ML19224D206
| ML19224D206 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1979 |
| From: | Judith Weaver NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19224D202 | List: |
| References | |
| ACRS-SM-0135, ACRS-SM-135, NUDOCS 7907110079 | |
| Download: ML19224D206 (8) | |
Text
T 4 g, E:iCLOSURE 2 h
A STATEMENT SY N
j%
1 HON. J Di WEAVE R, CH A IRMAN,
THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE g
,Q COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
]
\\v U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
}\\
s As chairman of the Task Force, and having been present continually at all Task Force interviews and the on-site tour of Three Mile Island, Unit 2, I would like to give the Committee my personal ovservations and evaluations.
These comments will be as objective as possicle; they are the result of considerable thought and review.
One very personal story provided me an acute insight.
Its background is the movie, "The China Syadrame", in which a nuclear plant is in the throes of a potential accident.
An operator of the plant, played by Jack Lemmon, believes there is great danger and attempts to tell the truth about what is happening in the plant.
A public relations man for the utility company brushes Lemmon aside and,.instead, tells the news media that "everything is fine".
The movie makes it clear -- as only fic:1cn can do that the PR man it lying.
As our committee toured Three Mile Island, I had the opper-tunity ta talk with Mr Jack Herbein, cne of the tcp cfficials of Metrepci:. tan Edisen and its s p o ke sma r. ir the fi:s: days cf the TM:
ac:; dent.
His cccments :: the news media in those first days cf the acciden: were ama:ingl similar -- seme-imes word for word --
- he "evervthing is fine" statenert: :
the
'O man in the movie.
260 12 7 90711cc&t
It seemed as if Jack tierbein had the same scriptwriter as "The China Syndrome".
I found Jack Herbein to be an open, intelligent, energe:ic man whom I instinctively liked.
I was curious as to what his reaction had been to the movie and I asked him if he had seen it.
He said he had, a few days before the accident.
"What did you think of the movie?"
I asked him.
"I like;i Jack Lemmon" he responded.
"What did you think of the ?R man?"
Jack said:
"I didn't think he was worth a damn."
We were walking down a concrete corridor together and I could tell that Jack was thinking about his last remark. Then he turned to me and said:
"But, you know, a week later I was doing the same dann things."
Jack Herbein s truck me as a highly '_apable and hones person.
There is only one conclusion I can draw from all of this:
People are placed in the unfortunate position by the situation and by this technology where -- within the bounds or " normal behaviour" --
they are forced to lie.
Something is deeply wrong when that is the case.
I believe the Task Force through its recorded interrogations and specific observations es tablished beyond ques tion the followin; factors contributing to the sericusness of the TMI accident 1)
Operator or ope ator trainin; error; 6
< 4%g,.
,g Design errCr; I ea 4
(
n,W, O, WC '
yw 9
qpsjh 3'
Malfunction of eCuipment;
)
Ch+D y
v u :2: en ce sac regu a-uns; ane et 3'
Ccrmunications :onfusicn 9
Furthermore, the lack of proper monitoring of radioactivity release, the extent thereof and steps dealing with both was by no means conclusively established, but grave doubts lie in my mind abou: this critical matter and I urge further investigation of it.
As to operator error, le: me first say that I was very in-pressed by the calibre of the people operating the plant whom we interviewed.
They were bright, inf ormed and in my j udgment, c,2ite competent.
Mistakes were made.
Pumps were turned off th :--all things being known-- should not have been.
Readings of signa.
and events were misjudged.
Observa lons which should have been made were not made.
But as the Task Force lis tened as they related their first hand descriptions of the events, I was not a all sure that others would have acted differently.
If they had been trained for this specific series of events--which they were not--it is likely that the degradation of the plant would have been lessened; but--and I em-phasi:e this qualifier--one ci two differences in the series would have plunged the operators into the same desperate straits.
Given the manifold potentialities, variations are not just p o s s ib le, but likely.
I saw no operator error not cicsely related to design or equipment error and, therefore, it would be impossible to assume that merely more training could preclude accidents.
The possibilitie:
for error are simply too numerous.
J si;n error _is more dif ficul: to pinpoin but 1:
s never-theless there; Mr. Michelscn's analys:s is evidence that it.s recognizable.
The lack of methods :: measure coclan level in the 260 123
reactor vessel is one important deficiency, there are others.
There were several equipmen:
al functions but the mos: impor-tant was, of course, the f ailure of the power-operated relief valve on the pressuri:er to close.
The signal to the opcrators that it was closed did not relay the proper information.
This failure lies between equipmen: =a.,runction and design error.
There was a clear violation of NRC regulations in that a valve on the auxiliary feedwater line was closed and had been closed fo'r some time.
It is unclear what part this violation played in the further degradation of the plant.
It did lead to confusion.
In any event, it certainly startled the operator who, upon discovering it eight minutes into the accident, shouted, "The twelves are closed'".
Communications can only be described as a mess.
From phone calls to the NRC which will only be understood once the thousands of telephone tapes are studied to the wearing of respirators in the control room which of ten interfered with normal verbal inter-changes, the relaying of important and appropriate informa tion to the necessary persons occurred in a state of confusion.
Though the communications system can certainly be improved upon, I have to wonder if it coulu not also be worse if, for example, radioactivity were more heavily to contaminate the centrol rocm.
As I review the Task Force's material, the c.uestion I ask more insistently than any other is: Can the lessons cf TMI hel; preven: such accidents in the future?
First, 1 matter paramounti; clear from cur investigation,
[" d[ f)
]["$'
L i
practically no one--the operators, the designers. :Se NRC--ever thought such an accident coulc happy,r.
Instruments and gauges that could have measurec :ne extent of the damage in the reactor vessel anc in other areas of the plan: were set at levels co low to be of value: s ino lv because no one thought higher readings would be necessarv.
Operators were not trainec for the events which did occur: simolv because no one thoucht thev would occur.
hey,xnow it now.
t Can we change?
Can we retrain or more in ten s ive ly train operators?
Design plants better?
I cannot answer these ques tions with certainty.
But I can say with certainty that the accident at TMI 2 was NOT a next-to-impossible f1ike.
One valve, just one of do ens,,s tuck oper..
It could happen again; indeed, this very valve stuck open before at the Davis-Besse plant; but so complica-ted are nuclear plants--as the plant supervisor told us, "So many papers cros s my desk"-- that none of the operators that we inter-viewed had heard of the valve problems at Davis-Besse.
A: Babcock and Wilcox plants, transients--a euphemism for a minor acc
- --occur almost four times a rear-But 35W is not
- alone, Almost : such accidents have occurred yearly a: Combustica Engineering plants also.
Given one or two other events, -hese transients could degrade into an accident as terrible as TMI.
Indeed, TMI cculd have been much worse, although it is s t i l.' un-
- lear frcm our investiga-ica how much worse or exactly what events w:uld have had to occur to make it wcrse.
'Ju r inve s t ig a tion o f the accident at TM1 revealed a ma::er whi:h re:Lires further investi,.:icn-the culnerab ill:- ci such
- lants :0 ;0Wer failure, DOth f"OP Within and with0u: 'he plant.
Severa. exper: witnesses, when csked wrt: : c u l c h '. ve 7.a p p e n e d.f 9[9 i ^, ;
LUV idj
power sources failed, suggestec the probabili y of a complete failure of the plan: (to a mel: down)
What will happen to TMI 2 now?
No one knows.
Mcw badly damaged are the fu 1 rods?
No one is sure.
Can they be removed someday' No one is positive.
These questions, and their perplexing answers, pose the fundamental problem of nuclear plants.
If something goes wrong with an oil steam generator, you take a monkey wrench and fix it.
If something goes wrong with a nuclear plant, the entire plant is in jeopardy, the populations around it are in danger, and, if the accident is serious, the loss of the pla.t: is the probable result.
This, causing long term disruption of power supplies, and enormous loss of. investment.
Three Mile Island has proved th e extreme vulnerability of nuclear power.
Therefore, I ask the committee to consider the fact that the nuclear industry has had 25 years to perfect ; s designs and operations, has spent billions of dollars in research and develop-ment, and is still brought to its knees by a valve malfunctioning and one or two inappropriate respcnses.
~he responses made amid the alarm and din of the accident itself, when fif ty to one hundred alarms were being registered.
As Presiden: DeKiemp o f General Public Utilities told me, "With that many things going on, the operator could not be expec ted to be en top of eve ry thing. "
I have of course asked mvself these questions and must concludt that an accident such as 02:ur ed at TMI not only could happen again but is 1.kelv to at any :ine.
No one can sa)--cortainly nct mysei:-
with what frequency or 2: wha c a[s, r1rti:bl rl-wher that
.0 3 :
mpendious cf a.. r.uclear s5fe:S research,..AfH 1100, ;iacec :ne ceas :f :he :x: ac:::en t, ac::r_ n, o :ne ccagrcss; nat aesearca
. ~.
260 126
Service, at 6 in one hundred million-
- Lastly, t return to the concern explored in the beginning of r testimony. have we been told the truth?
Jack Herbein's remarks are on the record.
He mus: 1;ve with them.
But the remarks of the.NRC are also on the record; en the record of this committee, as a matter of fact, on Thursday, March 29, the day following the initial accident at TMI.
Thirty-six hours af ter the accident began, thirty-three hours (we know now) af ter very serious damage had occurred to the fuel rods, the NRC testified to this committee that, while a significant accident had occurred, it was not grave and everything was then under control.
The NRC were not the only ones in the dark.
Operators and engineers involved frcm the s: art of the acciden: repeatedly told the Task Force they did not know the extent of the damage--the degree of serious danger--until one or two days af ter the damage had ocmurred.
For example, according to the testimony we received, the pressure spike (which we now know registered a hydrogen explosion in the containment) was considered by many, if not all, to be a minor gauge malfunction, not an event which actually happened.
'.!a n y other symptoms, s igns, and events were ignored or disbelieved accer-ding to the testimony given to the Task Force.
Yet all this time inside the reactor vessel and inside the containment, a radicactive cauldron was erupting dangercus1,..
~_
Appropriate steps either were no: taken cr, pcssibly, would have d:ne no good if they had been.
Test;me v to the Senate Ccm.ittee en Environment and ?uc'__:
Works by 'residen: Diekar- ?f GPU impiles the reactor sys te was w
w e w we4 w
4 8
-. e l.s* d.. p 6e e
m e
o
.b l
l tc "re-estr' lish con trol. "
Eventuall. they did.
But the plant c
was out of control. the operators did not know what was happening inside of it.
They could not icok in.
They could not ge on.
Measuring devices and gauges had either failed or were non-existent, were set improperly or in the wrong places.
Xere they actually ignorant of the extent of damage, of the degree of danger?
If they were, it is a terrible indictment of the entire technology:
to confess that in such a highly engineered, costly, and potentially dangerous f acility as a nuclear plant, thev did not know what was going on at the most critical time.
Or perhaps they did know and did not tell the truth; are still no: telling the truth; indeed, tried from the start to cover up the extent.and significance of this acciden until they could asser:
control and stability.
It is certainly one or the other.
Possibly some of 'coth.
I prefer to believe that it is the f o r= a r : Tha: they did not know what was happening.
And if that is indeed the f act, then the indictment stands.
e N
260 128