ML19221A936
| ML19221A936 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/30/1977 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REGGD-01.120, REGGD-1.120, NUDOCS 7907110123 | |
| Download: ML19221A936 (29) | |
Text
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4, UNITED STATES
[,
k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j,ig;mj! j WA HINGTON, D. C. 20555 m
f November 7, 1)77 REGULATORY GUIDE DISTRIBUTION LIST (DIVISTON 1)
Enclosed is a copy of Revision 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.120, " Fire Protection Guidelines for Nuclear Power Pltnts." This guide was initially issued for a 60-day period of cocinent in Jur.s 19/6.
The staff received more than 50 letters connenting on both the regulatory guide and Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, which is a part of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-75/087) and which formed the basis for the regulatory guide. All letters of coment received were evaluated by the staff and its fire ;'rotection consultants even though many letters arrived well af ter the 60-day coment period had elapsed, some as late as Decenber 27, 1976.
The guide was reviewed by the ACRS Fire Protection Working Group, and they met with the staff in an open meeting to discuss the guide on May 4,1977; at that time additional public caanents were solicited.
Nineteen additional letters of comment were received and evaluated by the staff.
The majority of these comments duplicated comments previously received and considered in the development of the guide.
In view of the many changes made as a result of the first public comment period, this guide is being issued for a further extended comment period of one year. At the conclusion of the ccment period the staff will consider the public comments in conjunction with an in-depth evaluation of different approaches to plant fire protection for future plants.
It is expected that this evaluation will be completed within two years of this issuance of the guide.
Decause of the extended comment period for this regulatory guide, Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 will continue to be used in the evaluation of fire protection provisions of operating nuclear power plants and of applica-tions currently under review for construction permits and operating licenses and the evaluation of f.ure applications for operating licenses for plants now under construction.
Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 has been revised to reflect the necessary changes since its initial issuance and Revision 1 of the Branch Technical Position is concurrently being issued and is available to the public and applicants.
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s Robert C. Minogue, Director Office of Standards Development Enclosure Regulatory Guide 1.120, 142 015 Revision 1 190'r110 /23
Revision 1*
[p arcq't, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Novenber 1977
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REG Z LATO RY GU DE i
OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT REGULATORY GUIDE 1.120 FIRE PROTECTION GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES
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This g'iide, originally issued for coment in June 1976, was revised as a ecs
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016 of substantive comments received fron the public and additional staf f revic v.
L It is now being issued for an additional extended consent period of rne year.
TABLE OF CONTENTS Pay A.
INTRODUCTICN.
1 8.
DISCUSSION.
1 1.
Defense in Depth.
2 2.
Use of Water on Electrical Cable Fires.
2 3.
Establishment and Use of Fire Areas.
3 4.
Definitions.
3 C.
REGULATCRY POSITION.
5 1.
Overall Requirements of the Fire Protection Program.
5 a.
Personnel.
5 b.
Fire Hazard Analysis.
5 c.
Fire Suppression System Design Easis.
6 d.
Simultaneous Eve P:
6 e.
Implementat',a c,' Fire Protecti,o Programs 7
2.
Administrative Procedures, Controls, and Fire Brigade.
3.
Quality Assurance Program.
8 a.
Design Control and Procurement Document Control.
9 b.
Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.
9 c.
Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services.
9 d.
Inspection.
9 e.
Test and Test Control.
9 f.
Inspection, Test, and Operating Status.
9 q.
Nonconforming Items.
9 h.
Correc'ive Action.
9
- i. Record:
9
- j. Audits 9
4.
General "lart Guideline; 9
a.
Building Cesign.
9 b.
Control of Combustibles.
9 c.
Electrical Cable Construction, Lable Trays, and Cable Penetrations.
9 d.
Ventilation.
13 e.
Lighting and Communication.
13 5.
Fire Detection and Suppression.
14 a.
Fire Cetection.
14 b.
Fire Protection Water Supply Systems.
14 c.
Water Sprinkler and Hose Standpipe Systems.
16 d.
Halon Suppression Systems 16 e.
Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems.
Il f.
Portable Extinguishers.
17 6.
Guidelires for Specific Plant Areas.
17 a.
Primary and Secondary Containment.
17 b.
Control Room Complex.
'9 c.
Cable Spreading Room.
19
TABLE CONTENTS (Cont'd)
P_ age d.
Plant Computer Rooms.
19 e.
Switchgear Rooms.
20 f.
Remote Safety-Related Panels.
20 g.
Safety-Related Battery Rooms.
20 h.
Turbine building.
20
- i. Diesel Generator Areas.
20
- j. Diesel fuel Oil Storage Areas.
21 k.
Safety-Related Pumps.
21 1.
New Fuel Area.
21 m.
Spent Fuel Pool Area.
21 n.
Radwaste and Decontamination Areas.
21 o.
Safety-Related Water Tanks.
21 p.
Records Storage Areas.
22 q.
22 r.
Miscellaneous Areas.
22 7.
Special Protection Guidelines.
22 a.
Storage of Acetylene-Oxygen Fuel Gases.
22 b.
Storage Areas for Ion Exchange Resins.
22 c.
Hazardous themicals.
22 d.
Materials Containing Radioactivity.
22 D.
IPPLEMENTATION.
22 REtERENCES.
23
\\by
A.
INTRODUCTION General Design Criterion ?, " Fire Protection," of Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nucitar Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, " Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,"
requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions. Noncombustible and heat-resistant materials are required to be used wherever prac-tical throughout the unit, particularly in locations such as the containment and control room.
Criterion 3 also requires that fire detection and suppression systems of appropriate capacity and capability be provided and designed to minimize the adverse effect of fires on structures, sys-tems, and components important to safety and that firefighting systems be designed to ensure that their failure, rupture, or inadvertint operation -ht3 not significantly impair the safety capabil-ity of these structures, systems, and components This guide presents guidelines acceptable to the NRC sta.'f for implementing this criterion in the development of a fire protection program for nuclear power plants. The purpose of the fire protection program is to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and mcintain it in a safe shutdown condition and to minimize radioac*.ive releases to the environment in
'ha event of a fire.
It implements the philosophy of de'ense-in-depth protection against the hazards of fire and its associated effects on safety relateu equipment. If designs or methods different from the guidelines recommended herein are used, they must provide equivalent fire protection. Suitable bases and justification should be provided for alternative approaches to establish acceptable implementation of General Design Criterion 3.
This guide addresses fire protection progr6ms for safety-related systems and equipment and for other plant areas containing fire hazards that could adversely affect safety-related systems.
It does not give guidance for protecting the life safety of the site personnel or for protection against economic or property loss.
This guide supplements Regulatory Guide 1.75, " Physical Independence of Electrical Systems," in determining the fire protection for redundant cable systems.
B.
DISCUSSION There have been 32 fire s in operating U.S. nuclear power plants through Cecember 1975. Of these, the fire on March 22, 1975, at Browns Ferry nuclear plant we. the most severe. With approximately 250 operating reactor years of experience, one may irfer a frequency on the der of one fire per ten reactor years.
Thus, on the average, a nuclea* power plant may experience one cr more fires of varying severity during its operating life.
lthough WASH-1400, " Reactor Safety Study - An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial duclear Power Plants," dated October 1975, co r'uded that the Browns Ferry fire did not affect the validity of the overall risk assessment, the staf f can' iuded that cost-ef fective fire pr stection measures should be instituted to significantly decrease the frequency and severity of fires and consequently initi-ated the development of this guide.
In this development, the staff made use of many national standards and other publications re'ated to fire protection. The documents discussed below were particularly useful.
A document entitled "The International Guidelines for the Fire Protection of Nuclear Power Plants," (IGL) 1974 Edition, 2nd Reprint, published on behalf of the National Nuclear Risks Insurance Pools and Association, provides a step-by step approach to assessing the fire risk in a nucleir power plant and describes protective measures to be taken as a part of the fire protec-tion of these plants.
It provides useful guidance in this important area.
The Nuclear Energy Liability and Property Insurance Association (NELPIA) and the Mutual Atomic Energy Reinsurance Pool (MAERP) have prepared a document entitled " Specifications for Fire Protection of New Plants,"
which gives general conditions and valuable criteria. A special review group organized by NRC under Dr. Stephen H.
Hanauer, Technical Advisor to the Executive Director for Operations, to study the Browns Ferry fire issued a report, NUREG-0050, " Recommendations Related to Brcwns Ferry Fire," in February 1976, which contains recommendations applicable to all nuclear newer plants.
This guide uses the applicable information contained in these documents.
The fire protection program for a nuclear power plant presented in this guide consists of design features, personnel, equipment, and procedures that provide the defense-ir-depth protec-tion of the public health and safety. The purpose of the program is to prevent significant fires, to ensure the capability to shut down the reactnr and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and ta minimize radioactive releases to the environment in the event of a significant
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1.120-1
fire.
To meet this objective, it is essential that management participation in the progr - begin a
with early design concepts and plant layout work and coniinue through plant operation and that a qualified staff be responsible for engineering and design of fire protection systems that provide fire detection, annunciation, confinement, and suppression for the plant.
The staff should also be responsible f or f're prevention activities, maintenance of fire protection systems, training, and manual firefighting activiiies. It is the combination of all these that provides tne needed defense-in-depth prutection of the public health and safety.
Some of the major conclusions that emerged f rem the Browns Ferry fi re investigations warrant emphasis and are discussed Delcw.
1.
Defense in Depth Nuclear power plants use the concept of defense in depth to achieve the required high degree of safety by u nq echelons of safety systems.
This concept is also applicable to fire safety in nuclear power, ants.
With respect to the fire protection program-the defense-in-depth princi-ple is aimed at achieving an adequate balance in:
a.
Preventing fires from starting; b.
Cetecting fires quickly, suppressing those fires that occur, putting them out quickly, and limiting their damage; and c.
Designing plant safety systems so that a fire that starts in spite of the fire pre. 9-tion program and burns for a considerable time in spite of fire protection activities will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
No one of these echelons can be perfect or complete by itself. Strengthening any one can compensate in some measure for weaknesses, known or unknown, in the others.
The primary cbjective of the fire protection program is to minimize both the probability and consequences of postulated fires.
In spite of sttps taken to reduce the probability of fire, fires are expected to occur.
Therefore, means are needed to detect and suppress fires with particular emphasis on providing passive and active fire protection of appropriate capability and adequate capacity for the systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe plant shutdown with or without offsite power.
For other safety related systems, the fire protection should ensure that a fire will not cause the loss of function uch systems, even though loss of redundancy within a system may occur as a result of the fire rerally, in plant areas where the potential fire dam 3ge may jeopardize safe plant shutdown, trimary means of fire protection should consist of fire barriers and fixed automatic fire detection and suppression systems.
Also, a backup manual firefighting capability should be provided throug"out the plant to limit the extent of fire d3 mage.
Portable equipment consisting of hoses, nozzles, portable extinguishers, complete person-nel protective equipment, and air br':athing eauipment should be provided for use by properly trained firefighting personnel. Access for effective manual application of fire extinguishing agents to combustibles should be prcvided.
The adequacy of fire protection for any particular plant safety system or area should be determined by analysis of the effects of the postulated fire relative to maintaining the ability to safely shut down the plani and minimize radioactive releases to the envircnment in the event of a fire.
Fire protection starts with design and must be carried through all phases of construction and operation. A quality assurance (QA) program is needed to identify and rectify errors in design, construction, and operation and is an essential part of defense in depth.
2.
Use of Witer on Electrical Cable Fires Experience with major electrical cable fires shows that water will promotly extinguish such fires.
Since prompt extinguishing of the fire is vital to reactor safety, fire and water damage to safety systems is reduced by the more efficient application of water from fixed systems spraying directly on the fire rather thar, by manual application with fire hoses.
Appropriate firefighting procedures and fire training should provide the techniques, equipment, and skills for the use of water in fighting electrical cable fires in nuclear plants, particularly in areas containing a high concentration of electric cables with pl' tic insulation.
This is not to say that fixed water systems should be installed everywhere. Equipment that may be damaged by water should be 3hielded oi relocated away from the fire hazard and the water.
Drains should be provided to remove any water used for fire suppression and extinguishment to ensure that water accumulation does not incapacitate safety-related equipment.
\\L 1.120-2
3.
Establishment and Use o_f Fire Areas Separate fire areas fo, each division of safety-related systems will reduce the possibility of fire-related damage to redundant safety-related equipment.
Fi<e areas should be established tu separate redundant safety divisions and isolate safety-related systems frum fire hazards ;n non safety related areas. Particular design attention to the use of separate isolated fire areas for redundant cables will help to avoid loss of redundant safety-related cables.
Separate fire areas should also be emoloyed to limit the spread of fires between components that are rajor fire hazards within a safety division. Where redundant systems cannot be separated by tire barriers, as in containment and the control room, it is necessary to employ other measures to prevent a fire from causing the loss of function of safety-related systems Within fire areas containing components of a safety-related system, special attention should be qlven to detecting and suppressing fires that may adversely affect the system.
Measures that may be taken to reduce the effects of a postulated fire in a given fire are=
lude limiting the amount of Combustible materi31s, installing fire-resistant Construction, providing fire stops or fire-retardant coating in cable trays, installing fire detection systems and fixed fire suppres-sion systems, or providing other protection suitable to the installation. The fire hazard analysis will be the mechanism to determine that fire areas h9ve been properly selected.
Suitable design of the ventilaticn systems can limit the consequences of a fire by preventing the spread of the products of combustico te other fire areas It is important that means be provided to ventilate, exhaust, or isclate the fire area as required and that consideration be given to the consequences of failure of ventilation systems due to fire causing loss of control f or ventilating, exhausting, or isolating a given fire area.
The capability to ventilate, exhaust, or isolate is particularly important to ensure the habitability of rooms or sp3ces that must be attended in an emergency.
In the design, provision should I,e made f or personnel access to and escape routes from each fire area.
4.
Definitions For the user's convenience, some of the terms related to fire protection are presented below with their definitions as used in this guide:
Acproved - tested and accepted for a specific purpose or application by a nationally reccq-nized testing laboratory.
Autom3(ic - self-actirg, operating by its cwn mechanism when actuated by some impersonal influerce such as a chsnge in current, pressure, temperature, or mechanical configuration.
Cembustible Material - m3t sal that does not meet the definition of noncombustible.
Control Room Complex - the zone served by the control room emergency ventilation system '3ee Standard Review Plan 6.4, " Habitability Systems").
Fire Area - that portion of a building or plant that is separated frcn other areas by bound-a ry fire barriers.
Fire Barrier - those components of construction (walls, flocrs, and their supports, including beams, joi s ts, columns, penet rat ion sea ls or c losures, fi'e doors, and fire dampers that are rated by approving laboratories in hours of resistance io 1;re and are used to prevent the spread of fire.
Fire Stop - a f eature of construction that p revents fire propagation along the length of cables or prevents spreading of fire to nearby corbustibles within a given fire area or fire zone.
Fire Brigade - the team of plant personnel assigned to firefighting and who are equipped for and trained in the fighting of fires.
Fire Cetectors a device designed to automatically detect the presence of fire and initiate an alarm system and other appropriate action (see NFPA 72E, " Automatic Fire Detectors").
Some typical fire detectors are classified as follows Waat Detector - a device that detects a predetermined (fixed) temperature or rate of temperature rise.
Smoke Detector - a device that detects the visible or invisible products of combustion.
42 021
flame Detector a device that detects the infrared, ultraviolet, or visible radiation produced by a fire.
L i re-Type Det ector - a device in which detection is cci.tinuous along a p3th, e.q fixed-temperature, heat-sensitive cable and rate-of-rise pneumatic tubing detectors.
Fire Protection Program - the i-tegrated effor' involving components, procedures, and person-rei utilized in carrying out all activities of five protection.
It includes system and facility design, fire prevention, fire detection, annunciation, confinement, suppression, administrative cont ols, fire brigade organization, inspection and maintenince, training, quality assurance, and testing.
fire Rating - the endurance period of a fire barrier or structure; it defines the period of resistance to a standard fire eiposure before the first critical point i n t'e h w i o r is cbserved (see NFPA 251).
Fire 5;..nression - control and extinguishing of fires (firefighting). Kinual fire sc; pres-sion is the use of hoses, portable extin g ishers, or manually actuated fixed systems by plant personnel.
Automatic fire suppression is the use of automatic. illy actuated fixed systems such as water. H.a l o n, or tart:en diodide systems.
Fire 2cnes - the subdivisions of fire areas in which the fire suppression systems are designed to cetrDat particular types at fires.
Nance-bustible Material a.
niterial, no part of which will ignite and burn when subjected to fire.
h.
material ta.irg a structural base c' rarcomb ust i bl e r*3ter i al, as defined in a.
with a surfacirg not over 1/16 inch thick h )s _ flaw spread ratirq not hi7er than 50 whe mea s ured us i n a A5 P1 E -84 T e s t, " Surf; nirg Charitteristics of Building Paterials.
Race.1s - refer to Regulatcc) Guide
- 1. 15.
Restricted Area - any arei to which access is controlled by tre licensee for purposes of prctecting i n d i v i d.,31 s trcm er,osure to radiatie" and radioactise miterials.
51fetv-Relatei % stes AN C m onents - syste*> and cc pcr.ent, required tv shut dmn the reactor, mitigste the consequeNes of postulated accidents, or maintain the reictor in a safe sholde-n co'liticn
' - a stn c tur e th at co~pletely encloses prim 3ry containment, uwd to (econdtry contair" c e nt ro l l i r <, conta i rw nt leakage.
Sprinnler % stem - a net.crk of p i pi rq c e nrec' ed to a re' i 3nl e w 3 t e r supplj th3t w.ll dis-tribute tre water trro.@ out the arei protectel *
- will di schar y tho water throu p s; ' i r-klers in suf ficient qartity either to extingaish tre five entirely or to prewnt its sp H d.
The system usu311y activated hy heat, i nc i sm s a controlltr
<ilss and a desice for a t u-ating an alarm ="ea tFe system. is in crer3 tion.
The f allo irg cate ;ories of wri *ler s
sy s t e:r.s a r e de f i r.ed ir V PA 13, " Standard for tr e Installaticn of Sprinkler 5.s s t e r s'
'et-Pipe System Cry-Fire System Preaction SysteT Celuge System Combined Dry-Pipe a"d Preac* ion System Gn-Off Ssstem
.ta t ipe and HJse SysteT - a fiped piping system with Mse out Iet s, hose, and nu zles cc rKted to a reliaale =3ter s gply to provide effective fire hose streams to y s ific r
areas inside t he t,ui l di r g.
Wate-Sprav System - a network of piping similar ta a sprinkler sys tem e = ce; i t h at it uti-lizes open-re H spray nozzles. M PA IS, " water Spray fixed 5fstems,' providos guidioce en these systPTs 142 022 1.120-4
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C.
REGUL",1 CRY POSITION 1.
Overa!1 Requirements of the Fire Protection Program a.
Personnel Responsibility for the overall fire protection program should be assigned to a desig-nated person in the uppet level of management who has m&nagement control over the organizations involved in fire protection activities. This person should retain ultimate responsibility even though formulatinn and assurance of program implementation is delegated. Such delegation of authority should be to a staff composed of personnel prepared by training and experience in fire protection and personnel prepared by training and experience in nuclear plant safety to provide a balanced approach in directing the f er protection prcqram for the nuclear power plant.
The staf f should be responsible for:
(1) Coordination of fire protection program requirements, including consideration of potential hazards associated with postulated fires, with building layout and systems design.
(2) Design and maintenance of fire detection, suppression, and extinguishing systems.
(3) Fire prevention activities.
(4) Training and manual firefighting activities of plant personnel and the fire brigade.
(S) Pre-fire planning.
On sites where there is an operating reactor and construction or modification of other units i s unde rway, the superintendent of the operating plant should have the lead responsibility for site fire protection.
(NOTE: NFFA 6, " Recommendations for Organization of Industrial Fire Los s Prevention,' contains useful gJid3nce for the 3rganization and operation of t'e entire fire loss prevention program.)
b.
Fire Hazard Analysis The overall fire protection program should allow the plant to maintain the ability to perform safe shutdown functions and minimize radicactive releu>es to the environment in the event of a fire.
A major element of this program should be the evaluation of potential fire hazards plant and the effect of postulated fires on safety-related plant areas.
throughout
'a T 1re initiatien should be postulated at the 1 icn that will produce the most severe fire, assering an ignition,curce is present at that pa fire development should consider the potential for involvement of other ccmDustibles, both fixed and transimnt, in the fire are3.
a'ere aate,atic suppression systems are installed, the effects of the postulated fire should be evaluated with and without actuation of the automatic suppression system.
(1) A detailed fire hazard analysis shculd be made during inicial plant design to
'vflect the proposed construction arrangement, materials, and facilities. This analysis should te revised periodically as design and construction progress and bef ore and during major plant rudifications.
(2) The fire hazard analysis should te a systematic study of (a) all elements of the fire prctection program being proposed to ensure that the plant design has included adequate identification and evaluaticn of potential fire hazards and (b) tha effect of postulated fires relative to maintaining the ability tu perform safe sh.itdawn fu'ctions and minimizing radicactive releases to the environment.
(3) Experienced judgement is necessary to identify fire hazards and the consequences of a postulated fire startirg at any poir.t in the plant.
Evaluation of tre consequences of the postulated fire on nuclear safety should be performed by persons thoroughly trained and experi-enced in reactor safety.
The person conducting the analysis of fire hazards should be thuroughly trained aid experienced in the principles of industrial fire prevention and control 3nd in fire phenomens from fim initiation, through its develcpment, to propag3 tion into adjoining spaces The fire tazard analysis should be conducted by or under the direct supervision of an engineer who is qualified for Member grade in the Society of fire Protection Engineers.
(4) The fire hazard analysis should separately idertify hazards and provide appro-priate protection in locations where s3fety-related losses can occur as a result of:
1.120-5
(a) Concentrations of combustible contents, including transient fire loads to combustibles expected to be used in normal operations such as refueling, maintenance, and rcdifica-tions; (b) Con *inuity of combustible contents, furnishings, building materials, or combinations thereof ir configurations conducive to fire spread; (c).xposure fire, heat, smoke, or water exposure, including those that may racessitate evacua'. ton from areas that are required to be attended for safe shutdown; (d) Fire in control rooms or other locations having critical safety related functions; (e) Lack of adequate access or smoke removal facilities that impede fire extin-guishment in safety-related areas; (f) Lack of explosion,nrevention measures; (g) Loss at electric power or control circuits; and (h) Inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems.
(5) The fire hazard analysis should verify that tha fire protection program g'rdelines of the regulatory position of this guide have been met.
To that end, the report on the analysis should list applicable elements of the program, with explanatory statements as needed to identify locat an, type of system, and uesign criteria. The report should identify any deviations from the r egulatory position and should present alternatives f or staf f review.
Justification for deviations f rom the regulatory position should si that an equivalent level of protection will w
be achieved. Deletion of a protective feature without compensating alternative protective meas ures generally will not be acceptable. unless it is clearly demonstrated that the protective measure is nut needed because of the design and arrangement of the particular plant.
c.
Fire "uppression System Design Basis (1) fotal reliance should not be placed on a single fire.uppression system.
Appro-priate backup fire suppression capability should be provided.
(2) A single active failure or a crack in a moderate-energy line (pipe) in the fire suppression system should not impair both the primary and backup fire suppressian capability.
For example neither the failure of a fire pump, its power supply, or controls nor a crack in a moderate-energy line in the ' ire suppression system should result in loss of function of both sprinkler ana hose standpipe systems in an area protected by such primary and backup systems.
(3) As a minimum, the fire suppression system sh uld te capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas cc. aining equipment required for safe olant shutdown following the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).
In areas of high seismic activity, the staff will cansider en a case-by-case basis the need to design the fire detection and suppres-sion systems to be functional following the 55E.
(4) The fire protection syster.,s should retain their original design capjbility for (a) natural phenomena of less severity and greiter frequency than the most severe natural phenomena (approximately once in 10 years) such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, ice storms, or sm311-intensity earthquakes that are characteristic of the geographic region and (b) pofential man-created site-related events such as oil barge collisions or aircraft crashes that have a reascnable probability of occurring at a specific plant site.
The effects of lightning strikes should be incluJed in the overall Dlant fire protection program.
(5) The consequences of inadvertent operation of or a cr ack in a moderate energj line in the fire suppression system should meet the guidelines specified for moderate energy systems outside containment in Secti n
.6.1 of the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-75/087.
d.
Simultanenus Everts (1) Fires need not be postulated to be concurrent with ron-fire related f ailures in safety systems, other plant accidents, or the most severe natural phenomena.
(2) On multiple-reactor sites, unrelated fires need not be postulated to occur simulta-neously in more than one reactor unit.
The effects of fires involving 'acilities shared between units and fires due to man-created site-related events that have a reasunable probability of 1.120-6 I
occurring and affecting more than one reactor unit (such as an aircraft crash) should be considered.
Implemontation of Fire Protection Programs e.
(1) The fire protection program (plans, personnel, a..d equipment) for buildings storing new reactor f uel and for adjacent fire areas that could af fect the fuel storage area should be fully operational before fuel is received at the site.
Such adjacent areas include those whose flames, hot gases, and fire generated toxic and corrosive products may jeopardize safety and surveillance of the stored fuel.
(2) The fire protection program for an entire reactor unit should be fully operational prior to initial fuel loading in that reactor unit.
(3) On reactor sites where there is an operating reactor and construction or modifica-tion of other units is under way, the fire protection program should provide for continuing evaluation of fire hazards. Additional fire barriers, fire protection capability, and adm nis-trative controls should be provided as necessary to protect the operating unit from cone 7ction fire hazards.
2.
_ Administrative Procedures, Controls, and F ire Brigide Administrative procedures consistent with the need for m.tintaining the performince of a.
the fire protection system and personnel in nuclear power plants should be provided.
Guidance is contained in the following publications:
NFPA 4 - Organization for Fire Services NFPA 4A - Organization of a Fire Department NFPA 6 - Industrial Fire Loss Prevention NFPA 7 - Management of Fire Emergencies NEPA 8 - Management Respcnsibility for Ef fects of Fire on Ope ations NF PA 27 - Private Fire Brigades NFPA 802 - Recommended Fire Protection Practice for Nuclear Reactors b.
Effective administrative measures should be implemented to prohibit bulk storage of combustible materials inside or adjacent to safety-related buildings or systems during operation or maintenance periods. Regulatory Guide 1.39 provides guidance on housekeeping, including the disposal of combustible materials.
Normal and abnormal conditions or other anticipated operations such as modifications c.
(e.g., breaching fire barriers or fire stops, impairment of fire detection and suppression systems) and transient fire load corditions such as those associated with refueling activities should be reviewed by appropriate levels of management and the fire protection staff. ApprcpriatP speCia}
action and procedures such as fire watches or temporary fire barriers should Le imphmented to ensure adequate fire protection and reacter safety. In particular:
(1) Work involving ignition sources such as welding and flame cutting should be done under closely monitored conditions that are controlled by a permit system. Procedures governing Such work should be reviewed and approved by persons trained and experienced in fire protecticn.
Persons performing and directly assisting in such work should be trained and equipped to prevent and car 3at fires. If this is not possible, a person trained in firefighting techniques and plant emergency procedures should directly monitor the work and function as a fire watch.
In instances where such operations may produce flame, sparks, or molten metal through walls or penetrations, care shculd be taken to inspect both rooms or areas (se-N'PA-51B, " Cutting and Welding Proce:ses").
(2) Leak testing and similar E ocedJres such as airflow determination should u;e one of the commercially available techniques. Open flames or combustion generated smoke should not be permitted.
(3) Use of combustible material, e.g., HEPA and charcoal filters, dry ion enchange resins, or other combustible supplies, in safety-related areas should be controlled. Use of wood inside buildings containing safety-related systens or equipment should be permitted only when suitable ncncombustible substitutes are not available. If wood must be used, only fire-retardant-treated wood (scaffolding, lay-down blocks) should be permitted. Such materials should be allowed into safety related areas only when they are to be used immediately. Their possible and probable use should be considered in the fire hazard analysis to determine the adequacy of the installed fire protection systems and the effects on safety-related equipment.
17-
'L L s1 eq rqr 1.120-7
(4) Disarming of fire datection or fire suppression systems shuuld be controlleJ by a permit system. Fire watcnes should be established in areas where systems are so disarmed.
d.
The plant should be designed to be self-suf ficient w'th resper.t to firefighting activ-ities to protect safety-related plant aress. Public fire department nsponse should be provided for in the overall fire protection program for supplemental and backuL capability.
e.
The need for good organization, training, and equippino of fire brigades at nuclear power plant sites requires that effective measures be implementeu to ensure proper discharce of these functions.
The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emerger.cy Planning f or Nuclear Power Plants,' should be tollowed as applicable.
(1) Successful firefighting requires testing and naint nance of the fire protecti on equipment and the emergency lighting and communication, as well as practice as brigades for the people who Tust utilize the equipment. A test plan that lists the individuals and their respon-sibilities in connection with r2utine tests and inspections of the fire detection and protection systems should be developed. The test plan should contain the types, frequency, and detailed procedures for testing. Prccedures should also contain instructions on maintaining fire protec-tien during those perieds when the fire protection system is impaired or during periods of plant maintenance, e.g., fire watches cr temporary hose connections tc water systems.
(2) Basic training is a necessary element in effective firefighting operation.
In urcer for = fire brigade to cperate effectively, it must operate as a team.
All members must bias what their individual duties are.
They must be familiar with the layout of the plant and with equipment location and cperation in order to permit effective firefightin, operations during times when a particu ar are3 is filled with smuke or is inr_fficiently lighted.
Soch training l
can only t e acco,aplished by conducting drills and classroom instruction several times a year (at least qu3rterly) so th't 311 m"mbers of the fire brigade nave haJ the opportunity to train as a team testina itself in she major areas of the plant.
The drills should include the simulated use of equipment in each area and should be preplanned and postcritiqued to establish the training cbjective of the drills and determine how well these cbjectives have been m :t.
These drills should provide for local fire department participation periodically (at least aanually). Such drills also peimit supersising personnel to evalu3te the effectiveness of cummunications v ithin the fire brigade and with the on scene fire team leader, the reactor cperator in the contrel room, the plant physical security org3nizatior., and any other command post.
(3) To have proper coverage during all ph3 es of operation, members of each shif t crew should be trained in fire protection. Training of the plant fire brigade should be coordinated with the local fire department so that resprosibilities and duties ara delineated in advance.
This cocrdination should be part of the training course and should be :ncluded in the training of the local fire department staff.
The plant fire brigad( should not include any of the plant physical security personnel required to be available tn fulfill the response requirements of paragraph 73.55(h)(2) of 10 CFR rart 73, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." Local fire departments should be provided training in operational precautions when fighting fires on nuclear power plant sites anJ should be made aware of the need for rcdiological protection of personnel and the special hazards associated with a nuclear power plant site.
(4) NF PA 27, "Pri vate F ire Brigade," shou'd be followed in crganization, training, and fire drills.
This standard also is applicaele for the inspection and maintenance of firefighting equipment. Among the standards referenced
.n this document, NFPA 197, " Training Standard on Initial fire Attacks," should be utilizeu as applicable. NFPA booklets and pampnlets listed in NF PA 27 may be used as applicable f or training ref erences.
In addition, courses in fire preven-tion and fire suppression that are recognized or sponsored by the fire protection industry should be utilized.
3.
Quality Assurance Program The quality assurance (CA) programs of applicants and contractors should ensure that the guidelines fnr design, procurement, installation, and testing and the administrative controls for the fire protection systems for safety-related areas are satisfied. The QA program should be under the management control of the QA organization. This control consists of (1) formulating a fire protection QA program that incorporates suitable requirements and is acceptable to the management responsible for fire protection or verifying that the program incorporates suitable requirements and is acceptable to the management responsible for fire protection and (2) verifying the effectiveness of the QA program for fire protection througn review, surveillance, and audits.
Performance of other QA program functions for meeting the firt protection prog.am requirements may be performed by personnel outside of the QA organization. The QA program for fire protection 4
0 1.120-8
should be part of the overall plant QA program.
It should satisfy the specific criteria listed below.
a.
Casign and Procurement Document Control Measures should be established to ensure that the guidelines of the regulatory position of this guide are included in design and procurement dacuments and that deviations therefrem are controlled.
b.
Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings Inspections, tests, administrative controls, fire drills, and training that govern the fire protection program should be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings and should be accomplished in accordance with these documents.
c.
Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services Measures should be established to ensure that purchased material, equ,pment, and services ccnform to the procurement documents.
d.
Inspection A program for independent inspection of activities affecting firr protection should be e,tablished and executed by or for the organization performing the activity to verify conformance with documented installation drawirgs and tett procedures far acccmplishing the activities.
e.
Tes and Test Control A te,t program should be established and implemented to ensure that tecting is performed and verified by inspection ard audit to demonstrate conformance with design and system readiness requirements. The tests should be performed in accordance with written test procedures, test results shculd be properly evaluated and acted on.
f.
I n spec t i o n, Test, and Operati79 Status Measures should be established to provide for the identification of items that have satisfactorily passed required tests and inspections.
g.
Nanconforminj Items Measures should be established to control items that do not confor m to specified requirements to prevent inadvertent use or installc h.
Corrective Action Measures should be established to ensure tf at conditions adverse to fire protection, such as failures, malfuncticns, deficiencies, deviations defective components, uncontrolled combustible material, and ncnconformances, are promptly identif;ed, reported, and corrected.
i.
Records Records should be prepared and maintained to furnish evidence that the criteria enumer-dted above are being met for activities affecting the fire protection program.
j.
Audits Audits should be conducted and documented to verify tcmpliance with the fire protection program, including design and procurement dccuments, instructions, procedures, and drawings, and inspection and test activities.
4.
General Plant Guidelines a.
Building Design (1) Fire barriers with a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours should be used, except as noted in cther paragraphs, to:
(a) Isolate safety-related systems from any potential fires in non-safety-related areas that could af fect their ability to perform their safety function;
(]
2 1.120-9
(b) Separate redundant divisions or trains of safety-related systems from each other so that both are not subject to damage frem a single fire hazard, and (c) Separate indiviaual units on a multiple-unit site unless the requirements of General Design Criterion 5 can be met w;th respect to fires.
(2) Apprcpriate fire barriers sbculd be provided within a single safety jivision to separate ccmponents that present a fire hazard to other safety-related components or high concen-trations of safety-related cables within that divi > ion.
(3) Lach cable spreading room should contain only one redundan' safety division.
Cable screading rooms should not be shared between reactars. Cable spreading rooms should be separated from each other ano from other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire resistance of three hours.
(4) Interior wall and structural components, thermal insulation materials, radiation shieliinq materials, and soundproofing should be noncombustible. Interior finishes should be noncoratustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory such as f actory Mutual or Unde rwri ters Labora tory, Inc., f or:
(a) Surface flamespread ratir.g of 50 or less when tested under ASTM E-84, and (b) Potential heat release of 3500 Btu /lb or le,s wher. tested under ASTM D-3286 or NFPA 259.2 Materials that are acceptable fcr use as interior finish withoJt evidence of test and litting by a nationally recognized laboratory are the following:
Plaster, acoustic plaster Gypsum plasterboard (gypsum wallboard)
Any of the above, plain, wallpapered, or painted with oil-or water-base paint Ceramic.i le, ceramic panels Glass, glass blocks Brick, stcne, concrete blocks, plain or painted Steel ana aluminum nirels, pisin, painted, or enameled Vinyl tile, viny 1 asbestos tile, linoleua, or asphalt tile Jr. Concrete floors.
(5) Metai deck roof constructior, should be noncombustible, listed as " acceptable for fire" in the UL Builoing Materials Directory, or listed s Class I in the factory Mutual System Approva! Guide.
(6) Suspended cei s ings and their supports shoult' be of noncombustible constructic' Concealed spaces should be devoid of combustibles except as noted in Regulatory ?osition C.u.b.
(7) Transformers installed inside fire areas containing safety-related systems should be of the dry type or insulated and cooled with nonccmbustible liquid. Where trans f e iners f illed with combustible fluid are located in non safety-related areas, there should be na openings in the fire barriers separating such transformers f rom areas containing safety-relat ?d systems or equipment.
(8) Cuildings containing saf ety-related systems should be protected f r(m exposure or spill fires involving outdcor oil-filled transformers by providing oil spill cortinement or drainage a*1y 'rcm the buildings and:
Locating such transformers at least 50 feet distant from the building, or Ensuring that such building walls within 50 feet of oil-filled transformers are without onenings and have a fire resistance rating of at leist three hours.
1 The concept of using a potential heat release limit of 3500 Btu /lb is similar to the " limited combustible" concept with its like limit, as sec forth in NFPA 220.
1.120-10 b.
t
(9) Floor drains sized to remove e=pected firefighting witerflow without flooding safety-related equipmer,t should be provided in those areas where f ixed witer fire suppression
'ystems are installed. fiour drains shoul0 also be provided in other areas where hant hose lines may be uwd if such firefighting witer could cause anacceptable dimage to safety-related equip-ment in the arei (see hf PA"J2, " Waterproofing and Draining of F loors").
Where gss suppression systems are installed, the drains shruld be provided with adequite seals or the gas suppression system should be sized to compensite for the loss of the sLppressio) agent through the driins.
Crains in areas containing combustible liquids should have provisions for preventing the spread of the fire throughout the drain system.
Water drainage frem areis that miy contain rajicactiv-ity should be collected, sampled, and analyzed before dischirge to the enviro w nt.
(10) F loors, walls, and ceilings separatii g f ire areis should have a minimom fire rating of three hours.
Cpenings throuq5 fire barriers around conduit or piping should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that required of the birrier itself. Coor openings shuuld be protected with equivalently rated doors, frimes, and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory. Such doors should be normally closed and delay alarmed with alarm and annunciation in the contrcl room, locked closed, or equipped with automatic self closing devices using magnetic hold-npen devices that are activ-ated by smake or rate of-rise heat detectors protecting both sides of the opening.
The status of doors eaairped with magnetic hold epen devices should be indicated in the control room.
Iire barrier openings f or ventilation systems should be protected t3 a "f ire door dimper" haviry a rating equivalent to thit required of the b arrier (see NF PA E0, " Fir t Doors and Windows").
Flexible air duct coupling in ventilation and filter systems should be noncombustible.
(11) Person el access routes and escape routes should be provided for each fire area.
Stairwells outside primary containment servirg as esc 3pe routes, access routes for firefighting, access routes to areas containing equipment recessary for safe shutdown should be encim ed in or masonry or concrete towers with a minimum fire riting of two hours and self closing Class B fire dacrs.
(12) Fire exit routes should be cleirly mirked.
b.
Control of CrThustibles (1) Safety related systems should be isolateJ or separated f rom combustible miterials When this is not possible because of tt e nature of the safety system or the ccmbust ible material, automatic fire suppression should be provided to limit the consequences of a fire.
(2) Use and storage of compressed gases (especially oxygen and flam able gises) inside buildirgs housing safety related equipment should be controllet Bulk storage cf flammable gis should not be permitted inside strz tures housing safety re',ated equipment and should be suffi-ciently remote that a fire or explosion will not adversely affect any safety-related systems Or equipw nt (3ea NFFA 6, " Industrial Fire loss Pre,ention").
(3) It is recognized that halogenated compounds are used to improve the fire rctardancy of cable insulaticn; insulating and jacketing materials shculd be chosen to hive a hic;h flaTe resistance and low smoke and offgas characteristics without degrading the required electrical and physical properties.
Ha.ever, plastic materials should not be used for other applications unless suitable noncombustible miterials are not available.
(4) Storage and usage of flammable liquids should, as a minimum, comply with the renuirements of NF PA 30, " Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code c.
Electrical Cable Construction, Cable Trays, and Canle Feretrations (1) Only metal should be used for cable trays. Only metallic tubing should be used for conduit.
Thin wall metallic tubing should not be used.
Flexible metallic tubing should only be used in short lengths to connect to equipment. Other raceways should be made of noncombustible material.
(2) Redundant saf ety relatec' cable systems outside the cable spreading room should t.e separated from each other and from potential fire exposure hazards in non-safety-related areas by fire barriers with a minimum fire ratirg of three hours.
These cable trays should be provided with continuous lite-type heat detectors and should be accessible for minual firefightirg.
Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with fire suppression water without electrical faulting. Manual hose stations and portable hand extinguishers should be provided.
Safety-related equir: ment in the vicinity of such cable trays that does not itself require fixed witer suppression systems but is subject to unacceptable damage from water should be protected.
14'b 029 1.120-11
, it e t, r e l it e ! c ib l e tr ifs of.i single dt.tsiw thit are s e p -i r,i t m l fium relm -d in t urs imi tr e sortilly in c, s i ti l e tir divisions t, a fire 1 irt ier wit'1 1 nini a r! ting of 3h ntill esposure fire ty prosidleg rmir ; i l fIrefiqhtinj h.ald t e prote ttei f rcm t he o f t ei. t s ut ap e
utinatic wtter
- pressien in tr+
ir e i where stn h a fire c oulJ ot cur.
Ot om it ic trei prote; tie
- e re pcovi.b d.
sh:uld ti sider cable t r iy i r r impw nt s a-ni ti sib!r tr n,ient
- t. C u,t it le s ti
- ul'! pre <ent to..;i ute t.iz a r it to tt e ( Ale ensure a% it o iter i;,,r ie for.i r e i, thit i
a M i", i ; Nse stan (;p, systems migte triiml us o 1.: Let side t tie primiv> f iv e s y pt.
.i<-n s i s t e 1.
,afety-relatro cibir trajs i,f i
s i m;!c (in lieu :t autt"itic
- w. iter suppres ion si,tems) tu r divistui thit,t re sep. ira t e : tita relculint s,i f e t y di s i s i c.n.
t.y a fire t 'tler with a minir a illy.eres,tble f or m eu il f i r e f i gf,t i" ; it ill of t!e f u l l.:w 1' q rstiul of ! tuiur s and are ro in t er.li t io i tre met-(tmth stfet,-
( i) if e n. c t e.
cf eqaiv ilent J st ind tr o Ji-iru h w im cable trtys 1 e l it ml ed m-s it et y r e l it e j ) in i gi,en fire tre s is
- ,in or le' or p"
to s,wtem,
- contiot, (b) I F.
celim; A es n<.t provide i ns t ron ent.it i e r r equ i r ed ti u.hiese in d m t i rit ii n t o ld s hu tda n, Ju ul (c) he.h t m t ors a r, provl' W in the av e 1 of the e table r out in ;, a ".1 ( on-tin #us lir -type t e tt detettat' are [tovided in the table t r iv ;
s1 tile for tr inoi l fi@tinq S;41d Le
> atety r rl ited c Ale t r i,s t r it are eat aaen r e n-t'e t i deluge or open di r et tie n il pr iy protetted t3 a imed iote 1 tic witer siste n wit h t
so thit i.h q.ite w it er cc,er i ; i <, prnided fur e it h cable t r tv bh table n
tle<
ir r r;mi
- tra, st mid ilsa t e pr otect ed from t*e effects of a potential e gosure fire !.y providinq.ia t o m it is water s t; p' e s i n ut in tre are i where suth.i f ir e c ould oc cur.
p r im ir <.t " d se< omtir y ( o n t a i mrent o r ot he r ir e s s w!.e r e it
[n sah pla,t areas is nay not tm p >ible b :iuse Et ntFor User ridim, A,i ;1 t r it ure recessiry f,ir reason <
<1t u lrir ritet-to separate re J nt int,ifety r91ated cibir
, stem, t c/
l-Fc u r - r a t ett tire tar r ier'
( ib l e trais sh afdt, pr ot e cted Ly an autr itic w iter sp tem with open-he ld delup or cpen d i r et t iim il spray su.;te: ar r a%m! so t ha t adeon.it e w it e r co.erige i, pr m ided f or e it h cable trav mh cable tra,s s!4 u l l a l s i te protet.ted from tti etterts of a potential esposur e fire t' y growilieg pressi( n in tra area d ere suth i fire c ould oc cur.
The c ap it i lit y tu achieve aut esit ic w it e r o
amt tii nt iin safe shuta wn considering the effetts et <i f ire i n v o l v i rn; f i m! r d potenti.il trrhient tiebu,tibles eould Le v aluated with ind with<ut actuition of the aatomatic suppressicn system
.i sui t ib l y de f i neJ t; is t s and should ta justified on (3) Cable r 1 table try Lenetr ition of fise barriers (verticil and horizontal) should t;e sealed to give protection at least equisilent to that required of the fire barrier.
It s design of fire bar rier g etrations for torizontal and vertical table trays s hou ld t,e qualified by tests 3 ine p+ "et rat ion qu ali t ir stion tests should use tr e tite-temperiture e=posur e c ur ve spet i t ied t.y A5T M L - l l1
'ftre Test of Eaildimi Construction and M.iterials Openings i m> i de (unduit larger than 4 inc N, in dii%ter should be sealed at tae f ire tsarrier penetrat ion; these se ils should t e qualified by tests as descrit ed above.
Crenind inside conduit 4 inch.
or less in dirreter should t,e wealed at tte f ire b irrier and should t e goilified h/ tests as desc r itml
.it o v e unless the conduit estents it le3>t 5 feet on each side of the fire barrier and is seiled ontucLustible m i t e r i.il to prevent the passage of either at l'uth ends or at tre fire barrier with 1
swke m J hot gises.
Fire Larrier penetrations th.it must maintsin e n v i ro r.m. n t a l isolition or pressure ditterentials should ta grilitied by test to maintain the barrier integri t y urde r the conditicn, specified aLove.
(4) Fire stops stv;ld t:e installad every 20 feet along horizontal cable rnutings in areas that are not pretected Dy a utom.it i c w.it e r systems Vertical cable routings should have fire strps installed at each floor / ceiling level.
Between lesels or in vertital cable chases, f i re st op, shoul d t;e installed at the midheight if the vertic al run is 20 f eet ur more t ut less t h in 30 feet or at 15-foot intervals in vertical runs of '10 teet or more unles> >uch vertical cible routings are protected by automitic w iter systems directed on the cable tr ays Individual fire steL d signs should prevent tt e prcpa ;ition of a fire for a minimum period of thirty minutes when tested for the largest number of cable routings and m3mimuu table density.
3 ays exceeding 24 irches should t e counted as t-o trays; trays exceedirq 4H inches should be counted as three trays, reg.trdless of tray fill.
3Fenetration qualification test criteria are under development.
Guidanc e is currently available in the form of a draf t s t int -
1, tandard for Cabla penetration Fire Stop Test Frocedure,"
t;eing develcped by Lisk f or..2-40 of the IEEE Insulated (.onductors Committee.
f INL 1.12c-12
(5) Electric cable constructions should, as a.inimum, piss the flim test in the current IEEE Std 393.
(This does not imply that cables passing this test will not require fire prntectien.)
(6) Cable race-af s should Le used only f or cables.
(7) Miscell3neou> stcrage and pipirq for f iammable or ccmbus t ible liqaids or gises should rot create a potential exposure hazard to safety-related systems.
d.
Ventilation (1) The products of combustion and the means by whiCh they will te removed from each fire are3 should be est ablished during the initial stages of plant design.
Consideration should be given to the in,ta'lation of automatic suppression system: as a means of limiting smoke and heat ge eration.
SmoLe and corrosive gases should generally be discharged direttly outside to in area that will not iffoct safety-related plant areas.
The normal plant ventilation system may be used for this purpose f capable and available. To facilitate manual fisefighting, separate i
smoke and helt sents should be provided in specific are3s such as cable spreading rooms, diesel fuel oil storage areas, switchge3r rooms, and cther 2reas where the potential esists for hesvy smoke conditions (see NFPA 204 for additional guidante on smoke control).
(2) Releasa of smose and gases centaining radioactive materials to tre envircrment should be monitored in accordance with emergency plans as described in the guidelines cf Regula-tory Guide 1.101, " Emergency Planning f or Nuclear Po.ar Plants " An/ ventilation system designed to exhaust potentially radioactive smcke or g$ses should be evalu3ted tn ensure that inadwertent operstien or single failures will not violate the radiologically controlled areas of the pl3,t design.
This requirement includes centainment functions for protecting the public and maintain-irg habitability for operations personnel.
(3) Special protection for ventilation po-er and control cables may be required.
The power supply and controls for mechanical sentilatior, systems should be run outside the f i re area served by the system where practical.
(4) Engineered-safety-feature filters should be protected ir accordance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52.
Any filter th3t includes combustible materials and is a potential exposure fire hazard that may affect safety-related components should be protected as determired by the fire hazard analysis.
(5) The fresh-air supply intakes to areas containing safety-related equipment or systems should be located remote from the exhaust air outlets and smoke vents of other fire areas to minimize the possibility of contaminating the intake air with the products of Combustion.
(6) Stairwells should be designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire.
(7) Self-contaired breathing apparatus using full-face positive pressure masks approsed by NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Saf ety and Health - approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Mines) should be provided for fire brigade, damage control, and control room personnel.
Cortrol rocm personnel may te furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a stcrage reservoir if practical. Service or rated operating life should be a minimum of one-half hour for the self-contained units.
At least two extra air bottles should be located on site for each self-ccntained breathing unit.
In addition, an onsite 6-hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged to permit quick and ccmplete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned.
If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air should be used; compressors should be operable assuming a less of offsite power.
Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contaminants.
(8) Whefe total flooding gas extinguishing systems are used, area intale and exhaust ventilation dampers should be controlled in accordance with NFPA 12, " Carbon Dioxide Systems,"
and NFPA 12A, "Halon 1301 Systems, to maintain the necessary gas concentration.
e.
lighting and Communication Lighting and two way voice communication are vital to safe shut
' emercancy response in the event of fire. Suitable fixed and portable emergency light.og JDmuniCation devices should be provided as follows:
(1) Fixed self-contained lighting consisting of fluorescent or sealed-beam units with individual 8-hour-minimum battery power supplies should be provided in areas that must be manned 1.120-13
f or s af e shutdown and f or access and egress routes to and f rom all fire areas. Safe shutdown areas include those required to be manned if the control room must be evacuated.
(2) Suitable sealed-beam b ittery powered portable haad lights should be provided f or emergency use by the fire brigade and othar operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdc.n.
(3) Fixed emergency communications independent of the normal plant communication system should be installed at preselected stations.
(4) A portable radio communications system should be provided for use by the fire brigide and other operations personnel r? quired to achieve saf e plant shutdown.
This system sheuld not interfere with the communications capabilities of the plant security force. Fixed repeaters installed to permit use of portable radio communication units should be protected from esposure fire damage. Preoperational and periodic testing should demonstrate that the frequencies used for portable radio communication will not affect the actuation of protective relays.
5.
F ire Detection and Suppression a.
Fire Detection (1) Area fire detection systems should be provided for all areas that contain, or present pc'ential fire expcsure to, safety related equipment.
(2) F ire detection systems should, as a minimum, comply with the requirements of Class A systems as defined in NFPA 72D, " Standard for the Installation, Maintenanct and Use of Preprietary Protective Signaling Systems," and Class I circuits as defined in NFPA 70, " National Electrical Code."
(3) Fire detectors should, as a minimum, be selected and installed in accordance with NFPA 72E, " Automatic Fire Detectors." Preoperational and periodic testing of pulsed line-type he3t detectors should demonstrate that the frequencies used will not affect the actuation of protective relays.
( 4 ', fi e detection systems should give audible and visual alarm and annunciation in the control room.
Where zoned detection systems are used in a given fire area, local means should be provided to identify which detector zone has actuated. Local audible alarms should sound in the fire area.
(5) Fire alarms should be distinctive and unique so they will not be confused with any other plant system alarms.
(6) Primary and secondary power supplies should be provided for the fire detection system and for electrically cperated control valves for automatic suppression systems. Such primary and secondary po-er supplies should satisfy provisions of Section 2220 of NFPA 720.
This can be acccmplished by:
(a) Using normal offsite power as the primary supply with a f our-hour battery supply as secondary supply; and (b) Having capability f or manual connection to the Class It emecqencv power bus within four hours of loss of offsite power.
Such connection should follow the appi1 cable guide-lines in Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.32, and 1.75.
b.
Fire Protection Witer Supply Systems (1) An underground yard fire main loop should be installed to furnish anticipated water requirements. NFPA 24, "Stardard for Outside Protection," gives necessary guidance for such installation. It references other design codes and standards developed by such org3niza-tions as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Water Warks Associa-tion (Aa%A).
Type of pipe and water treatment should be design considerations with tuberculation as one of the parameters. Means for inspecting and flusning the systems should be provided.
Approved visually indicating sectional control valwes such as post indicator valves should be provided to isolate portions of the main for mainterance or repair without shutting off the supply to primary and backup fire suppression systems serving areas that contain or expose safety-related equipment.
The fire main system piping should be separate from service or sanitary water system piping, except as described in Regulatory Position C.5.c.(4).
1.120-14
(2) A common yard fire main loop may serve multi unit nuclear power plant sites if cross-connected between units.
Sectional control valves should permit maintairing independence of the individual loop arcund each unit.
For such installations, common water supplies may also be utilized. For multiple-reactor sites with widely separated plants (opproaching I mile or more), separate yard fire main loops should be used.
(3) If pumps are required to meet system pressure or flew requirements, a sufficient number of pumps should be provided to ensure that 10J% capacity will be available assuming failure of the largest pump or loss of of f site power (e.g., three 50t pumps or two 100% pumps).
This can be accomplished, for exaTple, by providing either:
(3) Electric-motor-driven fire pump (s) and diesel oriven fire pump (s); or (b) Two or more Seismic Category I Class lE electric-motor-driven fire pumps connected to redundant Class IE emergency power buses (see Rgulatory Guides 1. 6, 1.32 and ! i$).
Individual fire pump conr.ections to the yard t ire main loop should be separated with sectien31izing valves between connections. Each pump and its driver 3nd controls sh'uld be located in a room separated from the remaining fire pumps by a fire wall with a minimum rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
The fuel for the diesel fire pump (s) should be separated so that it does not provide a fire source xposing safety-related equipment.
Alarms indicating pump running, driver availabil-ity, failure to start, and lcw fire-main pressure should be provided in the control room.
Details of the fire pump installation should, as a minimum, conform to NFPA 20,
" Standard for the Installatisn of Centrifugal fire PuTps."
(4) Two scparate, reliable frashw3ter supplies should be provided.
Saltw3*er or brac ki s h =3ter should not be used unless all freshwater supplies have been exhausted.
If tanks are used, two 100% (minimum of 300 000 gillens each) system capacity tanks shauld be installed.
They should be so interconnecte i that pumps Can t3ke suction f rom either or both.
however, a leak in are tank or its piping should be isolable <o th3t it will not cause both tanks to drain.
Water supply capacity should be capable of refilling either tank in eight hours or less.
Ccmmon tank s are pe rr ' tted for fire and sanitary or service water storage. knen this is done, however, minimum fire water storage requirements should be dedicated by passive me3ns, for ex3mple, use of a vertical standpipe for other water services.
(5) The fire.ator supply should be calculateJ on the bisis of the lirgest expected flow rite for a period of twa hours bnt not less than 300,000 gallons.
This flew rate should be based (conservatively) en 750 gpm for manual hose streams plus the largest design demand of any sprinkler or deluge system as determined in accordance with NFFA 13 or NFPA 15.
The fire water supply should be capable of delivering this design demand over the longest route of the water supply system.
(6) Freshwater lakes or ponds of sufficient size may a 31ify as so!e source of water for fire protection but require at least two intakes to tre pump supply.
Ono hu-dred percent c3pacity should be av3ilable following the loss of any one int de.
Wher i common water suppl is permitted for fire protection and the ultimate heat sink, the follcwing conditions should also be satisfiet (a) The additional fire protection water requirements are designed into the total storage cap 3 city and (b) Failure of the fire prottction system should not degrade the function of th-ultimate heat sink.
( /) Outside minual hose installatico should be sufficient to provide in effe tive hose stream to any onsite locatico where fixed cr transient combustihles could jeop3rdize safety-related egaioment.
To accemolish this, hydrints shculd be installed 4 proximitely evei. 250 feet on the yard miin system.
A h3se heuse equipped with hose and combinaticn nozzle and other auxiliary equipment reco mendod in NFPA 24 "Outsida Protection,' should be provided as n?eded, but at least every 1,000 feet.
Alternatively, mobile meins of providinn hose and assoc iated equipment, such as hose carts or tracks mi, be used.
When provided, such mobile equipment should be equivalent to the equipment supplied by three hoso houses Thre3ds compatible with those used by local fire dopartwnts should te prov4drd cn all hydrants, hose couplings, and stan 6tpe risors.
1
?O-15
c.
Weter Sprinkler and Hase St andp ipe Systems (1) Sprinkler systems cnd manual hose station st 3ndpipes shauld hase corr,'ctions to the plant underground water main so that no single active f ailure or crack in a traderate energy lina can impair bcth the primary and backup fire suppression systems.
Alternatively, headers fed from each end are permitted inside buildings to supply both sprirkler and standpipe systems, provided steel piping and f i tti ngs meet ing t he requi r e-'ent s o f ANSI B31.1, "Pc.e r Piping,'
are used for the haaders up to and including the first valse supplying the sprink'er systems here such headers are part of the seismically analyzed hose st ar dpipt sy v.
When provided, sucn headers are considered an extension of the yard main syste. Hose stat
- pipe 3rd aatom3 tic water suppression systems servirg a single fire area should have independent cs noections to the yard main systems.
Each sprinkler and standpipe systen should be eadipped with OS&f (outsida screw and yoke) gite valve or other apuroved shutoff valve ard waterflow alarm.
Safety-relate' equip" ment that does not itself require sprirkler water fire protection but is subject to un3c.eptable damage if wet by sprinkler water discharge should be protected by water shields or baffles.
(2) Control and sectionalizing valves 's the fire water systems should te electrically supervised or aJministratisely controlled The electrical supervision signal shnuid indicate in the control room All valves in the fire prctectico system shoJld t,e periodically checked to verify position (see NFPA 26,
,upervisien of Valves").
(3) Fixed water entinguishing systems should, as a miniman, conf orm to requir errents of appropriate stind3rds such as NrFA 13, "Standira for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems,' and NFPA 15, " Standard for Water Spray fixed Systems.'
(4) Irterinr manual hose installation s" mld be able to each any location that contains, or could present a fire exposure h3zard tu, safety-related equitment with at least one effective equipped with a maximum of IQI hose stream.
To accomplish this, standpipes with he>e ccnnect ic a 3
feet of I-l/2-inch woven-jacket, lined fire hose and sultable nozzles should t:e provided in all building > cn all floors.
Individaal standpices should te at least 4 inches in dia.Teter for
.mJlliple ho w connections and 2-1/2 incres in diameter for single hose connections. These systems shuuld follc. the require ents of NFPA 14, " Standpipe and Hose Systems," for sizing, spacing, and oipe su; s crt requirements Hose staticas should be ICcated as dict ated ty the f i re h 3za rd amil y s i s to facilitate iccess a": use for f i re f ignt ing wer 3tiens.
Alternat..e hose stations shculd be proviced for an avea it the fire hazard could block access to a s i rq l e hose station serving that area.
P r o,< i s i o n s,bould L.e F M to supply water at least to standpipes and hose connec-tions for manaal firefigr*ing in avets tainir q equir ent recaired for saf e plar.t shutda n in the eve"t of a Safe Shutown Earthqua.
The pipi g system serwirq such hose staticos should L.
analyzed for 55E loading and snculd te provided 'ith s L; po r t s ta ersure system pressure integrity ite piping and valves for the portien ct base stan tipe syste-affected bj this functional require-ment s!ould. as a minime, satisfy AN5l P31.1, "Poaer Piping.
The -iter supply for this condition 51y be obtair ed by ;r a n ua l cLerator ac tL iti on of valves in a conrection to the hose standpipe vice witer system.
reider frci a norm 31 'eism'c Category I water system such as the essential ser Ite crcis conrection sho 11 be (a) capable of presidi q flow to at least twa hose stations (apprv(-
iTately 15 gum ter huse station) and (b) designed to th-site st3"d3rds as tre Wismic Category I witer system; i' should not degrade the performar.ce of tre Reis-ic Category I w3ter system (S) The proper type o' hose nozzle to be st; plied te m h area sM uld te based on tre fi re hazard andysi s.
The usual cu%inition s! ray /st' ai@ t-str ev nozzle shculd not be used in 3reas
- ere the straight stream can cause unicceptable mechanical damage. Fixed fcq nozzles s*ould tr provided at 1xa m where higY s oltaga shoc* hazards ewist.
All hose nozzles shculd have s Ntctf capibility (Gaida"ce on safe distances for water applic at ion to live electrical equipme"? may be found in the "NFPA fire Protection H ndicM.")
(C) Certain fires such as those involvirq flammable 11cuids re spond well to foam suppress!nn.
Consideratica s*auid be given tu use of mecheical 10.-e pansico f o n s y s t err s,
high-e G ans on foam generators or auscas f ilm-f orming team (M F F ) systems, including the AfFF delta-s, stem.
These systems should comply with the reqJirements of NFPA 11, NFPA IIA, and NFPA Ils as applicable.
d.
Halon Sur pressien Systems Halon fire extinguishing systems snould, as a minimum, comply with the requirements of NrFA 12A and 128, "H31ogenated f ir e E x tingui shing Agent Sy s tems - Halon 1301 and Halon 1211.'
Cnly UL-listed or FM approved agents should be used.
? revisions for locally disarming autcmatic Halon system, should be key locked and under strict administrativa control.
Automatic Hilon 1.120-16 i
?
0,34
e x t i n ;u i s h i r") systems should not be disarmed unless controls as descritieJ in Regulatory Position C.7 c.
are provided.
In aldition to the guidelines of M PA 12A ind I?B, preventive miinten ece and tM ting of the s y s t e'n s, includirq chech weighing of the Halon cylinders, should t.e dere at least quarterly.
Particular consideration should also be gi 'en t o:
(1) Hinimum required H.ilon car centratien, distribution, soak time, and ventilation ccntrol; (2) Ic k it. i ty o f h a lon ;
(3) To icity and corrosive characteristics of ttu thermil decomposit1.
ts of H.i l o n ; and (4) location inJ relection of the attivating d.'tectors.
c.
C.irton Dio ide hauressinn % st en Ca rt un d i o m ide e x t in<;ui sh i ng sy st er.s could,
.i, a tr i, i m um, c ompl y w i t h t he requi rer, ut <
of M PA 12 Carbon Dioside Estinguishing Systru.
htere automatic carbnn dioxide >ystems e>
uwd, they st'culd b-equipped =tt a predisthirge ilarm system in t a di< charge delay to per,r'<
[ersonnel egres Prusisions for localiy disarming autenat ic car t dioxide systems s h e. h* ta key loc k t J r ' under strict a-Pini st rat i ve c ontrol. Automat ic car t-dioxide entihqJlshlrq sys.ams sN uld not tu d i s irried un i o3s controls as descrited in Acq,'itory Positien C.2.
ire p r o v i d.> !
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(1) Minim require 1 CO,, c n ontration, cnntr31; distribution, so n time, and sntilation
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142 035 1.12 -11
In primary containment, fire detection systems should be provided for each fire hazard.
The type of detecticn used and the location of the datectors should be the most suitable for the particular type of fire hazard identified by the fire hazard analysis.
A general area fire detection capability should be provided in the primary contain-ment as backup for the above-described hazard detection. To accomplish this, suitable smoke or heat detectors compatible with tha rajiation environment should be installed.
For secondary containment areas, cable fire hazards that could a'fect safety should be protected as described in Regulatory Position C.4.c(2).
The type of detection system for other fire hazards identified by the fire h3zard analysis should be the most suitable for the particular type of fire hazard.
(2) Ref ueling and Miintenance - kefueliDQ and maintenance operations in Containment may introduce additional hazards such as contamination control materials, decontamination supplies, wood planking, temporary wiring, welding, and flame cutting (with portable cumpressed gas fuel supply).
Pessible fires would not necessarily be in the vicinity of fixed detection and suppres-sion systems.
Management procedures and controls necessary to ensure adequate fire protection for transient fire loads are discussed in Regulatory Position C,1.
Manual firefighting capability should be permanently installed in containment.
Standpipes with hose stations a^d portable fire. cinguishers should be installed at strategic locations
- oughout containment for any required manuab firefighting operations.
The contain-mert pene' ions of the standpipe system should neat the isolation requirements of General Design Criterion 56 and should be 5eismic Category I and Quality Group B.
Adequate self-contaired breatting apparatus should be provided ne3r the contain-ment entrances for firefight in.; and damage contrul personnel.
These units should be independent of any breathing apparatus or air supply systems provided for general plant activities and should be clear'y marked as emetgency equipment.
b.
Control Room Cnmplen the contrni room complex (including galleys, office spices, etc.) should be protected agiinst disabling fire damage and should be senarated f r em other areas of the plant by floors, tm ee no_rs.
Peripheral rooms in the walls, and roof h3ving minimum fire resistance ratings ut control room complex should ! sve automatic fire suppression and shouls ce separated from the control room by noncomti'stible construction with a fire resistance rating of one hour.
Ventila-tion system openings bet-een the control room and peripheral rcoms should have automatic smoke dampers that close on operation of the fire detection or suppression syctem.
If a cart on dioxide flooding system is used for fire " oppression, these dampers stculd be strong enough to support the pressure rise acccmpa*ying carbon dioxide discharge and seal tightly against infiltratien of carbon dioxide into tr e control room.
Manual firefighting capability should be provided f ar:
(1) f ire originating within a cabinet, console, or ccnrecting cables; and (2) E=posure fires involving combustibles in the general room area.
Po ' table Ciass A and Class C fire extinguishers shot'd be located in the control rccm.
A hose statir should be installed immediately outside the control room.
Nozzles that are compatible with the hazards and equipment in the control room should be provided for the manual hose station.
The nozzles cnusen should satisfy actual firefighting needs, satisfy electrical safeiy, and minimize physical damnge to electrical equipment from hose straim impingement.
$moke detectors chooid t e provided in the control room, cabinets, and consoles.
If redundant safe-shutdown equipment is loc ated in the same control room sabinet or console, addi-tional fire protection measures should be provided. Alarm and local indication should be provided in the control room.
Breathing apparatus for control room operators should be readily available.
The outside air inta e(s) f or the control room ventilation system should be provided with smoke aetection capability to alarm in the control room to enable manual isolation of the control rcom ventilation system and thus prevent smoke from entering the control room.
-f
() I)()
r5 1.120-18 V
- L
Venting of smoke produced by fire in the control room by m ins of the normal ventila-tion system is acceptable; however, provision should be made to permit isolation of the recircu-lating portion of the r 3 rm 31 ventilation system.
Minually operated.cnting of the control room should be availdble t
.he operators.
All cables that enter the control room should terminate in the control ruom.
That is, no cabling should be simply routed through the control room from 3rea to arcther.
Cables in
+
the control room should he kept to the minimum recessary for plant cperation.
Cables in underfloor and ceiling spaces should meet the separation criteria given in Regulatory Guide 1.75.
Air 'andling functions should be dccted sepsrately from cable runs in such spaces; i.e., if cables are routed in underfloor or ceiling spaces, these spaces should not be used as air plenums for ve'tilation of the control room.
Fully enclosed electrical raceways in such underfloor and ceiling spaces, if over one square foot in cross-sectional area, should have automatic fire suppressici inside Area automatic fire sucpression should be provided for underfloor and ceiling space < if used for cable runs unless all cable is run in 4-inch or smaller steel conduit or the cables are in fully enc 1csed raceways internally protected by automatic fire suppressicn.
c.
Cable Spreading Room The primary fire suppression in the cable spreading room should be an automatic water system such as closed-head sprinklers, cpen-head deluge system, er open directional water spray system. Deluge and cpen spray systems should have provisions for manual operation at a remote station; tcwever, there should be orovisions to preclude inadvertent cperation.
Locaticn of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray arrangements and possible transient combustibles to ensure adequate water coverage for areas that could present eaposure hazards to the cable system.
Cables should be desig'ed to allcw wetting down with water supplied by the fire suppression systes. without electrical faulting.
Open-head deluge and Open directional spray systems should be zoned.
The use of foam is acceptable.
Automatic gas systems (Halon or CO ) may te used for pr' mary fire suppression if they 2
are backed up by a fixed water spray system.
Cable spreading rooms should have:
(1) At least two remote and separate entrances for access by fire brigide personnel; (2) An aisle separation between tray stacks at least 3 feet wide and 8 feet high; (3) Hose stations and portable extinguishers installed immediately outside the room; (4) Area smoke detection; and (3) Continuous line-type heat detectors for cable trays inside the cable spreading room.
Drains to remove firefighting water should be provided. When gas systems are installed, drains should have adequate seals or the gas extinguishirq systems should be sized to compensate for losses through the drains.
A separate cable spreading room should be provided for each redurdant division. Cable spreading rooms should not be shared between reactors. Each cable sp "-
-] room should be separated from the other, and from other areas of the plant by barriers with a minimum fire rating of three hours.
The ventilation system to each cable spreading room should be designed to isolate the area upon actuation of any gas extinguishing system in the area.
Separate manually actuated smoke venting that is operable from cutside the room should be provided for the cable spreading rcom.
d.
Plant Ccmputer Rooms Computer rooms for computers performing safety-related functions that are not part of the control room complex should be separated from other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours and should be protected by automatic detection and f
1.120-1.1
fixed automatic suppression. Computers that are part of the control room complex but not in the control room she 'd be separated and protected as described in Regulatory Position C.6.b.
Computer cabinets located in *Te control room sha he protected as other control room equipment and cable rens therein.
Mon-safety-rela
.yut
- outside the control room complex should be separated from safety related sas b,
. ii i i 'ers with a minimum rating of three hours and should be protected es reed-4 prevent ea 1 smoke damage to safcty-related equipment.
Manual hose stations and po'*able fire eatinguishers should be provided in areas that contain, or could pre
.t a fire expos hazard to, safety-related equipment.
e.
. itchgen P; cms Sw i 'angear rooms containin.; safety-related equipment should be separated f rom the remainder o' the plant by barriers with a minimum fire rating of three hours.
Redundant switch-gear safe'.y divisions should be separated from ea n other by barriers with a three-hour fire rating. Automatic fire detectors should alarm a'd annunciate in the cintrol room and alarm locally. Cables entering the switchgear room tt it do not terminate m-perform a function there should de kept at a minimum to minimize the combustible loading. These rooms should not be used for any other purpose. Fire hose stations ar.d portable fire extinguishers should be readily available cutside the area.
Ea,ipment should be located to facilitate access for manual firefighting. Drains should be p 'ovided to prevent water accumulation f rom d3maging saf ety-related equipment (see NFPA 92M, "Wat erproof ing and Draining of f loors").
Remote manually actuated ventilation should be provideu for venting smoke when manual fire suppression effort is needed (see Regulatory Position C.4.d).
f.
Remate Safety-Related Panels Redundant safety-related panels remote from the control room complex should be separated from each other by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three hours.
Panels providing remote hot shutdown capability should be separated from the contrul room complex by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three hours.
The general area housing remote safety-related panels should be provided with autom3 tic fire detectors that alarm locally and alarm and annunciate in the control room.
Combustible materials should be controlled and limited to those required for operation. Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations should be readily available in the general area.
g.
Safety-Related Battery Rooms Saf ety-related battery rooms should be protected against fires and explosions. Battery rooms should be separated from each other and other areas of tre plant by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three hours inclusive of all penetrations and openings.
D.C.
switchgear and inverters should not be Ivcated in these battery roums.
Automatic fire detection should be oroviaed to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Ventilation systems in the battery rooms should be capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentration well below 2 vol-%.
Loss of ventilation should be alarmed in the control room.
Standpipe and hose and portable extingaishers should be readily available outside the room.
h.
Turbine Building The turbine building should be separated from adjacent structures containing safety-related equipment by a fire barrier with a minimum rating of three hours. Openings and penetra-tions in the fire barrier should be minimized and should not be located where the turbine oil system or generator hydrogen cooling system creates a direct fire exposure hazard to the barrier.
Considering the severity of the fire hazards, defense in depth may dictate additional prntection to ensure barrier integrity.
i.
Diesel Generator Areas Diesel generators should be separated from each other and from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours.
Automatic fire suppression should be installed to combat any diesel generator or lubri-cating oil fires; such systems should be designed for operation wher the diesel is running without affecting the esel.
Autom' tic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Hose stations and portable extinguishers should be readily available outsiee tne area.
Drainage for firefighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided.
~
Day tanks with total capacity up to 1100 gallons are permitted in the diese! generator area under the following conditions:
(1) The day tank is located in a separate enclosure with a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours, including doors or penetrations. These enclosures should be capable of containing the entire contents of the day tanks and should be protected by an automatic fire suppression system, or (2) The day tank is located inside the diesel generator room in a diked enclosure that has suf ficient capacity to hold Il0't of the contents of the day tank or is drained to a safe location.
j.
Diesel fuel Oil Storage A eas Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capacity greater than 1100 gallons should not be located insir huildings containin-safety-related ec,uipment.
If above ground tanks are used, they should ue located at least 50 feet from any building containing safety related equipment or, if located within 50 feet, they should be housed in a separate building with construction having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours.
Potential oil spills should be confined or directed away from buildings containing safety-related equipment. Totally buried tanks are acceptable outside or under buildings ( see NF PA 30, "f lammable and Combustible Liquids Code," f or additional guidance).
Above ground tanks should be protected by an automatic fire suppression system.
k.
Safety-Related Pumps Pump houses and rooms housing redundant safety related pump trains should be separated from each other and from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having at least three-hour ratings These rooms should be protected by automatic fire detection and suppression unless a fire hazard analysis can demonstrate that a fire will not endanger other safety-related equipment required for safe plant shutdown.
Fire detection should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Hose stations and portable extinguishers should be readily accessible.
Floor drains should be provided to prevent water accumulation from d3maging safety-related equipment (see Regulatory Position C.4.a.(9)).
Provisions should be made for manual centrol of the ventilation system to facilitate
<moke removal i f required for m3nual firefighting operation (see Regulatory Position C.4.d).
1.
New Fuel Area Hand portable extinguishers srould be located within this area.
Also, hu>e stations should be located outside but within hose reach of this area.
Automatic fire detection should alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally. Combustibles should be limited to a minimum in the new fuel area.
The storage area should be provided with a drainage system to preclude accumulation of water.
The storage configuration of new fuel should always be so m3intained as to preclude criticality for any water density that might occur during fire water application.
m.
Spent fuel Pool Area Protection for the spent fuel pool area should be provided by local hose stations and portable extinguishers. Autcmitic fire detection shculd be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and to alarm locally.
n.
Radwaste and Decontamination Areas Fire barriers, automatic fire suppression and detection, and ventilation controls should be provided unless the fire hazard analysis can demonstrate that such protectinn is not necessary, o.
Safety-Related Water Tanks Storage tanks that supply water for safe shutdown should be protected from the effects of an exposure fire.
Combustible materials should not be stored next to outdoor tanks.
1.120-21
p.
Records Storage Areas Records storage areas should be so located and protected that a fire in these areas "follection, does not e= pose saf ety-related systems or equipment (see Regulatory Guide 1.88, Storage, and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Quality Assurance Records").
q.
Cooling Towers Cooling to.ers should be of noncombustible construction or so located and protected that a fire will not adsersely affect any safety <related systems or equipment. Cooling toaers should be of noncombustible construction when the basins are used for the ultimite heat sink or f or the f re protection water supply.
r, Miscellaneous Arels Miscellaneous areas such as shops, warehouses, auxiliary boiler rooms, fuel oil tanks, and flammable and cembustible liquid storage tanks should be so located and protected that a fire or effects of a fire, including smche, w;11 not adsersely affect any safety related systems or equipment.
7.
Spec i a l Protection Guidelines a.
Storage Acetylene-Oxygen F uel Gases locations should not be in areas that contain or espose s1fety-Gas cylinder stora
=
telated equipment or the fire protection systems th1t serve those safety related areas. A permit system should be required to use this equipment in safety related areas of the plant (also see Pequlatory Position C.2).
b.
Storage Areas for Ion Exchange Resins Unused ion e= change resins should not t;e stored in areas that contain or e= pose safety-related eqJipment.
c.
Hazardous Chemicals Hazardous chemicals should not be stored in areas that contain or expose safety related equipment.
d Materials Containing Radioactivity Materials that collect and contain radioactivity such es spent ion exchange resins, charcoal filters, and HEPA filters should be stored in closed metal tanks or containers that are located in areas free from ignition sources or ccmbustibles. These materials shouid be protected from exposure to fires in adjacent areas as well.
Consideration should be given to requirements for remtval of decay heat from entrainea radioactise materials.
D.
IMPLEMENTATION The purpose of this section is to provide information to applicants regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this regulatory guide.
This guide is being issued for an extended public comment period of one year.
1.120-22
REFERENCES Nitinnal Fire Protection Association Codes and Standirds NFPA 4-1977, "Orginization of Fire Services.'
NFPA 4A-1969, " Fire Department Organization."
NF PA 6-1974, " Industrial Fire Loss Prevention. '
NFPA 7-1974, " Fire Emergencies Mariagement."
NF P A B-1974, "E f f ects of F ire on Operations, "anagement Responsibli ty. "
NFPA 10-1975, " Portable Fire Extinguishees I ns t a11 it i on, Maintenance, and Use."
NFPA 11-1975, "Feam Extinguishing Systems."
NFPA 11A-1970, "High Fxpansion Foam Systems.'
NFPA 118-1974, " Synthetic Foam and Combined Agent Systems.'
'A 12-1973. "Carbcn Dioxide Systems. '
NFPA 12A-19)3, "Hilen 1301 Systems."
NFPA 12B-1973, "H31on 1211 Systems."
NFPA 13-1976, ' sprinkler Systems "
NF PA 14-1974 " Standpipe and H]se Systems.'
NFPA 15-1973, " Water Spray fixed Systems."
NFPA 20-1973, " Centrifugal r i re Pumps. '
NFPA 24-1973, "Cutside Prctection.'
NFPA 26-1958, " Supervision of Valves NFPA 27-1975, " Private Fire Brigade."
NFPA 30-1973, " Flammable Comtestible Liquids Code."
NFPA 518-1976 " Cutting & Weldirg Frocesses."
NFPA 69-1973, " Explosion Freverition Systems."
NFPA 70-1975, "Naticnal Electrical Ccde."
NFPA 72D-1975, "Preprietary Protective Signaling Systems."
NFPA 72E-1974, " Automatic Fire Detectors."
NFPA 60 -1975, "Fi re Doors and wirdews. "
NFPA 92M-1972, "Waterproofirg and Draining of Floors."
NFPA 197-1966, " Initial Fire Attack, Training, Standard On."
NFPA 204-1968, "5moke and Heat Ventirg Guide."
1.120-23
NFPA 220-1975, "lypes of Building Construction."
NFPA 251-1975, " Fire Tests, Building Construction and Materials."
NFPA 259-1976, " Test Method for Potentential Heat of Building Materials."
NFPA 8021974, " Recommended Fire Protection Practice for Nuclear Reactors."
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documents NUREG-0050, " Recommendations Related to Browns Ferry Fire," Report by Special Review Group, February 1976.
WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), " Reactor Safety Study - An Assessment of Accident Pisks in U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," October 1975.
NUREG-75/087, " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants "
Section 9.5.1, " Fire Protection System."
Section 3.6.I. "Piant Design for Protectiun Against Postulated Piping railures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment."
Section 6.4, " Habitability Systems."
Appendix A. " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, "Licer. sing of Production and Utilizat ion Facilities," General Design Criterion 3, " Fire Protection."
Regulatory Guide 1.6. " Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems."
Reoulatory Guide 1.32, " Criteria for Saf ety-Related Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Flynts."
Regulatory Guide 1.39, " Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
Regulatory Guide 1.52, " Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard format and Content of Safety Anc;ysis Repcrts for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2, Section 9.5.1.
Regulatory Guide 1. 75, " Physical Independence of Electrical Systems."
Regulatory Guide 1.88, " Collection, Storage, and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plant Quality Assurance Records."
Regulatoiy Guide 1.101, " Emergency Planning f or Nuclear Power Plants."
Other Documents ANSI Standard B31.1-1973, " Power Piping."
A5TM D-3286, "fest for Gross Calorific Value of Solid Fuel by the Isothermal-Jacket Bomb Calorimeter (1973). "
ASTM E-84, " Surf ace Burning Characteristics of Building Materials (1976).'
ASTM E-Il9, " Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials (1976)."
IEEE Std 383-1974, "IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," April 15, 1974.
MAERP-NELPIA, " Specifications for Fire Protection of New Plants."
i k, _
l.120-24
Factory Mutual System Approval Guide - Equipment, Materials, Services for Conservatien of Property.
" International Guidelines for the Fire Protection of Nuclear Power Plants," National Nucleat Risks Insurance Pools, 2nd Report (IGL).
NFPA Fire Protection Handbook.
Underwriters Laboratories Rating List.
Underwriters Laboratories, " Building Materials Directory."
142 043 1.120-25
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