolant PUmos 8 cay, 16 hrs, 50 min.

t A. 5:ukiewic: / S. H. Hanauer e

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