ML19220C400
| ML19220C400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1978 |
| From: | Herbein J Metropolitan Edison Co |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19220C401 | List: |
| References | |
| GQL 40, GQL-0040, NUDOCS 7905010124 | |
| Download: ML19220C400 (37) | |
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY POST CFFICE SCX 542 READING, PSNNSY LVANI A 19603 a
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Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation g,
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Mr. S. A. Varga, Chief Light *iater Reacters Sranch 4 U.S. :!uclear Regulatory Cc==issien
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Dear Sir:
3ree Mile Island 2 clear Station Unit 2 ('2C-2 )
Docket No 5C-320 Additicnal Info mation Ccncerning Fire Frctectica 21s letter is in respcnse to your letter dated December 27, 1977, as supplenented and arended by the Fire Frctectica Eeview teen on January 6, 1978 at 2ree
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Respense to questicn 6, 7, ik, 17-20, 30, 35, h9, 51, 61, 66, 9h, 101 and 103 as well as F-1 through F-17, vill be provided as scen as possible.
Should you have any questiens er require additicnal infc=aticr. please contact a~,.,
Sincerely, fs Eertein
.z.
7 ice President Generaticn JGE:C'4S:ie:
Attachnents:
- 1) Additional Inferratien Ocnceming Fire Frctectic:
- 2) Fire Frctecticn Program Plan for 2ree Mile Island.iuclear Statien.34-001
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34 002
ADDITICUAL UFCFlGTION CJ:!CI?l!DG FIp2 ppCSCTION FCR w.22 x2,: Istra mCma su Icu, tm: 2 (ntr-2) 34~003
Q 1.
The Shift Supervisor for TMI has been assigned by procedures as the management designee to take charge of the station in the event of an emergency.
In the event of simultaneous emergencies such as a fire combined with a security threat, emergency activities (by procedure) are coordinated by the Shift Supervisor, in order to prevent conflict of fire fight-ing and security r tvities.
2.
Deleted 3.
As indicated on the Safe Shutdown Logic Jiagrams (SSLD's) and in FSAR 9.3.1.3, Instrument Air is not required for safe shutdown.
A fire in the Instrument Air System will preclude the use of certain systems during shutdown and cooldown; however, alternate systems are available to maintain shutdown capability.
4.
Deleted 5.
A single failure will not impair the primary and backup fire suppression systems.
The fire protection system contains four (4) fire pumps, two (2) of which are capable of handling the maximum unit 42 deluge system requirements (2575 gpm required for pr;tection of the unit #2 natural draft cooling tower plus 1000 gpm for octside yarf hydrant stations.
Note that ear' anit $2 cooling tower incorporates six (6) deluge systems rne 2575 gpm flow requirement is for one deluge system only, and only one system is assumed to operate).
The two pumps can supply a sufficient amount of water to the deluge system valve and, at the same time, satisfy the pressure requirements at the valve header such that the system meets the design coverage requirement of providing
.5 gpm per square foot over the fill area and
.2 gpm per square foot under the distribution deck in accordance with NFPA 214 requirements.
The pressure required at the deluge valve header is 100 psi which can be obtained with two (2) fire pumps operating.
Three of the system fire pumps are diesel driven.
Each of the diesel driven pumps is provided with two independent and redundant starting battery systems.
The electrical portion of each fire suppression and detection system is gy supervised in accordance with NFPA requirements to detect an open or short circuit, loss of power or undervoltage C?
and ground faults in the system wiring.
System trouble alarms are crovided locally and in the main Control Room.
's distinct and separate from the TN The audible ~ trouble alarm i
C7 associated system fire alarm to enable personnel to distin-guish between the two.
Each fire suppression system con-tains more than one fire detector located at and around the
^
associated hasard area (s) such that failure of one fire detector will not impair the automatic suppression capabili-ties of the system.
Each deluge valve is provided with a locally mounted actuation station to enable the operator to manually trip the valve in the case of electrical problems associated with the valve's automatic release mechanism.
All TMI fire detection and actuation systems, except the halon extinguishing agent systems for the Cable Room and Air Intake Tunnel, are connected to the plant 125 volt D.C. or A.C.
uninterruptable power supply.
The Halon systems are connected to the Balance of Plant (BOP) power supply but have emergency stand-by battery packs provided in case of loss of normal power.
8.
The administrative aspects of the Fire Protection Program for TMI are governed by the attached Fire Protection Pro-gram Plan.
The procedures that have been developed to implement this plan are designed to be responsive to and meet the intent of attachment 2 to Mr.
D.
B. Vassallo's le -ter of August 29, 1977 to Mr. J. G. Herbein with. respect to drills and training.
Control of ignition sources and transient combustibles is handled as discussed in the response to Item 22.
Specific fire fighting procedures are not written he metheds for fighting fires in the specific fire i eos is covered by a seminar training program where specific fires are postulated.
Actions to be taken and equipment to be used are discussed in this program.
The TMI Fire Protection Program and related equipment is subject to the Quality Assurance Program required by Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 to the extent required by Items 1.0 through 10.0 of attachment 6 to the above mentioned letter from Mr.
D.
B. Vassallo.
In addition to the above, a program has been established to provide for annual physical examinations of fire brigade members to assure their ability to withstand the. strenuous activity necessary to perform their fire fighting functions.
This requiren.ent will be added to the Fire Protection Pro-gram Plan in a future amendment.
9.
All electrically locked doors at TMI can be manually un-locked using a key in che event of power failure or elect-rical device failure.
Keys to all locked doors are readily a"nilable to the fire brigade.
In addition all locked doors including electrically locked doors can be opened by force in the event of mechanical lock failures by using a pinch bar available at each hydrant house.
34 005
10.
The only item sP' ad by the fire brigade and the security force is the si-radio frequency used for walkie-talkies.
A single frequw._; is considered necessary in order to effectively coordinate the activities of the fire brigade and security force as discussed in the response to Question 1.
11.
Agreements have been reached with the local fire companies as documented in Appendix 13A of the TMI-2 FSAR.
Station procedures permit fire company access to the site in the event of a fire, however, no private car is permitted to enter the site.
Firemen who reach the site after the fire trucks have entered are not permitted unless identified by the Fire Chief and then they must enter in a fire com-pany vehicle.
The fire chief has agreed to leave his squad car at the gate for this purpose.
Command of the firemen remains with the Fire Chief.
The Shift Supervisor will act as a technical advisor in order to protect the firemen from indus* rial and rz.diation hazards and to prevent the developmer.L of nuclear safety hazard.
The local fire ccmpanies are invited annually to participate in a traininc session and a drill at TMI.
12.
Deleted.
13.
When a fire protection system or cc=ponent is removed from service a notification is made to the insurance carrier.
In addition, a tag signed by the Shift F neman or Shif t Supervisor is placed on the system or component.
When the system is returned to service the insurance carrier is again notified.
In the event that a fire protection system or component is determined or discovered to be out of service the Shift Foreman is notified and the appropriate action specified by the Technical Specification in taken.
In addition sur-veillance procedures specify the action required in the event the surveillance acceptance criteria is not satisfied.
34 CCG
15.
The Turbine Building, Chlorinator House and Circulating Water Pump House are the only steel structures.
These areas do not contain safety related equipment and do not affect the safe plant shutdown capability.
16.
All areas in TMI-2 that contain safety elated equipment and/or cables are provided with fire detection equipment which alarm locally, as well as in the main control room.
21.
The diesel generator fuel oil transf er pumps automatically stop and the f uel oil isolation solenoid valves automati-cally shut upon receiving a signal from the fire detection /
suppression system locat.d in the Diesel Building.
The transfer pumps and isolation valves are located in the piping lines between the large fuel oil storage tanks and the diesel generator day tanks.
22.
A list of transient ccmbustables has been generated and is currently being compared to the Fire Hazards Analysis for consistency.
When verified, this list will be in-corporated into the TMI Procedures and the quantity of transient combustables permitted in a fire area will be in-spected to the amount given on the list.
Cutting, welding, grinding, and open flame work are con-trolled by a Met-Ed procedure.
This procedure requires that a written work permit be issued by the supervisor in charge o f the work when cutting, welding, etc. are required.
A survey of the area by the supervisor of the work is conducted and removal of transient combusrables is acccmplished as required.
A fire watch with backup fire equipment is also established.
In the event that the supervisor determines that no fire watch is required a second supervisor must cosign the work authorization.
94 007
O 23.
Cables that are designated balance-of-plant (BOP), and which enter safety related equipment, will not degrade the safety related equipment.
Such BOP cables are of two categories: (a) low energy alarm or computer input cir:uits, and (b) power feeders supplying BOP equipment fron a safety related bus.
There are no BOP circuits directly connected within safety related control circuits.
Specifically, all indicating light circuits and control circrits from such items as pressure switches, etc., are in fact safety-related circuits if these indicating lights, etc., are within a safety related control circuit.
The only BOP circuits which interface with safety related control circuits are low energy circuits used for alarms or computer input.
These BOP alarm or computer input circuits do not connect directly into the safety related control power circuit.
All alarm and computer input circuits are initiated by dry contacts (auxiliary contacts) which are actuated from the magnetic contactor or relay of the control circuit.
A fire (external to the safety related equipment) could effect the BOP alarm or computer input, but there could not be any effect on the safety related control circuit.
This is because the alarm or computer input circuit 10 electrically isolated from the safety related circuit, and the alarm or computer input circuit is low-energy, with the energy source being in the annunciator or computer (the equipment which receives the signal f rom the dry contact).
Any BOP power feeders which connect to a safety related bus are connected through a safety related circuit breaker or fuse (isolation device).
The isolation device is located in the safety related equipment, and the BOP cable connects on the downstream side (load side) of the isolation device.
Separation is maintained between the 30P cable and all safety related cables, both inside and outside the safety related equipment, but once the BOP cable leaves the safety related equipment it is not separated from other BOP cables.
A fire external to the safety related equipment could affect the BOP cable, but any short circuit due to the fire would be cleared by the isolation de, ice in the safety related equipment. There would be no effects on the safety related equipment.
34 008
^
24.
Fire Stops Refer to FSAR Supplement 3, response to NRC Question 222.41, for information concerning penetration seals.
In addition to penetration seals as described in that section of the FSAR, fire barriers are used where sufficient air clearances are not maintained around safety related raceways.
Refer to FSAR Paragraphs 7.1.2.2.2.4, 7.1.2.2.3.8 and 7.1.2.2.3.9.
Where fire barriers are used in lieu of fire barrier tray covers, a 1" minimum air space shall be maintained between cable tray or conduit and the fire barrier.
Vertical fire barriers inserted between two cable trays which are side by side shall extend beyond the top and bottom of the cable trays as shown cn Figures 11 and 12.
Horizontal fire barriers inserted between two cable trays which are one above the other shall extend past the sides of the lower cable trays as shown on Figures 11 and 12.
Burns and Roe Drawing No. 3159 provides additional installation details for fire barriers.
Fire barriers inserted between raceways of redundant safety related channels, where the minimum air separation is not maintained, are made of 1" Kaowcol M-Board.
In lieu of using fire barriers, cable tray covers made of 1" thick Kaowool M-Board or 1" thick Kaowool Blanket are used.
Kaowool M-Board, 1" thickness, has been tested in accordance with ASTM E 84.
These test results show that 1" Kaowool M-Board has flame spread of 17.95, a fuel contribution of 4.37, and a cmoke rating of zero.
The results of this test indicate that 1" of Kaowool M-Board has a Class 1 rating in accordance with ASTM E S4.
94 0C3
Question 24 - Page 2 Kaowool M-Board is manufactured by the Babcock and Wilcox Company, Augusta, Georgia.
Kaowcol M-Board is vacuum formed from a slurry consisting of combinations of specially processed Kaowool ceramic fibers and binders.
The fiber raw material is kaolin, a naturally occurring, high purity, alumina-silica fire-clay.
Each piece of Kaowool M-Board is formed to a pre-determined thickness and dried; the board edges are macnined to be true and square.
Kaowool M-Board has high strength for case of handling 0
and installation.
The melting point is 3200 F; density is 12-16 lb./cu. ft.; modulus of rupture is 120 psi.
Compressive strength is 300-1400 psi at 5% deformation, anc 1400-2800 psi at 10% deformation.
Kaowcol M-Board possesses excellent resistance to chemical attack, except frca certain strong acids and alkalies.
It is unaffected by oil or water.
Thermal and physical properties are fully re-stored after drying, should the board beccme wetted.
In industrial applications, Kaowool M-Board is used as furnace and kiln con-struction.
Kaowool M-Board is used in furnace insulation, and it prevents high temperature gases from penetrating to the furnace shell should openings or cracks develop in the refractory hot faca lining.
Thermal conductivity of Kaowool M-Board varies frcm approximately c
0.45 Etu./hr./rg, ft./in./oF at 400 ? to approximately 1.12 Btu./ft.,
U 0
sq. ft./in./ F at 1600 F.
The thermal properties of Kaowool M-Board will limit the cold face temperature as follows:
Case 1 n
Ambient Temperature
= 104~F 1700 F (steady state for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />)
Hot Face of 1" M-Ecard
=
104 F + 252 F = 356 F Cold Face of 1" M-Board
=
n 94 010
Question 24 - Pace 3 Case 2 Ambient Temperature
= 104 F Hot Face of 1" M-Board
= 1600 F (steady state for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) 0 Cold Face of 1" M-Board = 104 F + 236 F = 340 7 Kaowool Blanket is also manufacturet' by the Babcock and Wilcox Company, Augusta, Georgia.
Kaowool is ccmposed of kaolin fibers in lengths up to 10 inches, with the avecage fiber length being 4 inches.
These long fibers are thoroughly interlaced in the production process so that Kaowool blanket has high strength.
Kaowool Blanket contains no organic binder or other organic constituents.
Kaowool Blanket will not contaminate furnace atmospheres or emit of fr
've odors.
The long fibers provide high tensile strength anc resiliency to withstand vibration and physical abuse.
The melting point is 3200 F, and the 5
tensile strength is 1.9 x 10 lb./sq. in.
Kaowool Blanket possesses excellent resistance to chemical attack, except frca certain strong acids and alkalies.
It is unaffected by oil or water, and thermal and physical proper ies are restored after drying.
Kaowool Blanket used on Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 has a density cf 8 lb./cu. ft.
Its thermal conductivity varies frem U
approximately 0.3 B~u./hr./cq. ft./in./ F at 400 F to approximately U
1.55 Btu./hr./sq. f t. /in./ F at 1800 F.
The thermal properties of Kaowool Blanekt ar2 such that a 1" thickness of Kaowool Blanket will limit the cold face temperature as follows:
Ambient Temperature
= 104 F U
Hot Face of 1" Kaowool Blanket
= 1600 F (steady state for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />)
O Cold Face of 1" Kaowool Blanket 104 F + 234 F=
333 F
=
34 011
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V 25.
Cable Insulation Materials Caole qualification for all types of cables used in the cable tray system is discussed in FSAR Section 3.11.2.
In addition, a complete discussion of flame test procedures is given in FSAR Supplement 3, Response to Questien 222.40, pages S3-222-40ee to S3-222-40mm.
Power cable insulation materials consist of the following:
Kerite Type HT, or Anaconda Type Ett.ylene Propylene rubber.
Pcwer cable jacket materials consist of the following:
Kerite Type FR or Kerite Type NS or Anaconda Chlorinated Polyethylene jacket.
Instrumentation cable insulation materials consist of the following:
silicone rubber or Teflon (FEP).
Instrumentation cable jacket materials consist of the following:
asbestos braid or Teflon (FEP).
Control cable insulatica materials consist of the following:
Kerite Type FR or Anaconda Type FR-EP (Flame Retardant Ethylene Propylene).
Control cable jacket materials consist of the following:
Kerite Type FR or Anaconda Type CPE (Flame Retardant Chlorinated Polyethylene).
S4 013
Question 2 montinued 9
Flame tests of cables Pave,een performed as follows:
(a)
Kerite cables have been flame tested as reported in the following Kerite Test Reports:
Test Recort Date 75-VG-49-P 9/8/75 77-VG-67-P 11/29/77 76-VG-6-C 2/3/76 76-VG-5-P 1/30/76 All test reports indicate rhat all cables successfully pass flame tests required by IEEE 383-1974.
(b)
Raychem cables have been flame tested Ts reported in Raychem report numbers:
EM-1238 Vertical Flame' Test EM-1239 Vertical Flame Test (Coax & Triax)
EM-llS9 Flame Test (Thermocouple cable)
EM-12J.0 Oil Rag and Burner Flame Test All test reports indicate that all cables successfully pass flame tests required by IPCEA-S-61-402 (NEMA WCS) and IEEE 383-1974.
(c)
Anaconda (Continental) cables have successfully passed flame tests in accordance with IEEE 333-1974.
Flame tests are documented in Anaconda (Continental) report numbers 76167, EM-ll250-D, 75315, and Anaconda Flame Test Report.
94 01G
I 26.
Separation Criteria used for the routing of electrical cables is described in detail in FSAR Section 7.1.2.2.
The separation criteria used on Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 meets the requirements of IEEE Trial Use Standard No. 384-1974 and U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75 (Revision 1, January 1975),
with the following EXCEPTIONS:
Exception #1 The definition of " isolation device" as stated in Section 3 of IEEE 301 has been used on Three Mile Island Unit No.
2, but the regulatory position C.1 of Pegulatory Guide 1 75 has not been incorporated.
The regulatory 7;sition states: " Inter-rupting devices actuated only by fault current are not consid-ered to be isolation devices within the context of this docu-ment."
The interpretation of the requirement is to require two circuit breakers or fuses in series to ensure that main circuit breakers do not trip as a result of a branch circuit fault.
Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 does not incorporate this regu-latory position; however, the circuit breaker / fuse coordination study has been performed and all circuit breakers and fuses have been properly coordinated.
The application of this coordination study will preclude the tripping of main circuit breakers due to a branch circuit fault.
Exception #2 IEEE 384, Paragraph 4.6.2, states that Non-Class lE Circuirs shall be sepcrated from associated circuits.
This requirement is not incorporated in the design of Three Mile Unit No. 2; however, the Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 design is predicated on the re-3 0 N s^
i quirement that a Non-Class lE circuit, which becomes an asso-ciated circuit if it is routed in one safety related raceway, will never be routed in the raceway system of a redundant safety related channel.
Exception s3 IEEE 384, Paragraph 4.6.2, states that Non-Class 1E instru-mentation and concrol circuits are not required to be separated frcm associated circuits.
Regulatory position C.7 of Regulatory Guide 1.75 requires that Non-Class lE instrumentation and control circuits should be separated from associated circuits.
The design criteria of Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 does not require Non-Class lE instrumentation and control circuits to be separated from associated circuits.
Exception #4 IEEE 384, Paragraph 5.1.2, require Class lE cables to be identified; regulatory position C.10 of Regulatory Guide 1.75 requires this identification to be applied at five (5) foot in-tervals.
The Three Mi?e Island Unit Nc. 2 design requires identifi-catice of safety related cables to be applied at six (6) foot intervals.
Exception #5 IEEE 384, Paragraph 5.1.3, restricts the routing of power circuits through the cable spreading room,and regulatory position C.12 cf Regulatory Guide 1.75 states that no power cables are to be touted through 'coth the cable spreading rocm and the control roCm.
The Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 design incorporates a 4160 Volt bus duct routed through the cable spreading recm; this bus duct will be enclosed by three hour fire barriers in order to 34 018
provide effective separation frcm safety related circuits.
In addition, there are four (4) power conduits running across one corner of the Centrol Rocm ceiling.
These con-duits are all safety related (of the same channel), and the conduits run in the void above the hung ceiling of the Con-trol Rocm.
These circuits do not terminate in this space.
Exception #6 IEEE 384, Paragraph 5.1.4, requires separation between re-dundant cable trays, in a general plant area, to be three (3) feet between trays separated horizontally and five (5) feet between trays separated vertically.
The design of Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 requires separ-ation between redundant cable trays, in a general plant araa, to be three (3) feet between trays separated horizontally and three (3) feet between trays separated vertically.
Exception #7 IEEE 384, Paragraph 5.3.1, requires redundant Class 12 bat-teries to be placed in separate safety class structures.
Regula-tory position C.14 of Regulatory Guide 1.75 requires independent ventilation systems to serve these separate safety class structures.
The Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 design incorporates separate safety class structures for the redundant Class lE batteries; how-ever, both battery rooms are served by a common ventilatica system.
3' 019
Additional Information Relatinc to Separation Criteria As stated in FSAR Paragraphs 7.1.2.2.3.S and 7.1.2.2.3.9, where the minimum air separation distances cannot be maintained, fire barriers are provided.
Fire barriers between raceways of redundant channels consist of Kaowool M-Board or Kaowool Blanket; the characteristics of these materials have been explained in the response to Question No. 24.
Fire barriers between cable bundles of redundant cafety related channels and balance-of-plant cables consist of Scotch Brand 7700 Arc and Fire-Proofing Tape, Raychem Type WCSF Heat Shrink Tubing (not shrunk), or flexible conduit.
Scotch 7700 Arc and Fire-Proofing Type is made by the 3M Company.
It consists of a conformable fabric having one side coated with a flame retardant, flexible, polymeric coat-ing.
The coating material consists of fire retardant plasticizers, fillers, and additives which provide intumescence and high tem-perature protection.
The tape is noncorrosive to the cable jacket; the tape is self-extinguishing and does not support combustion.
The tape is not less than 0.050" thick, and will retain 65% of its original tensile strength after 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> exposure to cil, water, gases, salt water, sewage, and fungus.
The tensile strength of the tape 34~020
~
9 9
is not less :han 40 pounds per inch width,' when tested in accor-dance with ANSI D14.134.
After the tape is wrapped around the cable bundle, it is held in place with tie cord or fiberglass electrical tape.
Scotch 7700 Arc and Fi;e-Proofing Tape has been flame tested using two methods.
Method A is based en a test developed by Consolidated Edison.
A one i ch diameter lead sleeve is wrapped with 3" wide tape with half overlap to give two thicknesses of tape (0.110").
This wrapped assembly is mounted horizontally with a Fischer propane gas burner placed 5" away; the blue cone of the flame, at a temperature of 1700-1800 F, impinges on the sample.
By observing the puddling of the lead, which occurs at 625 F, on the inside of the lead tube; an accurate burn through tima has been established as 217 seconds.
Method B of the flame test is a more severe test which uses a sharp, pointed flame from a glass-blower's torch with air feed.
The hottest part of the flame, at a temperature of 2100-2200 ~, impinges on the wrapped sample.
The time to melt U
the lead (625 F) has been recorded as 220 seconds.
An arc resistance test was performed using a 200 ampere d.c. arc drawn between 7/8" diameter pointed graphite electrodes, mechanically directed against sample surface approximately 1" frcm the electrodes.
The sample was prepared by wrapping one 34 021
layer of 3" wide 7700 tape around a 3" diameter x 1/16" wall thickness lead tubing.
The tape was secured using nylon cord.
The results showed that 70 seconds of arc resistance was obtained prior to the lead being melted.
Raychem Type WCSF Heat Shrink Tubing is a flame retardant, heavy wall cable sleeve material.
It has been designed for use where maximum flame retardancy and/or radiation resistance is required.
It is rated for continuous voltage applications up to 15,000 volts, and it has been tested in accordance with ANSI C-37.2 Type WCSF sleeves meet severe flammability tests.
Type WCSF coated with Raychem Type N (crosslinking adhesive) have been qualified to IEEE 383 for use on Class lE circuits et voltages up to 2000 volts.
This qualification to IEEE 383 of Raychem WCSF tubing is documented in Raychem Report 4 71100.
Raychem Type'WCSF Heat Shrink Tubing also meets the tensile strength and elongation requirements of ASTM D412, the heat aging requirements of ASTM D573, the corrosive ef f ects and heat shock requirements of ASTM D2671, the dielectric strength requirements of ASTM D149 and the water absorption requirements of ASTM D570A.
It has been tested for flammability in accordance with ASTM D635, UL 224 FR-1, and IEEE 383 (vertical tray test).
Raychem Type WCSF Heat Shrink Tubing successfully passed all flammability tests.
The detailed test methods and results of the vertical tray flame test, performed in accordance with IEEE 333, is detailed in Raychem Specification No. 1508.
34 0E
27.
There are'). stairways provided in b Reactor Building, the Control Building and the Auxiliary Building.
One stairway associated with each of these Buildings is fire ra ted with two hour masonry walls and 1 1/2 hour Class B automatic fire doors.
The stairway provided in the Diesel Building is not fire rated.
28.
The TMI Unit #2 HVAC systems and backup portable blowers with associated flexible ducting will be used for. smoke removal to exhaust toxic gases from a fire area after the fire has been extinguished.
.To use the permanently in-stalled HVAC systems for smoke removal, the following steps must be taken:
1.
Enter fire area and reset the fusibic links on any fire dampers that may have shut due to high temperature.
2.
Go to the associated fire panel and restart the,lrVAC system associated with the fire area by bypassing the fire protection signals interlocked with the IIVAC system.
Portable smoke removal equipment will be used as backup to the per=anently installed HVAC systems.
Seven (7) portabic el,ectric driven blcwcrs, six (6) air horns and seven (7) pieces of 6" diameter, 15 feet long, flexible ducting are available fcr smoke removal purposes.
6 m
G e
9
'94 023 e
29.
Ionization type smoke detectors are located in ali areas throughout the plant.
In addition, each HVAC system is monitored internally by the use of ductwork mounted ionization detectors which monitor products of combustion in the ductwork system.
Fire in any area will cause the associated BVAC system for that area to be isolated.
Isolation inc.ludes closing all outside air dampers and shutting down all supply, recirculation and exhaust fans for tha t area.
Therefore, fire and smoke are prevented from spreading throughout the plant.
Fire rated dampers are provided in the HVAC ductwork wherever that ductwork penetrates a fire rated barrier.
All TMI unit 42 fire dampers are UL Labelled.
Fire dampers contain fusible links which, when heated by fire, will break, and the damper will automatically close.
(Note that the fire dampers provided in the HVAC supply and exhaust transfer grilles and ducts to the Cable Room are each provided with an electro-thermal link which breaks either by transmitting a specified current through the link or by heat caused by a fire.)
The fusible links on the fire dampers are rated at 160*F.
TMI Unit 42 incorporates two types of fire dampers.
One type is a double unit which is rated for thrte hours and is used in ductwork where that ductwork penetrates a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barrier.
The other type is a single 1 1/2 hour unit which is CL labelled for use in 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire rated barriers.
This type is used at the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire rated stairwell walls.
31.
Deleted 34 024
^
32.
A total flooding halon e::tinguishing agent system designed
.to meet NFPA Code 12A requi. aments is provided for fire protection of the Cable Room located on elevation 305*-0" of the Control Building.
The halon system is automatically actuated by a cross zoned ionization detection system which monitors products of combustion at all areas through-out the room.
When a fire detector from one zone goes off, the ;r/AC system associated with the Cable Room is isolated by stopping the Cable Room air supply and exhaust fans and by breaking the electro-thermal links on the fire dampers associated with the system.
These fire dampers (total of
- 21) are located in the HVAC ductwork grilles wherever tha t ductwork penetrates the three hour rated fire barrier surrounding the Cable Room.
When a detector on the second zone goes off, the halon is released into the room.
Note that halon is discharged into the room only if an ionization detector on each of two electrically separated zones goes off.
Design concentration for the halon system is 7% which is satisfactory to suppress a deep seated electrical fire.
The fire dampers have to be manually reset prior to starting up the EVAC fans to exhaust smoke frca the area.
Manual reset means going to each damper ind ividually, _
replacing tue electro-thermal link and resetting the damper to the open position.
34 C'S
e e
33.
Separation of Redundant Communication Systems The ccmmunication systems are described in detail in the FSAR Section 9.5.2.
All cc=munications circuits are routed in individua. conduits, and therefore, the integrity of all cc=munications circuits would not be affected by a design-base-fire (DSF).
This is supported by the Fire Hazards Analysis, which recognizes that cable in conduit is not affected by the DBF, All communications circuits originate in the Control Building El.
230'-6".
Since all communications circuits are in separate conduitt no separation criteria has been applied to the routing of the conduits for the various communication systems as these conduits are routed between the Control and Service Buildings and the remainder of the plant.
During a fire emergency, it is' not likely that all communica-tion systems will be lost, since power is obtained frca vari-aus safety related vital power supplies and all circuits are in conduit.
In addition, "walkie talkies" could be used in all areas except the containment building, as a back-up to the electrically-powered communication systems.
Because the electrically-powered systems are considered relaible, and be-cause "walkie talkies" can be used a a back-up, a sound-powered syst em was not considered necessary.
Communications circuits enter the Reactor Building through three separate electrical containment penetrations, which are located as follows.
Penetration Number Animuth Location Elevati _;n o
R405 52 292' R606 237 296' E610 325 292' 34 C2G
,\\
Cuestion 33 - Continted Since these penetra'. ions are located at different parts of the containment, it is unlikely that a single fire could disable all communications into the Reactor Building.
Penetration R4C5 contains the circuitry for the emergency page/ party system.
Penetration R606 contains circuitry for the maintenance jack system and for the normal page/ party system.
Penetration R610 contains separate circuitry for the normal page/ party system; this circuitry connects to the circuitry for the normal page/
party system which enters through Penetration R606, through an isolation transformer inside the Reactor Building.
Thus, a loss of either Penetration R610 or R606 would not disable any
,t.of the normal page/carty system within the Reactor Building, car since the circuitry loops through both penetrations.
Within the Reactor Building, all circuits are routed in individual conduits, and the crnduit routings are such that one single fire could not disable all cenmunications from within the Reactor Building.
uJ kt C$Nf-i
24.
FSAR Section 9.5.3 describes the lighting systems in detail.
All lighting circuits are in conduit.
The wiring for the normal plant lighting has no relation to any wiring. for the emergency lighting, because normal plant lighting is powered from 480/277V lighting panels (except in a few areas where 120V lighting is provided), and the emergency lighting power supplies are powered from 208/120V receptacle panels.
Loss of power to the emergency lighting units would not disable the emergency lighting, since all emergency lighting is powered by self-contained battery pack units with sealed beam lamps.
Upon loss of power, the lamps become energized, powered by the self-contained battery pack.
A fire could only disable emergency lighting if the fire was directly concentratef at the location of the emergency lighting unit; however, no other emergency lights would be disabled because there is no interconnecting wiring since the emergency lights are self-contained.
A copy of nor=al and emergency lighting location drawings were provided to the NRC Review Team during the site visit.
Portable sealed beam lights are available for emergency use also.
No 34 08
36.
Refer to B&R Fire Protection System Description provided to NRC Review Team during site visit.
37.
Each TMI Unit #2 fire suppression system alarms locally as well as in the main Control Room whenever the system is actuated.
Pressure switches are used in the fixed spray deluge systems, pre-action systems and we t pipe sprinkler systems to indicate the flow of water which is indicative of system actuation.
Control Room indication for the wet pipe sprinkler systems consists of an audible and visual alarm which is identified by a lit-up annunciator window.
The annunciator window identifies the specific fire suppres-sion system name and respective systam location. Control Room indication for the pre-action systems and the deluge systems consists of system actuation indicating lights on the fire panel in addition to fire alarms on the annunciator windows.
The annunciator window will indicate where the fire is located.
Note that for these systems, the annunciator window is lit up through actuation of a fire detector while the indicating lights are energized by pressure switches indicating the flow of water in the system.
38.
Containment penetrations either contain one saftty related channel or balance-of-plant circuits; the same genetration does not carry circuits of two redundant channels, and the same penetration does not contain safety related circuits and balance-of-plant circuits.
In addition, penetrations containing redundant safety related circuits are physically separated by a minimum of 90 (azimuth location).
Physical separation is maintained outside of containment in accordance with the separation criteria; within containment, all safety related circuits are in conduit.
Thus, a fire at either side of a containment penetration could not disable redundant safety related channels.
39.
Deleted 40.
The remote shutdown panels are located in the Cable Room of the Control Building.
TMI-2-SSLD-003 evaluates all plant systems operable from outside che main control room and their capability to perform intended shutdown actions necessary to bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown following the uninhabitability of the main control room due to a fire.
In per forming the Safe Shutdown Analysis, fires were limited to a single fire area.
As such, no fire which could impair the control from thc cortrol room could also prevent the control from remote shutdown panels.
41.
Deleted
^
34 029
42.
See response to Question 22.
43.
Deleted 44.
The ventilation system is not designed for or reqcired for smoke removal or fire suppression.
45.
Deleted 46.
TMI is equipped and capable of fighting nearly all credible fires at the site without outside assistance.
Never theles s,
the local fire companies are autcmatically called to respond in accordance with procedures, regardless of the size of the fire unless othenfise specifically directed by the Shif t Supervisor.
47.
Deleted 48.
See Section E of the Fire Protection Program Plan submitted in response to Question 8.
50.
Deleted 52.
The design capability of the casc-de system is sufficient to charge 6 air bottles each hour and a total of 24 bottles before recharging.
Purity tests of the air are conducted on a quarterly basis by a qualified independent laboratory.
53.
Deleted 54.
Deleted 55.
Deleted 56.
Met-Ed provided the requested test results to the NRC Review Team during the site visit.
94 C30
57.
The main control for the TMI-2 fire pump is a selector switch located inside the fire pump controller.
Access to this switch is by opening the key-locked door to the controller cabinet or by breaking the glass enclosure to the switch frcm outside the controller.
The selector switch is a five position switch labeled
" TEST - AUTO - MAN A - MAN B - OFF".
In the "OFF" position, the pump cannot be started.
In the " AUTO" position, the pump will start on dropping fire main prescure through the action of a pressure switch instal-led in the fire main when the set point of the switch is reached (33 psig).
Note that the Unit 1 fire pumps are set to start at the following set points - 90 psig, 80 psig and 70 psig.
The unit II fire pump will continue to run until shutdown manually.
This can be achieved by two methods:
1)
Depressing the " MANUAL RESET" pushbutton on the outside of the controller.
This will stop the pump if the pressure in the yard loop has reached 85 psig or more.
This returns the pump to the " AUTO" mcde.
2)
Placing the selector switch inside the controller enclosure to the "OFF" position.
For manual operation, the fire pump starting sequence is as follows:
The operator selects either the " MAN A" or " MAN B" position on the selector switch, and then depresses the " MANUAL START" pushbutton on the controller until the engine starts.
If the pump engine does not turn over after about 15 seconds, the operator releases the pushbutton and places the celector switch in the other manual position and depresses the " MANUAL START" pushbutton until the pump engine starts.
To stop the pump in this condition, the following methods can be employed:
1)
Depress the " MANUAL RESET" pus hbutton 2)
Place the selector switch to the "OFF" position.
The pump will also start by placing the selector switch to the " TEST" position.
This will energize a solenoid drain valve in the pressure suitch sensing line which simulates a drop in the yard main pressure and starts the pump.
The pump is then stopped by placing the selector switch to the "OFF" position.
The above discussion also applies to the two TMI-l diesel ke above features driven fire pumps.
However, in addition the TMI-1 pumps may also be started from tne __.. trol room when the local control switch is in the auto position.
34 031
The electric driven fire pump has local controls similar to the diesel pump.
The local controls include "OFF, MANUAL, and AUTO PCSITION."
The electric fire pump may also be started from the control room when the local switch is in the auto pcsition.
All TMI fire pumps must be stopped locally.
58.
The purchase specifications for the TMI-1 fire pumps in-voked NFPA20 on the manufacturer, therefore these pumps meet NFPA20.
59.
Deleted 60.
The fire protection system flow requirement of 5207 gpm (Turbine Building El. 280'-6" and 305'-0" West and East Sprinkler Systems) is not taken to be the worst case for a fire condition.
The worst case is taken to be 2575 gpm required at a 6 inch deluge valve protecting the Unit 42 Cooling Tower, CW-C-1A.
This deluge valve is the most remote of all Unit #2 deluge valves from the fire protection water supply.
(Unit 1 and Unit 2 fire pumps.)
Two of the 2500 gpm pumps will be required to run in the event of actuation of this valve, taking into consideration friction losses end elevation losses with the flow of 2575 gpm through the deluge valve plus 1000 gpm for the hose streams in the area.
The fire pumps will deliver the required pressure of 100 psi at the deluge valve header which will satisfy the gpm coverage requirements of.5 gpm per square foot over fill areas and.2 gpm per square foot under the distribution deck.
Calculations assume the shortest length of piping is out of service.
62.
TMI and all local fire companies use National Standard threads with one exception.
One pumper used by one of the Middletown hose companies uses a different thread type.
Adapters are maintained at each entrance to the station and are offered to the fire company by the gate guard.
34 032 63.
Deleted 64.
Pcwhatten style 02-349, all fog (20' to 90 8) no::le, case brass with satin brass finish for use on A, B,
and C fires.
These no :les are used on all hose stations lo-cated throughout the plant.
Use of this no: le is not likely to prove hazardous when this no le is held at a distance in excess of 10 feet from live electrical apparatus and circuits involving voltages not in excess of 250,000.
67-71 Deleted
72.
Three self contained breathing units are stored in the control reca in the containers supplied by the manufacturer.
73.
The hydrogen detector alarm set point for indication is 11 concentration of hydrogen by volume in the battery rooms.
The alarm is annunciated on Panel 17 (Secondary Sampling) in the Control Room.
No local alarms are provided for a high concentration of hydrogen.
Readout of H2 concer.tration is constantly monitored on Recorder Analyzer Panel 310 in the Secondary Plant Sampling and Instrument Room.
Type of detector is combustible Gas Detection MSA Series I-501.
The sensing element burns surrounding air, converts the temperature rise due to the presence of H2 into an electri-cal impulse and alarms when the set point is reached in less than one second.
74.
Deleted 75.
The barrier between the two redundant decay heat removal pumps is not fire rated and the penetrations are not sealad.
76.
The barriers between the redundant makeup and purification pumps are not fire rated, and the penetrations are not sealed.
77.
As indicated on B&R Drawings 2033 and 2046, if the redundant reactor building emergency cooling booster pumps are lost, the Reactor Building Normal Cooling Water system is available to provide ccoling water
.o the Reactor Building Air Circulatory Cooling Coils, thus preventing excessive temperatures in the Reactor Building.
78.
It should be noted that many of the actions taken to shut-down and cooldown the plant involve mar.ual actions from the control room except when the fire causes inhabitability of the control room itself.
In that case, shutdown from out-side the control room is required.
The ability to shutdown from outside the control room has been demonstrated by test and witnessed by the NRC.
79.
Portable extinguishers have been located at strategic loca-tions throughout the plant in order to allow for easy acces-sibility.
In the case of the New Fuel Area, an extinguisher has been located at the entrance to the area from the Auxi-liary Building.
In the event of a fire, personnel will most M 033
likely enter the area from the Auxiliary Building.
If some-one is in area, the extinguisher is located in a readily accessible area, clearly out in the open, where a fire is likely to occur.
A review of the location of all portable extinguishers will be made and extinguishers will be added or relocated, as necessary, to meet NFPA 10 maximum travel distances and area coverage requirements as a minimum.
80.
Deleted 81.
The TMI storage facility-for compressed gas cylinders is adjacent to the south wall of the T:tI-1 Control Building.
The facility is in a cul-de-sac between the Unit 1 Control Building and the Unit II Auxiliary Building, both con-structed with aircraft impact hardened walls.
The facility fully complies with OSHA requirements (29 CFR 1910.252).
82.
Ion exchange resins are not stored in any of the TMI-2 fire areas.
34 034
83.
Deleted 84.
The cable insulation at TMI-2 was calculatad to have a heat-ing value of 980 BTU /ft.
This value was calculated on a cable length weighted basis for the various cable sizes used in the plant.
The heating value of 980 BTU /ft. represents a value that is equal or greater than the heating value of 93% of the total cable footage used in the plant.
No single size of cable with a higher heating value represents more than 2% of the total cable footage used in the plant.
Multiplying 980 BTU /ft. by the number of feet of cable within the area yields the energy release (in BTUS s) of the cable insulation.
The summation of the energy releases of all the combustibles in the area was used in the Fice Area Barrier Fire Loading Analysis to determine the adequacy of the Fire Area Barriers.
85.
Deleted 86.
As used in the analysis, " fire suppression" refers to capa-bility for control and extinguishing of fires (fire fighting).
Manual fire suppression refers to use of hoses or portable extinguishers.
Automatic
.re suppression refers to fixed systems such as water sprinklers or..alon systems.
The phrase "may bc available" was used in those areas where there are no fire suppression systems located in the area, but thace are fire suppression systems located in adjacent areas that could be used to extinguish fires in the area.
The phrase "may be available" should read "are available".
87.
Deleted 88.
Deleted 89.
Conduit used in Three Mile Island Unit #2 is all full-veight, rigid steel.
Flames and hot gases could not enter the in-terior of a conduit if the fire is external to the conduit.
TF;a cable insulation is flame retardant (and thus heat rcsis tan t), and the cable insulation will only burn when stujected to a direct flame, and even then, the cable sti:cessfully passes the required fire tes ts.
Q Thus, a cable in a conduit will not be disabled by a fire external to the conduit.
Furthermore, considering the low fire loadings in the fire areas, the duration of the fire can be assumed to be short and the heat buildup in the conduit would not reach extremes.
90.
Deleted 91 Deleted 92.
Deleted 93.
Deleted 95.
Deleted 96.
eleted 97.
Control rod drives are designed to be fail safe.
A fire in the rod control cabinets that created a short or open circuit would not preveat red insertion.
This design has been reviewed by the NRC in connection with Nuclear Safety.
98.
Deleted 99.
There were no cases in which non-safety related equipment was relied upon to provide a safe shutdown function.
100. The only case in which credit was taken for equipment which is not intended for the stated service is the use of the ECCS (HPSI) for borating the primary system during a manual shutdown.
It was concluded, however, that this equipment can satisf actorily perform this function since the HPSI pumps and the makeup pumps are the same pumps and perform dual functions.
34 03G e
9 102.
The following fire hazard classifications were determined by the Fire Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. testing of Armstror Fire Guard Ceiling Tile.
Armstrong Fire Guard Tile was installed in the Control Room.
Test procedures were in accordance with ASTM E-84.
Flame Spread 15 Fuel Contributed 15 Smoke Developed 5
Reference:
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.
Building Materials Directory Part I Accitstical Materials (40 US-1) BIYR.
e 34~037