ML19224C340

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Forwards Draft Tech Specs for Amend to License DPR-45,re Irradiated Fuel Storage & Handling of Heavy Objects Above Spent Fuel Pool & Containment Isolation During Cask Handling,In Response to NRC 790614,21 & 22 Requests
ML19224C340
Person / Time
Site: La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date: 06/26/1979
From: Linder F
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
To: Ziemann D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LAC-6356, NUDOCS 7907020177
Download: ML19224C340 (15)


Text

e DitIllYLitND POWER C00PEIt.1TIVE

& C-e, 0%,sa,,

54601 June 26, 1979 In reply, please refer to LAC-6356 DOCKET NO. 50-409 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:

Mr. Dennis L.

Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Operating Reactors U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.

C.

20555

SUBJECT:

DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)

PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT TO LICENSE

Reference:

(1)

DPC Letter, LAC-5266, Madgett to Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, dated April 20, 1978.

Dear Mr. Ziemann:

In conjunction with our request to amend Provisional Operating License No. DPR-45 for increased storage capacity of LACBWR irradiated fuel (Reference 1) and as a result of the telephone conversations on June 14, 21 and 22, with members of your technical staff, we are sub-mitting modified draft LACBWR Technical Specifications which were originally submitted to DPC for comment.

These Technical Specifica-tions address irradiated fuel storage and handling, the handling of heavy objects above the spent fuel pool and the requirement for con-tainment isolation during cack handling when certain conditions exist.

Additionally, we are submitting information supportive of the resultant modifications to the subject draft Technical Specifications.

Included within this information are summary results of a reanalysis of a spent fuel shipping cask drop accident (Attachment 1) and a determination of the gaseous iodine decontamination factor associated with a postulated cask drop accident in the spent fuel storage pool (Attachment 2).

The complete calculational set adcressing the reanalyzed cask drop accident will be submitted to you as soon as it is received from our consultant.

It is expected that this submittal can be released by us the early part of the week of July 2.

If there are any questions concerning this submittal, please contact us.

268 08i Very truly yours, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE Ii

',teL Q - N (pA 7 907020/ 77 j /4

?

Frank Linder, General Manager FL:LGP:af

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation LAC-6356 U.

S. N1? clear Regulatory Commission June 26, 1979 STATE OF WISCONSIN )

)

COUNTY OF LA CROSSE)

Personally came before me this

[7 dd day of June, 1979, the above named Frank Linder, to me known to be the person who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged the same.

/ a.._ J(

j'Lutw O,

Notary Public, La Crosse County Wisconsin My Commission Expires March 2, 1980.

268 082 Director sf Nuclear Reactor Regulation LAC-6356 U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 26, 1979 cc:

J.

G.

Keppler, Regional Director U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Directorate of Regulatory Operations Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.

C.

20555 Mr. Ralph S. Decker Route 4 Box 190D Cambridge, MD 21613 Dr. George C.

Anderson Department of Oceanography University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 O.

S.

Hiestand, Jr.

Attorney at Law Morgan, Let is & Bockius 1800 M Street, N.

W.

Washington, D.

C.

20036 Kevin P.

Gallen Attorney at Law Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, N.

W.

Washington, L C.

20036 Coulee Region Energy Coalition P. O.

Box 1583 La Crosse, WI 54601 268 083 3-

6/26/~9

SUBJECT:

LACBWR DRAFT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING, CASK HANDLINC.

Attachec are draf t LACEilR Technical Specifications from the Design and Performance and C'perating Limitations Sections.

These Technical Specifications address irradiated fuel storage and handling, the handling of heavy objects above the spent fuel pool and the requirement fcr containment isolation during cask handling when certain conditions exist.

The Technical Specifications were discussed by members of the NRC ?nd DPC staffs on several occasions and are in a form believed to be mutually acceptable.

The following addresses the specific changes made to the draft Technical Specifications by DPC.

T.S. 2.12.3 The phrase "in each individual rack assembly" was added to the second sentence.

It is possible that the distance between storage cells in different rack assemblies rav not confor" to a 7" nominal distance.

The U-235 fuel loading for stainless steel clad fuel was changrJ frcm 22.4 grams / axial cm to 22.6 gr ws/ axial cm The 22.d value is a nominal upper value whereas 22.6 is the actual bounding value cssumina no U-235 depletion.

15.2.12.5 No change.

T.S. 4.2.1.9 No change.

T.S. 4.?.8.3 The phrase "and sto.1e" was stricken from the first sentence as it will no longer apply with t:t application of T.S. 2.12.5.

A minimum of 10 fec' water coverage is required by operating procecure during fuel handling except..nen locating an assembly in the sipping rig when a minimum of approximately 5 feet is required for a short period of time (s 5 minutes /usembly).

The radiation levels increase approximately 20 mR/hr above background during this period.

T.S. 4.2.8.5 This draft Technical Specification was deleted completely based upon results of recently comrleted reanalysis of the consequences associated with a postulated cask drop accident in the LACBWR spent fuel storage pool.

Tha report " Spent Fuel Shipping Cask Drop Analysis for the La Crosse Boiling 268 08?

r ',v," o Water Reactor", Revision 3, adcresses the consenuential cutcc e follonina an assu ed E')-tnn cv! dr r with the ar reters ~evirusiv a w ei n.cr *

+F'+

the srent fuel nerl ater level was cmen a *it elv assumed to be at +ro t !

foot elevaticn i 12 feet above Icaer tier of f ael, versus the previc; sly used elevaticn cf 7CD foot-9 inches.

The results of the analysis ir date that, while the cask velocity at impact would be greater as would Le expected due to the reducticn in drag, the increase in ;crranent drage to the cras" pad and the spent fuel storage racks over that previously analyzed wculd be slight.

The pool ficar liner would not sust,in any adverse structural da ace.

aintaining the structural and led t ht intecrity c' the storage rcel,

're 4

results nf the reanalysis are attached ( Attacr ent 1).

hith the applicatier of T.S. 2.12.5, the minimun spent fuel pool water level will be 16 feet above eny stored spent fuel w' ch ccrresrcnds to an elevation of 684 feet (fdel in lcwer tier only) and the water level 'equire ents for cask bandling regarding the rechanical corsecuen:es of a cask drop are thus conserv3tively ret.

An analysis of iodine decontarination was perforred to assess the raJiclogical consequences of a cack drop vith a rinimun water ccverage of 16 feet above arj irradiated fuel.

'he previously sub-itted analysis, radiolcgical ccnsecuen:es of the Spent Fuel Shipping Cask Drcp Accident, EPC lctter LAC-3187, Lne 13, 1975, was utilized fer deterrinin~ the ccnsecuences associated with the two-tier storage' licensing effort and assu~ed an iodine decontamination factor cf 100 for a water depth of 23 #eet.

The analysis (Attacr cnt 2} sites orevicus w:er'-

n ental findings, by Duffery et.al., that show that if the iodine ccncentraticq in the water through which the gas containing iodine is passed, does not surpass a final concentration of 10" gr roles / liter, then 3 contarination factor of 100 or more is ecssible if the total gas volu e passed does not exceed the total water volure.

Ar.d at final wat.

oncentraticrs cf 10 ' gr roles / liter cr ' m,

the decontamination factor obtained is about 10 tires the values obtairec et higher icdine concentreticrs.

The results c' the analysis indicated th3t folicwing the pcstulated cask drop in which 72 fuel assemblies were darage1, the iodine concentration would be on the order of 9.8 x 10-E gr roles / liter and thus a decontamination of 100 with 16 feet of water ccverage versus 23 feet is still extrerely conservative.

The iodine corcentrations resultant fro a postulated fuel asserbly drop accident are conservatively bounded by the cask drop iodine scrubbing analysis results.

With the application of T.S. 2.12.5, a minimum of 16 feet of water coverage above stored irradiated fuel, will be provided and the iodine decontamination factor of 100 remains valid.

T.S. 4.2.8.6 (renumber 4.2.8.5)

The phrase, "The transfer canal shield plug and the other components and fixtures that are normally located and used within the spent fuel storage well",

was added to allow necessary operations in the area of the spent fuel pool.

Additional Requested Information 1.

Cost per assefrbly for storage rack modification:

$2273/ assembly.

2.

Cost per day with reactor shut down:

Low:

511,520/ day High:

569,120/ day Average:

528,800/ day,.n gn; 200 UOJ 2.11.2.5 Removal of all other potentially radicactive gaseous wasto and ventilation discharge rcm the restricted area shall be by rtn-F itored release through the stack.

2.11.2.6 There shall be twc stack blewers, each capable et dis-charging a mininura air flow of 35,000 ft' per min. through a 350-ft.

high stack.

2.11.3 Solid Wastes Solid radioactive waste shall be collected, packaged in suitable containers, and shipped offsite for disposal.

2.12 FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING 2.12.1 A fuel-handling system shall be provided which is capable of remotely installing or renoving fuel assenblies, one at a time, ircr the reactor core.

2.12.2 New fuel storage shall be provided in the new fuel storage racks located in pits in the biological shield.

The pits shall have draining provisions and shall normally be covered with a scaled closure.

The effective nultiplication factor for the new fuel storage racks, if the pits were flcoded while filled with new fuel, shall be less than 0.95.

2.12.3 Spent fuel storage shall be provided in the spent fuel stcrage racks located at the bottom of the storage well within the containment vessel.

The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall he main-tained with a narJJul 7.0 inch center-to-center distance between fuel assemblies in each individual rack assembly and with a bcron containing poison slab between each storage location to ensure Kef f of < 0.95 when flooded with unborated water.

Fuel in the storage well shall have a U-235 loading of <_ 16.6 grams per axial centimeter for zircaloy clad 22.6 grams per axial centimeter for stainless steel clad fuel and <

fuel assemblies.

2.12.4 Water in the storage well shall be maintained at a temperature not exceeding 1500F by a storage well cooling system.

2.12.5 The fuel storage well water level shall be at least 16 feet above any fuel stored in the spent fuel storage racks.

268 036

-29a-4.2.1.9 The containment building shall be isolated whenever the spent fuel storage well contains irradiated fuel which has decayed less than 43 days after exposure in a critical reactor and a shipping cask for irradiated fuel is being moved by the crane on the 701 level, or located within one cask length of the top of the spent fuel storage well, or is within the spent fuel storage well.

268 087 4.2.8 Spent Fuel Storage and Handling 4.2.8.1 Fuel elements and control rods shall be inserted or removed frem the reactor vessel one at a time.

4.2.8.2 Irradiated fuel elements shall be stored underwater in the spent fuel storage racks, at the bottom of the spent fuel stcrage well, or in an approved shipping cask.

4.2.8.3 During the handling of irradiated fuel elements that have been operated at pcwer levels greater than 1 Mwt, the depth of water in the reactor upper cavity and/or the spent fuel storage well shall be at least 2 ft. above the active fuel.

4.2.8.4 Irradiated fuel e lements shall have decayed for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to placing them in the s:'ent fuel storage well.

4.2.8.5 With the exception of a spent fuel shipping cask, the core spray bundle, the transfer canal shield plug and the other components and fixtures that are normally located and used within the spent fuel storage well, no objects heavier than a fuel assembly shall be hand 2ed over the spent fuel storage well.

268 000

6/18/79 ATTACI.ENT 1 RESULTS UF CASK DROP DN CP.A5h Plu Load Cr-1 Center Drep ( 7.

M id e l e

[ t f ec t i ve)

C iltul it ed Value A t ic. ble Vilue tia sir:

C.e.k Velocity a: In> tant of I r p a t_ t 48.2'6

'/A

( f t / '.e. )

tia x i r.u hinetic Ener<rr-at in, tant of Irpact 43427.0 N/A (ir/k)

' train in Inter cdiate Cylin!er (infin) 0.321

0. f 35
Maxic, Percent of Ultirate Strain in Intermediate 66.2 100 Cylinder (.;)

Total Detor:'ation of the crash Pa ' (in) 3.03 10.0 tiaxir o Pcac*. ion Land in Eich M3Jule (Lips) 329.6 361.2 fla x i rt Co pressive S t r, in 1:.n r cylinder 60.26 1C1.6 (ksi) tiax ir a' Strai: in Inn >r Cyi:- A r (in/;n) 0.0104 0.273 Percent of Ulti:,te St r

,a in I,

Lylind'r 2.15 E^.0

( ',' )

tiaxir un Co

.r :s s ivc Sir,>>

in Out e C y l i n d,2 r 53.94 101.6 (ksi)

Maxina-Sti 3in in On* r C <lir d r (in/in) 0.0054 0.263 Percent of Ulti ate 5 train in Got r cylinder

(' )

1.11 53.0 Maxinu Punching Shear Stress in I p;,a c t Plate 15.09 26.5 (ksi) tiaxi. mum Punching Shear St ress in Base Plate 19.98 26.5 (ksi) 2.64 4.17 fiaximum Local Bearing St ress on Concrete Floor (under each module) (ksi)

Maximum Punching Sheer Stress in Concrete Floor 0.0265 0.201 (under each nodule) (ksi)

Maximum Reaction Load for the 22 tiodules (kips) 7251.3 N/A 268 089 6/18/79 ATTACHMEt1T i (Cont'd)

Load Case 1 Center Dron (22 Madules Effective) (continued)

Calculated Value Allowible Value Maxi"u, Average Bearing Stress on the Reinforced f.53 2.1 Concrete Floor (ksi) 1648 5097.8 tiaxir u, Reac t ion load on the Reinforced Concrete Slab ABCD (kips)

Average Shear Stress in Reinforced Concrete S!a5 0.108 0.201 ABCD O.si)

Maxiru, Reaction load on the 29" Thick Reinforced 5603.2 nf3 Concrete Wall Under floor (kips) 1.09 2,03 tia x i -

Co pressist-Stress in *5e 29" Thick Reintocced Concrete Vall Under floor (ksi)

Load Care 2 Ouadrant ir; a : (17 Mndules Effective) 48.276 n /;,

M ixir um Cask V loci ty at Instant of Inpact (ft/sec) 43427.0 n/A tiaxi am Ki ne t i c Energy a t instar of Irpact (in-k) tiaxinu, Strain in intercediate Cytinder (in/in) 0.347 0.4E5 71.6 100.0 Percent of Ul t; rate Strain in Internediate Cylinder (%)

Total Deformation of the Crash Pad (in) 8.675 jo.o Maximum Reaction load in Each Module (kips) 350.10 361.2 Maximum Compressive Stress in inner Cylinder 61.08 101.6 (ksi)

Maximum Strain in inner Cylinder (in/in) 0.0113 0.243 2 34 50,0 Percent of Ultimate Strain in Inner Cylinder (%)

54.68 101.6 Maximum Compressive Stress in Outer Cylinder (ksi) 0.006 0.243 Maximum Strain in Outer Cylinder (in/in) 268 0?O 2-

9 AfTACHMENT I (Cont'd)

Loa.1 Ca.e ?

Quadiant In;w t (1/ I'aJulc

! f f o. t i '- c ) (continut.! )

Calculated V.ilue Allowable Value l'e r r. o ' o f Ul t ir ~it e Strain in Outer Cylinjer (')

1.20 50.0 fla xi-

, Pun hi n.; %ea r S t r e s <- in impact Plate 15.29 76.5 (ksi) fia s i ~

Punchin:, Shear Stre,s in Ba,e Plate (ksi) 20.26 26.5 2.68 4.17 Local Searin : Stres-an Concrete Floor Maxi:

( a ;'e cach codule) (ksi) 0.027 0.201 Maximum Punching Shear Stress in Coacrete Floor (unJ.r c ich r odale) (ksi) t'.a s i r :, Peaction lead for th-17 "'fule~,

( k i p.,)

5679 7 n/A 1.858 2.1 Maximu-i Average Bearing Stre,s on the Reinforced Concr te Flear (ksi) 2672.8 5037.3 l'.a x i r f.eactic LuaJ v7

  • h-

r i n f a r c t J C en : r, t e S I..b ' ". D (ki:.)

0.175 0.201

? --

for:c-' C1 rete Sla3 A' ' r a She > r 5:

A9CD (kins) 43b3 3 N/A tia x i - -,"cactic Lo'd on the 20" ihick P.einforced Concrete Vali Under Floar (kips)

0. 8 M 2.03 Maxirum Compre ss i"t Stre, in the 29" Thick fieinforced Concret.-

L' i l l

',r F!r

.r (k.i) 268 091 3-

ATT*sCHMENT 1 (Cent'd) 6 /1 P ' 7 4 htSulT5 Cr L A".K J:Um ( ' SiWD FOCK Calculatet!

A l l :nza h l e

...i T. > n o f c t o r a feli Valor Va l u.

?-

tiai s

10').00 N/A

'e c i. i t of S h i,';> i n g ( a,k (Li; )

23 22 N / /4 iti-

[' e., 1: i c'i t (f t) o 0.P0 N/A M is i*N Cisk Velos ity at in,t ml of 1: vac t (Ft/sec) 31018.14 n /;,

I n, t a.,

Lir t i, tnei.

of "rs ;s M is i' of I pact (in.k.)

52 sf.,

r

  • a ar of Stora,e Cell' t,ucto Maxino. Strain in L a c 'i S t ora.,

Et11

'ir,'i d C.0230 2.4^3 Fer Cent of Ul t ir 1:.

s* rain i r-Lara Stc m 4.74 103.0 Cell (in i t.)

4.E76

'l ?5 i

t n i; 5:

in c c i 'i i.;:

68.70 1.1. ?,2 e.-i.; - T r i,s

,:t.

', r: --.

83.62 N/A Pt r 5t--

. 11 1

t '. i >. i r u - T -,n s-i t t.

P

.i, L ~ c' :er 52 4348.2 N/A C e. ) ! <

(~,

3 t h..

19.71 2^.0 I;

In,x i o - S t r. a in Lell Wi!

t!-

e! it i

t'.a f. i r n S t r e > s in i; F.a s.: ;t: orture c2.52 41.4 e

(ksi) t.

M.w i r u-S t r e, s in Jad

_re.

(tsi) 51.72 106.3' e

Maxiro, local Bearing Stress on 1.36 2.03 Concrete Floor (ksi)

Maxinun Bending Stress in the Dearing 12.49

41. >>

Plate (ksi)

Maximum Punching Shear Stress in t hr-7.48 hl.4 Liner Plate (ksi)

Maximura Local Bearing Stress on Concre;e Floor (ksi) 1.7 2.03 tiaximum Punching Shear Stress on Concrete Floor (ksi) 0.01 0.201 268 0 "~

4-

ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd) 6/14/70 Calculated Allowable Stra: St D r. 'p

, To > of Stera, Cell Value Va lt -

P Co,;i c,

ve ', ;tess in t h.. 42 Itii c k l1a i t

Pint <u a Co.icret. Wall Una r Flwr 4.i) 0.96 JJ s

'a.'

o

. tis a loiJ Oa Conctc'i '. 'a l 1

(*i,u EU 1,

1.41 t U auppm ted Plate Thickness That Maxirmm M iy Pe rf ora t < d b, t'i sle Free Fall Velecity,(ir)

[ 7L For yla 0.30;

'1.625 Stanford Research Institute Fo r;ru l a 0.3C3 0.625 l.

Ulti ate, train for s cinless steel, iic yielJ t:.

!!;. $!c < t r; 4 :

re o-

,t s -.<

f--

3: ai i '

.ai.

in t'.e als - 1.o x 21 x 3 3._y - 2c.0 ksi, 0

3 n ! '.. A l e _

jU.IJ 4.

f t. c k l i n. Stre, for l ',

H,to i: l a steel at desig, te era t u r t:

c f4'L:Li 1)

't

-Q

'/(3 PR]R P riyagh[{Q i lbud

.;, m L. D D

(),i.)

?

5-

6/22/74 ATTACHME::T 2 GAEEOUS IODINE PELEASED I A CASK DROP ACCIDENT AT LACBWR Assume:

72 fuel assemblies and 10-day ccoling period.

Accident

'nvolves all 72 ascemblien.

OnIr I-131 c en s i d e r.'

.i r 20.8 hrs.).

1, I-2 ' 3 ha s decayed away.

(T t;

=

1 total iodine in assembl; is in :lenun region.

Curie content per assembly = 2445 Ci (After 10 days).

176040 Ci Total curie content

=

Re:

DPC Letter LAC-318 7 (June 13, 1975).

Weight in grams of I l4' disintearations (number curies, Ci) x l3.7 x 10

)

W(grams)

=

Curie-see

~

(number of atoms - ^

),. (nurber of mcles 3,,,,

erars 2 x dis /sec.

f.02217 x 10-atcms nele x10 1 E.07 days sec X 86400 X 131 cr/r. ole W(grams) = ci y

6.02217x10 '

.695 aY

~

1.425 grams of I l31 as I 2 species W(grams of 1 2)

=

I.

According to Reg. Guide 1.25, a decontamination factcr of 100 is used, 'vith 23 feet of water above the fuel.

II.

Differy (2) et.al., show by experimentation that if the elomental iodine concentrations in the water through which a gas cor taining I l31 is bubbled, does not surpass a final concentration of 10-5 gr mol/ liter, then decontamination factors of 100 cr rore are possible if the total air volume passed does not exceed the total water volume.

At final water concentrations of 10-6 M or less, the decontamin-ation factors obtained are about 10 times the values obtained at higher iodine concentrations.

Therefore, it may be shown that if the final concentration does not exceed 10-6 M, using a decontamination factor of 100 is conservative.

268 00' / 8

a.

I.TT7#H"ENT 2 (Cont'd) 11 it. :. 11 ft. x 16 ft.

\\'a lu: e of fuel noel li a otove rack

=

g

' 9 36 ft' r.492 1- ~

R.43'

'n"

  • -r' c :-

CcacentraLion ci 1

(molari'.; 3 r-Icu/ liter) 1.245 gr I I'!

(as I 3) 5.366 x 10 -

moles total released 232 grams / mole

=

Molarity = 5.3F6 x

'J 3 moles /5.482 x 10" liters 9.788 x 10-d M

=

Therefore, using a D.F.

of 100 is still extremely conservative.

(1) CONF-650407, Vol.

2, pp. 776-804.

International Symposium of Fission Produce Release and Transport under Accident Conditions, 1965.

2-268 095