ML19210B696
| ML19210B696 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  (NPF-03-A-020, NPF-3-A-20) |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1979 |
| From: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19210B697 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-08164, TAC-8164, NUDOCS 7911120103 | |
| Download: ML19210B696 (8) | |
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UNITED ETATES y
NUCt. EAR REGUI.ATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20585
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THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY AND THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-346 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO CACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 20 License No. NPF-3 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory.Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by The Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees) dated January 13, 1978, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will ' operate in confonnity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and agulations o?
the Ccrinission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements,
have been satisfied.
1215 283 7911120 /6 3
2 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specificati. ns as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, _ d paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. _NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 20, are hereby incorporated in the license. The Toledo Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is ?ffective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/
o ert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Operating Reactors
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical' Specifications Date of Issuance:
October 2, 1979 1215 284
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. pn FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 DOCKET NO. 50-346 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by Acendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
Paces 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-Sa (adced)
B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-2 i
1215 285
i EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0UIREMENTS (Continued) l 5.
Verify that a representative sample of TSP from a TSP storage basket has a density of > 53 lbs/cu ft.
6.
Verifying that when a representative sample of 0.35 + 0.05 lbs of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 50 + 5 gallons of 180 + 10*F borated watar from the BWST, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to
> 6 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, e.
At least once per 18 months, during shutdown ~, by 1.
Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal.
2.
Verifying that each HPI and LPI pump starts auto-matically upon receipt of a SFAS test signal.
f.
By performing a vacuum leakage rate test of the watertight enclosure for valves DH-11 and DH-12 that assures the motor operators on valves CH-ll and DH-12 will not be flooded for at least 7 days followiry a LOCA:
1.
At least once per 18 months.
2.
After each opening of the watertight enclosure.
3.
After any maintenance on or modification to the watertight enclosure which could affect its integrity.
g.
By verifying the correct position of each mechanical position stop for valves DH-14A and DH-148.
1.
Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of the opening of the valves to their mechanical position stop or following completion of maintenance on the valve when the LPI system is required to be OPERABLE 2.
At least once per 18 months.
1215 286 i
DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 2 0
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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) h.
By performing a flow balance test, during shutdcwn, following completion of modifications to the HPI or LPI subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying the following flow rates:
HPI System - Single Pump Injection Leg 1-1 2,375 gpm at 400 psig*
Injection Leg 1-2 2,375 gpm at 400 psig*
Injection Leg 2-1 2,375 opm at 400 psig*
Injection Leg 2-2 3.375 gpm at 400 psig*
LPI System - Single Pump Injection Leg 1 3,2650 gpm at 100 psig**
Injection Leg 2 3, 2650 gpm at 100 psig** -
Reactor coolant pressure at the HPI nozzle in the reactor coolant pump discharge.
Reactor coolant pressure at the core flood nozzle on the reactor vessel.
1215 287 DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-Sa Amendment No. 20
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,y
< 280*F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:
a.
One OPERABLE high pressure injection (HPI) pump, b.
One OPERABLE low pressure injection (LPI) pump, c.
One OPERABLE decay heat cooler, and d.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the borated water storage tank (BWST) and transferring suction to the containment emergency sump.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.
ACTION:
a.
With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the HPI pump or the flow path from the borated water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.
b.
With no ECCS subsystem 0PERABLE because of the inoperability of either the decay heat cooler or LPI pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System T*V9 less than 280*F by use of alternate heat removal methods.
c.
In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the reactor coolant system, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances e the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to uate.
SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMD.f5 4.5.3 The ECCS subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.
DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-6
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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
BASES 3/4. 5.1 CORE FLOODING TANKS The OPERABILITY of each core flooding tank ensures that a sufficient i
volume of borated water will be imediately forced into the reactor vessel in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the tanks.
This initial surge of water into the vessel provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.
The limits on vnhnne, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for core flooding tank injection in the safety analysis are met.
The tank power operated isolation valves are considered to be
" operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, waich requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.
In addition, as these tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.
The limits for operation with a core flooding tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring coacurrent with failure of an additional tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding tempera-tures.
If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full caoabi'ity of one tank is not available and prompt action is required tc place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.
3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECC3 SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems with RCS average temperature > 280 F ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability wTil be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.
Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the core flooding tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to maintain the peak cladding tempera-tures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.
In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.
1215 289 DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 2 0
_E_MERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES With the RCS tem'.erature below 280*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensura OPERABILITY of each component ensures, that, at a minimum, tha ass.mptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
The decay heat removal system leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage rates assumed for the system during the recirculation phase of the low pressure injection will not be exceeded.
Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.
Maintenance of proper flow resistance and presnre drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
3/4.5.4 BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the borated water storage tank (BWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.
The limits on BWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain suberitical in the cold condi-tion following mixing of the BWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.
These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
The contained water volume limit incid; _n allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.
The limits on contained water volume, and boron concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 11.0 of the solu-tion sprayed within containment after a design basis accident.
The pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion cracking on mechanical systems 'and components.
1215 290 DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 20