ML19220B209
| ML19220B209 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1978 |
| From: | Herbein J Metropolitan Edison Co |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GQL-1147, NUDOCS 7904250509 | |
| Download: ML19220B209 (10) | |
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.. 2 METROPOLil AN EDISON COMPANY PCST CFFICE BOX 542 RE AOING. PENNSY LV ANI A 196c3
- ELEN ONE 215 - 329 :501 June 30, 1973 G -,s Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. S. A. Varga. Chief Light Water Reactors L anch, No. 4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co==issicn Wasningten, D. C. 20553
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 (D1I-2)
Docket No.30-320 Operating License No. DPR-73 Additional information Concerning Fire Ptotection
Enclosures:
(1) Conduit Failure Analys.s aupplement to Fire Hazards Analysis (2) Loss of Cable Room Supplement to Fire Hazards Analysis (3) Shutdcwn from Outside the Ctble Roc = Modifica:icus to the Existing Design As requested, six additional copies of enclosures (1) and (2), originally sub=1:ted by our letter of May 1, 1978, are forsarded he ewith f
- ?ur use.
This letter also serves to confirm the following infor ation regarding Position 11, Doors and Decr Frames:
Pressed steel doors and frases installed at n!I-2 were purchased from FENESTRA. They are FENESTRA's Presidential Series, and labeled or unlabeled, are all constructed from the same materials ar.d assembled in the sa=e canner.
Therefore, the unlabeled doors D11-2 are equally qualified for their intended fire rating as at equivalent labeled doors and frames. Additional information regarding the =aterials of construction and manufacturer's supporting docu=entatica can be found in our January 31, 1978 (GQL 0162) and January 16,1973 (GQL C039) letters.
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Varga June 3c, ;p-3 3
Enclosure (3) represents the design modifications currently being con-te= plated in order to achieve shutdown capabilities frc= outside the Cable Rocc in the event of a Cable Room fire.
If you have any questions, please advise.
Very truly yours,
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G. Herbein v/ Vice President JGE:JES : t as Inclosures
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- 1 DCLCSURE 3 Shutdcwn from Cutside the Cable Rocm Modifications to the Existin Desien A fire in the cable rocm, which assumes the complete destruction of the cables in this area, will jeopardize the ability to bring the plant to a safe shutdevn.
It is necessary, therefore, to make modifications to the existing plant design in order to in-crease the level of confidence on the ability to safely shutdewn the plant under these circumstances.
As a result of a fire hazard analysis conducted by EDS Nuclear Ccapany, the minimum electrical equipment and instrumentation required has been identified.
This list of equipment was prepar-d based on certain assumptions which are also delineated in this reporr..
One major assumption in the EDS analysis is that the plant can be shutdown with only one safety related train in operation and that the only instrumentation required is that associated with
.ne Steam Generator level, Steam Generator pressure, Reactor Ccolant temperature, and pressuricer pressure, level, and tempera-ture.
Other assumptions made by EDS are:
1.
Local control switches, pushbuttons or contacts routed in series with Control Rec = and/cr Cable Roca control switches, pushburtons or contacts are incapacitated.
2.
Fire induced faultings in electric circuits causing ccm-ponencs to fail in unexpected positions have not been considered.
3.
Credit has been taken for the manual operatien of valves, if necessary, during shutdown.
4.
Five Met-Ed people will be available to shutdown the plant.
Based on the above assumptions, we propose to make the follcwing
- . modificatiens to the plant
a 1.
valve Controls - Motor Control Centers (480 VAC)
No hardware modifications will be made to the existing valve centrols. Operators must trip all the breakers asso-ciated with these valves at their respective motor control centers and then proceed to manually position them to their required state.
These breakers must be tripped in order
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to prevent a subsequent fault in the cable room control cables from repositioning tbo valves.
No credit is being taken for local switches since most of the " local" switches are not located near the valves and the local indicating lamps might not provide the correct indication on the position of the valves because they are connected in parallel with the indicating lamps in the control room.
The following valves and MCC's will be affected:
AC Valves Ecuicment MCC/ Location Elementary Diacram MU-V16A 2-llEA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-63 MU-V16B 2-llEA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-63 DH-V5A 2-llEA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-69 MU-V376 2-21EA/ Aux Bldg 30$'-0" 3079-238 MV-V377 2-11EA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-239 DH-V4A 2-11EA/ Aux aldg 305'-0" 3075-65 DH-V2 2-21EA/ Aux Eldg 305'-0" 3075-208 DH-V1 2-llE3/ Aux 31dg 305'-0" 3075-62 DH-V171 2-llES/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-62 DH-V100A 2-11EA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0*
3075-142 DH-V3 2-11EA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-20SA DH-V12SA 2-11EA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-163 DH-V102A 2-11EA/ Aux 31dg 305'-0" 3075-139 CF-VlA 2-11ES/ Aux Bldg 305 ' SU7a-54 CF-V13 2-21EL/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-30 EF-V4A 2-llEA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-153
- EF-V32A 2-21EA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-221
- EF-V32A 2-11EA/ Aux Eldg 305'-0" 3075-221
- EF-V12A 2-llEA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-153 CO-V87 2-llEB/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-148 DH-V157 2-323/ Aux Bldg 32S'-0" 3075-199 WDL-V96A Pnl 3013 (Sol. oper.) /
3077-8A Aux Bldg 305'-0" WDL-V963 Pnl 3013 (Sol. open)/
3077-8B Aux Bldg 305'-0"
- The combination o' EF-V32A and EF-V12A prcvides a parallel path to EF-V33A DC Valves Ecuic=ent Power Source Location
. Elementary EF-VSA CCA-1A/LCL. Starter Aux. Bldg. 328'-0"/CA 280'-0" 3078-9 MS-VllA DCC-1A/LCL. Starter CB 280'-0"/CA 280'-0" 3078-22 MS-V207 CCC-1A/LCL. Starter C3 280'-0"/CA 280'-0" 3077-21 C3 - Control Building CA - Control Building Area Q ' U 'h
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3 2.
Motor vriven Pumps or Fan; - Motor Control Centers (480 VAC)
The control sc:. me of the ph=ps that must be kept running to assure safe shutdown will be modified in order to by-pass all wires leading to the control rocm via the cable room.
This will be done by installing individual " Remote-Local", key-locked, bypass switches on the ccmpartment front doors of the units affected.
In the event of a fire in the cable room the operator will proceed to move these e
switches frcm the " Remote" to the " Local" position.
When this action is taken, all wires from the MCC to the control /
cable room will be disconnected and the starter will be connected directly across the control transformer through a separate auxiliary fuse and the motor overload relay contacts.
All permissive interlocks will be bypassed as well, so that the pump.eill be under strict manual control.
A separate fuse is being provided in the bypass circuit of these pumps to allow for the possibility of the running fuse having being blown, due to a short circuit of the wires in the cable room, prior to the operation of the bypass switch.
One indicating lamp wil] also be installed on the com-par tment front door whd.ch will only go on when the pump is started through the bypass switch.
Figure 1 below illustrates the basic approach.
The transfer of the bypass switch will cause the respective motor overload alarm to sound in the control rocm.
The bypass switches will be located on the front doors of the respective MCC compartmants in order to make all the required connections internal to the motor control center compartments and thus eliminate the necessity of pulling new cables.
The following instructions will be provided at each bypass switch:
CAUTION - For emergency use in case of fire in the cable rocm only.
The following pumps and fans will be affected:
Ecuirment MCC or USS/ Location Elemartarv Diacram NS-P-1A MCC 2-IlES/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-88 NS-P-lc MCC 2-llEB/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3073-89 CC-P-1A MCC 2-11ES/ALx Bldg 305'-0" 3075-37 SF-P-1A MCC 2-llEA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-92 AH-E-llA USS 2-llE/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3074-45 AH-E-113 USS 2-llE/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3074-45A AH-E-llc USS 2-llE/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3074-45B MU-P-1A (Lube Pumps)
MCC 2-llEA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-196 MU-P-13 (Lube Pumps)
MCC 2-llEA/ Aux Bldg 305'-0" 3075-192, 193, 19 RS-P-1A MCC 2-llEA/ Aux Sldg 305'-0" 3075-179
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4 3.
Motor Driven Pumos (4.16Ki Switchgear)
As in the c'se of the pumo circuits in motor control centers, the p cp circui*:
the 4KV switchgear will be provided wit.~.. indi"idu
""c.'ote-Local", key-lockef, bypass switches to Se insta]'ad )n the switchgear cubicle front docrs.
These switches will disconnect all wires for both the breaker c_asi g and tripping circuits which are routed "ia the cabl
- om.
The running fuses of both the closing.nd vrippin circuits will be disconnected while w
at the scae time, a spare set cf fuses will be inserted in their place.
The circuit breaker can then be closed by means of a r.ew pushbutton whicF. will also be mounted on the cubicle front door.
The circuit breaker can be tripped through 69/T switch contacts in the breaker trip circuit This action will allcw complete manual control of these ureakers even if tne running fuses had already been blown due to spurious short circuits in the control cables routed via the cable room.
The protective relay functions, which will trip a breaker in the event of a fault in the motor power circuits, will be preserved.
The control room ammeter leads will be shorted out in order to preserve the integrity of the protective re-laying and C"' circuits.
For normal operation, the position of these bypass switches will be alarmed in the control rocm by in-serting contacts from these switches in associated existing alarm circuits so that no new cables would be required to be pulled.
The following instructions will be provided at each by-pass switch:
CAUTICN - Fcr emergency use in case of fire in the cable room only.
In addition, the follcwing in-structions will be provided at each of the Make-Up Pump bypass switches:
CAUTICN - Do not start this pump until the associated lube oil pumps have been started.
Figure 2 below illustrates the basic approach.
The following equipment will be affected:
Ecuipment Switchgear/Lecation Elementarv Diagram DH-P-1A 2-lE/ Aux Bldg 32.S'-0" 3073-50 MR-P-1A 2-3E/RNPH 3073-76 NR-P-13 2-3E/RNPH 3073-76 EF-P-21.
2-lE/ Aux Bldg 328'-0" 3073-55 MU-P-1A 2-lE/ Aux Bldg 328'-0" 3073-48 MU-P-13 2-lE/ Aux Sidg 32S'-0" 3073-49
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h he5 4.
Feeder and Tie Breakers (4KV Switchcear)
In order to assure that prwer will be available at the ESF buses during a fire in the Cable Roca, provisions will be made to secure all tie breakers in their open position and the running feeder breakers in their closed position.
This will be done by disconnecting the wiring, associated with both the closing and tripping circuits, which are routed via the Cable Room employing the same scheme used for the 4.16KV motors.
As in the case of the 4.16KV motors, all protective relay functions will be preserved.
The following breakers will be affected:
Feeder Breakers Ecuipment Switchcear/ Location Elementary Diagram 23-1E2 2-1E/ Aux Bldg 328'-0" 3073-43, 43A 2A-lE2 2-lE/ Aux Bldg 328'-0" 3073-42, 42A 23-2E2 2-2E/ Aux Bldg 328'-0" 3073-63, 63A 2A-2E2 2-2E/ Aux Bldg 328'-0" 3073-62, 62A T1E-3E-2 2-lE/ Aux Bldg 329'-0" 3073-46 2B-32 2-3/Turb Bldg 305'-0" 3073-3 2A-32 2-3/Turb Bldg 305'-0" 3073-2 2B-42 2-4/Turb Bldg 305'-0" 3073-22 2A-42 2-4/Turb Bldg 305'-0" 3073-21 Tie Breakers T-56-2 2-5/CWPH 3073-80 T-73-2 2-7/MCCT 3073-91 TIE-2E-2 2-lE/ Aux Bldg 328'-0" 3073-56 T3E-4E-2 2-3E/RWPH 3073-74A, 74B Although tie breakers T-56-2 and T-78-2 are Non-Class lE braakers, they must also be prevented from accidental closing which might cause the two auxiliary transformers to be operated in parallel.
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Instrumentation:
In consultation with the NSSS supplier (B&W), we propose to provide the independent local indicatlon of the signals shown in the table below by adding a parallel branch ahead of the existing signal transmitters (pressure and level) going into the control room via cable room.
The reactor coolant tempera-ture indication would be provided from existing B&W's string 15 (RC System) where one of the dual e.lements is spare.
We and B&W feel that pressuri:er temperature (RC-2-TEl and TE2) is not required for safe shutdown.
Pressurizer level and Pressuriner pressure are the parameters required for safe shutdown.
Measured Tag Numbers Tag Numbers Parameters Identified by EDS Identified by B&W T
RC-5A-TE2 RC-15A-TE2 rcs RC-5A-TE4 RC-15A-TE3 (Reactor Coolant RC-dB-TE2 RC-15B-TE2 Temperture)
RC-58-TE4 RC-153-TE3 P,
RC-3A-PT4 Duplicate e
(Pressurizer Trans=1tter Pressure) for each L
RC-1-LTl Duplicate p
(Pressurizer Transmitter Level) for each L
SP-1A-LTl Duplicate 3g (Steam Generator SP-1A-LT4 Transmitter SP-13-LTl for each Level)
SP-13-LT4 Pg, sp-6A-PTl Duplicate (Steam Generator SP-6B-PTl Transmitter Pressure) for each O
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