ML19224D209
| ML19224D209 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1979 |
| From: | Carr R, Runnels H, Judith Weaver NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19224D202 | List: |
| References | |
| ACRS-SM-0135, ACRS-SM-135, NUDOCS 7907110086 | |
| Download: ML19224D209 (11) | |
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, The Subccr.mittee heard conflicting testimony with regard to the following:
Whether operators had sufficient information to know that the Power Operated Relief Valve was stuck open.
Whether the operators had suf ficient information to know that they should have allowed the High Pressure Injection Pumps to inject water into the primary at full capacity.
Whether the operators had sufficient information to infer that there had been a hydrogen burn or explosion at approximately 1:50 p.m. on March 28, and the impact of definite knowledge of this event upon decisions by plant managers.
The time at which the operators had sufficient information to know that more than 11 of the fuel rods had suffered cladding failures.
The extent to which there was danger on March 28 and the following several days of equipment or instrument failures that might have led to neiting of fuel.
C" rR ?cCUTS There renain many other issues which the Task Force was not able to explore adequately, but which are very important aspects of the accident and the events surrounding it:
n DU I J' f i
. 1)
The significance vis-a-vis Three Mile Island of incidents at other Sabcock & Wilcox reacters including the transients at Rancho Seco and Davis-Besse, and the question of whether informatica concerning these incidents had been adequately analyced and disseminated.
2)
The response of Sabcock & Wilcox to TVA's April 2, 1978 letter forwarding co=nents of TVA engineer Carl Michelson regarding decay heat removal during a very small break loss of coolant accident:in a Babcock & Wilcox reactor.
3)
The frequency of the Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORVs) failing to open at TMI-2 (cne previous occassion) and the responde by the licensee, vender and NEC to this problem.
4)
Concentrating on developing an understanding of the accident and recovery sequence, the working group did not explore the questions regarding the communications between and the decision-making process of the State and the NRC.
This issue, hew:ver, is a crucial sne and should be explored full.
2 5)
The Task Force identified issues involving both communication between tha licensee and the NRC staff as well as uestions regarding the role of the NRC in decision-making during the accident and recovery operations.
It is apparent, for example, that in the early stages of the events (Wednesday afternoon) inportant information regarding the pressure spike and associated events which indicated a hydrogen detonacion or burn was, in fact, for 260 135
. reasons the Task Force was unable to identify, not conveyed to the NRC's incident response center.
The hydrogen detonation or burn may have been an indication of substantially greacer core damage than Federal or State officials had believed up to that point, or indeed until Friday.
While it is not clear that the failure to transmit this information contributed to any increased threat to health and safety, the f ailure did serva to diminish the NRC's ability to understand what was happening in the reactor and it denied both State and Federal officials information that was essential to their consideration of the need for evacuation.
The Task Force received testimony indicating that following the accident there existed no clear procedures spelling out the role of the NRC in its relationship to the utility with respect to how decisions regarding reactor operation were to be made.
A working relationship evolved that may or may not be considered satisfactory upon further analysis.
6)
The adequacy of radiation monitoring in the area surrounding the plant was not examined but is, of course a very significant issue.
3,b
,n 63 bU
APPENDICES THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE MEMBERS Hon. James Weaver, Chairman Hon. Manuel Lujan, Ranking Minority Member Hon. Harold Runnels Hon. Dan Marriott Hon. Bob Carr Hon. Mickey Edwards Hon. Ed Markey Hon. Richard Cheney Hon. Peter Kost=ayer Hon. Bruce Vento Hon. Jerry Buckaby 26L1 1si h
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h'ITNES SES l
1 Name Date Mr. Harold R.
Denton (NRC)
May 4 Director,} Office of Nuclear Reculation Regulation
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Mr. Roger Mattson (NRC)
May 9' Director, Division of System Safety, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mr. Vic Stello (NRC)
May 9 Director, Division of Operating Reactors Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mr. Darrell Eisenhut (NRC)
May 9, Deputy Director, Division of Operating R'eactors, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mr. Carl Michelson May 10 TVA Nuclear Engineer Knoxville, Tennessee Mr. James Creswell (NRC)
, May 10 NRC TMI Inquiry Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement Mr. James Higgins (NRC)
May 10 Region I Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement Dr. Charles Gallina (NRC)
May 10 Region I Office of Inspection and Enfcrcement Mr. Craig Faust May 11 Control Recm Operator TMI Unit 2 Metropolitan Edison Co.
General Public Utilities 260 138
Witnesses (cont'd) l Mr. Edward Frederick May 11 Control Rocm Operator TMI Unit 2 l
Metropolitan Edison Co.
General Public Utilities Mr. William Zewe May 11 Station Shift Supervisor TMI Unit 2 i-Metropolitan Edison Co.
General Public Utilities Mr. Gary Miller May 11 Station Manager TMI Unit 2 Metropolitan Edison Co.
General Public Utilities Mr. Frederick Sheimann May 11 Station Shift Foreman TMI Unit 2 Metropolitan Edison Co.
Ceneral Public Utilities Mr. John McMillan May 15 Vice President i-Nuclear Power Generation Group Babcock & Wilcox Lynchburg, Virginia o
Mr. James Deddens May 15 Manager, Projects Management Group Nuclear Fower Generation Group Babcock w Wilcox Lynchhut.g, Virginia 260 139 l