ML19221B050
| ML19221B050 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-75-087, NUREG-75-087-09.3.4, NUREG-75-87, NUREG-75-87-9.3.4, SRP-09.03.04, SRP-9.03.04, NUDOCS 7907120314 | |
| Download: ML19221B050 (9) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STANDARD REVIEW PLAF OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SECTION 9.3.4 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (PWR)
(INCLUDING BORON RECUVERY SYSTEM)
REVIEW RESPONSIBILITTES I
Primary - Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB)
Secondary - Core Performance Branct (CPB) g Structural Engineering Iranch (SEB)
Mechanical Engineering t ranch (MEB)
Materials Engineering Branch (MTEB)
Etfluent Treatment Systems Branch (ETSB)
I Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (ICSB)
Radiological Assessment Branch (RAB) l Power Systems Branch (PSB)
I.
AREAS OF REVIEW Pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants include a chemical and volume control system (CVCS) and boron recovery system (BRS). These systems maintain the required water inventory and quality in the reactor coolant syster (RCS), provide seal vater f'ow to the reactor coolant pumps, control the boron neutron absorber concentration in the ree-tor coolant, and control the primary water chemistry. Further, the system provider recycled coolant for the demineralized water makeup system for normai operation and the design may also provide high pressure injection flow to the emergency core cooling system in the event of postulated accidents. The review is performed to assure conformance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, S, 26, 27, 29 and 33.
1.
The ASB reviews the systems f rom the letdown line of the primary system to the i
charging lines that provide makeup to the primary system and the reactor coolant pump seal-water system. The system is reviewed to the interfaces with the demineralized water makeup system and radioactive waste system.
2.
The ASB reviews the functional performance characteristics of CVCS components and l
reviews the effects of adverse environmental occurrences, abnormal operational requirements, or accident conditions such as those due to a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
3.
The ASB reviews the system to determine that a malfunction, a single failure of an l
component, or the loss of a cooling source will not reduce the safety-related activ a functional performance capabilities of the system.
4.
The system is reviewed with respect to the effects of postulated breaks or leakage cracks in high and moderate energy piping outside containment.
I USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN standeed re.*ew piene are pr.pered %r th. g2:dence of the omco of Nocieer R..eto, R.gonetion etoff ree ene.bie for the review of oppcications to construct ead operste nececar power plants These i.ocumente are mode evoetab4e to the pub 4ic es part of the Commenoson a polecy to inform the nucieer 6advetw and the genere se of reguietory procedures and pelienee Stendeed recew p6ene oro not subetnutes for regulatory guides or the Comenisonen a regwietione end r
e 49tRpHenke urttft them to not Fergulted The etenderd revsew plan secteene are heyed to Receeon 2 of the Standard Formet end Content of Safety Ana#yees Reports fer Necteer power plente Not SH sect one of the $tendard Format have e corree.,ondeng revtew plan.
Pubtenhed standard review plane we#a be receed periodice#v es appropriate. to accommodate com ne vte end to refiset new information and exponence Cop *se of standard rev6ew pkce may be obtained by reeuest to the U S Nocteer Reguletory Commisema, Weehangton. D C 20E6E Attent*on Off6ce of Nucteer Reactor Reguieteen Comments and suggeettone foe impeseement wtH be considered and shov6d e43e be sent to the Offwe of Nucioes Reactor Regwiet6on mmey
- 148 284"
5.
The system is reviewed to determine that quality group and seismic design requirements are net.
The ef fects of f ailure of ec,dipment or components not designed to withstand seismic events on saf ty-related functions of the system are evaluated.
6.
The.;SB reviews the system design with respect to the ;apability to detect, collect, l and control system leakage and to isolate portions of the system in case of excessive leakage or component malfunctions. RAB reviews the system with respect to maintaining occupational radiation exposure as low as practicable.
7.
The ASB reviews the system features provided to prevent precipitation of boric acid 1 in components and lines containing boric acid solutions, and the adequacy of the system design to protect personnel from the effects of toxic, irritating, or explosive chemicals tnat may be used.
8.
Provisions for operational testing are evaluated, as are the instrumentation and control features that determine and verify that the system is operating in the cor"ect mode.
9.
The applicant's proy sed technical specifications are reviewed far opercting license applications as they relate to areas covered in this SRP section.
I 10.
lhe RSB, in accord with SRP Section 15.4.6, reviews *.he system features to assure that a decrease in boron concent.'ation in the reactor coolant will not result in a violation of the fuel damage limitt or the system prest Jre criteria and that adequate time is available for the *eactor operator to terminate any dilution that may occur before the shutcown margin has been lost.
Secondary reviews are performed by other branches and the its used by the ASB to I
complete overall evaluation of the system. Ths secondar)
!ws are as follcws. The CPB determines the adequacy of the specified t,or)n concentraticas in the primary coolant for normal and accident conditions. The SEB determines tae acceptability of the design analyses, procedures, and criteria used to establish the ability of Category I structures housir.g the system and supporting systems to withstanJ the effects of natural phenomena such as the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), the probable maximum flood (PMF), and tornade missiles The MEB reviews the seismic qualification of components and confirms that components, piping, and structures are designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards. The MfEB verifies that inservice inspection requirements are met for system components and upon request will verify the compatibility of the materials of construc-tion with service conditions. The ICSB and PSB evaluate the controls and instrumentation, and power sources, respectively, with regard to their capability, capacity, and reliability to perform safety-related functions during normal and emergency conditions. The ETSB reviews the CVCS and BRS to determine the source terms for possible radioactive t eleases and the processing of adioactive effluent from the BR$ by the waste management systems.
The RAB will verify that the system meets radiation protection criteria.
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II.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA analysis Acceptability of the CVCS and BRS design, as described in the applicant's safet-y report (SAR1, is based on specific general design criteria and regulatory guides. Listed belew are the specific criteria related to the CVCS and BRS.
The design of the CVCS and BR5 is acceptable if the integrated design of the system is in accordance witt, the following criteria:
1.
General Desiqn Criterion 2, as related to structures housin3 the facility and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods.
I 2.
General Design Criterion 4, with respect to structures housing the syste.n and the system itself being capable of withstanding the effects of external missiles and internally gener ated missiles, E :pe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breats.
3.
General Design Criterion S, as related to shared systems and components important to safety being capable of performing required safety functions.
4.
General Design Criterion 26, as related to the CVCS capability to control the rate of reactivity changes resulting from normal power changes and the capability to maintain the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions.
5.
General Design Criterion 27, as related to the CVCS capability to control reactivity changes so that under postulated accident conditions, and with appropriate margin for a stuck control rod, the capability to cool the core is maintained.
6.
General Design Criterion 29, as related to the reliability of the CVCS to perform its safety-related f unction.
7.
General Design Criterion 33, as related to the CVCS capability to supply reactor coolant makeup in the event of small breaks or leaks in the reactor coolant pressure boundary so that specified fuel design limits are not exceeded.
8.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, as related to quality grnup classifications.
9.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, as related to seismic design classifications.
10.
Regulatory Guide 1.102, as related to the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of flooding.
11.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, as related to the protection of structures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of tornado missiles.
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12.
Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, as related to breaks in high and l
moderate energy piping systems outside Containment.
' or those a eas of review identified in subsection I of this SRP section as being the responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria and their methods of application are contained in the SRP sections corresponding to those branches.
II.
REVIEW PROCEDURES The procedures below are used during the construction permit (CP) review to determine that the design criteria and bases and the preliminary design as set fo-th in the preliminary safety analysis report meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II.
l For the review of operating license (OL) applications, the procedures are utilized to verify that the initial design criteria and bases have been appropriately implementec in the final design as set forth in the final safety analysis report.
The procedures for OL applications include a detennination that the content and intent of the technical specifications prepared by the applicant are in agreement with the require-ments for system testing, minimum performance, and surveillance developed as a result of the staff's review.
Upon r,,est from the primary reviewer, the secondary review branches will provide input for the areas of review stated in subsect wn I
'he primary reviewer obtains and uses such inputs as required to assure that this review procedure is complete.
For the purpose of this SRP section, a typical system is assumed for use as a guide since l the design of the CVCS will vary with each reactor plant supplier. It is assumed that the typ cal system consists of a regenerative heat exchcnger to cool the letdown flow l
from the RCS before processing through the demineralizers and to reneat it prior to reinjection into the RCS, demineralizers and filters for removal of suspended and dissolved impurities, high pressure charging pumps to inject makeup flow into the RCS, a volume control tank for system surge capacity and makeup volume, a boron makeup and storage system to provide neutron absorber to the RCS as needed, evaporators and tanks for baron recovery and demineralized water makeup, and a boron thernal regeneration subsystem to minimize the quantity of waste water and allow eactivity control by varying the temperature of demineralizers so as to remove or add boron to the CVCS. For cases where there are variations from this system, the reviewer would adjust the review procedures given below. However, the system design would be icquired to meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II.
l 1.
The SAR is reviewed to determine that the system description and piping and I
instrumentation diagrams,F6 ids,show the CVCS equipment that is used for normal oper-ation, and the minimum system heat transfer and flow requirements for normal plant operation. The sy'
,erformance requirements will also be reviewed to determine l
that it limits exp amponent operational degradation (e.g., pump leakage, heat exchanger scaling, resin deterioration) and describes the procedures that will be Rev. 1 9.3.4-4
followed to detect and correct these conditions when they become excessive. The reviewer, using the results of failure modes and effects analyses, comparisons with previously approved systems, or independent calculations, as appropriate, determines that the system can sustain the loss of :ny active component and meet the minimum system requirements for site shutdown or accident mitigation. The system P& ids, layout drawings, and component descriptions and characteristics are then reviewed for the following points:
a.
Essential portions of the CVCS are correctly identified and are verified to be isolable from the non-essential portions of the system. The P& ids will be reviewed to verify that they clearly indicate physical divisions between such portions and indicate design classification changes. System drawings are also reviewed to see that they show the means for accomplishing isolr+ ion and the system description is reviewed to
- ntify minimum performance require..m as for the isolation valves, b.
Essential portions of the CVCS, including the isolation valves separating essential portions from non essential portions, are classified Quality Group C l
and seismic Category I.
Component and system descriptions in the SAP are reviewed to verify that the above seismic and safety classificaticns have been included, and that the P& ids indicate any points of change in piping quality group classification.
c.
Design provisions have been made that permit appropriate inservice inspection and functional testing of system components important to safety. It will be acceptable if the SAR information delineates a testing and inspection program and if the system drawings show the c:onnections and special piping and equipment required by this program.
d.
The system description and drawings are reviewed in conjunction with the reactor coolant system to determine that the CVCS has sufficient pumping capacity to maintain the RCS water inventer-rithin the allowable pressurizer level range fo all normal modes of ooeration including startup from cold shutdown, full power operation, and plant cooldown. It is further ascertained from a review of the P& ids that makeup to the RSC can be accomplished via two redundant appropriately designed flow paths.
e.
Using the resu!ts of evaluations perf>rmed by the CPB, the ASB verifies the l
adequacy of the system for reactivity control in the following areas:
(1) Boration of the reactor coolant system is accomplished through either of two flow paths and from either of two boric acid sources. This is verified from the review of P& ids and sistem description.
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(2) The amount of boric acid stored in the CVCS exceeds the amcunt required to borate the reactor coolant system to cold shutdown concentration, assuming that the control assembly with the highest reactivity worth is held in the fully withdrawn position, and to compensate for subsequent xenon decay during any part of core life.
This is verified from a review of the SAR.
(3) The CVCS is capable of counteracting the inadvertent positive reactivity insertion caused by the maximum boron dilution accident.
f.
The adequacy of the CVCS for control of water chemistry is verified by examina-tion of the information provided in the SAR, i.e.,
the allowable ranges for primary coolant activity, total dissolved solids, pH, and maximum allowable oxygen and halide concentrations.
g.
The adequac-f resin overtemperature protection is verified by.'eviewing the stion and drawings to determine that temperature sensors are svn...
- p. avidL will actaate the demineralizer bypass or isolation valves.
s h.
The boron thermal regeneration subsystem is reviewed to determine the mavimum change in primary coolant boron concentration due to equipment or control errors as determined from failure modes and effects analyses.
i.
The operating procedures and controls for boron addition and primary coolant dilution are reviewed for adequacy.
j.
The system P&lDs are examined to determine that all components and piping that can contain boric acid will either be heat traced or will be located within heated rooms to prevent precipitation of boric acid.
2.
The reviewer verifies that the safety function of the system will be maintained as required in the event of adverse environmental phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods, or in the event of certain pipe breaks or loss of offsite power.
The reviewer uses engineering judgment, failure modes and effects analyses, and the results of reviews performed under other SRP sections, as applicable, to determine the following:
a The failure of portions of the system or of othar systems not designed to seismic Category I stand:-ds and located close to essential portions of the system, or of non seismic category I structures that 1.ouse, support, or are close to essential portions of the CVCS, will not preclude operation of the essential portions of the CVCS. Reference to SAR sections describing site features and the general arrangement and layout drawings will be necessary, as well as the SAR tabulation of seismic design classifications for structures and systems. Statements in the SAR that verify that the above conditions are met are acceptable. (CP) 9.3.4-6 148 239
b.
The essential portions of the CVCS are prutected from the effects of floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and internally or externally generated missiles.
Flood protection and missile protection criteria are discussed and evaluated in detail under the SRP Section 3 series. The location and the design of the system, structures, and pump rooms (cubicles) are reviewed to determine that the degree of protection provided is adequate. A statement to the effect that the system is located in a seismic Category I structure that is tornado missile and flood protected, or tl.at components of the system will be located in individual cubicles ur rooms thao will withstand the effects of both flooding and missiles is acceptable.
Essential portions of the system are protected from the effects of high energy c.
line breaks and moderate energy line cracks. Layout drawings of the system are reviewed to assure that no high or moderate energy piping systems are close to essential portions of tM CVCS, or that protection fror the ef fects of f ailure will be provided. The means of providing such crotection will be given in Section 3.6 of the SAR and procedures for reviewing this information are given in SRP Section 3.6.
d.
Escential components and subsystems (i.e., those necessary for safe shutdown) can function as required in the event of loss of offsite power.
The system design will be acceptable if the CVCS meets minimum system requirements as stated in the SAR assuming a failure of a single active component, within the system or in the auxiliary electric power source, which supplies the system.
The SAR is reviewed tc verify that for each CVCS component or subsystem affected by the loss of offsite power, boric acid addition and n olant charging c:pabilities meet or exceed minimum requirements. Statements in the SAR and the results of failure modes and effect analyses are considered in assuring that the system meets these requirements. This will be an acceptable verifica-tion of system functional reliability.
1 The descriptive information, P& ids, layout drawings, and failure modes and effects analyses in the SAR are reviewed to assure that essential portions of the system will function following design basis accidents assuming a single active component failure. The reviewer evaluates the analyses presented in the SAR to assure function of required components, traces the availability of these components on system drawings, and checks that the SAR contains verification that minimum system flow and heat transfer requirements are met for each accident situation for the required time spans. For each case, the design will be acceptable if minimum system requirements are met.
4 The boron recovery system is not required for safe shutdown, or for the prevention or mitigatien of postulated accidents. The BRS will be reviewed for the following:
If the system tankage is of non-seismic Category I design, the results of analyses which postulate the rupture of tanks are reviewed to verify that the accident
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releases are in accordance with safe limits. The facility design, including P&lDs, are reviewed to assure that safety-related equipment will not be adversely affetted by flooding.
IV.
EVALUATIdN FINDINGS The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided and his review supports conclusions of the following type, to De included in the staf f's safety evaluation report:
"The chemical and volume control system (including boron recovery system) includes components and piping associated with the system fro.a the letdown line of the primary system to the chargirg lines that provide makeup to the primary system and the reactor coolant pump seal water system. Based on the review of the applicant's proposed design criteria, design bases and safety classification for the chemical and volume control system, and the requirements for system performance of necessary functions during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions, the staff has determined I that the design of the chemical and volume control system and supporting systems is in conformance with the Commission's regulations as set forth in General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases," General Design Criterion 5,
" Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components,' General Design Criterion 26,
" Reactivity Control Systerr Redundancy and Capability," deneral Design Criterion 27,
" Combined Reactivity Control Systems Capability," General Design Criterion 29,
" Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences," General Design Criterion 33, " Reactor Coolant Makeup," and meets the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.26, " Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water,
Steam, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants,"
Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification," Regulatory Guide 1.102,
" Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification," Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, " Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," and Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1 and, therefore, is acceptable.
V.
REFERENCES 1.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena."
2.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases."
3.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components."
4.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 26, " Reactivity Control System Redundancy and Capabili>>."
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5.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 27, " Combined Reactivity Cortrol Systems Capability."
6.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 29, Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences."
7.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 33, " Reactor Coolant Makeup."
8.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, " Quality Group Classifications and Starcards for Water,
Steam, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants."
l 9.
Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification."
l 10.
Regulatory Guide 1.102, " Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants."
11.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Ciassification."
12.
Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment," attached to SRP Section 3.6.1, and MEB 3-1,
" Postulated Break and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment,"
attached to SRP Section 3.6.2.
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