ML19221B070
| ML19221B070 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-75-087, NUREG-75-087-09.5.5, NUREG-75-87, NUREG-75-87-9.5.5, SRP-09.05.05, SRP-9.05.05, NUDOCS 7907120351 | |
| Download: ML19221B070 (7) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STANDARD REVIEW PLAN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SECTION 9.5.5 EMERGENCY DIESEL ENGINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM REVIEW RESPCNSIBILITIES Primary - Power Systems Branch (PSB)
Secondary - Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB)
Materials Engineering Branch (MTEB)
Mechanical Engineering Branch (MEB)
Structural Engineering Branch (SEB)
I.
AREAS OF REVIEW The emergency diesel engine cooling water system (EDECWS) provides cooling water to the station emergency die w; engines and is reviewed to assure conformance with General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 44, 45 and 46.
The PSB review includes those portions of the EDECWS that receive heat f rom components essential f or proper operation of the die,el engines and that are housed within their respective diesel engine compartments, and those additional parts of the system that transfer the heat to a heat sink.
The system includes all valves, heat exchangers, pumps and piping up to the engine housing.
1.
The PSB reviews the functional performance characteristics of the EDECWS and the l
effects on those characteristics of adserse envirotmental occurrences, abnormal operational requirements, acciaent co.ditmns, ano loss of of f site power.
2.
The system is reviewed to determine that a malfunction or single failure of a component, or the loss 01 a cooling source, will not reduce the safety-related f unctional performance capabilities of the system. The PSB verifies that:
l System components and piping have suf ficient physical separition or shielding a.
to protect the system from internally-or externally generated missiles and from pipe whip and jet impingement caused by cracks or breaks in high and moderate energy piping.
b.
System components are designed in accordance with the design code., required by the assigned quality group and seismic category classifications.
The system is housed in structures designed to seismic Category I requirements.
c.
d.
Failures of non-seismic Category I structures and components would not affect the safety-related functions of the EDECW5.
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3.
The PSB reviews the design of the EDECWS with respect to the following:
l a.
Functional capability during periods of abnormally high water levels (the probable maximum flood).
b.
Capability to detect and control system leakage, including isolating pct' ions of the system in the event of excessive leakage or component malfunction.
c.
Measures to preclude long-term corrosion and organic fouling that wnuld degrade system cooling performance, and the compatibility of any corrosion inhibitors or antifreeze compounds used with the materials of the system.
d.
The capacity of the EDECWS with regard to the manufacturer's recommended engine temperature differentials under adverse operating conditions.
e.
Provision of proper instruments and testing systems to permit operational testing of the system.
f.
Provisions to assure that normal protective interlocks do not preclude engine operation during emergency conditions.
4.
The PSB will determine the adequacy of design installation, inspection and testing of all electrical components (sensing, cont rol and power) required for proper operation of the system, including interlocks.
5.
The PSB will review the applicant's proposed technical specifications for operating j
license applications as they relate to areas covered in this SRP section.
Secondary reviews sill be performed by other branches and the results used by the PSB to complete the averall eval _ation of the system. The secondary reviews are as follows. The SEB will determine the acceptability of the design analyses, procedures, and criteria used to establish the ability of the Category I structures housing the system and supporting systems to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as a safe shutdown earthqu3ke (SSF), tne probable maximum fload (PMF), and tornado missiles. The MEB will review the sei m M qualification testing of components and will determine that components, piping, and structures are designed in accordance with apr'i ile codes and standards. The MTEB will verify that inservice inspection requirements are met for system components and, upon request, will verify the compat bility of the materials of construction with service i
conditions. The ASB will determine that the seismic and quality group classifications for system components are acceptable. The ASB also determines that the EDECWS is in accordance with Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1 for cracks and breaks in high energy and moderate energy piping system outside containment.
O Rev. 1 9.5.5-2 149 037
II.
ALCEPTANCE CR!'ERIA Acceptability of the diesel engine cooling system design, as descrit;ed in t e applicant's safety analysis report (SAR), is based on specific General Design Criteria and regulatory guides. Ar ~
nal basis f or cetermining the accepta' ility cf the systeo, will be the degret af c i. #a it the design with that for previously reviewed plants with satis-fat _ory operatiny experience. Listed below are the specific criteria as they relate t o e 2DErWS.
The system is acceptable if the design is in accordance with the following criteria:
1.
General Design C'iterion 2, as related to structures housing the system and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods, as established in Chapters 2 and 3 of the SAR.
2.
General Design Criterion 4, with respect to structures housing the system and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of external missiles and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet imoingement forces associated with pipe breaks.
3.
General Design Criterion 5, as related to the capability of shared systems and components important to safety being capable of performing required safety functions.
4 General Design Criterion 44, to assure:
a.
The capability to transfer heat from system; and components to a heat sink under transient or accident co iditions.
b.
Redundancy of components so that under accident conditions the safety function can be performed assuming a single active component failure.
c.
The capability to isolate components of the system or piping, if required to aaintain the system safety function.
5.
General Design Criterien 45, as related to design provisions to permit periodic inspection of safet; related components and equipmen+. of the system.
6.
General Design Criterion 46, os related to desigt, provisions to permit appropriate functional testing of safety related systems or components to assure structural integrity and leaktightness, operability and performance of active ccmponents, and the capability of the system to function as intended under accident conditions.
7.
Regulatory duic'? 1.26, as related to the quality group classification of system components.
149 038 9.5.5-3 Re#- I
8.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, as related to the seismic design classification of system components.
O 9.
Regulatory Guide 1.68, as related to preoperational and startup testing of the diesel engine cooling wat.*r system.
10.
Regulatory Guide 1.102, as related to the protection of structures, systems and components important to safety fram the effects of flooding.
11.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, as related to the protection of structures, systems and components important to safety from the effects of tornado missiles.
12.
Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, as related to breaks in high and moderate energy piping systems outside containment.
13.
Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB), as it relates to engine cooling water pro-tective intarlocks during accident conditions.
For those areas of review identified in subsection I of this SRP section as being the responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria and their methods of applica-tion are contained in the SRP sections corresponding to those branches.
III. REVIf W PROCEDURES The procedures below are used during the construction permit (CP) review to determine that the design criteria and bases and the preliminary design as set forth in the preliminary safety analysis report meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II.
For the review of operating license (OL) applications, the procedures are used to verify that the initial design criter a and bases have been appropriately implE'ented in the final design i
as set forth in the final safety analysis report. The procedures for OL reviews include a determination that the content and intent of the technical specifications prepared by the applicant are in agreement with the requirements for system testing, minimum performance, and surveillance developed as a result of the staff's review.
The desiga of the diasel engine cooling water system may vary considerably from plant to plant due to the requirements of various diesel engine manufacturers, the number and type of secondary cooling loops used for heat removal, and the number of intermediate cooling loops required to transfer the rejected heat to the ultimate heat sink.
Variations in design may also occur due to preferences of various architect engineer firms.
Therefore, for the purpose of this SRP section, a typical system is assumed. Any variance in the review procedure, to suit a particular design, will be such that the system review areas in subsection I are covered, and the system will meet the criteria in subsection II.
Upon request from the primary reviewer, the secondary review branches will pro"ide input for the areas of review stated in subsection I.
The primary reviewer obtains and uses such input as required to assure that this review procedure is complete.
Rev. 1 9.5.5-4
-"r)
1.
The SAR is reviewed to establish that the EDECWS description and relatad diagrams clearly delineate system operation, individual and total heat removal rates required by components, and the margin in the design heat removal rate capability. The reviewer serifies the following:
Failure of a piping interconnection, as shown on system pipirg aid instrumen-a.
tation diagrams (P& ids), between subsystems does not cause total degradation of
+he EDECWS. The results of failure modes and effects analyses are used as a basis of acceptance.
b.
Provisions have been made to permit inspection of components, as shown on system layout drawings.
c.
The performanc( and water chemistry of the EDECWS is in conformance with the engine manuf acturer's recommendations.
a.
The engine "first try" starting reliability has been increased by providing an independent loop for circulating heated water while the engine is in the standby mode.
e.
Temperature sensors have been provided to alert the operator when cooling water temperatures exceed the limits recommended by the manufacturer. Protective interlocks in this system are acceptable if the SAR indicatts that the inter-locks are ;n conformance with Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB).
l 2.
The reviewer verifies that the EDECWS can be vented to assure that all spaces 3re filled with water.
Statements in the SAR to the effect that the system design satisfies the above requirement are acceptable.
3.
The reviewer verifies that system function will be maintained in the event of ad,erse environmental phenomena and loss of offsite power.
The reviewer evaluates the system, using engineering judgment and the rcsults of failure modes and effects analyses to determine that:
a.
Failure of non essential portions of the system or of other systems not designea to seismic Category I requirements and located close to essential portions of the system, or of non-seismic Category I strucLures that house, support, or are close to essential portions of the EDECWS, will not preclude essential functions.
Reference to SAR sections describing site features and the general arrangement and layout drawings will be necessary, as well as the SAR tabulation of seismic design classifications for structures and systems. Statements in the SAR to the effect that the above conditions are met are acceptable.
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b.
The essential portions of the system are protected from the effects of floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and internally-and externally generated missiles. Flood protection and missile protection criteria are discussed and evaluated in detail 9.5.5-5 pey, 1
utide-the SRP sections for Chapter 3 of the SAR.
A statement to the effect that the system is located
,r. a seismic Category I structure that is tornado missile and flood protected, or that components of the system will be located in individual cubicles or rooms that will withstand the effects of both floodi,1g and missiles, is acceptable.
4.
The reviewer verifies thit there are no high or moderate energy piping systems located close to the EDECWS or that the EDECWS is protected from the eff? cts of postulated breaks in these systems.
The means of providing such protection are given in Chapter 3 of the SAR and procedures to review the information pra 'nted are given in the SRP sections for that chapter.
5.
The descriptive information, P& ids, onsite emergency power supply drawings, and system analyses are reviewed to assure that essential portions of the system will function followirq design basis accidents, assuming a concurrcat single active component failure. The reviewer evaluates the results of failure modes and effects analyses preserted in the SAR to ensure the functioning of required portions of the system.
o.
T r.e performance requirements of the diesel engine are reviewed to determine the time available to prowide cooling water to the diesels and the other systems that have to operate to assure onsite power capaoility.
7.
The reviewer verities that the ECEC 6 and the diesel generator can perform during periods when less than full electrical power generation is required.
IV.
EkALUATICN FINDlNGS The reviewer verifles that sufficient information h3s been provided and his review supports conclusienc of the following type, to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report:
"The emergency diesel engine cooling water system includes all piping, valves, heat exchangers, and pumps up to the points where the cooling water piping connects to the engino housings.
The scope of review of the diesel engine cooling water system for the plant included laycut drawings, process flow diagrams, piping and i ns t rument 3tio 1 diagrams, and descriptive infornation for the system and auxilic.ry supporting systems that are essential to its nopra+ inn.
((he review tis deterrrined the adequacy of t% 3ppiicant's proposed design criteria and bases for the amergency diesel engine cooling water system, and the require ents for continuous cooling during all conditions of plant operation.
(CP)] [The review has de' ed that the design of the diesel encine cooling water system and auxiliary supporting systems is in conformance with the design criteria and bases.
(OL)]
"The basis for acceptance in the staf f review has been conformance of the applicant's designs and design criteria fer the diesel engine cooling water system and necessary auxiliary supporting systems to the Commission's r egulations as set fc th in the general design criteria, and to applicable regulatory guides, branch t
' cal positions, and industry standards.
Rev l 9.5.5-6 149 041
"The staff concludes that the design of the diesel engine cooling water system con-forms to all applicable regulations, guides, stiff positions, and industry standards, and is acceptable."
V.
REFERENCES 1.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion ?, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena."
2.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4, "Environuental and Missile Design Bases."
3.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components.'
4.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 44, "Coolina Water System."
5.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 45, " Inspection of Coolinq Water System."
6.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. General Design Criterion 46, " Testing of Cooling Water System."
7.
Regulatory Guide !.26, " quality Group Classifications and Standards For Water,
5 team, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants."
8.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification."
9.
Regulatory Guide 1.68, ' Initial Test Programs for Water Coolea Reactor Power Plants."
10.
Regulatory Guide 1.102, " Flood Protection for Nuclear Po.er Plants."
11.
Regulatory Cuide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification."
12.
Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping FailJres in Fluid Systems Outside Containment," attached to SRP Section 3.6.I, and MEB 3-1,
" Postulated Break and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment,"
dttached to SRP Section 3.6.2.
13.
Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB), " Diesel-Generator Protective Trio Circuit Bypasses."
h it;9 042 9.5.5-7 Rev. I