ML19210B097

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Amend 25 to DPR-50,revising pressure-temp Curves for Two & Three Pump Operation & Reactor Internals Vent Valve Surveillance Requirements
ML19210B097
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 03/07/1977
From: Goller K
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19210B096 List:
References
NUDOCS 7911040039
Download: ML19210B097 (8)


Text

.

o#

UNITED STATES j

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON

  • 4 3

{

1/

WASHINGTON. D. C. 20566

. /

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-289 THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No, 25 License No. DPR-50 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

The application for amendment by Metropolitan Edison Company, A.

Jersey Central Power and Light Company, and Pennsylvania Electric Company (the licensees) dated July 7,1976, as supplemented October 19, 1975 and January 31, 1977, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in confonnity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendrent can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

.a 1538 186

791104o 0 3 7

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.c.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 is hereby amenfed to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 25, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Karl R. Goller, Assistant Director for Operating Reactors Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:. March 7,1977 ibC3 lb7

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 25 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-50_

DOCKET NO. 50-289 Revise Appendix A as follows:

Insert Pages Remove Paces iii iii 2-6 2-6 4-59 4-59 4-60

' Insert Figures

, Remove Ficures 2.1-3 2.1-3 Changes on the revised pages are shown by marginal lines.

1E 0

103 IJUV 4 h,

TABLE OF CONTDTS P_afg;,

Section k-k6 k.6 D4ERGENCY POWER SYSTD4 PERIODIC TESTS h-k8 k.7 REACTOR CONTROL ROD SYSTD4 TESTS k-k8 k.7.1 CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTD4 WNCTIONAL TESTS k.7.2 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM VERIFICATION h-50 h-51 h.8 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES k.9 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMPS PERIODIC TESTING k-52 h-52 k.9.1 TEST k-52 h.9.2 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA k-53 k.10 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES k.ll SITE ENVIRONMENTAL RADI0 ACTIVITY SURVEY k-5k h-55 k.12 CONTROL ROOM FILTERING SYSTEM k-55 k.12.1 OPERATINC TESTS k-55 k.12.2 FILTER TESTS k.13 RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SCURCE3 SURVEILLANCE k-56 k.lk REACTOR BUILDING PURGE EXRAUST SYSTEM h-57 k.15 MAD STEX SYSTD4 INSERVICE INSPECTION h-58 k.16 REACTOR IJTERNALS VENT VALVES SURVEILLANCE k-59 5-1 5

DESIGN FEATURES 5-1 51 SITE 5-2 52 CONTAINMENT 5.2.1 REACTOR BUILDING 5-2 5 2.2 REACTOR BUILDING ISOLATION SYSTEM 5-3 5-k 53 REACTOR 5-k 5.3.1 REACTOR CORE 5 3.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 5-k 5.k NEW AND SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES 5-6 5-6 5.k.1 NEW FUEL STORAGE 5-6 5.h.2 SPENT FUEL STORAGE 55 AIR INTAKE TUNNEL FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 5-8 6-1 6

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6-1 6.1 RESPONSIBILITY 6-2 6.2 CRGANIZATION 6-2 6.2.1 0FFSITE 6-2 6.2.2 FACILITY STAFF 6.3 STATION STAFF QUALIFICATIONS 6-3 6-3 6.4 TRAINING 6-3 6.5 REVIEW & AUDIT 6.5 1 PLANT OPERATIONS REVIEW CONMITTEE (PORC) 6-3 6.5 2.A MET-ED CCRPORATE TECHNICAL SUPPORT STAFF 6-5 6.5 2.B GENERAL OFFICE REVIEW BOARD (GORB) 6-7 6.6 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE ACTION 6-10 6.7 OCCURRENCES INVOLVING A SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION 6-10a 6-11 6.8 PROCEDURES 25 fii Amendment No.

1ra9 189

The power le-rel trip set point produced by the pover-to-flow ratio provides both high power level and lov flow protection in the event the reactor power level increases or the reactor coolant flow rate decrertses. The power level trip set point produced by the power to flow ratio provides overpover DNB protection for all modes of pu=p operation. For every flow rate there is a maxi:: ram permissible power level, and for every power level there is a mini =um permissible icv flow rate. Typical power level and lov flow rate ccabinations for the pump situations of Table 2.3-1 are as follows:

1.

Trip would occur when four reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 108 percent ani reactor flow rate is 100 percent, or flow rate is 92.6 percent and power level is 100 percent.

2.

Trip would occur when three reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 80.7 percent and reactor flow rate is Th.7 percent or flow rate is 69 2 percent and power level is 75 percent.

3.

Trip would occur when one reactor coolant pump is operating in each loop (total of two pu=ps operating) if the power is 52.9 percent and reactor flow rate is h9.2 percent or flow rate is h5.h percent and the power level is k9 percent.

The flux / flow ratios account for the maxi =um calibration and instrumentation errors and the maximum variation from the average value of the RC flov signal in such a manner that the reactor protective system receives a conservative indication of the RC flow.

No penalty in reactor coolant flov through the core was taken for an open core vent valve because of the core vent valve surveillance program during each refueling outage.

For safety analysis calculations the maximum calibration and instrumentation errors for the power level vere used.

The power-imbalance boundaries are established in order to prevent reactor thermal limits from being exceeded. These thermal limits are either power peaking kW/ft limits or DNBR limits. The reactor power i= balance (pover in the top half of core minus power in the bottom half of core) reduces the power level trip produced by the power-to-flow ratio so that the boundaries of Figure 2.3-2 are produced.

  • he pover-to-flow ratio reduces the power level trip and associated reactor pover/ reactor power-imbalance boundaries by 1.08 percent for a one percent flow reduction.

b.

Pump monitors The redundant pu=p monitors prevent the minimum core DN3R from decreasing belov 1.3 by tripping the reactor due to the loss of reactor coolant pump (s). The pump monitora also restrict the power level for the number of pumps in operation.

c.

Reactor coolant system pressure During a startup accident from low power or a slow rod withdrawal from high power, the system high pressure trip set point is reached before the nuclear overpower trip set point. The trip setting limit shown in Figure 2.3-1 for high reactor coolant system pressure (2355 psis) has been established to maintain the system pressure below the safety limit (2750 psig) for any design transient.

Amendment No. ),

, 25 2-6 D *

  • 10 *D'R }A

~

A whs w

1 % R 190

Reactor Internals Vent Valves Surveillance 4.16 Applicability Applies to Reactor Internals Vent Valves.

Objective To verify the operability and structural integrity of the reactor internals vent valves.

Specification At least once each refueling cycle, each reactor 4.16.1 vessel internals vent valve shall be demonstrated operable by:

Conducting a remote visual inspection of visually a.

accessible surfaces of the valve body and disc sealing faces and evaluating any observed surface irregularities, b.

Verifying that the valve is not stuck in an open position, and Verifying through manual actuation that the valve c.

begins to open from the fully closed position with a force equivalent to < (0.15) psid, and is fully open with a force equivalent to < (0.30) psid.

Bases The internals vent valves are provided to relieve the pressure generated by steaming in the core following a LOCA so that the core remains sufficiently covered. Inspection and manual actuation of the internals vent valves (1) ensure OPERABILITY, (2) ensure that the valves are not open during nor=al operation which would allow coolant flow to bypass the core, and (3) deconstrate that the valves begin to open and are fully open at the forces equivalent to the differential pressures assumed in the safety analysis.

4-59 Amendment No. 25 1r q

1 n/ I Isuv i

Pages 4-60 through k-65 DELETED endP G

Amendment No. 25 l$Jau 6 e '

h-60

1 f

e l

2400 1

f

\\

f 2200

(

E.

A l[

.i i

E A

l

=

E 2000 C

3 t

5 i

=

5 av 1800 t

1600 560 560 800 620 640 660 Reactor Outlet Temperature, 'F REACTOR COOLANT FLOW PUMPS OPERATING (TYPE OF LIMIT)

POWER (LBS/NR) 1 139.8 x 106 (1005)*

1125 Four Pumps (DNBR Limit)

CURYi intes Pumps (DNBR Limit) 2 104.5 x 106 (74.75) 8S.75 One Pump in Eacn loop (Quality Limit) 3 68.8 x 108 (49.25) 59.15

  • 106.5% of Cycle 1 Design Flos THI-1, UNIT I, CYCLE 2 CORE PROTECTION SAFETY Figure 2.1 3 15u3 i?3 Amendment No.

25