ML19220B877
| ML19220B877 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1976 |
| From: | Vollmer R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Deyoung R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7904270564 | |
| Download: ML19220B877 (7) | |
Text
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.%.ccu t.so. : a u3 Richard C. DeYoung, Aasistant. Director for Li.ht Ystar. Reactors, OF.
t TL2T. MILi. ICL.GD C;IT MO. : SIR I:f?LJr PL.UT ;WG: Three Mile Island Unit Lo. 2 LI G SLC SIAGE: CL DC C L.T '.T.~,' C T.R : 50-320 ti1J.:. 'ONI n'.f4En: 24-31 2::.SFO:iSIBLZ 02A*iCT.:
L'iR 12; 5. Silvar L?M RL:;UESTLb C32LI.TIO3 F: N/A RLVliM C,TATUSt AA3 Jaview Co:rplate Attsc ed is the revised Accident Analysi:r Branch SE2. input on Section 13 Tai:lc 15-1 b.ased on the draf t X/Q valaes provided by taa a teorolot ical vill section of the Eydrolon-Fetcorology F.ranca on August 5, 1976.
ae require that the applicant suitably revise the contai:.nent spray adlitiva system as potated out in our earlier memos of nay 13, 1976 and June 4, 1976 Using the revised v.ateorolo;ical values and a reduced contaimet dasi;.:n lemi rate of 0.13; par day, we calculate that the revised spray ad..itin systen will be required to achiava a two hour iodine dose reductica factor of 6.6 in order that t.w of fsita dosea for the postulated desis;n casis accident usat the guidelines of 10 CTR Part 100, This input was coordinated by Charles 7errall, site Analyst, Section E, Accidant Analysis Branch.
2ichard C. Vollmer, Assistant tirector 79042705kd for site Au lysts Division of Site Safety and Envirocnantal Analysia 2nclosure Turac '.d.11.r Island Ccit So. 1 SER Input Distribution:
f S. Hanauer R. Vollmer K. Kniel Docket Files H. Denton D. Bunch H. Silver NRR Rdg. Files D. Muller L. Soffer W. Mcdonald (w/o encl. )
DSE Rdg. Files T. Miller C. Ferr-ll J. Panzarella (w/o encl. )
AAB Rdg. Files
.i. Varga R. Boyd P. Shuttleworth (w/o encl. )
AAB Files T
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s 13.1 Radiolazical Consecuences of tecidents We ha 'e perforced an evaluation of the effsita doses resulting from a postulated design basis LOLA, and conclude that, based upon concaia.=ent leak rate of 0.2% par day and upon cur present evaluation of the con-tain=ent spray additive sysuem (see Secticn f.2.3), the offsirs doses exceed the guideline values of 10 CFP. Part 100.
Wit.h a reduced con-tainment leak rate of 0.13% per day, the dose falls within the guideline values of 10 CFR Par: 100.
We will require that the aarlic2.t provide a revised spray additive systeu which is effeccive in renoval of iodine ia order to meet the guideline values of Part 100 "e believe that, with a reduced con-tainment leak rate of 0.13% per day, an overall iodine dose. reduction factor of at least 6.6 would be required of the spray additive <
- to have the offsite doses neet the guideline values of Par 100.
F e
reviewed and approved coat.uinnent spray additive syste=s in the past.
that have achieved such a doca reduction factor and believe that this is feasible. We will review proposed changes to these systens and we will provide our evaluations, as well as revised offsite doses, as appropriat2, in a supplecent to this report.
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TAOLE 15-1 POTE'iTIAL OFFSlIE NiSES TE TO ';C3IC. I! ASIS ACCIDE':!S Two Hour Course of Accidents Exclusion bcundary
, Low Population Zena (600 =cters)
(3213 Meters)
Thy rcid Whela 3cdv Thvroid ti.: ole ?c y Accide t (Pe=)
( ?.e n)
(Rea)
( F.c c i Loss-of-Coolant Post-LOCA
<1 Hydrogen Purge Dese
<1 Fuel Handling 45 3
<1 Tube Rupture 6
<1 Tube Rupture with Iodine Spike 76
<1 Steam Line Brsak 2
<1 Loss of Offsita Pcwer
< 1
<1 Loss of Offsite Power with Coincident Iodine Spike 1
<1 Gas Decay Tank Rupture Negligible 6
Negligible
< 1 Rod Ejectien*
Case I 24
<1 11
< 1 Case II 102 2
19
<1
- Actual rod ejection doses will not exceed the doses for Case I (releases through the containment) or Case II (releases through the secondary system).
]$0 rf FQ
{l s_. ~.,>
. 1.
Design contain:2n laa.4 rate of 0.13; for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and 1/2 or 0.0657'/ day therer f;ar.
2.
Iodine rencval by the containment quench spray system was based on:
Reactor Building Volume x 10 ft Spray Fall Height feet Spray Flow Rate gpc Elemental Mass TransC;c '!elocity cm/sec Organic Mass Transfer Velocity cm/sec Spray Drop Diameter micron Spray Terminal Ve.1. city en/sec Y
Factor of Conservatism Spray Reduction Li=its
, Elemental Organic Particulate Spray Renoval Rates Elemental hr-Organic hr-
-1 Particulate hr 3.
X/Q Velues
-3 610 =eters (0-2 hours) 1.1 x 10 3218 meters (0-8 hours) 1.1 x 10-
-5 3218 =eters (8-24 hours) 6.7 x 10 3218 meters (1-4 dayc) 2.5 x 10-
~
6.0 x 10-6.
3213 meters (4-30 days';
- Cur evaluation is not yet ec=r n this area, C',"1
<? T ~ )
o
. Our evaluation of the icdins rt:cval ef fectiveness cf the containnent sprays is discussed furt'.'er in icatica 6.2 of this report.
15.2.5 Hvdrogen Purge Dose The assu=ptions used to calculate the low population zone doses due to post-loss-of-coolant accident hydrogen purging are:
Power level:
2772 MWt 6
3 Contain=ent volume:
2.1 x 10 t
Purge time:
30 days Eoldup tire prior to purging:
25 days Purge rate:
35 cfa Sodium thiosulf ate spray reduction factor for 1: dine:
1000 for elemental and 20 for organic iodides Charcoal filter efficiency ef 90" and 70% for elemental and organic iodine, respectively
-6 X/Q value:
4-30 days (6.0 x 10 secf33) 13.2.2 Fuel Handling Accident The assumptions used to calculate offsite doses fr:m a fuel handling accident (Regulatory Guide 1.25) are:
1.
Rupture of all fuel reds in onc assembly.
2.
All gap activity in the reds, assumed to be 10% of the noble gases and 10 of the iodine Ortth a peaking factor of 1.65), is released.
3.
The accident occurs 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> af ter chutdown.
^
br3 ".58
4
. 4 99% of the iodine is retained in the pool rater.
5.
Icdine above the pool is 75 inorganic and 25% org(nic species.
6.
X/Q values (610 =eters) 0-2 nours:
1.1 x 10 sac /=3
~
(3213 meters) 0-2 hours:
1.1 x 10~
sec/n 7.
Iodine ce=cval factor of 90% and 70" for the charcoal filter for ele = ental and organic iodinea respectively.
15.2.3 Gas Decav Tank Ruoture The assunptions used to calculate the of fsite doses from a gas decay tank rupture were:
1.
Gas decay tank contains one cr=plete reactor coolant loop inventory of noble gases resulting from operation with 10 f ailed fuei (97,000 curies of noble gases).
2.
X/Q values (610 meters) 0-2 hours:
1.1 x 10~ sec/m
(.3218 neters) 0-2 hours:
1.1 x 10~
sec/=
15.2.4 Control Rod Ejection Accident The assunptions used to calculate offsite doses from a control red ejection accident are:
Case I 1.
Power level of 2772 MWt.
2, 26% fuel failed in transient.
3.
10% of iodine and noble gas inventory in gap of failed fuel.
4 Release of total gap activity in failed fuel to containment building.
..9
- 5.
50" plate-out of radicact:va iodines.
6.
Containment building ; prays are ao initiated.
+9 7.
Containment building leak rate cf 0.13 per d -y foe 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
8.
X/Q values (610 eters) 0-2 hours:
1.1 x 10-sec/n (3210 secar.) 0-8 hours:
1.1 x 10-sec/a 6-24 hcurs :
6.7 2 10-sec/
15.5 Tube Failure, Stean Lin2 ra ilu r e., and Case II Rod Ej ecticn Accident Assumotions Assu=ptions:
- Power = 2772 MWth
- Two-hour X/Q = 1.1 x 10 ' cec /a' at exclusien Scundary
- Iodine decontaninatic.. f actor of 10 between water and steam
- Primary and secondary. ci:nt equilibrtu concentrations as limited by Standard Technical 3pecifications (1. pC1/ gram I-131 Eq and 100/E ;C1/gran noble gases for primary coclant and.1 pCi/ gram I-131 Ec ter seconda:y coolant)
- Primary to secondary leak rata as linited by Standard Technical Specifications, (1 gpe)
- For accidents assu=ed to cccur in coincidenca with an icdine spike, the primary coolant concentration is as liaited by the Standard Technical Specifications for 48-hour periods (60 pC1/ gram I-131 Eq at 100% power)
- Source spika f actor of SCQ af tar accidents
- 10% of iodine and noble gases fuel activity in gaps
- All releases through the secondary systes
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