ML19210D207

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IE Insp Rept 50-298/79-14 on 790910-14 & 19-21.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Log Unexpected Change in Power Level
ML19210D207
Person / Time
Site: Cooper Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/10/1979
From: Dean S, Rich Smith, Westerman T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML19210D197 List:
References
50-298-79-14, NUDOCS 7911260038
Download: ML19210D207 (7)


See also: IR 05000298/1979014

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION IV

Report No. 50-298/79-14

Docket No. 50-298

License No. DPR-46

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Licensee:

Nebraska Public Power District

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P. O. Box 499

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Columbus, Neb.aska 68601

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Facility Name:

Cooper Nuclear Station

Inspection At:

Cooper Nuclear Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska

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Inspection Conducted: September 10-14 and 19-21,1979

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Principal

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Inspector:

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G. (K. Constatfie, Reactor Inspector

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R.* Smith,' Reactor Inspector

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S. R. Dean, Reactor Inspector

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Approved By:

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T. F. Westerman, Chief, Reactor Projects Section

Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection conducted September 10-14 and 19-21, 1979 (Report No. 50-298/79-14)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced ir.spection of plant operations, Quality

Assurance Program, Part 21 Report, and a follow-up on IE Bulletins, Circulars and

LER's. The inspection involved one hundred thirty-three (133) hours on-site by '

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three (3) NRC inspectors.

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Resul ts: No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted in five of the six

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areas inspected.

One item of noncompliance (deficiency - Failure to log unexpected

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change in power level TS 6.6.1).

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DETAILS

Persons Contacted

L. F. Bednar, Electrical Engineer

R. D. Black, Shift Supervisor

P. F. Doan, Mechanical Engineer

R. A. Jansky, Shift Supervisor

H. A. Jantzen, I&C Supervisor

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J. H. Kuttler, Lead HP Technician

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  • L. C. Lessor, Station Superintendent

C. R. Noyes, Technical Assistant to Station Superintendent

J. L. Peaslee, Shift Supervisor

J. V. Sayer, Chemistry & HP Supervisor

R. W. Seier, Quality Assurance Supervisor

P. V. Thomason, Assistant to Station Superintendent

M. G. Williams, Operations Supervisor

V. L. Wolstenholm, Quality Assurance Specialist

W. H. Wunderlich, Administrative Supervisor

  • Present at the exit interview.

In addition to the above technical and supervisory personnel, the inspectors

held discussions with various maintanance, operations, technical support and

administrative members of the licensee's staff.

1.

Plant Status

During the period of this inspection, the plant was in routine full power

operation on September 10, 11 and 19-21, 1979. The Unit experienced recirc

pump seal failure on September 12 and remained shut down for repair until

September 14, 1979.

2.

Review of Plant Operation

The inspectors reviewed logs and records, discussed plant operation with '

management and shift personnel, observed a safety system operability test

from the control room and locally observed routine and abnormal operation

of the plant, observed routine radiological controls during maintenance of

a primary system within containment, and toured accessible areas of the

plant.

The purpose of this effort was to determine that operations were

being conducted in accordance with license conditions and other NRC

requirements.

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The below listed logs and records were reviewed:

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Reactor Operations Log

June 5 - July 14, 1979

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September 10-20, 1979

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Shift Supervisor's Log

June 18 - August 31, 1979

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September 10-20, 1979

Scram Reports

79-4 May 25, 1979

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79-5 August 9, 1979

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79-6 September 13, 1979

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Night Order Book

August 1 - September 20, 1979

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Jumper Log

All outstanding entries

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The inspectors witnessed the operability testing of the High Pressure

Coolant Injection System in accordance with System Operating Procedure

2.2.33 and Surveillance Procedure 6.3.3.1.

The test was performed

following maintenance to the HPCI turbine stop valve. The coupler

between the valve actuator and valve stem had failed. The deficiency

was discovered on September 12, 1979 while performing routine surveillance

testing.

The inspectors observed normal power operation from the control room and

within the plant.

During observation of normal reactor power operation,

the inspectors witnessed the isolation of a small primary coolant leak.

The B loop recirculating pump seals had been slowly degrading for seven

hours prior to the occurrence.

Plant management and operators were aware

of the situation and were monitoring pump performance and leak rate in

light of the seal preblem. At approximately 1:15 p.m. on September 12, 1979,

the leak from B loop recirculating pump rapidly increased to approximately

30 gallons / minute.

Plant power was reduced from approximately 100 percent

to approximately 50 percent and at approximately 1:35 p.m., the leak was

isolated with B loop recirculating pump secured.

Beginning at approximately

10:00 p.m. on September 12, 1979, a plant shutdown was begun and at

approximately 4:09 a.m. on September 13, 1979, the reactor was scramed

from approximately 12 percent power.

Health Physics and Radiation Control practices were reviewed at the

contamination control point. Acceptable radiological control practices

were observed to be in effect.

No radiation exposures exceeding the

limits of 10 CFR 20 Occurred as a result of this maintenance activity.

The inspectors toured accessible areas of the plant including the contain-

ment building. The following conditions were observed:

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General cleanliness was satisfactory.

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There were no excessive fluid leaks.

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There were no excessively vibrating piping.

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There were no observed fire hazards.

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Seismic restraints and pipe hangers appeared to be in satisfactory

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condition.

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During discussions with shift operators on the current method of adjust-

ing RRMG set speed, the inspector learned that on or about September 18,

1979, while attempting to reset a scoop tube lock out, the ARRMG set ran

back to minimum then ramped back to 93 percent. When the inspector looked

at the Operator's and Shift Supervisor's Logs he discovered that the

event had not been logged.

The failure to log this unexpected deviation from normal station operation

is in noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.6.1 and Cooper Nuclear

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Station Administrative Procedure 1.4.

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No other items of noncompliance were noted in this area.

3.

Quality Assurance Program Review

The objective of this inspection effort was to review changes made to the

licensee's QA program and verify that this program is in confonnance with

the approved QA program as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

Selected

licensee personnel were interviewed to determine their familiarity with

this program. A sample of Administrative Procedures, Quality Assurance

Instructions and Procedures were reviewed to ensure compliance with the

approved QA program. The inspector reviewed the licensee approved QA

program amendment 37 of the FSAR and it was determined that although a

QA program is in effect, changes have been submitted to this program to

better identify the requirements necessary for Cooper Nuclear Station.

Minor procedure changes will be necessary to implement the submitted

Quality Assurance Program. These changes will be inspected at a future

date.

The inspector had no additional questions in this area.

4.

Part 21 Report - Namco Controls

A Part 21 report was made by Namco Controls on August 24, 1979 regarding

Namco EA180 series limit switches. Three of these switches are used on

each of the eight main steam stop valves.

Four of the valves are inside

the drywell and the other four are outside of the drywell in the steam

tunnel.

Cooper Nuclear Station had reported to Namco the discovery of

" crystal-like" resin deposits on one of the switches. Tests conducted by

Namco indicated that the deposits were from the vaporization of some of the

Loctite in impregnated gasket material. Namco believes that the deposits

were formed due to excess or non-uniform impregnation of the Loctite in

the gaskets. A question was raised as a result of the Namco report as .to

whether the switches at Cooper Nuclear St. tion were exposed to higher than

design temperatures.

The inspector discussed the location of the switches

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with plant staff, observed drywell temperature monitors and observed while

plant staff took a direct reading on one of the installed Namco switches.

As a result of this review, it was determined that the Namco switches are

exposed to an approximate maximum temperature of 1800F, compared to the

continuous design limit of 1940F.

The inspector has no further questions

at this time.

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5.

Follow Up on IE Bulletins

The inspector performed follow up on'the following IE Bulletins to determine

that the licensee's station staff had received a copy of the Bulletins and

had reviewed them for applicability. The inspector reviewed the licensee's

response for each Eulletin to determine that the response had been submitted

in the time frame required and the information discussed in the licensee's

reply was supported by facility records or a visual examination of the

facility.

The licensee's corrective actions or proposed corrective act'ons

were reviewed to verify appropriateness.

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IEB

Title

Status75-04B

Cable Fire at Browns Ferry

Closed

78-05

Malfunctioning of Circuit Breakers

Closed

78-11

Examination of Mark I Containment Torus

Closed

Welds

78-14

Deterioration of BUNA-N Components in ASCO

Closed

Solenoids

79-11

Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit

Closed

Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems

79-13

Cracking in Feedwater System Piping

Closed

79-17

Pipe Cracks in Stagnant Borated Water

Closed

Systems (PWR's)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted in this area.

6.

Follow Up on IE Circulars

The inspector reviewed the following IE Circulars to determine that the

licensee's station staff had received these Circulars and reviewed them

for applicability. The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions and

proposed actions on each Circular to determine if these actions were

consistent with the situation at the facility.

IEC

Title

Status

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78-15

Tilting Disc Check Valves Fail to Close

Closed

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78-17

Inadequate Guard Training

Closed

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79-02

Failure of 170 Volt Power Supplies

Closed

79-04

Loose Locking Nut on Limitorque Valve

Closed

Operators

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IEC

Title

Status

79-05

Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Conductors

Closed

79-08

Attempted Extortion - Low Enriched Uranium

Closed

79-09

Ruptured Diaphragms - Scott Air Packs

Closed

79-10

Pipefittings Manufactured from Unacceptable

Closed

Material

79-12

Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger

Closed

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Problem

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79-13

Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting

Closed

Contractors

79-15

Bursting of High Pressure Hose and Malfunction Closed

of Relief Valve and "0"-Ring in Self-Contained

Breathing Apparatus

79-17

Contact Problem in SB-12 Switches on General

Closed

Electric Metalclad Circuit Breakers

No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted in this area.

7.

Follow Up on Licensee Event Reports

The inspector reviewed the following licensee event reports to verify that

reporting requirements were met and to assess whether further NRC action

is appropriate.

LER

Title

Status

79-06

Fire Watch net established when doors

Closed

removed between diesel generator rooms

79-07

Core spray valve failed to open during

Closed

surveillance.

79-10

Surface linear indication found during ISI.

Closed

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79-12

Vessel temperature reached 2200F during leak

Closed

test without primary containment being

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established.

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79-13

Drywell/ Suppression Chamber differential

Closed

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pressure not established within 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br />

due to leaky valve.

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79-16

RHR Pump tripped during surveillance.

Closed

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LER

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Status

79-20

Failure of relief valve bellows monitoring

Closed

switch.

79-23

High steam flo,i d/p switch failure

Closed

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In addition to the above, the following LER's were reviewed on site to

verify that the report accurately describes the actual event and to

verify that corrective action planned or taken is appropriate.

LER

Title

Status

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79-5

Recirculating MG trip

Closed (See

comment below)

79-8

Breaker 1FA failed to trip

Closed

79-15

Breaker lA5 failed to close

Closed

79-18

Level switch found out-of-specification

Closed

79-19

PCI did i.ot start

Closed

During the review of LER 79-5, the inspector investigated how I&C shop

personnel verify what the set point for a particular instrument should-

be. The inspector noted that LER 79-5 had reported that NBI-LIS-58A had

two sets of contacts: one to provide a scram and a primary containment

isolation at 12.5 inches, and the other to give a ATWS recirculation

pump trip and MSIV isolation at -37 inches. A corrected LER 79-5-1

indicated that the level indicator had one switch to give an MSIV

closure at -37 inches and the other switch to give the ATWS recircula-

tion pump trip at -37 inches. The normal method of verifying a set

point is to consult the I&C set point book which is maintained by the

I&C supervisor.

In the case of the first LER, the set point book was not

used.

Instead an I&C component index that was being developed to provide

input for computer records had been used. Although the I&C component

index had been through one level of review the data in it was incorrect.

The inspector expressed concern that the licensee should ensure that

incorrect safety-related data should not be stored in the computer.

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This item will remain open pending further review.

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Exit Interview

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The inspector met with the Station Superintendent at the conclusion of

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the inspection.

The scope of the inspection and the findings were

discussed.

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