ML19220C164

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Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Open Items in OL Review. W/O Encl
ML19220C164
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/09/1976
From: Vassallo D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Arnold R
Metropolitan Edison Co
Shared Package
ML19220C163 List:
References
NUDOCS 7904300014
Download: ML19220C164 (4)


Text

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4'1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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July 9,1976 Docket No. 50-320 Metropolitan Edison Company AT! r Mr.

R. C. Arnold Vice President P.

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Ecx 542 Reading, Pennsylvania 19603 Gentlemen:

In recent meetings and telephcne conversations, we have identified and discussed open items in the operating license review of Three Mile Island Unit 2, including those under the purview of cur Containment Systems Branch.

The enclosed request for additional information confirms the need for this info: nation as previously discussed.

Sincerely,

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H D.

B. Vassallo, Chief Light Water F.eactors Branch 4 Divisica of Project Managenent

Enclosure:

Request for Additicnal Information ecs:

Listed en Following Page 88 070 of V

9 9,14 0-064 '.

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DCCKET ;O. 50-320 042.0 CO!; TAI:0!E:;T SYSTEMS BRA';CH C42.17 Provide the fc11cwing information for the reactor cavity analysis:

(6.2.1) 1.

Page S3-42-3d of Supplement 3 to the FSAR indicates that the neutrcn shield is designed to withstand the differential pressure that may develop across it in the event of a pipe break accident.

Provide an analysis of the differential pressure across the neutron shield, and compare the results to the design capability of the shield.

2.

Provide the resultant leadings cn the reactor cavity structures and compare them to design values.

We note that information pertaining to the shield plugs, which will no longer be used in the TMI-2 design, has not been removed frca the FSAR.

Since we do not agree with the analytical model presented in the FSAR regarding the removal of the shield plugs under postulated accident conditicns, and since they will nct be used, any information related to the shield plugs should be deleted frca the FSAR.

042.18 The response to 042.7, regarding the main steam line break accident, (6.2.1) discusses three postulated accident cases including:

(a) steam line break with failure of the turbine s cp valves to close; Os) steam line break with failure of a main feedwater centrol valve to close; and, (c) steam line break with failure of an emergency feedwater valve to close.

The follcwing additional information is needed in order to ecmplete our review of the main steam line break accident:

1.

For each of the above cases, discuss hcw reverse steam ficw and/or feedwater addition to the affected steam generator is terminated; 2.

Discuss and justfy the methodolcgy and assumptions used Oc calculate mass and energy addition (steam and/or feedwater) to the affected steam generator prior to steam and/cr feedwater line isolaticn; l

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If operator action is required to isolate a steam or feedwater line to mitigate the consequences of the postulated accident, justify the assumed time for the operatcr to take action and isolate the lines; 4.

If valve closure cccurs automatically to isolate a steam or feedwater line, specify and justify the isolation signals and the total elapsed time, including instrument delay times, for valve closure to occur.

Discuss the design criteria for the safety system.

5.

It is stated en Page S3-42-7C that the B&W versien of the CCNTEMPT code was used fcr the main steam line break accident analysis.

This version of the code dces not include liquid dropout of the condensate formed en passive heat sinks when the containment atmosphere is superheated.

It is our position that all condensate on the heat sinks should be added directly to the samp.

Provide justification for any other mcdel that is used.

In addition, provide the equations and assumptiens used to calculate the mass of condensate resulting frca condensation on the passive heat sinks for both saturated and superheated conditions in the containment.

6.

No respense to 042.7 (2) has been presented; provide the requested information.

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Metropolitan Edison Company ccs:

George F. Trowbridge, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 18C0 M Street, NW Washington, D. C.

Chauncey R. Kepford, Esquire Chairman, York Comraittee for a Safe Environment 2586 Broad Street York, Pennsylvania 17404 Mr. Richard W. Heward Project Manager GPU Service C';rporation 260 Cherry Hill Road Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Mr. Thomas M. Crimmins, Jr.

Safety and Licensing Manager GPU Service Corporation 260 Cherry Hill Road Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 88 073